The day after the people of Virginia ratified the ordinance of secession, Lee received the long-expected news: the Federals that morning, in great strength, had occupied Alexandria and the Virginia side of the Potomac and had captured a small troop of Virginia horse serving as a rearguard there.1 Lee promptly forwarded to Manassas three regiments of reinforcements and some cavalry2 and gave orders for dispositions in case the Federals continued their advance.3 The danger to Manassas Junction was manifestly so acute that he determined to go there and see the situation for himself as soon as he could arrange to leave Richmond.
The occupation of the Virginia side of the Potomac had, of course, a personal aspect that Lee could not wholly overlook, even in the excited hour of the first movements to present an opposing front to the Federals. It meant that the pleasant hill of Arlington was in the hands of those former friends who now were enemies. Lee had anticipated this and was reconciled to it. His concern was for his invalid wife, not for himself. Mrs. Lee had been very loath to leave Arlington, despite the urging of her husband and the imminence of a Federal advance. She had long been unable to decide where to go, and not until about May 14 did she betake herself temporarily to nearby Ravensworth. Even then she left many of the family's possessions and some of the Washington relics within easy reach of marauders. Lee knew that Mrs. Lee could not remain for any length of time at Ravensworth without causing embarrassment to Mrs. Fitzhugh for housing the wife of a "rebel general," but he was unwilling to have her come to Richmond, inasmuch as he expected to take the p511 field speedily.4 The daughters went to visit friends in Fauquier County, Virginia. Lee had left his sons free to make their own choice and had most carefully urged Custis not to be influenced by his own example. But all of them sided with the South. Custis resigned, came to Richmond, and soon was working as an officer of engineers; Rooney promptly enlisted and was made a captain of cavalry; Robert was ere long to be chosen to like rank in one of the student companies at the University of Virginia, though, because of his youth, his father was as yet unwilling for him to enter the service.5 Smith Lee returned his Federal commission and became a captain in the Virginia navy.6 Lee took all these changes calmly. "When I reflect," said he, "upon the calamity impending over the country, my own sorrows sink into insignificance."7
The impending calamity was brought nearer, three days after the occupation of Alexandria and Arlington, by a report that Federal transports had appeared in Hampton Roads and were unloading troops in large numbers at Newport News, close to Fort Monroe, at the tip of "the Peninsula," as that part of Virginia between the York and the James River is styled.8 The second of the four probable Federal offensives was taking form. Lee was not unprepared for it. Although the informal truce had continued around Fort Monroe,9 Lee consolidated the command on the lower Peninsula under Magruder on May 21,10 and had been strengthening him as steadily as the numerous calls from other quarters had permitted. Embarrassed by lack of cavalry and of wagons, Magruder was making progress on the line intended to link up Jamestown, Williamsburg, and Yorktown.11
Lee reasoned that the troops being collected at Newport News might be planning either to turn the position at Yorktown and thus open the York River, or else to cross Hampton Roads, p512 ascend the Nansemond River, cut the railroad from Norfolk to Petersburg, and mask Norfolk. Both possibilities will be apparent from this sketch:
Lee accordingly put both Magruder and Huger on notice.12 He hastened to send more troops to the Norfolk district and some artillery to defend the approaches to Suffolk.13 Magruder received a few heavy guns to protect his line from being turned by way of the James, and continued to improve his position.14
Before the object of the landing at Newport News had become apparent, Lee felt it necessary to make his proposed visit to Manassas Junction. Leaving Richmond on May 28 he made a hurried inspection of the junction that afternoon, and the next morning p513 went on to Fairfax Courthouse.15 The troops, he found, were increasing rapidly in number, but were in every conceivable state of efficiency and the lack of it. Some were ready for action; some of those who had retreated from Alexandria did not even have arms.16 The officers ranged from wholly inexperienced civilian volunteers to men with West Point training and a solid background of service in the regular army. Lee promptly made now dispositions to cover the flanks and to place a detachment for observation at Fairfax Courthouse. He concluded that the size of the force to be collected at Manassas would make the Federals cautious in any advance against Harpers Ferry along the south bank of the Potomac, and that there consequently would be time for joint operations between the troops at Harpers Ferry and those around Manassas.17 This was the germ of the strategy subsequently employed in the campaign of First Manassas.
The selection of the best available commander for the force mustering at Manassas Junction had been giving Lee much concern. General Cocke had worked zealously, in the face of many obstacles, but the Virginia convention had concluded that the state had too many general officers and had reduced their number. Letcher had accordingly renominated Cocke, along with others, for rank in the volunteer forces one grade lower than they had previously held. Under another ordinance, officers of the provisional army outranked officers of similar rank among the volunteers. This had virtually displaced Cocke, who a time had not even had a regiment. Cocke had naturally protested, and Lee had been at pains to explain how the change had come about, but there was no alternative to the selection of an officer of commanding rank to take charge of the Manassas line.18 Brigadier General M. L. Bonham of South Carolina, the fourth officer to be assigned that rank in the provisional army of the Confederacy,19 had reported in Richmond with a brigade of South Carolina volunteers,20 and as these troops were most needed at Manassas, p514 Bonham was sent there. Being the senior officer he was given command on May 21, with very detailed instructions to hold to the defensive.21 Lee now concluded that a more experienced soldier than Bonham was needed for Manassas and he began to search about to find him.
On his way back to Richmond from Manassas a crowd surrounded Lee's train at Orange Courthouse, and, after the fashion of the day, demanded a speech. Lee demurred, for he had neither taste nor time for haranguing an idle crowd. The Orangemen persisted until he felt it would seem snobbishness or discourtesy to refuse. He stepped out and told his auditors that he had much more important matters on this mind than speech-making. All those who were in the service should be drilling, and those who for good reason had not joined the army would do well to attend to their own affairs and to avoid the excitement and rumors of crowds. That was all. It was not the utterance of a man currying favor with the multitude, but it made an impression.22
When Lee reached the city he found that during his absence President Jefferson Davis had arrived from Montgomery, Ala., to make Richmond the capital of the Confederacy, in accordance with the invitation of the Virginia convention. This invitation had been extended on April 2723 and had been accepted on May 21,24 probably because some of President Davis's friends in Virginia had insisted that his presence in Richmond was necessary to a vigorous prosecution of the war.25 Strategically it was a serious mistake, for it placed almost on the frontier of the Confederacy, in a state whose rivers were open to the warships of the enemy, the capital that was so soon and so surely to become the emblem of the Southern cause that its retention took on a moral significance out of all proportion to the industrial importance of the city, great though that was to the agricultural South.
The preliminaries of this unwise removal of the capital to Richmond had not been wholly cordial, and the separate efforts of the state government and of the Confederacy in Virginia had not been without friction. Governor Letcher had been in no hurry to effect the transfer of the Virginia forces to the Confederacy. p515 An inquiry from Secretary Walker concerning the strength and position of the troops of the Old Dominion had gone unanswered, and when, on May 1, this inquiry had been repeated, Letcher's answer had been a simple statement of Virginia's military resources and plans for mobilization.26 Later, when Walker had asked whether Virginia desired the Confederate Government to take charge of operations, the governor had contented himself with saying that he would act until the Confederacy assumed the direction of affairs.27 The Montgomery government had not pursued the subject further, but had gradually asserted its authority thereafter, and on occasion had ignored both Letcher and Lee, though, on May 10, Lee had been given command of all the forces in Virginia. General Joseph E. Johnston had been ordered on May 15 by the War Department to take charge at Harpers Ferry, without reference to Lee, and had been directed to forward from Lynchburg to Harpers Ferry certain Confederate troops that Lee had previously earmarked for Richmond.28 Subsequently, while Lee had been ordering Confederate forces already in Virginia to points where they were needed,29 the War Department had dispatched other Southern regiments to Virginia — some to report to Lee and some to move to assigned posts, apparently without regard to Lee's control.30 Lee had recommended at the very beginning that Johnston be given rank equal his own, and had assigned him to temporary duty around Richmond as a major general on April 26, but in the rebellion of the convention at too many exalted military titles, Johnston had been made brigadier general in the provisional army of Virginia, a position next to that of Lee. Johnston, however, had preferred to accept a commission as brigadier general in the Confederate army, and it was in this capacity that he had been assigned to Harpers Ferry.31 On his way to that post Johnston had written Lee and had announced to him, "The President intends to p516 assemble an army near Harpers Ferry."32 On Johnston's arrival there Jackson had refused to recognize the new officer's seniority until he had seen documentary evidence of it,33 but he had then supported him cordially. Johnston had found all the approaches well-guarded and more than 8000 troops at Harpers Ferry, 7000 of them armed. Raw though they were, "a fierce spirit" animated these "rough-looking men," in the words of the inspector, and their only serious deficiency had been in horses for the artillery.34 The Maryland Heights had been held, plans had been made to block the railroad at Point of Rocks, and conditions generally had been favorable, even if it had been rumored that the Federals had increased to 15,000 the men supposed to be at Chambersburg and Carlisle, Pa.35 Johnston, however, had been apprehensive from the first, was doubtful of his ability to hold Harpers Ferry, and, though he recognized Lee's authority and even went so far in one letter as to style him "commander in chief," he was only too plainly out of sympathy with Lee's plan to retain Harpers Ferry as long as practicable.36
Johnston's attitude, the conflict of authority, the arrival of Davis, and the near approach of the day when the Virginia forces would be taken over by the Confederacy added to the difficulties of Lee's position. There was a feeling of uneasiness and perhaps of jealousy toward the Confederacy on the part of some Virginia officers. They had doubts concerning their future status, despite the purpose of the advisory council to provide for all those capable officers who had resigned from the United States army.37 However, in this muddle, with a President and a governor, a Confederacy and a state alike to be served, Lee had one asset in his steadfast refusal to be incensed by slights or provoked by the clash of authority. Another asset was the esteem of the President.
Jefferson Davis was then close to his fifty-third birthday, a year and a half younger than Lee. Although his father had been a man of scant schooling, his blood was good, and his instincts, his bearing, and his manners were those of an aristocrat. His well-chiselled p517 features and his fine head bespoke high intelligence; his thin, erect form was commanding and gracious. In his dealings with the public he had dignity without austerity, and his speeches were usually impressive. His experience had been long and varied, as planter, as volunteer in the Mexican War, as senator, and as Secretary of War in the Cabinet of Franklin Pierce. Although not a profound strategist, his understanding of military matters was sound and his viewpoint in war essentially that of the professional soldier. Brief as his service had been in the regular army, he never forgot West Point, or the relations between commanding officer and subordinate. Had he been in the field, as a minor officer, neither Lee nor Jackson would have been more mindful of discipline than he. In his capacity as commander in chief he expected to be obeyed as he would have obeyed. In administration, he was of average capacity or better, occasionally disposed to delay decisions but usually reaching them promptly and reasonably, without permitting himself to be engulfed in detail. He had in him, in fact, some of the qualities essential to the success of a revolution, but these were coupled with serious weaknesses, only a few of which had become apparent in the summer of 1861. His nature was exceedingly sensitive, perhaps because he had received more than his share of applause and had seldom had the tonic of personal criticism. His health, moreover, was uncertain. At intervals — and most inconveniently when he was under the strain of anxious vigils and difficult decisions — he suffered from the inflammation of a facial nerve that caused him agony and prostrating illness. He endured this with fortitude and often discharged his duties when he was almost blinded by suffering and was subjected every few minutes to sharp spasms of the affected nerve, but on occasion his long combat with physical pain made him irritable. His political life had been an endless struggle for a strict and rigid interpretation of legal right, and he was to prove himself too much of constitutionalist to be a daring revolutionary. He hesitated to exceed the admitted limits of his authority as President, and when he did so he was an unconvincing as he was irritating; but he was instant to claim his full constitutional prerogatives, and in doing so he was often abrupt and sometimes unreasonable. Two things were certain to make p518 him hostile: one was to accuse him of unfairness; the other was to impinge upon his authority as President. In his dealings with men he applied to the fullest the political maxim of loyalty to friends and of hostility to foes. His judgment of men was not exceptional, for he relied too much upon the impressions formed in youth; and impressions once formed he was slow to change. If he named one of his supporters to office, criticism of his appointee he would almost invariably regard as criticism of himself. With a political antagonist he would dispute to the last line of a long correspondence, in as high regard for logical victories in the theoretical points at issue as if he were speaking for The Congressional Globe. In the end, if he could not convince he would not attempt to conciliate, but would accept a man as a permanent enemy and would sever relations with him. He had energy, he had a measure of vision, he had patience, patience with everything but contradiction. His stubborn loyalty to friends of mediocre mind was to cost the Confederacy dearly, but in the case of Lee his loyalty was to be, perhaps, his largest service to the South. Davis had not forgotten Lee's superintendency at West Point and his reputation in the old army. At this time, and always, as he subsequently testified, Lee had his "unqualified confidence, both as a man and a patriot, and had the special knowledge of conditions in Virginia that was most useful."38 From the time of his arrival in Richmond, Davis kept Lee near him and consulted often with him.39 Together, on Lee's return from Manassas Junction, they conferred on the choice of a commander for that exposed line. The President decided to entrust the post to Lee's friend of earlier days, the "Hero of Charleston," General P. G. T. Beauregard, who was then in Richmond. Beauregard was called in, was given a review of the situation, and was directed to leave the next day for Manassas. His orders, which Lee prepared, were for close vigilance and a strict defensive, a course that Beauregard complained, years afterwards, left him no discretion and no initiative.40 Had he complained at the time it probably would have made no difference, for Lee had not modified in the slightest his view that Virginia's p519 safety demanded that she avoid aggression until she was prepared to meet it.
The dispatch of Beauregard to Manassas put three of the four exposed posts in Virginia under the charge of professional soldiers of experience: Huger and Magruder were on opposite sides of Hampton Roads, Johnston was at Harpers Ferry, Beauregard faced the enemy below Washington. Conditions in each of these threatened areas were improving hourly. Very different was the situation in the fourth zone of probable Federal advance, western Virginia. For two weeks the news from that quarter had been bad. Optimistic reports had given place to gloomy intelligence of disaffection, opposition, and open hostility. By May 21 Lee had realized that volunteers would not be raised in adequate numbers in the northwestern counties, and he had adopted the alternative, which he had been maturing, of sending into that section troops from nearby counties in the hope that they would gather strength as they advanced. Commanding officers were enjoined anew to prevent the use of the Baltimore and Ohio by the enemy, though Lee had rejected the proposal of Colonel Jackson that a strong force should be thrown into northwest Virginia as soon as the vote on secession was announced. Lee did not have the men to spare and he could not afford to risk Harpers Ferry or the troops that were garrisoning it.41
On June 1 a messenger arrived from General Johnston with dispatches. One of them contained a rumor which had reached Harpers Ferry to the effect that Colonel Porterfield had evacuated Grafton, and that the Federals had occupied it.42 Lee was loath to believe that this had happened,43 and still less prepared to learn a few days later that Porterfield had been surprised, at Philippi, •fifteen miles south of Grafton, and had lost most of his equipment.44 This was a serious matter, for Philippi was closer by •forty miles to Staunton than to Harpers Ferry. If the enemy were permitted to advance unhindered through the mountains to Staunton, a distance of •about 120 miles by road, the whole of western Virginia might be cut off.
p520 A third Federal offensive of unknown strength was thus developing more rapidly and in some respects more ominously than either the threat against Manassas Junction or the concentration in Hampton Roads. Both the state and the Confederate authorities moved quickly to redeem the situation. Porterfield was relieved and brought before a court of inquiry.45 The militia in seven counties were ordered out.46 A special expedition was planned to burn the Cheat River bridge on the Baltimore and Ohio.47 Colonel R. S. Garnett, Lee's adjutant general, was commissioned brigadier general and was hurriedly sent to the Allegheny Mountains. Plans were laid road reinforce him rapidly by way of Staunton.48
As soon as these necessary measures of relief had been initiated, Lee paid a visit on June 6‑8 to the York and James Rivers,49 for the Confederate authorities were about to take over the Virginia forces,50 and Lee wished to satisfy himself that the batteries had been properly placed and armed. He found the work almost completed by the naval officers and by the engineers entrusted with it. Three batteries had been constructed on the York, and nineteen of their thirty heavy guns were already in position. In the two batteries on the lower James, twenty of the thirty-two guns were ready for service. Like progress had been made on the other tidal rivers that time did not permit Lee to visit. Five batteries had been thrown up along the estuaries of the Potomac, one had been dug on the Rappahannock, three were being erected on the Nansemond, though they were not yet armed, and several had risen around Hampton Roads. On the Elizabeth River and in the immediate vicinity of Norfolk there were six batteries, mounting eighty-five guns, most of them already prepared for action. Field works of an elaborate nature had also been constructed p521 around Norfolk, and the Jamestown-Williamsburg-Yorktown line was taking form.51
On his way back to Richmond, Lee was able to stop for a few hours at the •White House, though in circumstances far different from those that had formerly attended his visits to that old plantation. His daughter Annie and his daughter-in‑law Charlotte were there, together with his little grandson and namesake. Rooney was away, and did not arrive until the coming of the train that carried Lee back to the capital city.52
The ceremony of transferring the Virginia forces to the Confederacy was now to be completed. The Confederate Government during the preceding fortnight had been assuming additional parts of the sombre work of defense;53 the council had tendered all Virginia resources on June 1, reserving only the machinery seized at Harpers Ferry;54 and on June 5 the Confederate War Department somewhat ostentatiously had called on Virginia to surrender the control of military operations.55 On Lee's arrival from York River, on June 8, the governor formally issued his proclamation, which Lee incorporated in a general order.56
In one sense Lee's immediate task was finished. The rivers were defended by the batteries he had just inspected. The navy yard was operating again, and the frigate Merrimac, raised from the bottom, was in dry dock. The old United States had been fitted with guns. Arrangements had been made to salvage the sunken Plymouth and Germantown. As far as practicable, Norfolk had been secured from direct attack and from a turning movement by way of Suffolk. Seven thousand troops, Virginia and Confederate, were on duty there. Magruder had somewhat more than 5100 men on the lower Peninsula. A slightly larger force, approximately 5500, was in Richmond and in Ashland as a reserve. On the Manassas line, 7000 men or more had been assembled, with 2700 around Fredericksburg and on the lower Potomac. At Harpers Ferry the Virginia units mustered 7000 of p522 a force that exceeded 8000. All told, approximately 40,000 troops had been enlisted and armed from Virginia and had been supplied with field officers, staff, and partial equipment.57 Nearly all these soldiers had some lead and powder. A million percussion caps, with 114,400 rounds of infantry ammunition, were to be available in the Virginia laboratory, when delivered to the Confederacy on June 14.58 One hundred and fifteen field guns had been issued, including twenty batteries of four guns each, harness and caissons complete.59 The whole mobilization had cost Virginia $3,779,000, including unpaid accounts and claims,60 and it had been effected in slightly less than eight weeks, during seven of which Lee had been responsible. Thanks largely to Lee's insistence upon a defensive policy, the work had been done without a single major engagement, and with only three brushes, involving some fifty casualties, of whom seven, or thereabouts, had been killed.61
The record speaks for itself. "When it is remembered," Lee reported to the governor, "that this body of men were called from a state of profound peace to one of unexpected war, you will have reason to commend the alacrity with which they left their homes and families and prepared themselves for the defense of the State."62 As an achievement in mobilization it would seem to be without serious error. As a feat in the preparation of a force for service under the conditions of combat prevailing in 1861, it was deficient only in the failure to provide adequate field transportation and in the inability of the state properly to equip the cavalry.
In the larger view of strategy, the disposition of the forces, as p523 mobilized, was sound otherwise than as respected western Virginia. Lee doubtless was deceived by the first reassuring reports from that area of disaffection. He probably acted with wisdom in refusing to weaken Harpers Ferry in order to send troops westward along the line of the Baltimore and Ohio, for he might have lost both the column he sent out and Harpers Ferry itself. Limited as his forces were, he had to take chances somewhere. But with the fullest allowance for all these conditions, and with the rough character of the country and the hostility of a large element of the people taken into account, one turns the pages of the correspondence regarding western Virginia with the feeling that the import of the loss of that section was not foreseen, or else that Lee yielded more readily than was his habit to obstacles which were bad enough yet scarcely more serious than others his energy and strategic sense elsewhere overcame.
In effecting the mobilization of Virginia, Lee had hearty encouragement from first to last. Except for the criticisms of Secretary Walker's agent, D. C. Duncan,63 the records yield no evidence of hostility to Lee or of any lack of co-operation with him. The Richmond press was sympathetic and admiring, or, at worst, refrained at this time from criticism of him. The powerful Enquirer and the chatty Dispatch were warmly his supporters.64 "When General Lee assumed the command of affairs here," The Dispatch stated editorially, two days before the Virginia forces were transferred to the Confederacy, "everyone knows that our military preparations were in a condition which it makes us shudder to look back upon. But he gave himself, head, heart, and soul, to the great work, and so wisely, skillfully and energetically has he used all the resources at his command, that the insolent enemy, notwithstanding his boasted numbers and important possession of the powerful fortress of Old Point, has been held at bay, and compelled to postpone his march of invasion till now we can set him at defiance. We do not pretend that everything has been done which could be done if Gen. Lee had possessed at the start an army of a hundred thousand, or even fifty thousand men; but, bearing in mind the feebleness of our resources, at the beginning, p524 in men, arms and munitions of war; remembering that the organization of a large military force is a work of such time and labor that, up to this hour, the Federal government, with all its immense resources of men, means and machinery, has not been able to put itself in position for attack, we may point with honest pride to the position Virginia is now in for defense, and claim that even Gen. Scott with all his boasted military genius and experience, and all the vast resources of his section, has not proved himself as great and efficient a leader as the son of Light Horse Harry, the sagacious, intrepid and high-souled chieftain of Virginia."65 This was the prevailing opinion and it was expressed formally to the Virginia convention by Governor Letcher in his report on the mobilization. He said: "It is due to truth and justice that I should here record . . . my high appreciation of the industry, judgment and professional skill which has marked the conduct of the distinguished officer who had been called by me, with the unanimous approval of the convention, to conduct the military and naval operations of Virginia."66 Jubal A. Early, a member of the military committee of the convention, subsequently attested the "active energy and utter abnegation of all personal consideration with which [Lee] devoted himself to the work of organizing and equipping the Virginia troops for the field."67
Heavy as were the calls on Lee's energy and patience, during these difficult seven weeks, his strength of body and of character was equal to them. There is a post-bellum tradition that he was something of a "bear" at this time,68 and it is possible that he did not then have all the imperturbable self-mastery that later elicited the wondering admiration of his subordinates, but there is not an echo in contemporary records of any violent outburst. He arrived early and punctually at his office every morning and methodically transacted business, with a close eye to detail, "but not," Walter Taylor observed, "as is sometimes the concomitant, if not the result of this trait, neglectful of the more important matters dependent upon his decision." He seemed, Colonel Taylor further recorded, "to address himself to the accomplishment of every task that devolved upon him in a conscientious and deliberate p525 way, as if he himself was directly accountable to some higher power for the manner in which he performed his duties."69 Anxious as he was to take the field, and convinced that his stay in Richmond would not be permanent,70 he met patiently the vexations of office work. Only in his handling of his heavy correspondence was the worry and annoyance of his post manifest to his little staff of aides and clerks. "He did not enjoy writing; indeed, he wrote with labor, and nothing seemed to tax his amiability as much as the necessity for writing a lengthy communication; but he was not satisfied unless at the close of his office hours every matter requiring prompt attention had been disposed of."71 When the last letter was signed and the last order given in the afternoon, he would take one or two of his official family with him, and would ride out to some camp or fort around Richmond, combining necessary exercise with an inspection. And when he returned it was often to seek out some group of children and to talk with them.72 No homesickness was discernible in his letters, and there must have been distinct relief for him to know that Mrs. Lee, having left Ravensworth, was at Chantilly, cheerful and reconciled to indefinite absence from Arlington.73
He had committed his loved ones, along with his own destiny, his strategy, and his preparations for Virginia's defense, into the hands of a God who was never more personal or more real to him than in those days of a divided nation's insanity. The religious note that had become the strongest of his life in the hour when he had cast in his fortune with Virginia and it so remained to his last day. "In God alone must be our trust," he wrote Cassius Lee in a frank avowal that mediation was impossible.74 Domestic letters contained prayers and self-reproach for ingratitude to God for past mercies.75 "God's will be done," he said. "We must be resigned."76 And again: "Be content and resigned to God's will."77
p526 "Are you sanguine of results?" a minister asked him in the midst of the intense strain of the first ordeal.
"At present," he answered calmly and with a sincerity that saved his words from any suggestion of cant, "I am not concerned with results. God's will ought to be our aim, and I am quite contented that his designs should be accomplished and not mine."78
4 For Lee's letters, urging her to leave, see R. E. Lee, Jr., 28‑32. For correspondence between her and General Irvin McDowell, who promised to protect Arlington, see Jones, L. and L., 143. For the offer of a home by William C. Rives, see Jones, L. and L., 141. For letter from Mrs. Lee to General Scott, enclosing an account of Lee's reception in Richmond, and echoing the old friendship, see Fitz Lee, 93.
5 R. E. Lee, Jr., 32; for Custis, see 11 Calendar Virginia State Papers, 133; for Robert, see Jones, L. and L., 143.
6 Lee to Mrs. Lee, May 16, 1861; R. E. Lee, Jr., 31.
7 Lee to Mrs. Lee, May 8, 1861; R. E. Lee, Jr., 30.
18 Cocke's protest, MS., is among the Virginia Executive Papers, May 12, 1861; Lee to Cocke, May 13, 1861; O. R., 2, 836‑837, O. R., 51, part 2, p109; F. H. Smith to Cocke, May 14, 1861; D. H. Ruggles to Cocke, May 8, 1861; F. G. Skinner to Cocke, May 15, 1861; Cocke MSS.
19 Wright: General Officers of the Confederate Army, 49.
22 Richmond Whig, June 7, 1861; p2, cols. 3‑4.
27 O. R., 2, 805; O. R., 51, part 2, p74. Relations between Governor Letcher and the Confederate executive were far less cordial than those between Letcher and the governors of the Southern states to whom Virginia supplied arms or from whom she received help. Cf. O. R., 2, 793; MS. N. C., 153, Confederate Museum.
38 1 Davis, 340.
39 R. E. Lee, Jr., 35.
52 Lee to Mrs. Lee, June 9, 1861; R. E. Lee, Jr., 35.
57 Lee's report, June 15, 1861; O. R., 2, 927‑29, and his partial return of troops, May 30, 1861; O. R., 2, 895. To the totals given by Lee in this latter document have been added the troops known to have been dispatched between May 30 and June 8.
60 11 Calendar Virginia State Papers, 173; IV O. R., 1, 391‑92. Lee's own pay probably was among the unsettled items, for on June 27, 1861, he received a check for $132.33. This paper is now in the possession of C. S. Hutter of Lynchburg, Va., who gave a photostat of it to Wylie R. Cooke. He in turn presented it to H. R. McIlwaine, former State Librarian of Virginia.
61 In the evacuation of Alexandria on May 24 (see supra, p510), at Fairfax Courthouse on June 1 (O. R., 2, 60), and at Philippi on June 3, 1861 (see supra, p519. The casualties cannot be stated with precision, as the number of prisoners taken in Alexandria and at Philippi is nowhere given in exact figures.
64 Cf. Richmond Dispatch, April 30, 1861, p2, col. 3, quoting The Richmond Enquirer. Cf. also, Dispatch, May 21, 1861, p2, col. 1.
65 Richmond Dispatch, June 6, 1861, p2, col. 1.
66 11 Calendar Virginia State Papers, 162.
67 Jones, 2.
68 Gordon in Riley, 79.
69 Taylor's General Lee, 24‑25.
70 Lee to Mrs. Lee, May 25, May 28, 1861; R. E. Lee, Jr., 33, 34.
71 Taylor's General Lee, 25.
72 Taylor's General Lee, 25.
73 Mrs. Judith McGuire: Diary of a Southern Refugee (cited hereafter as Mrs. McGuire), 26.
74 April 25, 1861; E. J. Lee, 420.
75 R. E. Lee, Jr., 29‑33, notably 32.
76 Lee to Mrs. Lee, May 11, 1861; R. E. Lee, Jr., 30.
77 Lee to Mrs. Lee, May 8, 1861; R. E. Lee, Jr., 30.
78 Jones, 143. For his attendance on the opening services of the Episcopal convention, and for his conversation with Bishop Meade, see R. E. Lee, Jr., 31, and Jones, L. and L., 142.
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