When spring began to melt the river ice, Wayne started his men loading the ninety-five boats that the Legion had built during the winter before. He was preparing to move down the Ohio to the country that the Indians had menaced since the defeat of St. Clair. During the month of May, 1793, a thousand men or more debarked •a mile below Fort Washington and raised their tents on the high ground near by. Hobson's Choice was the name of their newly made camp — no other site was available in a neighborhood flooded with heavy rain. Wayne had come to bring peace to the frontier, through negotiation or the sword.1
Wilkinson ruefully considered his prospects. Now his activities would be more closely supervised, perhaps considerably curtailed, and he would have fewer opportunities to enhance his own reputation or build up a personal following. There, too, was more of a chance that his intrigues with Spain might be discovered. Wayne had already shown disapproval of some of the things that he had done in the Army. There was the case of the soldier, Reuben Reynolds, whom Wilkinson had dispatched, under the guise of a deserter, to gather information about the designs of the Indians. Setting out some time in May, 1792, he had visited various tribes from Mackinac to Montreal and, for reasons not equally clear, passed through Vermont and gone to Philadelphia. Finally he had turned up at Pittsburgh, where Wayne treated him roughly and regarded his story lightly.2 Soon nearly everybody knew what Reynolds had been up to; his career as a secret service agent was ended. Wilkinson was angry and humiliated; he foresaw that his devious methods would not find favor with the direct-dealing p131 Wayne. Serving under such a general would be intolerable; he thought of demanding relief as commander of the line from Fort Jefferson on;3 he was almost ready to resign from the Army.
But the notion proved only a passing one. Maybe Mrs. Wilkinson, now returning from the East in the van of the Legion, helped him reach a more sensible decision. Usually she made thoughtful his whimsical judgment. And she also brought the good news that Knox thought well of his work.4 Her presence alone was enough to induce content.
They settled at Fort Hamilton — a favorite station of his. Here he spent the early summer of 1793 training troops and laying in supplies against the prospect of a forward movement. Work, though constant, was pleasant: Ann was about, and his men were healthy and ready to reënlist.5 Peace was also possible if Beverly Randolph, Timothy Pickering, and Benjamin Lincoln were successful in their negotiations with the Indians on the shore of Lake Erie.
After hearing of their failure during September, Wayne was given permission to advance.6 Wilkinson was not eager for an offensive at this later date, for over three-quarters of his men at Fort Hamilton were on sick report and he himself was abed with the colic. Ann not being well, some safe and comfortable place had to be provided for her.7 Generally, too, he had been more successful at diplomacy than at tactics; and the Spaniards, knowing the Army was fully occupied in the Northwest, would have less fear of American aggression and slighter desire for his aid and advice. For Wilkinson the world was out of joint. To Innes he dismally croaked: "I feel for our country, I feel for Kentucky which will again be covered with opprobrium. I feel for my brethren in arms and if I had not the firmest reliance in the protection of Heaven I should feel for myself.
"The volunteers may go to damnation and stay at home for all we care, we can do better without them. When crossed, perplexed, disappointed and perhaps deserted what will we say — rather what not say."8
p132 "My General treats me with great civility, and with much professed friendship, yet I am an O, for he conceals his intentions from me, never asks my opinion, & when sense of Duty forces me to give it, he acts against it."9
Bilious colic and stubborn influenza had made him morose. Sick, jealous, and ignored, he found fault with almost everything that that Wayne did. He foresaw his own recovery just about in time to get his brains knocked out by the savages. To him such a personal calamity was only a part of the general ruin that his "blockhead" commander was fathering.10
In spite of Wilkinson's jaundiced estimate, Wayne was laying the basis of lasting peace. He was methodically accomplishing the conquest of the Indian country. During the early days of October he and the Legion encamped •six miles north of Fort Jefferson. Soon blockhouses and stout walls rose to give security and comfort to those who would winter there. Wayne called the place Greenville in honor of his old-time friend General Nathanael Greene.11 The Indians looked on and were disturbed at this sign of permanent occupation; but, heartened by the British, they still refused peace, picking off stragglers and attacking wagon trains whenever opportunity offered.
Wayne's work was slow, expensive, and without speculator features; but it was almost wholly devoid of chances for failure. Knox's habitual warnings against a defeat like that of Harmar or St. Clair had produced effect. Wayne appreciated his great responsibility.
Wilkinson did not rise to share it by rendering loyal support. Though giving his service grudgingly, he was clever enough to avoid an open breach at this time. He was ruled almost exclusively by considerations of personal advantage and consequently inspired little confidence in those superiors who knew him. Though a petulant critic in private, he was publicly courteous to Wayne in official relations. On occasions he went even further than routine duties demanded. Wayne had been kind to Mrs. Wilkinson. Often he was asked to dine with them. One of these invitations is dated December 20, 1793. Simple and direct, it reveals Wilkinson at his best, and Ann as a true daughter of the peerless host of the Indian King Tavern. It reads like this:
p133 "Mrs. W. ventures to hope your Excellency may find it convenient & consistent to take dinner with Her on the 25th inst. with your suite, & any eight or ten gentlemen of your cantonment you may think proper should attend you; she begs leave to assure you the Dinner shall be a Christian one, in commemoration of the Day, and in Honor of Her Guest, and on my part I will promise, a welcome from the Heart, a warm fire, and a big-bellied Bottle of the veritable Lachrymaeº Christi. We pray you answer."12
A glowing fire, fat bottles, and friends have often made endurable the pitiless hardships common to the winning of a great frontier. Wayne was convivial, but his sense of duty was keen and his regard for Wilkinson slight. Instead of travelling south to Fort Jefferson, he and Captain Burbeck and eight companions started north on the 24th of December, planning to establish themselves on the site of St. Clair's defeat. Here, after many skulls had been cleared away, a camp was pitched, the beginning of Fort Recovery.13
Thoughtful chiefs grew fearful when they saw its bastions rise in the heart of their country. They now could count Forts Recovery, Greenville, Jefferson, and Washington stretching on an almost straight line to the south; they already knew that presiding over them was an iron-willed man whose eyes were seldom closed. When spring and summer came they might expect an invasion of their rich and long-held lands of the Maumee and Auglaize; Wayne, as rumor ran, was working out the details of just such a campaign.
Wilkinson, as second in command of the army, bent his energies to the same task; but he still maintained his connection with the Spaniards and enjoyed the fruit of their bounty. This dual rôle seldom disturbed his casual conscience. On December 4, 1791, shortly after accepting his commission, he had written to Miró and asked for ideas on the "principal subject," the alignment of Kentucky with Spain, urging that letters in reply be in cipher, "much perplexed," and directed to Judge Innes or Clement Biddle.14
Meanwhile Francisco Louis Hector, Baron de Carondelet, had become governor of Louisiana on December 30, 1791, and on him fell the burden of answer. He had only a commonplace mind with which to solve the complicated problems of his extensive province. Soon Wilkinson had a reply that was thoroughly satisfactory; he was p134 granted an annual pension of $2,000 retroactive to the first of the year 1789, and was asked in what way he wanted the money sent. Of course, $7,000 was to be deducted — the amount that Miró had previously advanced as a loan.15
Don Francisco Louis Hector,
From a painting owned by the Duc de Bailen, Madrid,
Some time during the year 1792, $4,000 was secured from the Spaniards by the Frenchman, La Cassagne, postmaster, gardener, and general rich man about Louisville, who in turn remitted it to Wilkinson on the 4th of August.16 This was $3,000 more than was actually due at the end of the year; but opportunities for remitting so large an amount were infrequent, and the General had repeatedly voiced his great need. He declared that he ultimately received only $2,600. The balance of $1,400 may have been thriftily assumed by La Cassagne, to whom he was indebted from time to time.17
From money like this Wilkinson could not abstain. On the contrary, he tried to evince such zeal for the service of Spain that Carondelet would be deeply impressed and the pension money continued, perhaps even doubled. Again he confessed his faith and offered advice. He declared: "I have not abandoned those views, principles and attachments which I professed to Miró." He added that he foresaw no immediate peace with the Indians, for the secretary of war was incompetent and the commanding general ignorant. Besides, "intestinal discord," quarrels, disunion, etc., throughout the United States "renders [sic] the whole wake and contemptible, the occasion is favorable to Spain and you know how to improve it."18
From these alleged conditions, Carondelet hoped Spain would profit, perhaps securing Kentucky, even though she had become the fifteenth state on June 1, 1792. In this mistaken conception he revealed little knowledge of the Union or the character of the western people. His credulity and ignorance were a fertile field of exploration; and Wilkinson made the most of both, suiting his advice to those whom he would beguile. Often when engaged in a competitive struggle for Spanish trade, he had urged that the Mississippi be closed to all foreigners except a favored few. Now, no longer in business, he declared that Kentuckians should be given a free port and that merchandise should be made as cheap for them in New Orleans as in the p135 East. Possessed of an excellent market for buying and selling and a natural highway thither, they would then gravitate toward Spain; they might even become her ally in a war that seemed inevitable with the United States. To be ready for such a struggle Spain should, of course, strengthen her river defenses.19
To the thoughtful, preparedness was wiser than trying to extend dominion through liberality to the Kentuckians. However, the former plan was expensive, and Spain did not care to lavish more funds on a province that had proved only a liability even if there was real prospect of its being invaded.
Danger of invasion soon became obvious. On March 9, 1793, Napoleon had declared war against Spain, and, without delay, tried to foment rebellion in her far-flung colonies of America. The Spanish masters of Louisiana trembled; they realized that the French at New Orleans yearned to be once more under the flag of their ancestors. Perhaps they might join with those hardy Americans of the backwoods, always ready for a fight, especially if there was a chance to wrest New Orleans from the Spaniards.
When Genêt, the French minister to the United States, arrived in Charleston on April 8, 1793, he quickly provided the Georgia frontiersmen with means to raid East Florida, and simultaneously laid plans for an expedition to attack Louisiana from the north. George Rogers Clark thought he could take New Orleans with 800 men. Genêt agreed, and appointed him "major-general of the Independent and Revolutionary Legion of the Mississippi." Washington in a few months proclaimed neutrality, Jefferson warned, and Genêt was recalled. Then Clark realized that France, like his own country, paid little for what he had already done.20
Though the enterprise failed, its preparation filled Carondelet with fears. Wilkinson made capital of them without delay. He urged the governor to strengthen his defenses against the possible coming of the Kentuckians, now keen for plunder and eager to navigate the Mississippi in their own right. He had bribed, as he says, the real leaders away from Clark's bandits and thereby saved New Madrid and St. Louis as Spanish possessions. Money was needed; in fact, he expected to spend from $6,000 to $10,000, and so he asked that $4,500 be sent him by the bearer. His own pension should be raised p136 to $4,000 a year, for it was "absolutely necessary" to leave the Army and devote himself exclusively to the interests of Spain. But, said he, "do not believe me avaricious as the sensation never found place in my bosom. Constant in my attachments, ardent in my affections, and an enthusiast in the cause I espoused my character is the reverse."21
With the ever gullible Carondelet apparently accepting these self-made credentials as true, Wilkinson continued to emphasize his interest for Spain by harping on filibusters and Mississippi navigation. On the last day of April he wrote that he was employing a stool-pigeon to learn about Clark's plans, which, he added, were designed to drag the United States and Spain into war. Spain, he advised, had better court peace through negotiation, insisting on the exclusive right to navigating the Mississippi. If Congress agreed to such a monopoly, this would result in the "summary and infallible mode of accomplishing our wishes"; Kentucky would immediately apply for "the protection of Spain or England." To prevent an alliance with England, the Spanish minister at Philadelphia should have $200,000 for bribe money. Wilkinson, of course, would help in its correct distribution.22
As spring turned into summer, Wilkinson still continued his intrigues against the Spaniards, although much of his time was consumed in preparing his men for the long expected campaign against the Indians. He liked neither Wayne nor his methods; in fact, he had written to Knox directly charging his commander with incompetence. Under such a general, dangerous service had no personal appeal. Again he thought of resigning, but doing so would not enhance his prestige among the Spaniards, even less among his companions now on the eve of battle. After all, the Army did furnish a livelihood, and he was always in need of a dollar.
As usual, he was spending a good deal faster than he earned. In early March he had paid $800 to Harry Innes and Benjamin Sebastian through Michael La Cassagne, that thrifty Frenchman who had received $4,000 for him from the Spaniards in 1792. In May and June he had to meet $900 more in drafts drawn in favor of Major Thomas Cushing and others.23 His Army pay of $104 per month could not liquidate obligations like these. He had to look about for other sources of income.
p137 On June 15, he wrote to Innes and asked if he knew the whereabouts of Henry Owen, that Irish soldier of fortune who was well acquainted with Spaniards of importance. He was just the man for a difficult mission and was one of the few that had an intimate knowledge of the General's intrigues. Wilkinson, now believing that he had "a magic wand at which all my difficulties are to vanish," wanted to employ him and a certain Captain Collins to help loosen the Spaniards' purse strings. They were both to go to Natchez and New Orleans bearing letters full of ruses for extracting pieces of eight from Carondelet, the governor of Louisiana. One scheme, previously referred to, involved furnishing the Spanish minister at Philadelphia with $200,000 which Wilkinson offered to distribute so that the Kentuckians would no longer desire to invade Louisiana or secure an alliance with England. They were the "dregs of society" or renegades from across the mountains and would listen readily to his plans, if paid. For several distinguished men in the West he needed immediate cash, were they to accompany him to a conference at New Orleans in November. He added that there were some sixteen Army officers, from major to lieutenant, who would like to enter the service of Spain. Naturally he counted himself in the number. They might prove valuable. Could the matter be arranged? Personally he had shown great zeal for His Majesty's interests; he had papers to prove that he had expended $8,640 in breaking up the contemplated expedition of George Rogers Clark against New Orleans. In view of this outlay and what was due him as pension, he asked that $12,000 be sent him in two amounts equally divided between Henry Owen and Captain Collins.24
Carondelet replied on the 6th of August. Yes, Wilkinson could help by dispensing the money that Spanish agents would send from Philadelphia. Besides, his own expenses to the November conference would be paid, as well as those of two others, Innes and Sebastian, for example. The Army officers, he warned, could not be taken care of, for that would only make others jealous. The General's pension might be increased to $4,000, there is, if the governor had anything to do with it. As a final piece of good news, the letter added that Henry Owen was being sent with $6,000, and, if directions to the contrary were not received, Collins would soon follow with a similar amount. p138 Of the $12,000, $4,000 was to be credited as pension; the rest was reimbursement for the Clark business.25
Some time in August, 1794, Owen left New Orleans. Though a resourceful fellow, he needed help with so much specie; hence for greater safety it was sent in a Spanish vessel as far as New Madrid. Here it was packed in three small barrels, transferred to the galiot Flèche, and carried to the mouth of the Ohio, where Lieutenant Langlois, the officer in charge, left Owen, turning over to him the money and providing him with six oarsmen and a pilot called Pepillo. Owen did not travel far before the crew murdered and robbed him.26 When he failed to appear, Wilkinson grew anxious and wrote to find out what had become of him. The worst was learned when three of the culprits were arrested and taken to Frankfort and confined in a house near Lewis' Tavern. Here they were interviewed by Innes and several others.27 To try them then and there required evidence and might reveal important secrets; besides, a question of jurisdiction was involved. Judge Innes thought best to send them to Fort Washington, with the idea, perhaps, of the Army handling the case or giving Wilkinson an opportunity for personal investigation. The General did not care to have them about; they might talk too glibly; so he hustled them back to the Spanish commandant at New Madrid. On the way they were seized by a certain Major Doyle, of the Army, who was then commanding at Fort Massac and did not seem to like Wilkinson. Once more they were sent to Frankfort, where they were finally discharged for lack of evidence.28
About the same time that Owen was leaving New Orleans, Wilkinson was moving north to make war on the Indians. During the winter of 1793‑1794 they had come to Greenville and discussed peace, but they were only a few and not representative of all the tribes. Those present were unwilling to return all their white captives — a condition for further negotiation. On February 10 they were heartened by the speech of Lord Dorchester, Governor-General of Canada, who told them that the British were on the eve of war with the Americans and expected to seize the land that was held in violation of the treaty of 1783. In April the Indians saw soldiers of the Crown erect a sturdy p139 fort at the foot of the Maumee rapids, and believed they had won powerful allies. They were happy, too, that the trader, Colonel Alexander McKee, was close by and could supply them with plenty of powder and ball. They saw their crops growing lush in the river bottoms and realized these soon would be burned unless the progress of the Americans was stayed.29
Blue Jacket, bitter with grievances, stirred the young braves with ideas of attacking Fort Recovery. They eagerly joined him in an enterprise that offered chances of good rations, horses, and blankets. On June 30, 1794, a band of a thousand or more were lurking in the tall grass a few hundred yards from the fort, waiting for a convoy returning to Greenville. Scarcely had the wagons rattled through the gates and headed southward, before the Indians opened fire, killing or wounding most of the officers and men and chasing the rest of them back to the cover of the stockade. Surrounding the fort, they fired into it all day long, hoping to exasperate the defenders, now half casualties, into a sally. Failing in this, they waited until the middle of the misty night and then tried to crawl forward until they could climb the wooden walls; but the sentinels were watchful and the attackers met with a stinging repulse.30
Reproduced from "The Pageant of America" II, 87. Copyright Yale University Press.
Such was the answer of the Indians to the white men's proposals of peace. Wayne now determined to let them have war, as they had chosen. On July 24, Major-General Charles Scott reached Greenville with the militia. With these reinforcements the Legion began the advance two days later.31
Of course Wilkinson was along, jealous of Wayne and peevish because few of his ideas had been adopted. Some of these had been expressed in a letter of the 10th of May. Wayne had replied three days later, stating among other things that the use of mounted volunteers had been anticipated as early as the 24th of March, but that he did not want them until the "avaricious" contractors had improved his supplies and transportation. When both were bettered, then he could give directions where the volunteers should join him; and he hoped that Wilkinson would then help him in accelerating their movement forward.32 Wilkinson was angry because of an insinuation that he had not accumulated enough provisions at the head of the p140 line.33 He also believed that he could advantageously employ the volunteers immediately. Wayne did not want them until everything was ready; he did not expect them to act as an independent body striking the enemy when and wherever they chose; they were not to enjoy federal pay without giving him aid in the way that he wanted it. He was not eager for superficial popularity and success; what he sought was a lasting peace, and he was carefully making preparations to obtain it. As might have been expected, Wilkinson found fault with such plans; the expense was excessive, the campaign was progressing too slowly, the volunteers were shabbily handled, etc.34
He felt peevish and humiliated because Wayne had sometimes ignored him. He was fearful that he might become a subordinate under Major-General Charles Scott of the volunteers, who, "though a fool, a scoundrel, and a poltroon," might secure the chief command in case Wayne were incapacitated.35 Some time in April, Scott had visited Philadelphia, and while there had praised the work of Wayne that others had criticized.36 Wilkinson knew only too well who these critics were, and he was resentful because any one had tried to confute them. To the stigma of incompetence Scott had added the sin of being a partisan of Wayne.
Fortunately for all concerned, Wayne, in spite of an old and often painful wound, continued as the commanding general of the advancing army. For nearly two weeks after leaving Greenville, it met with no resistance. It marched at the "usual velocity of •twelve miles a day through "Marassies," "Thickets almost impervious," "Defiles and beads of nettles more than waist high & miles in length." Mosquitoes were everywhere, water was scarce and heat intense. The men saw few hostile signs, and each day ended the same: they "beat their drums," "blowed" their trumpets and went to bed.37
On August 7 the Legion arrived within •six miles of the Auglaize villages. Wilkinson would have attacked them immediately and thus p141 ended the war, as he thought; Wayne preferred to wait until more of the Indians had assembled. When he had come to the confluence of the Maumee and the Auglaize, he halted in this choice spot for eight days. Here fish and game were plentiful and the men found forage for their horses and ate greedily of the vegetables growing in the abandoned gardens. Wayne coveted the land and determined to hold it. Without delay he set his men to cutting timber for his latest stronghold, which was to bear the name of Fort Defiance. While at this task he sent a message to the Indians, making them again an offer of peace. In a few days an answer came, bidding the invaders halt for ten days; then they would learn if peace or war was to be their portion. Time was needed for the warriors to gather. Wayne understood, and resumed the advance.38
By the 18th his men had reached the head of the Rapids of the Maumee River; at the foot of them, •ten miles distant, the Indians had pitched their camp about the British fort. For two days the Legion was busy building an earthwork, where all except the equipment for battle was stored. On the 20th, stripped for a fight, the men again took up the march. At about ten o'clock that morning they came to an opening in the woods where once a tornado had passed. Trees had fallen in a network of intricate patterns, and in this tangle of timber the Indians lay hidden, eagerly waiting for the moment of attack.
When Wayne's advance guard of volunteers approached, they met with a withering fire and retreated in confusion; but the regular light infantry re-formed and counterattacked. General Scott was ordered to move up on the left and fall on the Indian flank. The center and right rapidly advanced, driving the savages back •two miles in less than an hour. Once through the forest and in the corn-fields and prairies beyond, the Legion cavalry readily broke down any further resistance. Some of the fugitives made for the British fort, but they found the gates closed and had to continue their headlong flight to other places of refuge.
Major William Campbell was unwilling to give shelter to his would‑be allies and risk war with the United States. He could salve his pride only by demanding an explanation of Wayne, who sent in turn an even more insolent reply. To anger the British more, he advanced within range of their guns and lay waste the land that they p142 had cultivated. The Indians now had proof that they could no longer expect aid from the British as once they had hoped.
Moreover, casualties, though not extremely heavy, were enough to lessen the Indians' faith in their prowess. Wayne generously estimated that there were 2,000 warriors at Fallen Timbers, and that they suffered twice his own losses, which he reported as 133 dead and wounded.39 The Indians still had their main force; but they had lost the will to fight, they had begun to sense the power of Wayne and the futility of further resistance. He had invaded their best lands, cut down their crops, and burned their long-established villages. Wherever they threatened, he seemed to build a fort and place a garrison, and neither one nor the other could they take or surprise. Fallen Timbers was merely another convincing token of the irresistible advance of the white men into the lands north of the Ohio.
Wilkinson did not consider the battle of great importance, although he relished the praise that came to him for his action in it. Wayne, usually appreciative of good work on the part of subordinates, did not depart from his custom in his report to the Secretary of War:
"There were, however," said he, "some whose rank and situation placed their conduct in a very conspicuous point of view, and which I observe with pleasure, and the most lively gratitude. Among whom I beg leave to mention Brigadier General Wilkinson and Colonel Hamtramck, the commandants of the right and left wings of the legion, whose brave example inspired the troops."40
Hamtramck was that sturdy, combative Frenchman who sat on his horse like a frog. Praise to him was also sweet. In return for it he gave good and loyal service.
Wilkinson was different. On the very day that the official report on the battle of Fallen Timbers was composed, he wrote John Brown, senator from Kentucky, a letter that was filled with strictures on the conduct and capacity of Wayne. As he went on to say, Wayne lacked both resolution and enterprise; he was ignorant and liked to gasconade; he neglected his wounded, kept his men poorly supplied, and was indifferent to public expense. The same results, Wilkinson p143 beloved, might have been achieved by 1,500 volunteers in thirty days.41
A month and a half later, in October, he was even more caustic in a letter to Innes. "I am," said he, "well satisfied that such feeble & improvident arrangements, and such guardless & disorderly conduct was never before witnessed in any military corps of six months standing — Yet the specious name of Victory & the gloss of misrepresentation, will doubtless gild the Character of our Chief — For my own I am content, conscious as I am, that I have in several instances partially saved my country, and having extorted applause from my most bitter enemy, and the most finished scoundrel on Earth."42
By November he had lost all judgment and restraint in discussing the campaign. In another letter to Innes:
"The whole operation presents us a tissue of improvidence, disarray, precipitancy, Error & Ignorance, of thoughtless temerity, unseasonable Cautions, and shameful omissions, which I may safely pronounce, was never before presented to the view of mankind; yet under the favor of fortune, and the paucity & injudicious Conduct of the enemy, we have prospered beyond calculation, and the wreath is prepared for the brow of the Blockhead."43
In December, Wilkinson characterized Wayne as "a liar, a drunkard, a Fool, the associate of the lowest order of Society, & the companion of their vices, of desperate Fortunes, my rancorous enemy, a Coward, a Hypocrite, and the contempt of every man of sense and virtue."44
Apparently Wilkinson overlooked such obvious blemishes as being short-tempered and having the gout. Nevertheless, they were probably very important to Wayne even if Wilkinson did not think them worth mentioning.
Wilkinson's railing, almost wholly untrue, strikingly contrasted with the opinion of the people, whose enthusiasm had been deeply aroused by the victory of August 20. In December, 1794, Wayne and his men received the thanks of Congress.45 This commendation was not undeservedly given. The Legion had labored unsparingly in the erection of forts across the length of a hostile country. These, with p144 lines of communication between, it continued to hold against frequent attack. In a trying campaign, it had decisively defeated the Indians in battle; and from them had wrested the control of the Northwest for the first time. Peace had not been definitely established; but the memory of Fallen Timbers, the hunger of hard winter days, and Wayne's indomitable will were destined to accomplish the treaty of Greenville within a year.
Against such a successful person, Wilkinson would have difficulty in proving his jealous and ill founded indictments. On December 5, 1794, he received a letter from Henry Knox, Secretary of War, in answer to two of his own that had been written in June and July making five general charges against Wayne and requesting a court of inquiry covering his own conduct. Wilkinson was told that he might have his inquiry if he chose, but that the charges would have to be more specific before they were considered further. A copy of them, Knox significantly added, had been forwarded to Wayne, who duly received them some time in January, 1795. He straightway pronounced them "as unexpected as they are groundless, and as false as they are base and insidious; and had I not known the real character and disposition of the man, I should have considered the whole as the idle Phantom of a disturbed immagination [sic]."46 If guilty of them, Wayne declared, he himself ought to be hanged.47 Just what they stated is not easily ascertained; the letters containing them seem to have been lost or destroyed. Not unlikely Wilkinson expressed in some of them his belief that Wayne was arrogant and overbearing toward his subordinates, notoriously wasteful of government funds, and contemptuous in his treatment of the volunteers. After the battle of Fallen Timbers, Wilkinson's strictures were equally violent but less open and more extended in scope. Among other things he declared that Wayne had failed to take all the prisoners warranted by that victory, he had pursued a line of march which was "improper and absurd," and his battle formations were wholly preposterous. In his official correspondence, Wilkinson changed the character but not the number of charges. Unfortunately they have not been found in their final form.48
p145 Seeing that Knox would not countenance any underhand methods to ruin a rival, Wilkinson temporarily changed his tactics, especially after Fallen Timbers, when the star of Wayne was in the ascendant. It might prove highly embarrassing to attack a general who could, if he chose, retaliate meanly. Accordingly on January 1, 1795, he wrote Knox a "public letter" to this effect:
"My Lips are now Sealed, my Pen is dismissed from depicting well founded grievances, and I implore Heaven that the painful office may never be forced upon me."49
Apparently Wilkinson was willing to bury the hatchet.
But next day, in a letter to Knox marked "private," he disclosed his real thoughts. Toward Wayne and Scott he showed no change of heart. Wayne, he declared, knew nothing about the action of the right wing at the battle of Fallen Timbers; in fact, he had not even come near his ranking brigadier during the whole engagement; hence the official report covering that part of it was just about as applicable as "the battle of the Kegs." Doubtless Scott's version would have proven even less satisfactory. When Wilkinson thought he might possibly have to serve under such "a worthless old scoundrel" as the latter, he declared this would be "the most agonizing mortification" of his life.50
Lately Scott had been circulating the story that Knox was eager to have Wayne in command so that he would not be persecuted by Wilkinson's "damned long letters."51 This gossip quickly gave offense to Wilkinson, who was never able to save himself through a sense of humor. Because of his exaggerated sense of honor, he was readily offended and quickly stirred into action. Often in mad moments he flung caution to the winds and attacked with vigor and vengeance. Then he was easily vulnerable but none the less dangerous to those who had aroused his anger. Only enemies with a real stomach for fighting and a hatred to strengthen their arm had spirit to challenge his strength.
Wayne did not do so immediately. Though acquainted with Wilkinson's treachery, Wayne may have decided that the wisest procedure was to ignore it temporarily. Certainly it was not because he was noted for his patience and his willingness to conciliate. He p146 must have realized that this was no time for factional fights. He could well recall how investigations and courts-martial had nearly wrecked the Army during critical days of the Revolution. So far he had succeeded only partially in the mission assigned him; more important work was ahead. Congress was in session and hopefully watching developments in the Northwest. In a way, Wayne himself was on trial, and he could not afford to jeopardize his own and his country's interests by spending his energies in bringing disloyal subordinates to book particularly when they had a strong following and charges against them would be difficult to prove.
Wilkinson was, therefore, left free in his efforts to injure the reparation of Wayne. He wanted his own to grow by contrast. Both faced the recurrent danger that one of them would lose his commission in case Congress should decrease the Army. In February, 1795, its members were debating this very question. Madison, among other Virginians, favored a reduction. To him the Army was expensive and a constant menace to the liberties of the people; if it had to exist, its functions should be confined to protecting the frontier.52 Fisher Ames of Massachusetts was of contrary opinion, for he knew that the use of militia in the past had only tended to increase expenses and prolong the period of war.53 Wayne, according to Wilkinson, was guilty of the "pious fraud" of trying to save the Legion by withholding news of a favorable turn in negotiations with the Indians until after Congress had adjourned. If once the prospect of peace were certain, support for the Army would weaken.
Wilkinson might not have made this imputation of trickery had he shared in the preliminaries of the treaty of Greenville; apparently he was engaged in only a few routine duties of minor importance. At the time Wayne declared Wilkinson "had no command in the Army, and if he had any modesty he would resign";54 he considered him a "vile assassin," an agent of British and Democrats of Kentucky to dismember the Union, the "worst of all bad men." No wonder he swore to resign his commission if Wilkinson continued in the service.55
Openly ignored and given little work to do, Wilkinson was left largely free to follow his own peculiar bent. Like most persons in p147 the West, he had not been able to refrain from trying to make a fortune in real estate. At one time while living in Kentucky, his personal and joint holdings had been counted in thousands of acres; but many of these had been sold in the last few years to pay different persons for losses that they had suffered in his tobacco transactions. To Peyton Short, former business associate, he still owed three thousand dollars. In 1795 Wilkinson was "tampering" with him through an agent who was authorized to pay one-third of the amount as total settlement. Of course, as he wrote Judge Harry Innes,56 the ruse was to be kept as silent as the grave.
The Judge had handled all of the General's legal business for several years. When debtors failed to make their payments or titles were clouded, he brought suit for his client. As often as requested, he arranged for the sale of large or small tracts to raise funds for meeting the demands of insistent creditors. He prosecuted some for knavery in land deals. One of them was Humphrey Marshall, who had lied about the title and quality of land sold to Wilkinson. The case was decided in the General's favor during 1793. From then on Marshall voiced his hatred without restraint or regard for the facts. In November, 1795, Wilkinson believed that he and the "Old Harredan [sic] the Widow Todd" were attempting to vilify him through the agency of one Percival Butler.57 He retaliated in characteristic fashion. Within a few months, during January, 1796, Marshall, as a newly elected senator from Kentucky had to suffer the humiliation of defending himself from charges of "gross fraud" and "perjury" that Muter, Wallace, and Wilkinson had formulated and forwarded through the governor of Kentucky. By a vote of eight to sixteen, the Senate permitted Marshall to retain his seat.58
Legal services, such as Judge Innes rendered, were expensive, and the transactions that they involved required considerable capital. As a good liver and a free spender, Wilkinson had to have more than his Army pay. He had a hankering for speculation, for, beside being a field for daring ventures, it sometimes disclosed a short road to affluence. He did not seem to have trouble in finding some one to share in his enterprises, inasmuch as they frequently presented alluring prospects of gain and he usually lived up to his own part of the bargain. Often leading men in the West and East were his associates. p148 On October 18, 1796, he and John Brown, a senator from Kentucky, signed a bond to Innes for $4,000, one-half of which was to be paid within a year.59
Maturing accounts like this one, Wilkinson might be able to meet, if the Spaniards continued to provide him with funds. And this they appeared willing to do. Late in August, 1794, Captain Collins, Wilkinson's agent, had begun preparations for leaving New Orleans for Kentucky with $6,334 that Carondelet was sending. After a number of delays he took the route by sea instead of the more direct one that the unfortunate Owen had followed the year before. He arrived in Charleston safely with the money but was somewhat the worse off because of a stormy autumn voyage.60 From there he made his way to Pittsburgh, where he remained until the weather made travel safe down the Ohio. On April 3, 1795, Wilkinson was expecting to see him in a month; a week later he arrived, but with only a part of the original sum. A thousand dollars had been frittered away; $2,500 had been invested without authority in land around Fort Pitt; $334 was paid over to Collins as a carrying charge; only $2,500 remained — this, at least, was the way that Wilkinson would have the Spaniards cast up his account.61
While Wilkinson was anxiously waiting for the coming of Collins, arrangements were being perfected for a conference with the Indians at Greenville. During the winter of 1794‑1795, some of their chiefs, hungry like their lean horses, had come and talked and eaten with Wayne. They had agreed to an armistice and planned to gather again in larger numbers for discussing conditions of peace. In midsummer they came, about eleven hundred strong; but it was not until August 3, 1795, that the treaty of Greenville was formally signed. By its terms the Wyandots, Shawnees, Delawares, Miamis, and other tribes of the Northwest ceased making war and agreed to evacuate all but the upper third of the Ohio country less certain parcels of land about Chicago, Detroit, and a few other places. Thus for a time they desisted from robbing and killing those who would settle in a long disputed area, and the United States, relieved of a great burden of defense, was better able to defend her rights against those who held dominion along her borders.62
p149 Close by was Canada. England, an old and powerful enemy, possessed it; but she had lately given tokens of friendship in the Jay treaty, which the Senate had grudgingly ratified on June 24, 1795. It said nothing about impressment, little about trade; boundaries, damages, and debts were to be arbitrated, the fur posts along the Great Lakes were to be evacuated within a year.63 Such terms indicated a rapprochement that other powers beheld with jealous concern.
Spain was one of these. Although a traditional enemy, she had become an ally of England on May 25, 1793. To her, Protestant doctrines were somewhat easier of acceptance than the democratic principles that France had adopted and was endeavoring to spread. From this mismated alliance of three years, Spain profited little on the Continent of Europe; within the United States she saw her ally indirectly help toward stabilizing conditions along the Ohio.64 Once peace and unity obtained in this area, Spain would find increasingly difficult a continued monopoly of the Mississippi and the defense of her possessions along its lower reaches. Consequently her agents at New Orleans viewed with alarm the turn that events were taking during the summer of 1795.
They tried to revive their old scheme of breaking up the Union, centering their efforts on Kentucky, whose citizens were now exasperated with excise taxes and the apparent failure of federal diplomacy to secure navigation of the Mississippi. To promote discord in the West, Carondelet had written to Wilkinson on August 6, 1794, asking that Benjamin Sebastian, Harry Innes, and others come to New Madrid and confer with certain Spanish officials on matters of mutual interest.65 By July 1, 1795, the governor felt sure that through the means of private discussions they would be able to reach an agreement concerning the Mississippi in fewer months than Congress had taken years.66 Fifteen days later he wrote that commissioners must come "indubitably prepared to treat," and that he would recompense them liberally with pensions. If negotiations proved successful Wilkinson himself might aspire to the same position in the West that Washington had attained in the East. On the same date, July 16, he also wrote to Sebastian, requesting again that those who were to p150 act as delegates be properly empowered as his own Spanish agents would be. He suggested October as the time for meeting and that the general plan be discussed with leading men in Kentucky.67
Soon Innes and William Murry met at the house of Colonel Nicholas, and there Sebastian showed them the letter that he had received. Then the four of them composed a reply. They evinced willingness to attend a conference, for they realized that the navigation of the Mississippi was of supreme importance to their section and, if it were not secured, peace could not long be maintained. However, they declared their inability to come except in a private capacity.68
On October 3, 1795, Thomas Power arrived in Cincinnati bringing letters of "greatest importance." Wilkinson had known him for several years as a confidential agent of Spain whose "ruling passion" was traveling. The two held several nocturnal conferences in Wilkinson's quarters. Power remained in the neighborhood until the 14th, and then left with letters for Gayoso de Lemos, Spanish governor at Natchez.69 These, with others that Wilkinson wrote to him shortly afterwards, urged a cash gratuity of $20,000 and an increase of his pension, liberal payment of those who should attend the conference, and secret strengthening of Spanish defenses along the Mississippi. Should the need arise, Spain should be ready to supply Kentucky with 10,000 stands of arms, a field train of brass ordnance and accompanying ammunition. War, however, was not desirable; it would prove better to increase indulgences to the western people until peace was established in Europe. Then, as he apparently wished Gayoso to infer, the United States would have greater difficulty in finding an ally to support her claims. He declared the Army would soon be reduced, if he had his way. He pertinently advised that the whole matter should be kept secret; disclosure would mean the sending of a federal army corps to the Mississippi. He might have added that Kentucky would have been thrown into tumult and that he and his friends would have suffered unmeasured embarrassment.70
During December, Power got in touch with Sebastian, and the two made their way to the mouth of the Ohio, where they were to meet p151 Gayoso. Here they discussed Carondelet's chimerical scheme for Kentucky's seduction. Innes, Nicholas, and Murry were not present; for one reason or another they had thought best not to go. Since Gayoso could come to no agreement with the ex-preacher and lawyer without cases, they decided to go to New Orleans and lay their differences before Carondelet. They arrived there about the first of the year 1796. In February the governor received the text of the Pinckney treaty. It gave to the western people all they wanted concerning navigation of the Mississippi, but Carondelet still clung to the infatuation of winning their allegiance to the Crown.71
Sebastian was paid $4,000, and Power was given the job of carrying more written and verbal messages to Wilkinson. They remained in New Orleans till about the last of March, and then left together, returning to Kentucky via the Atlantic and Philadelphia. On the 19th of May, Power again reached Cincinnati. From this place he wrote and asked permission to visit Fort Greenville for the purpose of delivering some "segars" and other gifts to Wilkinson. His request was granted, and before long he was at the fort, where he remained a week. Thus he had full opportunity to deliver in person important dispatches from New Orleans and talk over with Wilkinson the aid Spain might give toward promoting the separation of the western country from the United States.72 They were discerning enough to know that an objective like this could not be achieved, but both wanted to line their own pockets; and so they colored their reports in a way best suited to make Carondelet believe that his scheme was entirely feasible. The governor was no match for this parasitical pair; at this very time he was paying handsomely for wholly imaginary services.
Power brought exhilarating news that $9,460 was being sent up the Mississippi by Carondelet for Wilkinson. Thereupon Wilkinson dispatched him to get it. Bound on this errand he set out for New Madrid. On reaching there he had difficulty in obtaining the money, because Wilkinson had refused to give him a written order for it. To make matters worse, a certain Elisha Winters, of the town, wrote and told Wayne of its coming. In the hope of avoiding a disaster like that of Henry Owen, the money had been packed in barrels of sugar and coffee. So hidden, it had passed safely up the river, even escaping p152 detection when a Lieutenant Steele of the Army searched the boat that bore it. This piece of international discourtesy Wilkinson endeavored to make much of while on a later visit to Philadelphia. Knowing the need of haste, Power plied his men with whisky to give zest to their rowing. Arriving at Louisville, he had the cargo landed safely and then hastened to Cincinnati to inform Wilkinson, from whom he received directions to deliver the money to Nolan, who had recently returned to Kentucky from Louisiana. The barrels were carried to Frankfort and opened in the store of Montgomery Brown. Nolan took $9,000, while Power retained $640 as payment for expenses. When a report was made to Wilkinson, he said "it was well."73
Wilkinson might have said the same thing about his success as a Spanish agent for the preceding six years. In 1790 Miró had advanced him $7,000.74 Since accepting his commission in the Army, he had received $4,000 through La Cassagne in 1792; $12,000 had been sent him in 1794 by Owen and Collins, of which he had probably received half; and lately Nolan and Power had delivered $9,000 more. Therefore by the end of 1796 Spain had disbursed, at least, $32,000 for Wilkinson's alleged services for the Crown. Of this amount he received approximately $26,000. Since his venality was never long disturbed by pricks of conscience, so large a sum must have made bearable what, as he confessed, was his "villainous confidential connection with Spain."75
In the future the Spaniards were not to yield so readily to requests for pay. The Pinckney treaty had placated most of their enemies in the West, and Wilkinson could no longer picture them as Vandals eager to plunder a Spanish domain. He would, of course, try to create bugbears out of boundary disputes, prospects of an English alliance, or the Burr conspiracy, but fears would not be engendered that were productive of great financial reward. The heyday of bribes, gifts, pensions, and perquisites was coming to a close. They would continue only in a very modified way, for Spain was growing poorer every day.
Wilkinson could not even feel sure of his pay as a brigadier-general in the Army. Through the work of Jay, Pinckney, and Wayne our p153 relations with England, Spain, and the Indians had all been improved during the critical year of 1795. Peace in the West, from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, was nearer realization than it had been for a long while. The immediate need for an Army was not so apparent as before. Its reduction was therefore espoused by some who were prejudiced and shortsighted and others who courted popular favor by curtailing federal expenditures.
Wilkinson knew that a "Grand Committee of the Union" had favorably reported a bill on March 25 that involved cutting down the Army and abolishing the grade of major-general.76 Later he was informed by Jonathan Dayton, a congressman from New Jersey, that the Senate favored retaining the higher grade but abolishing that of brigadier-general."77 It is significant that Wayne had been in Philadelphia since the first of April, enjoying there and elsewhere many marks of popular esteem. On June 7 Wilkinson learned that both houses had come to an agreement on the size of the Army but none could be reached about which of the two grades in question should be eliminated.78 Finally a law was passed on May 30, 1796, providing for the retention of both, a diminished strength for the Army, and abolition of the legionary organization. The changes were to become effective October 1.79
Wilkinson might congratulate himself that he had been neither deranged nor eliminated. He could attribute his good fortune more to the work of some of his friends and a belief among the discriminating that the integrity of the Army should be preserved than to any helpful, friendly influence that Wayne, while in the East, had exerted. Less than a year had passed since he had stated publicly that Wilkinson, being without a command, ought to resign.80 Wayne knew the source of disloyal and subversive influences in the Legion and the author of the charges against him that Washington was then endeavoring to find out the best way to handle. He was also acquainted with Power, whom he considered both a spy of Spain and a friend of Wilkinson. So suspicious had he become of the Spaniards that boats coming from the lower Mississippi were ordered searched. In short, Wayne had good reasons for wishing to be rid of his second p154 in command. If he had been more of the type of an Andrew Jackson, he would have done so in spite of political obstacles.
In this struggle between the two, Wilkinson was cleverer, and usually more indirect, in venting his spite. Two days after Wayne's departure for the East in February, 1796, he had declared in a general order his "Determination to inculcate, to enforce and to maintain a Uniform System of Subordination and Discipline through all Ranks, without Partiality, Prejudice, Favor or Affection." In this "Arduous undertaking" he called on his "Officers one and all for their aid and cooperation."81 Thus was the Army to be remade according to Wilkinson standards. By implication, it was no longer to suffer the deterioration that had existed during the days of Wayne's command.
This unbecoming declaration added nothing to the reputation that Wilkinson now appeared so eager to improve; perhaps it made others less appreciative of the good work that he had actually performed and expected to perform. Forts that Wayne had recently built and those that the British were to evacuate, all were subject to his orders. When Captain B. Shaumburgh was sent to arrange the details for the surrender of Detroit he was instructed to arouse no discontent among the inhabitants but to assure them that the government would promote their happiness. He himself was bidden to be discreet, live quietly, and make no promises.82 One could little improve advice like this. Major H. Buell was told to move to Fort Wayne until supplies were on the way. For this newly made fort, Wilkinson arranged for 12,000 pounds of flour, asked Wayne for proper artillery and ammunition, and warned against peculation of soldiers' clothing and Indian annuities that were soon to arrive.83 In another area Colonel Hamtramck was urged to conciliate the savages and economize on supplies.84
Thus did advice and arrangements run concerning rations, shelter, and protection of the scattered garrisons in the great Northwest. As a soldier of experience Wilkinson understood the difficulties of the task and his own personal responsibility as commanding general. Goaded by professional pride and nettled with jealousy, he was keen to give proof of work well done when once Wayne had returned and demanded an accounting.
p155 In June, 1796, he arrived after four months' leave in the East. Wilkinson wanted to go there himself, possibly in the Federal, the government barge offered for the purpose.85 Two generals were one too many in the Northwest; one could look after the routine work of the Army without the other's help. The frontier could spare him, Philadelphia beckoned. He and Ann had not been there for several years; now they could make a visit in comfort on the money that Power had brought. Soon another President would be elected, a new administration inaugurated. It was well to know those who were to sit in the seats of the mighty. In the late Army reorganization, he had escaped elimination only by a hair's breadth; next time he might not be so fortunate. Wayne had told his own story of the campaign; the time was ripe for another version that would invigorate the reputation of Wilkinson, on which lengthening shadows had been lately cast.
To some Wilkinson gave his own specific reason for going. He told Innes that he wanted to defend his own name "against a variety of foul and infamous imputations," to support his "allegations against Wayne," and to vindicate the "Conduct & the Character of many of my friends in Kentucky."86 Perhaps the "infamous imputations" concerned his intrigues with the Spaniards; they may have referred to his connection with the case of Robert Newman. For some time before the battle of Fallen Timbers the British had been trying to induce men in Wayne's army to desert and join them. Acting as a stool-pigeon for Wayne, Newman became friendly with those suspected of British leanings and obtained from them, in the name of Wilkinson, "sundry papers under seal." After reading their contents, Wayne ordered Newman to carry them to the British at Detroit. He did so, but on returning to Pittsburgh, he was put in irons and brought to Greenville, where he was held in confinement until the treaty of 1795 had been made with the Indians. He hoped for reward but obtained little. Wayne's aide, who acted as intermediate, spent the money instead.87 Such, at least, is the story as told by Obadiah Newman, a brother of Robert; found among the former papers of Wilkinson, it is probably favorable to him.
The exact part Wilkinson played in the affair is not clear; that p156 imputed to him was sinister enough to cause the greatest personal anxiety. For several days he was incapable of "eating or drinking." He tried to confuse the real issue by making much of "the violated seal."88 If the evidence forwarded to Philadelphia had indicated his collusion with the British or Indians, he never would have escaped merited punishment at the hands of Washington or Adams. Wayne certainly was in no mood to minimize any incriminating details when he wrote or talked to the Secretary of War. Wilkinson may have been employing dubious methods, but it was unlikely that he was guilty of treachery. He may have been up to one of his old tricks, using real or pretended deserters to obtain information that he wanted. Wayne had shown displeasure with Wilkinson for sending Reuben Reynolds on a somewhat similar mission during 1792; he would scarcely countenance a repetition of the same methods without his consent only two years later. Wayne liked to spend secret service money in the way that he chose; obviously he did not want it diverted into channels that would benefit a rival.
Holding the purse strings was a privilege worth having, and serving as a commissioner to the Indians increased an officer's pay at the rate of eight dollars a day. These, without other perquisites and honors of the commanding general, Wilkinson coveted and was determined to have. By a vigorous counter offensive he expected to save himself and ruin Wayne. His principal weapon consisted in the charges that he had previously preferred, somewhat modified by conditions that had arisen since the battle of Fallen members. Thomas Cushing, a stanch friend, carried letters including them to the Secretary of War, remaining in Philadelphia for a while and informing Wilkinson what Wayne and his staff were doing.89 Until his departure for the East, Wilkinson searched far and near for evidence that would injure Wayne; he also took steps to prevent his own reputation from being assailed.
He was afraid that his intrigues with the Spaniards might be discovered. During the autumn of 1796 he wrote to Gayoso de Lemos that he was planning a trip to the East to "belie Wayne's slanders" and make an international affair of Power's mistreatment. Along with such an avowal went this request: "For the love of God, my friend, p157 enjoin greater secrecy and caution in all our concerns; never suffer my name to be written or spoken." He added that the suspicion of Washington was wide awake, and that he wanted his correspondence placed beyond the reach of treachery.90
Simultaneously he urged Carondelet to observe all secrecy in writing, and so to distort Spanish accounting that moneys remitted in the past would appear as tobacco balances legitimately due him. He also asked that Power, provided with plenty of papers, meet him in Philadelphia. Power's case might be the means of "disjoining" the Pinckney treaty. By such means Wilkinson hoped to dissipate rumors of his dishonesty that came from New Orleans; then he could better discharge his confessed mission in the City of Brotherly Love; "to keep down the military establishment to disgrace my commander and secure myself the command of the Army."91
In early autumn Wilkinson left Fort Washington and began his passage up the Ohio. Wayne remained behind, performing the duties incident to an army widely scattered along an Indian frontier. Broken by hardships and wounds in the service of his country, he, too, was soon to start upon an even longer journey. His strength was failing and his days were few. Shortly after reaching Presque Isle he sickened and died. While cold December winds blew strong his comrades buried him in the frozen earth beside the flagpole of the fort. Young "Jackie" Wilkinson had already traveled to that same "fearsome country" during the autumn.92 Thus within a short while Wilkinson was to find that death had robbed him of his eldest son and destroyed his bitterest rival. A new chapter in his career was opening; his visit to Philadelphia was to mark its beginning.
1 Boyd, Mad Anthony Wayne, 258‑259.
2 Davis, "Three Islands," in Michigan History Magazine, XII, 513‑553.
3 To Wayne, May 18, 1793, Innes Papers, Vol. XXIII.
4 Knox to Wilkinson, May 17, 1793, Durrett Coll., Univ. of Chicago.
5 To Wayne, various dates, July, August, and September, 1793, Wayne Papers, Vols. XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX.
6 Boyd, op. cit., 261.
7 To Wayne, Sept. 30, 1793, Wayne Papers, Vol. XXIX; to Innes, Oct. 3, 23, 1793, Innes Papers, Vol. XXIII.
8 To Innes, Oct. 3, 1793, Innes Papers, Vol. XXIII.
9 To Innes, Oct. 23, 1793, Ibid.
10 To Innes, Oct. 23, 1793, Ibid.
11 Boyd, op. cit., 264.
12 To Wayne, Dec. 20, 1793, Autograph Letters, II.
13 Boyd, op. cit., 266.
14 To Miró, Dec. 4, 1791, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2374.
15 Carondelet to Wilkinson, Feb. 1, 1792, Ibid.
16 Wilkinson, Memoirs, II, 119.
17 Statement of Wilkinson account (undated), Oct. 23, 1793, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2374.
18 To Miró, Dec. 15, 1792, Ibid.
19 To Gayoso and Carondelet, Dec. 21, 1792, Ibid.
20 James, The Life of George Rogers Clark, 408‑427.
21 To Carondelet (undated), Oct. 23, 1793, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2374.
22 To Carondelet, Apr. 30, 1794, Ibid., to same, June 20, 1794, A. H. N. Estado, leg. 3898.
23 To La Cassagne, Mar. 11, 12, 1794, Innes Papers, Vol. XXIII.
24 To Innes, June 15, 1794, Innes Papers, Vol. XXIII; to Carondelet, June 20, 1794, Oct. 23, 1793, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2374.
25 Carondelet to Wilkinson, Aug. 6, 1794, A. H. N., Madrid, Estado, leg. 3898.
26 Deposition of F. Langlois, Dec. 29, 1808, Amer. State Papers, Miscel., II, 81‑82.
27 Thurston to Innes, Dec. 28, 1810, Innes Papers, Vol. XXII.
28 Affidavit of Thurston, Feb. 20, 1811, Ibid.; affidavit of William Hubble, James Hampton, and Ambrose White, Ibid., Vol. XVIII.
29 Boyd, Mad Anthony Wayne, 267‑271.
30 Ibid., 273‑278.
31 Ibid., 280.
32 Wayne to Wilkinson, May 13, 1794, Wayne Papers, Vol. XXXIV.
33 To Wayne, June 8, 1794, Gratz Collection.
34 To Innes, Oct. 23, 1793, Feb. 10, 1794, Innes Papers, Vol. XXIII.
35 To Wayne, June 8, 1794, Gratz Collection; to Innes, Innes Papers, Vol. XXIII, Jan. 2, 1795, et passim.
36 Scott to Wayne, Apr. 20, 1794, Wayne Papers, Vol. XXXIV.
37 Clark, Journal of General Wayne's Campaign; Boyer, A Journal of Wayne's Campaign; and Wilkinson to John Brown, Aug. 28, 1794, in Miss. Valley Historical Review, June, 1929, pp81‑90.
38 Boyd, op. cit., 279‑286.
39 Wayne to Sec. of War, Aug. 28, 1794, Amer. State Papers, Ind. Aff., I, 49. For other accounts of Fallen Timbers, see Wilkinson to John Brown, Aug. 28, 1794, in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., June, 1929, pp81‑90; Clark, Journal of General Wayne's Campaign; Boyer, A Journal of Wayne's Campaign.
40 Wayne to Sec. of War, Aug. 28, 1794, Amer. State Papers, Ind. Aff., I, 49.
41 To John Brown, Aug. 28, 1794, loc. cit.
42 To Innes, Oct. 13, 1794, Innes Papers, Vol. XXIII.
43 To Innes, Nov. 10, 1794, Ibid.
44 To Innes, Dec., 1794, Ibid.
45 Boyd, op. cit., 303.
46 Wayne to Butts, Jan. 29, 1795, Wayne Papers, Vol. XXXIX.
47 Hamtramck to Wilkinson, Aug. 29, 1796, Wilkinson Papers, Vol. I, Chicago Hist. Soc.
48 Belli to Wilkinson, May 16, 1796, Ibid.; Day to Wilkinson, May 23, 1796, Ibid.; Blue to Wayne, Jan. 8, 1796, Wayne Papers, Vol. XXXIX.
49 To Innes, Jan. 1, 1795, Innes Papers, Vol. XXIII.
50 To Knox, Jan. 2, 1795, Ibid.
51 Wilkinson to Innes, Jan. 2, 1795, Ibid.
53 Ames to Dwight, Feb. 3, 1795, in Works of Fisher Ames, I, 166.
54 Certificate of J. M. Scott, Jan. 8, 1796, Wayne Papers, Vol. XLIII.
55 Wayne to Knox, Jan. 29, 1795, Ibid., Vol. XXXIX.
56 To Innes, Mar. 17, 1795, Innes Papers, Vol. XXIII.
57 Wilkinson to Innes, Nov. 28, 1795, Ibid.
58 Amer. State Papers, Miscel., I, 141, 144.
59 Bond of Wilkinson and Brown, Oct. 18, 1796, Innes Papers, Vol. XXIII.
60 Collins to Clark, Mar. 10, 1809, Amer. State Papers, Miscel., II, 84.
61 To Gayoso, Apr. 3, Nov. 1, 1795, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2374.
62 Boyd, Mad Anthony Wayne, 305‑322.
63 Channing, History of the United States, IV, 137‑138.
64 Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty, 191 et passim.
65 Carondelet to Wilkinson, Aug. 6, 1794, A. H. N., Madrid, Estado, leg. 3898.
66 Carondelet to Wilkinson, July 1, 1795, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2374.
67 Carondelet to Wilkinson, July 16, 1795, Ibid. Carondelet to Sebastian, July 16, 1795, Bodley, "Introduction" to Filson Club Publications, No. 31, p. lxxx.
68 Bodley, op. cit., lxxxi‑lxxxiii.
69 Deposition of Power, Mar, 18, 1809, Amer. State Papers, Miscel., II, 86‑87.
70 To Gayoso, Nov. 4, 11, 1795, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2374; Whitaker, The Mississippi Question, 212‑213.
71 Bodley, op. cit., lxxxiii; Bemis, Pinckney's Treaty, 345‑347.
72 Annals of Congress, 11th Cong., Part 2, pp2313‑2323.
73 Deposition of Power, Mar. 18, 1809, in Amer. State Papers, Miscel., II, 86‑87.
74 Miró to Wilkinson, Sept. 2, 1790, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2374.
75 To Gayoso, Apr. 7, 1795, Ibid.
76 To Innes, Apr. 16, 1796, Innes Papers, Vol. XXIII.
77 Dayton to Wilkinson, May 20, 1796, Durrett Coll., Univ. of Chicago.
78 Belli to Wilkinson, June 7, 1796, Ibid.
80 Certificate of J. M. Scott, Jan. 8, 1796. Wayne Papers, Vol. XLIII.
81 Boyd, Mad Anthony Wayne, 331‑332.
82 To Shaumburgh, May 27, 1796, Miscellaneous Papers, N. Y. Public Library.
83 To Buell, May 10, 1796, to Butler, June 20, 1796, Ibid. Wayne to Wilkinson, Apr. 1, 1796, Wayne Papers, Vol. XLIV.
84 To Hamtramck, June 30, 1796, Miscellaneous Papers, N. Y. Public Library.
85 Boyd, op. cit., 332.
86 To Innes, Sept. 4, 1796, Innes Papers, Vol. XXIII.
87 Deposition of Obadiah Newman, July 13, 1796, Wilkinson Papers, Vol. I, Chicago Hist. Soc.; Memoirs, II, App. XLIV.
88 Hamtramck to Wilkinson, Aug. 29, 1796, Wilkinson Papers, Vol. I, Chicago Hist. Soc.; Turner to Wilkinson, Feb. 19, 1796, Ibid.
89 Cushing to Wilkinson, June 4, 1796, Ibid.
90 To Gayoso and Carondelet, Sept. 22, 1796, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2375.
91 To Carondelet, Sept. 22, 1796, Ibid.
92 Butler to Wayne, Oct. 19, 1796. Wayne Papers, Vol. XLVII.
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the item is copyright someone else, and used by permission or fair use.
If the URL has none the item is © Bill Thayer.
See my copyright page for details and contact information.
Page updated: 22 Oct 18