On his return to London the tourist found to his delight that the papers which he had left in Penman's custody had not fallen into the eager clutches of the Spaniards. In a short time he relinquished his plan of making a visit to the University of Edinburgh. He called on the Russian Ambassador, Count Woronzow, who wrote to St. Petersburg that "Count Miranda" was no simpleton and that clever Parisian sleuths would not be able to entice him away from England. Inklings of his continental adventures became known to intimate friends.
In the letter to Ogden of June 29, 1789, which has already been mentioned, Stephen Sayre, who was now in London, wrote that Miranda had traveled "to great advantage — nothing has escaped his penetration." Then, after mentioning in scandalous terms the traveler's intimacy with the Czarina, the American said that Miranda had "such Letters, to all her Ambassadors, as no other man ever received from a Crown'd Head. They command everything he may wish or desire. He talks of returning to Russia — I would never have left it, under the same circumstances, for I am fool enough to get into Love, when I get into favor."1
Shortly after taking lodgings in London, Miranda divined that the Spaniards were watching his movements. In an autobiographical fragment he wrote that his suspicions were aroused by reports of whispered conversations between Spanish officials about his continental travels. Miranda recorded that although while dining in the Spanish legation he could detect nothing in the face of his host, yet he could read past events in the physiognomy of his secretary. Further, he stated that Bernardo del Campo alleged that he had heard nothing about him since his departure for the Continent and advised p91 him to write again to Count Floridablanca. After declaring that Campo offered to write an epistle to accompany this, Miranda exclaimed indignantly: "Behold the chicanery of these people who think that they can deceive the whole world with impunity!"2
Either Colonel Miranda had not entirely relinquished thoughts of serving under the Spanish flag or else he was anxious to conceal his real intentions. On June 29, 1789, the colonel sent a letter to Campo, who had become a marquis, to inquire what action the court of Madrid had taken concerning his petition of April 10, 1785. In reply the Marquis asserted that he had heard nothing about him recently and that, as he had even been ignorant of his whereabouts, he had concluded that he had adjusted his affairs with Spain.3 Miranda accordingly wrote to Count Floridablanca to allege that although he received attractive offers to enter the service of other nations during his recent travels, yet he had awaited Spain's response to his plea before making a decision.4 By this time the astute creole realized that Spain's agents regarded him with animosity.
A worthless Spaniard even trumped up a charge of debt against Miranda who evidently escaped a debtor's prison or covert transportation to France only by an avowal that he was attached to the Russian legation in London.5 "I understand perfectly," wrote Miranda to Count Bezborodko, "that this was an artifice of the Spanish Ambassador in order to fathom my relations with Russia: His Excellency has received me in friendly fashion, inviting me to dine with him, and so on, but nevertheless I am informed from a reliable source that he has secret instructions to work against me. It is accordingly natural for me to take measures to frustrate his persecutions; on my part I simulate complete ignorance of his activities, and apparently maintain perfect harmony with him. Such p92 people should be paid in their own coin."6 In a letter to Potemkin on July 21, 1789, he informed that Prince of the efficient protection against Spanish intrigue afforded him during his travels by the Russian aëgis. As a token of his appreciation of the Prince's kindness, Miranda sent him two fine field glasses; and he offered to have identical glasses made for Count Mamonov by the same optician.7 Like a mariner whose craft is being rudely tossed about in an angry harbor, Miranda hastily cast an anchor to windward.
On July 20, 1789, Miranda addressed a letter to Catherine II that exhibits him in the rôle of a courtier:
"I have requested Count Woronzow to add my name to the list of the embassy of Your Imperial Majesty. To me this appears sufficient, — in conjunction with some slight legal precautions, — to prevent any iniquitous proceedings that the Spaniards might undertake. As I have thus secured by your kindness the repose and tranquillity that I need in order to revise my observations and to become useful in the future, I am incessantly busy, and trust that I shall continue under the magnanimous auspices of Your Majesty. Your aëgis is the only protection that remains to me after the perfidious persecution which has been undertaken against me from Madrid, — a persecution which stealthily deprives me of my patrimonial resources and even of correspondence with my relatives in America! Happy those persons who under the government of an enlightened, wise, and philosophic Sovereign are sheltered from fanaticism and the Inquisition and who can pass their days enjoyably in the cultivation of letters and the exercise of virtue! May the Supreme Being prolong the inestimable life of Your Imperial Majesty for the happiness of your own subjects and the consolation of all mankind!"8
On October 9, 1789, Campo sent a long dispatch to Floridablanca to ask about the attitude that he should assume. p93 The Spanish envoy had become convinced that the discredited officer sincerely wished to have his honor vindicated; that he would not return to Spain without a royal safe-conduct; and that, although England would doubtless concede him such protection as Russia had granted, yet he had not dared to enter into relations with English ministers. With a sympathetic appreciation of Miranda's character Campo declared that he would "rejoice in spirit when either through rigorous justice or the benignity" of the King he saw "this stray sheep return to the fold. Otherwise," he added, "I shall live in constant anxiety; for, although at the present moment this youth does not display a desire of acting against his King and country, yet circumstances may so alter that, when engaged in the service of another nation, he may be drawn step by step into measures offensive to Spain. Upon an earlier occasion I have portrayed his personality, — accomplishments above the average, zeal and impetuosity in his demeanor, an exalted imagination, and, above all, an extraordinary activity. Endowed with such a combination of qualities, if this young man becomes exasperated and is forced to enter the service of a foreign power, I believe he will always disdain a course that insures a tranquil and uneventful life and prefer one which promises an active and unique career."9
Despite the conciliatory attitude of the Marquis del Campo, his government did not relent. On January 20, 1790, Count Floridablanca formally instructed the Marquis that because of weighty reasons King Charles IV could not place any confidence in Colonel Miranda. Campo responded on February 28 to say that he had endeavored to encourage in Miranda a spirit which would be least inimical to Spain. The Minister asked for a message from court implying his own good faith which he could display to the disgraced officer. At last, on April 6, 1790, Floridablanca formulated his verdict in these phrases: "The King has considered all that you have written on various occasions as well as what you said in your letter p94 of February 28 in favor of Don Francisco de Miranda, but unless this gentleman defends and justifies his conduct in a certain suit His Majesty cannot deign to employ him."10
This tardy decision was made known to Colonel Miranda near the end of April. The Marquis del Campo informed Count Floridablanca that the colonel "appeared somewhat surprised and extraordinarily saddened," and that he asked for a copy of the Count's letter, which favor, said Campo, he could readily grant, for "it was couched in suitable terms."11 Convinced by information which he had gleaned from various quarters that he would be thrust into a dungeon if he ventured into Spain, Miranda had decided not to appear personally in the suit concerning contraband trade that was still pending in the Council of the Indies. Thus it was that, after asking the Marquis to return a biography which he had borrowed, and after tendering him "a thousand thanks" for his favors, the Venezuelan withdrew from Campo's society, — never again to cross the threshold of a Spanish legation.12
In the draft of a letter to Charles IV, Miranda expressed the opinion that, instead of according him satisfaction for the injuries and insults which he had suffered, the Spaniards had been hatching new plots against him, — "thus harshly compelling me to sacrifice all my property and income and, what is worse, to renounce the pleasant society of my parents and other relatives in order to seek a country that would at least treat me with justice and assure me civil tranquillity."13 At last Miranda had formally renounced the government that had bestowed honors and distinctions upon his family. So far as Peninsular Spain was concerned, he became an Ishmael.
Meantime he had not lost touch with America. In the extensive and varied collection of visiting cards that Miranda carefully preserved, which included cards from several English noblemen, there was one showing that Colonel "Pozo Sucre" and other Spanish Americans had called at his lodgings.14 p95 In a letter to General Knox, who was now secretary of war for the United States, Miranda made this inquiry: "Pray, is your Roman plan of military Legions aprouved or not? I think it is the best forme we can adopt."15
Diarial jottings indicate that Miranda used his leisure to inspect English antiquities. Among these was the residence of Sir Isaac Newton. He visited London's museums, libraries, and clubs. He attended a banquet in honor of the Lord Mayor. His palate was tickled, we may be sure, with English roast beef and plum pudding. As a compensation for the renunciation of his two‑faced Spanish acquaintances, he got into closer touch with the rich and varied life of the English metropolis.
He soon had an opportunity to renew his friendship with Sir William Johnstone, an English officer whom he had met in the West Indies.16 A toast was drunk in Miranda's honor at a meeting of St. Andrew's Society because of "his very handsome and benevolent behaviour" towards English prisoners of war in Cuba.17 By letters of introduction he became acquainted with Englishmen in various walks of life. Through the kind offices of General Roy, he dined with Sir George Yonge, secretary of war.18 Sir Frederick Haldimand, ex‑governor of British North America, with whom Miranda dined frequently, declared that he found his guest every day more interesting.19 Among his new friends was a retired military officer with literary interests named General Melville, who soon formed the habit of inviting him to dinner and of asking his advice about geographical and historical problems.20
Dr. John Marshall found much delight in his company. From Lynn on February 10, 1790, Marshall wrote Miranda a letter reflecting his opinion of the traveler. "I saw you in town with pleasure, and I left you with regret. I consider you now as the modern Puffendorf: The history of Europe (y p96 mas) you are perfectly Master of." In a letter to "the Spaniard Peter" on March 16, the physician conveyed the view that Miranda was composing a memoir of his travels and expressed the hope that he would publish it. "Remember that this World, in all parts, is still very young, very foolish, and very unjust. Teach it therefore, more wisdom, and more generosity." He advised the traveler "by all means, to write without any reference to books or to former opinions. Describe men and things as they really struck yourself at the time."21
However it seems probable that instead of composing memoirs Miranda had been framing memorials. The following paragraph from a letter of John Turnbull, the English merchant whom he had met at Cadiz, dated January 28, 1790, proves that the refugee had entered into relations with influential English publicists:
"I have hitherto delayed to acknowledge and thank you for your very agreeable Letter, in hopes from day to day to hear of your having finished satisfactorily your depending and very interesting Concerns. You mention that on the Sunday after the date of your Letter you were to have a Conference on the Subject; but I fear that it has been put off, not having had the pleasure of hearing from you since. Your Friend, Governor Pownall, with whom I am frequently, and from whom I have just parted, is also anxious to hear of your having concluded the matter, as you will discover, entirely to your wishes, and we are both of us the more uneasy at the Delay, as after the Parliament meets it is to be feared that Mr. P–––––'s Time and Attention will be entirely employed. I am also apprehensive that you may have been a little incommoded from want of Pecuniary Assistance. We purpose returning to London in ten or twelve Days — but in the meantime I shall be happy to know what Progress is made in your Business."22
Ex‑governor Pownall was strongly attracted by Miranda's personality and designs. As a student of politics Pownall had become interested in the Spanish Indies while serving as governor p97 of English colonies in North America. Perhaps the ex‑governor felt that Miranda was an "injured enterprising Genius" who would, as he had predicted in a booklet published in 1780, conduct a revolution that would lead "to the establishment of a great Monarchy" in Spanish America.23
Thomas Pownall. From Pownall's "Thomas Pownall." Reproduced by courtesy of Henry Stevens, Son, and Stiles.
In any case, from January 13 to January 24, 1790, Pownall had such full and confidential communication with Miranda about the Spanish Indies as convinced him that if the "proper occasion" arose the South American might be able to perform an "important service" for England. With Miranda's permission the Englishman conveyed a suggestion to William Pitt that he had conversed with a foreigner on a subject of importance to English power, finance, and commerce, and that if the Minister desired he would transmit some preliminary communications.24 Soon afterwards Pownall received a hint that Pitt desired an interview with him. In his unrevised journal Pownall thus described his subsequent proceedings. On February 9 he went to see the Prime Minister and described the general purport of the proposed measure that would undoubtedly lay a firm basis for "the future power of Great Britain," would open "an almost inexhaustible source of Commerce," and might enable her to pay a part of her national debt. This measure was to assist discontented Spanish-Americans by an auxiliary naval and military force to start a revolution, and politics in the Spanish Indies, "that all this is a mine ready charged" to which only a match had to be applied. He also explained that the instruments to be used were some Jesuits who had been exiled from America and certain expatriated South Americans. "Here I introduce particularly Col. Miranda, the Person proposed to be communicated with as precisely the person in Character, Knowledge, and Activity to plan, conduct, and execute this measure, with p98 whom I had considered and concerted the Plan, which I am ready to communicate in general, and also in Detail."25
In these overtures Pownall also mentioned the remuneration that he believed the oppressed colonists should offer for English aid. Evidently he proposed to the Prime Minister that the Spanish-Americans should give England a portion of the revenue which they had been accustomed to pay to Spain. They were to reimburse England the expenses that she might incur because of her share in liberating them. In addition they were to pay her an annual subsidy until a certain fraction of the English debt was thus paid. They were to open their ports for several years, at least to the commerce of England and the United States. Pownall also proposed to Pitt that, as there were many enterprising persons in North America who wished to see South America emancipated, if England undertook this task she should try to discover whether the United States would participate. After England had actually undertaken offensive measures, she could announce that her operations contemplated "neither conquest nor commercial monopoly," but that she intended to give liberty to an "oppressed people." A feature of the military operations should be the occupation of the Isthmus of Panama. Pownall's part in the formation of this tentative project is suggested in his statement that it might be better to get the details directly from Colonel Miranda.26
In February, 1790, circumstances favored the presentation of Miranda's designs to the English Government. A dispute had broken out between England and Spain about the right to make settlements on the northwest coast of North America near Nootka Sound. At that inlet a Spanish commander named Martínez had seized Englishmen who had sailed from China with the purpose of planting a colony. In fine, the controversy about Nootka Sound was the outcome of rival claims p99 to territory: the Spanish title to sovereignty over that region was based mainly on discovery and exploration, while the English claim was based on discovery, trading voyages, and actual colonization. This acrimonious dispute had far‑reaching possibilities; for France was bound to Spain by the Bourbon Family Compact. On the other side of the Atlantic, statesmen of the New Republic that was flanked by possessions of both England and Spain began to speculate about the policy which they should adopt.
The prospect of hostilities between England and Spain whetted Pitt's appetite for projects directed against the Spanish dominions in America. Miranda had already been favorably mentioned to the Prime Minister by Captain William Johnstone. On July 29, 1789, that officer sent a note to Miranda that inclosed a letter intended for Pitt. "The Letter," said Johnstone, "will call to his recollection the conversation" I had at his house "in your behalf and the just Statement of the kind of treatment which I communicated the prisoners of war had experienced through your means at the Havannah."27 Through ex‑governor Pownall an arrangement was accordingly made that the soldier who had fought with England's enemies during the American Revolution should be given an opportunity to present his plans to Pitt. In a register kept by Miranda the following undated entry is found: "Assignation given by Mr. Pitt. Hollwood, Kent, •four miles beyond Bromley on the road to Westerham."28
William Pitt was the second son of the Earl of Chatham, "the Great Commoner." In July, 1782, at the early age of twenty-three, the gifted youth became Chancellor of the Exchequer and took up his residence in the vast, awkward house in Downing Street. Francisco de Miranda met the Prime Minister for the first time in his country house at Hollwood in the county of Kent on Sunday, February 14, 1790. Among Pitt's favorite books Miranda noticed the Parliamentary Debates, Goethe's Die Leiden des jungen Werther, Livy's History, and p100 also the works of Euripides and Samuel Johnson.
William Pitt. Painting by Sir Thomas Lawrence. In the National Gallery, London. Mezzotint by G. Turner. In the collection of the British Museum.
In his notes Miranda left a memorandum asserting that the plan of operations which he proposed to Pitt was to be carried out without fail at the moment when England made a declaration of war against Spain.29 Miranda declared that the general character of his proposal was considered and that the new form of government "intended to be introduced in South America" was fully explained as well as his personal circumstances and actual situation.30 Negotiations were meantime initiated for a pacific settlement of the Nootka Sound Controversy. On February 26 the Duke of Leeds, who was England's secretary of foreign affairs, informed the Marquis del Campo that it was necessary to suspend any discussion of Spain's pretensions until "a just and adequate satisfaction shall have been made for a proceeding so injurious to Great Britain."31
In March, 1790, Miranda transmitted to Pitt some papers concerning Spanish America. Among these was a précis of the conditions that justified English intervention. The revolutionary criticized Spain's policy of excluding creoles from office. He denounced the pernicious censorship of the Inquisition which prohibited Spanish Americans from reading useful or instructive books. He mentioned certain revolts that had been provoked in South America by excessive taxes and other burdens; he declared that the South Americans had a right to reject Spanish rule and to form a free, wise, and equitable government. He asserted that, being superior in wealth and population to Spain, South America might be able to carry out the revolution unaided, if it were not for the enormous difficulties of intercommunication which made unity of action impossible and for the lack of vessels with which to counteract Spain's naval measures. To quote from a plea in English that Miranda had evidently prepared with the aid of p101 Pownall and which he presumably presented to Pitt:
"No Power can do this with greater facility than England, and under the principles of Justice, perfect reciprocity in regard to Spain, and for her own welfare. South-America has a very extensive Trade to offer with preference to England; has Treasure for to pay with puntuality the services that she may receive . . . and even for to pay an essential part of the national debt of England. For which reason conceiving this important subject of mutual interest to both parties, South America hopes that being united by a Solemn Compact with England; establishing a free and similar government; and combining a Plan of Commerce reciprocally advantagious, these two nations may form the most respectable and preponderant Political union in the World.
"Considering the analogy that exists in the Caracter of these two nations; and the effects that naturally must flow from Liberty, and a good Government, giving an instruction to the general mass of men, that will progressively expel the religious prejudices that offuscate the minds of that People . . . otherwise honest, hospitable, and generous — we must expect to see soon growing up a respectable and illustrious nation, worthy of being the intimate Allie of the most wise and celebrated Power upon earth.
"The adjoined Statement will show the Population, Wealth, and actual Products of South-America; her consumptions from Europe allso; and a comparative Plan of Old Spain at present, by which it may be conceived the disparity that results in favor of the former; and the impossibility in which Spain is, of making any efficacious opposition if the stated combination should take place.
"The practicability of all the military opperations (for which purpose only 12 or 15,000 men inf. and 15 sail of the line are required) is a subject to be explained afterwards, if required. As well as the possibility of making without much difficulty a Canal of navigation across the Isthmus of Panama, that will facilitate the Commerce of China, and the p102 South‑sea with innumerable advantages for England and America."32
In addition to this memoir Miranda submitted instructive data concerning the Spanish Indies. Its population he estimated at about eleven million people that he divided into two groups: the peninsular Spaniards, creoles, negroes, mestizos, and colored persons who amounted to five million; and the Indians, either nominally subject to Spanish rule or entirely independent, who aggregated six million. He calculated that the gold, silver, cochineal, indigo, cacao, sugar, hides, and tobacco produced annually in Spanish America came to fifty-five million pesos. He estimated that there were exported to it every year from Spain products valued at twenty‑two million pesos, while an equal amount of merchandise was introduced into the colonies through illicit trade. He presented figures to show that the regular soldiers in the Spanish Indies numbered some thirteen thousand men, while the colonial militia came to twenty thousand. He stated that Spain had in the West Indies and on the western coast of South America only four ships and four frigates. In a summary that evidently included contingents which were not stationed in America, Miranda estimated the armed forces of Spain at thirty‑six thousand soldiers. Her naval forces he set at forty-four thousand sailors and one hundred and twenty-three ships.33
Miranda also submitted to the Prime Minister a project in French for the government of the liberated Spanish-American colonies. The territory of the proposed state was to be bordered on the east by the Atlantic coast line, the Brazilian and p103 Guianan boundaries, and the Mississippi River. On the north it was to be limited by the parallel of 45° which was to be followed from the source of the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean. On the west the Pacific coast line was to form the boundary, which was to run south as far as Cape Horn. Islands situated within 10° of the western coast were to be within the jurisdiction of this vast state, but to the east only Cuba should be included, as Habana was "the key to the Gulf of Mexico."
Executive authority was to be vested in a descendant of the Incas who should be styled "emperor." His position was to be hereditary. Legislative power was to be given to a bicameral congress. The upper house or senate should be composed of a certain number of senators or "caziques" who were to be selected by the emperor for life from citizens who had held important offices. Members of the lower chamber, which was styled the house of commons, were to be chosen by popular vote. They were to hold office for five years and might be re‑elected. Their persons were declared to be inviolate during their term of office, except for capital crimes. Federal judges were to be appointed by the chief executive from distinguished members of the judiciary. They were to hold their positions for life unless deprived of them by a judgment of forfeiture.
Censors, ediles, and questors were to be chosen to serve for five years. Two censors were to watch over the morality of young people, senators, educators, and educational institutions. Ediles were to be intrusted with the care of ports, canals, highways, public monuments, and national feasts. The questors were to supervise the fiscal administration of the state.
No law contrary to the spirit of the constitution was to be valid. Proposals for its amendment might be made by two‑thirds of both houses of the legislature and should become effective when approved by three-fourths of a council composed of the emperor and the judges of high national courts. Proposals for its amendment might also be made by a majority of two‑thirds of this council and should go into force when p104 approved by three-fourths of both houses of the legislature.34
Certain clauses raise the query whether this constitution was designed to form the fundamental law for a federation or for an empire. Perhaps the best answer is to style it a scheme for a constitutional monarchy. The project declared that the form of government should be "mixed and similar to that of Great Britain." Suggestions for this frame of government had been gleaned by Miranda from various sources. The clauses regarding the hereditary executive and the legislature were largely based on his knowledge of the English Government, which he had long admired. His political notions had evidently been influenced by the ideas of Pownall who had proposed in 1783 that the United States should adopt a mixed form of government with a monarch as chief executive. Stipulations in Miranda's constitution concerning its amendment were patterned after provisions in the United States Constitution. The articles regarding censors, ediles, and questors were the outcome of his study of Roman history. The adaptation of Amerindian institutions had been suggested by his knowledge of South American aborigines and by his perusal of manuscripts concerning the revolt of Tupac Amaru, a descendant of the Incas.
A proclamation in English, which was probably drafted by Pownall, was undoubtedly intended — when translated into Spanish — for distribution among Spanish Americans. This manifesto outlined the steps to be taken for the formation of a provisional local government. A "Native and Noble Citizen of South America" should be permitted temporarily to assume the position that had been vacated by the Spanish viceroy or governor. That temporary official should hold his position for five years and should govern by the advice of a council of thirty-five members who were to be chosen by deputies appointed by magistrates of cabildos. Until this council was convoked, with the aid of the cabildo of the capital city, the provisional p105 governor was to be the sole civil and military ruler of a particular region.
Unless altered by the governor and his council, those ordinances, regulations, and decrees of the Spanish Government that composed the "Laws of the Indies" were to remain in force. To the clergy was reserved the right of jurisdiction over purely ecclesiastical cases. Yet the Inquisition, having become "unnecessary," was to be "abolished forever." The Church was to continue in the enjoyment of its properties. All government monopolies were to be abolished. The capitation tax that had been imposed upon the Indians was to be swept away. Other taxes and duties that had been levied by the Spain were to be collected by the new government but the resulting revenue was to be "the property of the nation."
The governor and council were to make laws for the organization and discipline of the land and naval forces. They could grant military and naval commissions and establish military tribunals. They might even contract with a foreign power for additional soldiers and sailors. If they saw fit, they could negotiate a "Foederal Alliance, and Treaty of Commerce, with Great Britain" and with all nations that acknowledged Spanish-American independence. The governor and council were also to have the authority to issue decrees and ordinances that should have the force of laws until a "General Representative Legislature" should be assembled.35
Ignorant of England's diplomacy with Spain, Miranda and Pownall were puzzled as to the proper course to pursue. The ex‑governor sent an epistle to Miranda in March, 1790, to intimate that his scheme could be carried out only in case of a war and to counsel him to observe "silent patience" in his negotiations.36 The South American was evidently in financial distress; for on March 18 Turnbull sent him a check for fifty pounds, with a promissory note to be signed for two hundred pounds that he had already advanced. The merchant advised p106 him to be cautious in regard to his finances:
"I would really, my Dear Sir, wish to recommend to you, some pretty serious consideration respecting your future Resources — Although your present negociation should have the desired Effects which I have no doubt that it will, yet it will not probably for some time produce any money."37
On April 16 Pownall wrote to express regret that Miranda had sent any of his papers to the Prime Minister, to hint that the precious documents ought not to have left his hands, and to explain that Pitt's time was engrossed by matters concerning the national budget and parliamentary elections. He advised Miranda not to require an interview or an immediate decision, at least so far as concerned him "personally."38 On April 30 Pownall wrote again to advise his protégé how to conduct his negotiations with Pitt after the juncture was reached when he could procrastinate no longer. In a letter that was couched in crude phrases Miranda was admonished against urging or expecting a decision upon the subject of his proposals. The ex‑governor advised that if Miranda were selected as the instrument to carry out the emancipatory proposals that he should require a decision as to the place where he should await the first move, because of the necessity of giving "a decisive answer" to offers from his august Russian protector. Pownall's alternating hopes and fears were thus expressed:
"I cannot finish this letter without saying that at the same time that I fear to see the flattering prospect we had in View crossed by a cold dark blast — I can yet raise to my mind's Eye another Prospect of better hopes; and fancy that I see it coming forward into the horizon of affairs — When I place myself on the Shores of Kamscatsky I can almost streachº forth a hand of friendly assistance to Mexico so as to touch any beginning of effort towards Emancipation, and with this hope I will say — melioribus inter Fabis — God bless you."39
p107 However, events changed so that Miranda was afforded an opportunity further to develop his plans. The English cabinet decided to demand adequate satisfaction for the "outrages" committed by Martínez. On May 4 Leeds and Pitt sent a note to Campo in which they maintained that Spain's reply to their communications was inacceptable. They argued that English subjects in the neighborhood of Vancouver Island had the "unquestioned right to a free and undisturbed enjoyment of the benefits of commerce, navigation, and fishery, and also to the possession of such establishments as they may form, with the consent of the natives, in places unoccupied by other European nations."40 Thus they nailed their colors to the mast.
On the evening of May 6, when Miranda had returned to his lodgings after listening to a debate in House of Commons, Joseph Smith, Pitt's secretary, called on him to deliver a communication from "Downing Street." This note suggested that he should visit the Prime Minister at a time "when Mr. Pitt can meet Him without it's being likely to be observed."41 Read what Miranda wrote in a contemporary memorandum about the ensuing conference:
"I proceeded to the Treasury with Smith and there met Mr. Pitt who introduced me to Mr. Grenville. We conversed together for a long time. Pitt showed me my plans which he had carried in a green box to a Cabinet Council. We talked about Gage's Travels and about the disposition of the people of Caracas and other provinces to join English forces for the purpose of securing their liberty and independence. It appeared to me that the Prime Minister only desired to be assured that upon the appearance of English soldiers on the coast of those sections of Spanish America which had been designated, the inhabitants would be disposed to receive us with arms in their hands and to march immediately to initiate the revolution."42
p108 In another memorandum Miranda added that they subsequently held other conferences to discuss such matters as "the mode of conducting the operations."43 During the negotiations he evidently sent the Prime Minister a plan of the fortifications and defenses of Habana, documents concerning rebellions that had taken place in 1781 in Peru and New Granada, and lists of Jesuits exiled from the Spanish Indies who in 1786 were residing in Italy.44 Miranda evidently believed that those papers would convince Pitt that the Spanish Americans were ripe for emancipation, "if the delicate points" of their religion and independence were properly adjusted.45 To judge by Miranda's later projects, the immediate point of attack was to be either his native province or the Isthmus of Panama. Obviously he expected that the insurrection would spread throughout the Spanish-American colonies.
It appears that Sir Archibald Campbell was selected to take charge of an expedition against South America.46 A naval officer named Thomas Graves was evidently instructed to collect information concerning the coast of Venezuela and the neighboring Isthmus. English ministers also gathered data about strategic points in Central America and Mexico.47 They contemplated an offensive movement against the Spaniards from British Honduras as a base. They took measures to prepare for an attack upon the west coast of the Spanish Indies. They also seriously considered an expedition against the city of Mexico and New Orleans. Divers Englishmen thus took steps that would enable Pitt to kindle revolutionary fires in various sections of Spain's American dominions.
In June, 1790, after the court at Madrid had categorically declined to give satisfaction for injuries to English subjects at Nootka sound, Lord Camden wrote to the Prime Minister to express his serious concern at this refusal. "War," said he, p109 "as I always thought, was inevitable, and to temporize impossible."48 The ports of England soon resounded with the din of preparations; while her naval officers began to anticipate adventurous voyages to Mexico or the South Sea.
The Nootka Sound Controversy furnished Francisco de Miranda with the stimulus that was necessary for the formulation of his plans. As presented to William Pitt they contemplated the revolutionizing of the Spanish Indies by discontented colonists who were to be effectively aided by English military and naval forces. Though Miranda evidently pined to be the chief commander of the liberating expedition, yet it is not plain in what capacity the English Government aimed to utilize him, whether as agent, commissary, instigator, guide, or commander. In return for the aid furnished by England the promoter promised her commercial concessions and, on one occasion, even hinted at limited territorial grants on the coast of South America. In Miranda's mind the chief political result of the emancipation of his native Continent from Spanish rule was to be the founding of a vast constitutional monarchy stretching from the sources of the river Mississippi to Cape Horn. Accordingly there was thus presented to English statesmen for the first time the prospect of Spanish-American emancipation as a weight that might be cast into the fluctuating scale of European politics.
Not only did the prospect of initiating an insurrection in South America seem promising because of the interest that Pitt displayed but also because of the hope which the promoter entertained that prominent citizens of North America would lend their coöperation. Unfortunately for his knowledge of international relations Miranda did not meet Gouverneur Morris who had been sent from America as informal agent to confer about the evacuation of frontier posts that were still retained by the English. Animated by sanguine expectations resulting from his American travels, Miranda fixed his eyes upon a great triumvirate: General Washington, who p110 had become president of the United States, Henry Knox, secretary of war, and Alexander Hamilton, secretary of the treasury. On March 15, 1790, Miranda wrote to General Knox to inquire why he had not replied to an earlier letter and to ask if he had forgotten his friends and his promises. As in a previous epistle, he desired to be remembered to Hamilton and Washington.49
Knox did not respond until September 6, 1790, when, ignoring the delicate relations between the United States and Spain, he wrote to state that despite the delay his "warm friendship" for Miranda was "still undiminished a single particle," and that he looked forward "with pleasure" to the time when he should again enjoy his conversation.50 A ray of hope was conveyed to Miranda by an undated letter of William Duer introducing a friend who was about to pay a visit to Europe: "Colo. Hamilton and all your Friends here are well — when we are together, you are frequently the subject of Conversation, and affectionate Remembrance."51 It was perhaps unfortunate that Miranda did not write directly to Secretary Hamilton about the revolutionizing of Spanish America, for in August, 1790, that Secretary had expressed the opinion to President Washington that the United States should cultivate relations with England rather than with Spain. From Knox the promoter of revolution could scarcely expect any encouragement in his project to enlist the aid of the United States because that Secretary had expressed to Washington the opinion that his government should pursue a neutral policy in the Nootka Sound Controversy. Miranda was reluctantly forced to realize that his friends in North America were not burning with ardor for Spanish-American emancipation and that his hope of coöperation from the American Republic at this juncture was illusory.
Eventually circumstances did not force the United States to choose between an alliance with one or another of the contending p111 parties. Pressed by the English diplomat, Fitzherbert, Floridablanca soon inclined toward a pacific solution. On July 24, 1790, the Spanish Minister signed a declaration that his government would give satisfaction for the seizure of English property near Vancouver Island. On the other side, Fitzherbert signed a counter declaration which stated that the English King would consider the performance of this promise as full and entire satisfaction for the injury committed. Further, perhaps through the use of English gold proffered by Pitt's semi-official agents, in the end of August the National Assembly decided that France should recognize only the defensive and commercial clauses of the Family Compact and that she should negotiate with Spain to transform this alliance into a National Compact. When Count Floridablanca realized that otherwise France would not assist Spain in offensive operations against England, being unwilling to alter the Compact of the Bourbon Monarchs, he decided that it would be useless to prolong the negotiations about Nootka Sound.
Hence in October, 1790, an agreement was reached between England and Spain which promised the parties injured at Nootka Sound restitution and indemnification, and which provided that the English were to be confirmed in the right to fish in the Pacific Ocean at •ten marine miles from the coast but that they were to be prohibited from engaging in contraband trade with the Spanish colonies. The Nootka Sound Convention also stipulated that in case of its infringement the contracting parties would adjust the ensuing dispute in an amicable manner.52
To the world this treaty was important, for it signified an irremediable breach in Spain's monopolistic policy. The eastern Pacific was no longer a Spanish Ocean. Miranda, however, stigmatized this convention as futile. In a letter to Henry Knox he declared that it would never compensate England for p112 the immense advantages which she would have gained by a war with Spain.53 An attaché of the Russian legation vividly described how the disgruntled promoter vented his spleen:
" 'I admit that I am beaten,' he exclaimed with emotion; 'I would not have believed that human perversity could have gone thus far; I have learned of things which make me shudder and which Count Woronzow would never have suspected! Pitt is a monster who seems to have no other guide than Machiavelli's Prince.' Then in a calmer tone, 'I am sold, he said to me, 'by a treaty of commerce with Spain.' "54
Even before the treaty had been signed Miranda had been cogitating about the financial remuneration that England ought to grant him. On July 26, 1790, the ex‑governor cautioned him to "do nothing" which would give the Prime Minister "the most distant suspicion" that he had "any view to money."55 During the next month Pownall sent a letter to Miranda which contains these interpretative passages:
"When I first engaged my mind in this business, — it was from an anxious wish I have long had to see an oppressed honest part of Mankind restored to their rights which they had been robbed of: and at the same time to make the doing of this to obtain for my own Country a sweet and just revenge, for the treachery she had been injured by — but when in the course of this I was led to know you and your worth and merit, I have become anxiously interested for everything that concerns you personally. * * * If on trying the ground with ––––– you perceive nothing of this kind can be made practicable, — you have nothing left to do but to go directly to your Great and Generous Friend and explain to her with disguise without reserve, the Reasons which have detained you so long in England."56
As this confidential epistle indicates, Miranda had been contemplating a trip to St. Petersburg, perhaps with the design p113 of entering the Russian service. It also suggests that meantime he may have been receiving financial assistance from the Czarina. When he heard of the melancholy death of Prince Potemkin, the ex‑governor expressed keen regret that Miranda had been prevented from going to St. Petersburg "by a trumpery negotiation in this Country."57
On August 21, 1790, Pownall sent a letter that we quote at length as it contains counsel which perhaps affected Miranda's management of his financial affairs:
"I have been in situations similar to those in which you find yourself at present — I can therefore, and I do, enter into all your feelings and perfectly coincide in your reasoning upon them. You both feel right and reason right, when you say that you will not in any form accept any pecuniary offer, if it is not upon some plan of engaging your services; Yet remember you have in View a Great Point, and I hope you will never lose sight of that point. That must at all times be your first Object. Do not therefore sacrifice that to any feelings whatsoever. Do not putt yourself in any circumstances of Distress, which may render you incapable, at any future time, of taking again the same measure; Do not make any quarrel with the only power (taking all in all) that can ever take up your measure and putt it into execution. * * *
"And if they knew you as I do, they might engage your services to be carrying such measures on. If I was Minister I would engage your Services, and send you to N. A. where you might prepare both the People and Things for the liberating Mexico — And I wd. do this not by a Sum of Money — but by a regular salary — A small one would enable you to do great things in that Country — I could find other ways of employing such services as you are able to perform — honorable to you and beneficial to them, but if they have no further nor more extended plans but for the momentary event of a Warr which yet they are endeavoring to avoid, they are unworthy your Services. However, I end my advice as I began. Remember, your Grand Point must be your first, your last, your sole p114 But and your fixed Line of Conduct — So in that View; However you despise Money — and Worse than Despise, as even to be offended with the Person who offers it; Take it, rather than putt yourself in any Situation that may disable you to pursue Your Point. * * * I would, old as I am, not despair of living to see you at the Head of Mexico; and from thence going to the liberating the Greatest Part of your poor oppressed Country Men — Try then if the Person you are now in treaty with will settle such a moderate annuity on you as shall enable you to go and live in N.––– Am."58
A few lines in Miranda's disjointed diary indicate, however, that in November, 1790, he was warned that an employee of the English Treasury had engaged spies to watch his movements.59 With the object of securing a financial settlement the revolutionary solicited an interview with Pitt in December, 1790, but was informed that the Minister was about to depart from London.60 In a letter dated January 28, 1791, Miranda formulated his views regarding their future relations. He stated that his "only views now, and always were, to promote the happiness and prosperity of my own country (South America) excessively oppressed — and in so doing, to offer also great commercial advantages to England, as stated in the proposal presented on the 5th of March, 1790." With regard to terms he stated that he was willing to enter into "judicious arrangements" which might "bring to maturity, in a future period, the same generous and benevolent plan . . . for the happiness and prosperity of South America; for the grandeur and opulence" of England.
In the only proposal in which he ever hinted at territorial cessions to a European nation in Spanish America, Miranda suggested that some of the exiled Jesuits "might be of very great service; both for the purpose of directing the new settlements and commercial intercourse to be formed between the English and the natives upon the granted coasts of South p115 America, and for establishing some communications with the great Spanish towns on that continent, by means of their own relations and friends." He then raised the question whether the English Government could grant him financial aid, and declared that his mention of the grant of "a competent annual support" was due to his "personal situation," as he was prevented from securing "any income from Caracas. — Any sums of money that may be granted to me, on any account whatsoever, either for services done, or expected hereafter; shall be repaid by me, at the time I may come to the possession of my property in South America." Then he went on to say, "It is expected, that the intention being purely patriotic, with the view only of offering services to my country, and promoting the interests and advantages of Great Britain, as perfectly compatible; services should not be requested from me against Spain, with any other motive — being a point of delicacy in me; though authorized by the rights of nations, and the example of great and virtuous men in modern and ancient times."61
To judge by Miranda's assertions as well as by later events, the Prime Minister assured him that his projects would be given consideration in case of a war between England and Spain. Yet the query about the remuneration to which the revolutionary should be entitled was not promptly answered. On May 5, 1791, Joseph Smith wrote a note to him from Downing Street that read as follows: "Will you do me the favor to call here tomorrow morng. at eleven, and Mr. Pitt will take an opportunity of seeing you."62 Disappointed in his hopes of a prompt adjustment, during that month Miranda again presented his financial needs to Turnbull's consideration.63 On June 17 he again brought to Pitt's attention the inquiry concerning the sum which he should be paid.64 Not having received any response to his "pressing request," six days later he again wrote to Pitt to declare that "absolute p116 necessity" impelled him to desire an immediate financial adjustment.65 On July 6 he addressed to Smith a letter which ran thus: "Pray tell me if you have received any response concerning my two letters of the past month. If you have nothing to communicate, I shall feel compelled to proceed to Downing Street tomorrow to gain possession of my papers, and to put an end to all correspondence whatever with the only person whom I have believed to be infallible in his promises and worthy of the great confidence which formed the basis of our intimate relations."66
On July 10, 1791, the Prime Minister sent the impecunious promoter five hundred pounds. Perhaps Pitt also promised to conclude other financial arrangements with him.67 Nine days later Miranda announced to Smith that he expected soon to sail with Turnbull on an excursion to the Isle of Wight and that he intended to view the English fleet at Spithead. On August 19 Miranda wrote to Pitt to remind him of the alleged promise to adjust "his affairs" and to state that "after so many delays" it would be "very inconvenient" for him "to wait longer."68 Still more insistent, on September 8, 1791, the petitioner solicited the Minister to pay five hundred pounds which he considered were still due him; he also asked that a pension of twelve hundred pounds a year should be settled upon him by the English Government as a loan to pay his living expenses in London.69 Fortunately for a better understanding of this delicate affair Miranda preserved Pitt's reply. It is the only available letter expressing the Minister's views regarding the revolutionary promoter.
"I received the day before yesterday your Letter of the 8th inst., in answer to which I must inform you that I cannot entertain the smallest Idea of recommending you for a Pension to the Amount which you mention.
"The giving you any fixed annual allowance was only thought of in Case it should appear upon Consideration that p117 your Continuance here, or your being employed might be useful to the Public Service. If otherwise all that you had any reason given you to expect, was a reasonable Sum in proportion to your necessary Expences and to the Inconvenience or Loss of Time occasioned by your Stay here. On this Ground £500 was by my direction paid you by Mr. Smith.
"I certainly do not recollect ever having told you that you should receive £1000, nor have I understood from Mr. Smith, that you stated any such Expectation when the sum of £500 was paid you. It will be necessary, however, as so much of the Communication with you passed thro' Mr. Smith, that I should refer to Him before I form a final Decision.
"I shall probably receive his Answer before I return to Town, which will be in the Beginning of Next Month, and you shall then be informed what further you may have to expect. Under these Circumstances I imagine you will think it more convenient to defer your Journey."70
To this challenge Miranda framed a reply on September 18, 1791. He announced that the only recourse left him was to ask for his valuable papers, plans, and memoirs which seemed to have been mislaid or lost. In what the Minister may have regarded as a brazen manner he added: "I hope that all of them will be returned to me without a copy, a translation, or anything being retained." Miranda affirmed that he did not entertain the slightest idea of remaining in England on any other terms than those which he had proposed. He declared that if two thousand pounds were paid him, he would be poorly remunerated for his delay and expense. He asked to be informed exactly when his papers would be returned so that he might set the date of his departure from London.71 Tired of waiting for a response, six months later Miranda addressed another letter to the Prime Minister, to acknowledge the receipt of thirteen hundred pounds from him, and again to solicit the return of his priceless manuscripts. Rightly did he declare that it was beyond his power to furnish complete proof p118 of what had passed between himself and Pitt in confidential interviews. Whether or not Miranda actually sent this epistle to the great Minister, it thus presents his side of the dispute:
"Yet do you believe, Sir, that it is just or reasonable for you to appropriate what belongs to another, and to fail in the engagements and promises that you made in the name of your nation? For it is the English nation that I addressed through your ministry, in order to communicate plans worthy of her which I would never think of doing through the honorable Mr. Pitt. And perhaps you think that when I leave this country you can use my projects as you like. No, sir, you ought never to forget that all the ideas embodied in these plans were expressly communicated to you in order to promote the liberty and happiness of the Spanish-American people and the welfare and honor of England as objects that were entirely compatible with each other. Yet, should you be inclined to use these projects in any other manner be convinced that my compatriots do not lack the means to thwart your sinister views. Your secretary, Mr. Smith, sent me the other day four papers of the ten which I had the honor of confiding to you and told me that the others could not be found. Sir! papers transferred personally to the Prime Minister of Great Britain and judged by him to be of great national importance, — lost! Allow me to refrain from making the reflections provoked by these peculiar circumstances. * * * Money has never been the object of my endeavors as you should be convinced by the refusal that I have made of those employments and dignities which the greatest and most magnanimous Sovereign in the world has been so good as to offer me in her service for the execution of an object that surpasses any personal interest."72
Such seems to have been Miranda's parting fusillade. Though we can do little more than speculate about Pitt's precise object with regard to the Spanish Indies, yet we can be sure that some prominent Englishman of this era cherished other designs than those of liberation and commercial conquest. Had England become involved in war with Spain in p119 1790 it would have been strange if her doughty seamen had stopped short of the occupation of portions of the Spanish Empire in America. Curious though it may seem, the negotiations, — if such we may style them, — between Miranda and Pitt were not brought to the attention of the Duke of Leeds. In English official circles a knowledge of these transactions did not pass far beyond the Prime Minister, his secretary, and Secretary Grenville. Yet this need not occasion surprise; for, in dealings with the South American, Pitt merely followed his custom during a crisis of taking the management of certain matters into his own hands.
Whatever may have been Pitt's intentions, it is clear that because of the liaison of 1790 Miranda wished to draw a regular financial compensation from England in return for services pertaining to the emancipation of the Spanish-American colonies. Either because the promoter made demands for remuneration which the Prime Minister considered excessive or because of a misunderstanding about the financial settlements that should have been made, their relations ended in mutual dissatisfaction. It was not without significance that this fiasco took place at the very juncture when the drama of the French Revolution was being unrolled. That thrilling spectacle attracted the attention of the observant Venezuelan, who in an undated memorandum recorded the singular fact that while on a visit to the House of Commons he saw placed on sale there with sandwiches the second part of Tom Paine's Rights of Man.
1 Knox MSS., vol. 24, f. 70.
2 Diario, June 25, 1789, Mir. MSS., vol. 13; Grisanti, Miranda y la Emperatriz Catalina la Grande, p104.
3 Grisanti, pp104‑5.
4 July 15, 1789, Mir. MSS., vol. 18.
5 Parra-Pérez, Miranda et la révolution française, p. xlvii.
6 Mir. MSS., vol. 18; Grisanti, p106.
7 Miranda to Mamonov and to Potemkin, July 21, 1789, Mir. MSS., vol. 18.
8 Mir. MSS., vol. 18; Grisanti, pp107‑8. Although in a dispatch to St. Petersburg, Aug. 5, 1789, Woronzow stated that he had added Miranda's name to the roll of his legation (Parra-Pérez, p. xlvii), yet search in the Public Record Office does not reveal such a list.
9 Robertson, Miranda, pp516‑17.
10 A. G. S., estado, 8148.
11 May 6, 1790, ibid.
12 Miranda to Campo, April 26 and 29, 1790, ibid.
13 April 23, 1790, Mir. MSS., vol. 18.
15 Mar. 29, 1790, Knox MSS., vol. 26, f. 10.
16 Johnstone to Miranda, July 29, 1789, Mir. MSS., vol. 18.
17 Melville to Miranda, Dec. 3, 1789, ibid., vol. 22.
18 Roy to Miranda, Oct. 10, 1789, ibid., vol. 18.
19 Report on Canadian Archives, 1889, pp249, 269, 289.
20 Melville to Miranda, Oct. 29, Dec. 3, 1789, Mir. MSS., vol. 22.
21 Mir. MSS., vol. 18.
23 Pownall, A Memorial, pp26‑27.
24 "Extracts from Governor Pownall's Journals," Mir. MSS., vol. 45.
25 Mir. MSS., vol. 45.
26 Ibid. Cf. on Pownall's share in forming the project, Pownall, Thomas Pownall, pp440, 459‑60.
27 Mir. MSS., vol. 18.
28 Ibid., vol. 45.
30 Am. Hist. Rev., VII, 711‑12.
31 Rose, William Pitt and National Revival, p566. See further Manning, "The Nootka Sound Controversy," in Am. Hist. Assn. Rept., 1905, p369.
32 Mar. 5, 1790, Mir. MSS., vol. 45. Among the comments affixed by Miranda to a letter to Pitt, Mar. 19, 1799 (ibid.), was the following: "Les ouvertures furent faites à Mr. Pitt dans sa maison de Campagne à Hollwood au mois de Fevrier 1790 — et le resultat fueº une Stipulation formelle, par la quelle l'Angleterre s'obligoit (en cas d'une Guerre quelconque avec l'Espagne) de donner du secours aux Colonies pour obtenir leur independance absolu;º — et ceux ci prometoient à l'Angleterre un parteº de Commerce avantageux, sans monople ni exclusion des autres nations — À cet effet le soussigné devoit remettre au Ministre les Memoirs, Plans, et tableaux militaires et Commerciaux dont ontº etoient convenus, &c. . . . ce que êutº lieu le 5 Mars 1790." As will be shown, Miranda overestimated the encouragement given by Pitt.
33 "Apuntes sobre la América Española, Febrero, 1790," ibid.
34 "Projet de Constitution pour les Colonies hispano-américaines," Ch. MSS., bundle 345.
35 Endorsed, "August the 3d., 1790," ibid.
36 Mar. 18, 1790, Mir. MSS., vol. 18.
37 Mir. MSS., vol. 18.
40 Rose, William Pitt and National Revival, pp569‑70.
41 May 6, 1790, Mir. MSS., vol. 45.
42 Undated, ibid.
43 Undated, Mir. MSS., vol. 45.
44 "Liste de Papiers et c. remis au tres honble. W. Pitt," inclosure in Miranda's letter to Pitt, Sept. 18, 1791, ibid.
45 Am. Hist. Rev., VII, 713.
46 Campbell to Pitt, Oct. 26, 1790, Ch. MSS., bundle 120.
47 Robertson, Miranda, pp276‑277.
48 Rose, op. cit., p574, note 2.
49 Robertson, op. cit., pp277‑78.
50 Mir. MSS., vol. 45.
51 Ibid., vol. 18.
52 Manning, "The Nootka Sound Controversy," Am. Hist. Assn. Rept., 1905, pp454‑56.
53 April 5, 1791, Knox MSS., vol. 28, f. 8.
54 Bartenev, Archiv knjaza Voroncova, XXX, 294.
55 Mir. MSS., vol. 18.
56 With postscript dated Aug. 21, 1790, ibid.
57 Nov. 13, 1791, ibid., vol. 19.
58 Mir. MSS., vol. 18.
59 Nov. 3, 1790, ibid., vol. 19.
60 Smith to Miranda, Dec. 27, 1790, ibid., vol. 18.
62 Mir. MSS., vol. 19.
63 May 17, 1791, ibid., vol. 22.
64 Ibid., vol. 19.
65 Mir. MSS., vol. 19.
66 Ibid., vol. 45.
67 Am. Hist. Rev., VII, 714‑15.
68 Mir. MSS., vol. 45.
69 Am. Hist. Rev., VII, 714‑15.
70 Sept. 12, 1791; Mir. MSS., vol. 45; cf. Conway, The Life of Thomas Paine, II, 23.
71 Mir. MSS., vol. 45.
72 Mar. 19, 1792, Mir. MSS., vol. 45.
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