Like the three witches who on another day "so foul and fair" met Macbeth on the heath, a group of ladies under dripping umbrellas awaited Lee on the Maryland side of the Potomac — not to hail him as thane of Cawdor, but to wish him victory on his second invasion of the North. Their spokesman, whom Captain Dawson in a most ungallant phrase charged with having a "face like a door-knocker," stepped forward as Lee rode up.
"This is General Lee, I presume?"
Lee admitted his identity.
"General Lee," she went one, "allow me to present to you these ladies who were determined to give you this reception."
Lee thanked her and introduced General Longstreet and General Pickett, whose flowing locks fell back from eyes that never failed to see all that was comely in the other sex. Then came flowers and fair words and, at length, a wreath the ladies desired to put around the bowed gray neck of Traveller. Lee balked at this. Garlands were well enough for Stuart, but for the mount of an infantryman commanding an army of invasion on a desperate venture — well . . . he was extremely indebted to the ladies for their courtesy, but would they excuse him? Marylanders of the persuasive sex who had braved rain and radicals to do honor to a "rebel" were not so easily put off. A parley ensued, with the ladies insistent and Lee resolute. It was compromised at length by giving the wreath to a courier to carry for the General.1
The holiday spirit of this welcome persisted. After Lee's column stopped in a hickory grove on a hill •three miles from Williamsport, Colonel Taylor spoke up. "General," he said, "this gentleman has brought me some raspberries, and I have asked him to take snack with us." Lee turned quickly and saw Leighton p54 Parks, the little boy who had visited him in Maryland the previous year. He smiled: "I have had the pleasure of meeting your friend before," he answered. Then he stopped, lifted the youngster and kissed him. He had the lad eat with his mess, and then took him into his tent, put him on his knee and talked to him until General Hill demanded the same privilege. After Hill, Longstreet insisted on a chat and confidentially whispered that he had a pony he thought could carry the boy's weight if he would join his staff. At length when Lee resumed his duties, Hill told an orderly to "bring the captain's horse," and after it developed that the youngster could not mount so high, Lee lifted him into the saddle. "Give him time," he said, "and he'll do for the cavalry yet."2
The friendly spirit of the invasion was somewhat the same the next morning, June 26, when Lee left his camp3 and rode through Hagerstown en route to Chambersburg, whither Hill's and Longstreet's columns were moving. Although it was raining again,4 another company of ladies surrounded him, and one of them asked for a lock of his hair. As the General's grizzled coverage was beginning to thin, he made that his excuse. Besides, he said, he was sure they would prefer a ringlet from a younger officer. There was General Pickett — surely he would be glad to give her one of his curls. This did not appeal strongly to Pickett, who had left his heart in Virginia, nor did the proposal impress the young lady.5 Those who had seen the General at the time of the first invasion of Maryland remarked that he had aged perceptibly in ten months,6 but Southern sympathizers did not lionize him less on that account, and even one Northern girl who persisted in waving a Union flag was heard to say as he passed, "Oh, I wish he was ours"7 — a remark that must have been the text of many a quip among irreverent and envious young staff officers.
From Hagerstown he rode northward and entered Pennsylvania for the first time since the beginning of the war. Hill p55 had gone ahead and as Lee rode toward the public square in Chambersburg, Hill came down the street and met him. Another throng was awaiting him, and a man with a camera was stationed in a window, only to have his picture ruined by soldiers who insisted on being included in it. Posterity will not readily forgive them their forwardness, for if the artist had not been interrupted he doubtless would have taken a photograph of high historical interest.8 However, if the good people of Chambersburg could not have a picture, they could at least have a look, and they eyed Lee critically, if with awe.
"What a large neck he has," one civilian whispered.
"Yes," said a nearby Confederate, "it takes a damn big neck to hold his head."9
Lee moved on and established headquarters in a little grove out from the town on the road to Gettysburg, a picnicking place, known as Shatter's Woods and later as Messersmith's Woods.10 "A Confederate flag marks the whereabouts . . .," an Austrian visitor wrote. "There are about half a dozen tents and as many baggage wagons and ambulances. The horses and mules from these, besides those of a small escort, are tied up to the trees or grazing about the place."11
Here the atmosphere was not that of merrymaking, but of preparation for battle. Lee's first concern, on the 27th, was to assure the safety of private property. Before he had left Virginia he had talked on the subject with General Trimble, and had expressed himself strongly against the retaliatory acts that were being urged on him in many letters. "I cannot hope," he had said, "that Heaven will prosper our cause when we are violating its laws. I shall, therefore, carry on the war in Pennsylvania without offending the sanctions of a high civilization and of Christianity."12 It had been in this spirit that he had issued orders on June 21 governing the seizure of supplies for the army while in the enemy's country. He had then directed that all p56 the necessities of the army should be met by formal requisition on local authorities or by purchase and payment in Confederate money. Where Confederate notes were refused, the quartermasters were to issue receipts, setting forth the name of the owner of the seized property, the quantity and the fair market value.13 These instructions had been measurably respected by Ewell's troops, but now that the whole army was in a district where Lee expected it to remain for some time, the regulations were reiterated in General Orders No. 73 for the guidance of the individual soldiers. After thanking the men for their fortitude and loyal performance of duty, Lee said:
"Their conduct in other respects has, with few exceptions, been in keeping with their character as soldiers, and entitles them to approbation and praise.
"There have, however, been instances of forgetfulness on the part of some, that they have in keeping the yet unsullied reputation of the army, and that the duties exacted of us by civilization and Christianity are not less obligatory in the country of the enemy than in our own.
"The commanding general considers that no greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it our whole people, than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon the unarmed and defenseless and the wanton destruction of private property, that have marked the course of the enemy in our own country.
"Such proceedings not only degrade the perpetrators and all connected with them, but are subversive of the discipline and efficiency of the army, and destructive of the ends of our present movement.
"It must be remembered that we make war only upon armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of our enemies, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in vain.
"The commanding general therefore earnestly exhorts the p57 troops to abstain with most scrupulous care from unnecessary or wanton injury to private property, and he enjoins upon all officers to arrest and bring to summary punishment all who shall in any way offend against the orders on this subject."14
These orders were written, no doubt, with an eye to the encouragement of the peace movement in the North, for mercy disarms hate; but they were drafted in sincerity and they were enforced with vigor,15 despite some grumbling in the army and some protests at home.16 No officer below the rank of general was allowed to go into Chambersburg without a special pass from Lee, which he was slow to give.17 By daily reminders and by careful example — as when he stopped on the road opposite a pasture to put up bars that some negligent soldier had left down18 — he succeeded in protecting property from damage and women from insult. There were no charges of rape and few of plundering. The chief difficulty of the officers was in keeping hot, bareheaded soldiers from snatching civilians' hats as they marched through the crowd-lined streets of the little towns. "This was repeatedly done in the presence of officers, who invariably tried to have the offending person pointed out, that the stolen property might be restored and the offender punished, but in the similarity of the men and the necessity for the column to keep moving on, not a single one was detected" — so testified a Northern writer.19
Regardless of hats, the army had to be ready for action. By the 27th Ewell was well advanced in two columns, one as far as Carlisle on the road to Harrisburg,20 and the other, which consisted of Early's division, within •about six miles of York. Ewell's orders were to take Harrisburg if his force was adequate, and Early was under instructions to cut the railroad between Harrisburg and Baltimore and to destroy the bridges at Wrightsville and Columbia.21 Longstreet's and Hill's corps were encamped around Chambersburg and Fayetteville, in excellent p58 health and full of confidence, far better shod and clad than when they had entered Maryland in 1862.22
The general advance of the army was to be on Harrisburg, in order to draw the enemy out and to cut communications between East and West. The execution of the plan depended primarily on the arrival of Stuart's cavalry, for it manifestly was dangerous, if not impossible, to move freely so long as nothing was known of the position of the Federals. Presumably, Hooker was still in Virginia. Otherwise Stuart would surely have notified Lee. But the uncertainty hampered operations.23
While waiting for Stuart, Lee checked his maps carefully by all the information he could get from Southern sympathizers,24 and he had a lengthy interview with Major General Trimble, who had been chief engineer for one of the nearby railroads and knew the country well. Trimble told him there was scarcely a square mile east of the mountains in Adams County that did not offer good positions for manoeuvre or for battle. Lee was pleased at the assurance: "Our army," he was quoted long afterwards by Trimble as saying, "is in good spirits, not overfatigued, and can be concentrated on any one point in twenty-four hours or less. I have not yet heard that the enemy have crossed the Potomac, and am waiting to hear from General Stuart. When they hear where we are, they will make forced marches to interpose their forces between us and Baltimore and Philadelphia. I shall throw an overwhelming force on their advance, crush it, follow up the success, drive one corps back on another, and by successive repulses and surprises, before they can concentrate, create a panic and virtually destroy the army."
Trimble expressed his belief that this could be done, because the morale of the troops had never been higher. "That is, I hear, the general impression," Lee answered. Then, as Trimble rose to go, Lee laid his hand on the map and pointed to a little town east of the mountains, Gettysburg by name, from which roads p59 radiated like so many spokes. "Hereabout," he said, "we shall probably meet the enemy and fight a great battle, and if God gives us the victory, the war will be over and we shall achieve the recognition of our independence."25
Bidding the stout-hearted Trimble adieu, Lee turned to the further study of the map and to the administration of the affairs of the 40,000 men who waited in their camps for his word to go forward. Much he had to do, also, for the civilians who came to him freely with the troubles the invasion brought to their households. He dealt with them as considerately as he could, seeking always to promote peace sentiment. One woman who visited headquarters with a request that he make provision for the hungry in Chambersburg remained long enough to ask for his autograph.
"Do you want the autograph of a rebel?" he asked, in surprise.
"General Lee," she retorted, "I am a true Union woman, yet I ask for bread and your autograph."
"It is to your interest," he answered, "to be for the Union, and I hope that you may be as firm in your principles as I am in mine."
Lee told her that his autograph might be a dangerous souvenir for her to possess, but when she insisted, he gave it to her, and turned the conversation to the cruelties of war. His only desire, he said, was that they would let him go home and eat his bread in peace.26
The 28th came, and still no word of the enemy, of Stuart, or of the cavalry that had been left behind to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge. Outwardly, Lee continued calm and cheerful, but inwardly his apprehension rose, and he began to wonder if the absence of reports from Stuart meant that the Federal commander was contemplating an attack on Richmond while the Army of Northern Virginia was above the Potomac.27 However, taking "no news" to mean "no danger,"28 that day he ordered p60 Ewell to pursue his advance on Harrisburg, with Longstreet and probably Hill to follow on the 29th.29
As the day passed without other incident, Lee's wonder at the silence of Stuart increased, and when he retired for the night, it must have been with amazement that an officer who was in the habit of reporting so promptly and regularly should have sent no messenger since the army had crossed the Potomac on the 25th. Stuart had been told plainly that if he found Hooker moving northward, when he was himself sure of the safety of the mountain passes, he was to move into Maryland and take position on Ewell's right. That was Stuart's chief mission and a fundamental of the whole plan of operations, for it was an essential precaution of invasion to keep a heavy cavalry screen between the army and the enemy.
After 10 o'clock on the night of the 28th there came a rap on Lee's tent pole, and when Lee answered, Major John W. Fairfax of Longstreet's staff30 entered and announced that Harrison, one of Longstreet's scouts, had arrived and had brought the startling news that Hooker was north of the Potomac. It seemed so incredible, in the absence of all confirmation, that Lee was skeptical. "I do not know what to do," he said to Fairfax, "I cannot hear from General Stuart, the eye of the army. What do you think of Harrison? I have no confidence in any scout, but General Longstreet thinks a good deal of Harrison."31 Fairfax had no opinion and went his way. Later in the evening, Lee decided to talk with Harrison and sent for him. The scout duly reported — a stoop-shouldered, bearded man •about five feet, eight inches tall, well dressed in civilian clothes, but dusty and very tired.32 The spy said that he had left Longstreet at Culpeper p61 and had gone to Washington, where he had frequented the saloons and had picked up much gossip. Hearing that Hooker had crossed the Potomac, he had started for Frederick, walking at night and mingling with the soldiers during the day. At Frederick he had found two corps of infantry, one to the right and the other to the left of the town. He had heard of a third corps nearby but had not been able to locate it. Having learned that the Army of Northern Virginia was at Chambersburg, he had procured a horse and had hurried northward. On the way to Chambersburg, he had ascertained that two more corps were close to South Mountain. Incidentally, he had heard that General Hooker had been replaced by Lee's old comrade and friend, Major General George Gordon Meade.33
Lee heard Harrison through without a tremor,34 but he was profoundly concerned by the intelligence the spy brought. Hooker on the north side of the Potomac, close to his rear, and not a cavalryman at hand to ascertain whither he was moving! There could hardly have been worse news. Lee had not fully carried out his design of abandoning his communications with Virginia. There had, as yet, been no reason for doing so. Although he did not consider his line to the Potomac open for all purposes, he still believed that if a strong cavalry escort were supplied, he could bring up ammunition from Virginia as long as the Federals were east of South Mountain. But if the Army of the Potomac was already at the foot of that ridge, the new commander would almost certainly cross, move westward and destroy the Confederate communications.35 Not only so, but if the Federals got into Cumberland Valley, they might force Lee to conform and thereby rob him of the initiative, which he must retain for the type of campaign he hoped to conduct. The situation instantly became p62 one of gravity — and because of Stuart's unexplained absence, the army was blindfolded.
Almost as soon, therefore, as Harrison had finished his story, Lee determined on his course of action. The advance of Ewell on Harrisburg must be abandoned; the Second Corps must be recalled; Longstreet's and Hill's orders to march northward must be cancelled; the whole army must be concentrated at once and must be moved east of the mountains so as to compel the Federals to follow and thereby to abandon their threat to Lee's rear.36 As there was no way of ascertaining when Stuart would arrive, Imboden's cavalry, which was operating to the westward, must be called in, and the two mounted brigades that had been left behind in the passes of the Blue Ridge must be brought up immediately.
Orders flew fast.37 A messenger hurried off to Carlisle to recall Ewell.38 Another took the road back to Virginia with orders to Robertson and W. E. Jones to hasten forward.39 By 7:30 A.M. Lee had so far developed his plan that he saw there was danger of delaying the movement by crowding too many troops on the road from Chambersburg eastward, so he modified Ewell's orders and directed him to march directly from Carlisle toward Cashtown or Gettysburg.40 Hill was to use the road that led over the mountains from Chambersburg to these towns, and he was to be followed the next day, June 30, by Longstreet, who was to leave one division to guard the rear until the arrival of Imboden's cavalry.41
The day of the 29th had broken dark and stormy,42 and Lee's feelings were gloomy. As he prepared to mount for the day he saw a former staff officer of Jackson's who had just come up from Virginia, and he eagerly inquired of him if he had any news of Stuart. The officer replied that he had met on the road p63 two cavalrymen who had said that on the 27th they had left Stuart in Prince William County, Virginia. Lee was surprised and visibly disturbed.43 Repeatedly during the day he inquired for additional news of the movements of the cavalry.44 Not a word further did he hear. All Jenkins's troopers were with Ewell; Early had the only other organized unit, White's battalion. Why Jones and Robertson were delayed, Lee did not know. Imboden, who might at least have supplied men for a reconnaissance, was p64 two days' journey away. So completely was Lee stripped of cavalry that the foraging actually had to be done by men mounted on horses from the artillery or the wagon train. But this did not compass the whole of Lee's embarrassment. Not only was he entirely without cavalry for an advance against an enemy who might soon be hanging on his front, but he also was deprived of the presence of Stuart himself, on whom he had been accustomed to rely for information that he had come to value as consistently accurate.45 A Federal visitor found him restless and concerned during the day,46 but later he recovered his poise completely and jestingly told Hood, who came to call: "Ah, General, the enemy is a long time finding us; if he does not succeed soon, we must go in search of him."47 When he went out to walk in the road for exercise, during the afternoon, his outward calm was as complete as ever and he announced quietly to some officers who attended him, "Tomorrow, gentlemen, we will not move to Harrisburg, as we expected, but will go over to Gettysburg and see what General Meade is after."48 When asked for his opinion of the latest change in the command of the Army of the Potomac, he answered that he thought the Federal cause benefited by the promotion of Meade, but that this was counterbalanced by the difficulties that Meade would encounter in taking charge of the forces in the midst of a campaign.49 He said then, or soon thereafter, "General Meade will commit no blunder in my front, and if I make one he will make haste to take advantage of it."50 As Lee spoke, Heth's division of the Third Corps was moving to Cashtown, east of the mountains.51 The advance was slow on account of the rain, and cautious because of the absence of all information concerning the position of the enemy.52
Still with no news from Stuart, Lee speeded up the march on p65 the morning of June 30. Hill went on with Pender to Cashtown,53 and two divisions of Longstreet's corps started on the same road from Chambersburg. Pickett remained behind, according to Lee's plan, to protect the rear until Imboden's arrival; Law's brigade was left on duty at New Guildford;54 and Anderson of Hill's corps, who was encamped at Fayetteville, east of Chambersburg, was directed to move on July 1.55 Lee himself left with Longstreet's troops on the 30th, and about 2 P.M. went into camp at a deserted sawmill near Greenwood, where he intended to wait until the next morning.56
Thus far on the road no enemy had been encountered. Such information as Lee could get from officers and men who had come up from the rear was to the effect that Meade was still at Middletown, about midway between Frederick and Boonsboro, and had not struck his tents to move.57 Late in the evening of the 30th, however, General Hill, who had ridden on to overtake his troops at Cashtown, sent back word that Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division had gone on that day from Cashtown to Gettysburg to procure shoes. Near Gettysburg, Pettigrew had found Federal cavalry, and some of his officers reported that they had heard the roll of infantry drums beyond the town. Having only his brigade with him, and no cavalry support, Pettigrew had not felt justified in advancing farther and had returned to Cashtown.58 Lee could hardly believe this report,59 and even if it were true he could nothing until morning.
Dawn of July 1 broke with a gentle breeze, and was sunshiny and clear, except for occasional showery clouds.60 Anderson's division passed Greenwood early to join its corps, which had spent the night between Cashtown and Gettysburg. Despite the uncertainty, Lee was cheerful and composed, and called to Longstreet to ride with him.61 The men of the First Corps were confident, and as they swung into the road, doubtless every one of them shared the view Lee's adjutant general had expressed in a letter p66 two days before: "With God's help we expect to take a step or two toward an honorable peace."62
•About six miles east of Chambersburg, the head of the First Corps found Johnson's division of Ewell's corps pouring into the road from the northwest, in obedience to Lee's order for a quick concentration. It was a welcome assurance that the greater part of the army would be together for any adventure that lay beyond the mountains; but Johnson's men and their wagons blocked the road, over part of which, first and last, six divisions and the trains and reserve artillery of all three corps had to pass.63 Lee directed Longstreet to halt the First Corps and let Johnson have the road.64
After a short wait, however, Lee proposed that they ride ahead, and, with their staffs, he and Longstreet began to climb the mountain, past the toiling troops of Johnson.65 As they ascended there was audible, above the tramp of horses and the familiar clatter of bayonets against canteens, an occasional distant rumble — artillery! At first Lee imagined that it was simply a brush with cavalry, but his lack of information irritated him. Ordinarily, in Virginia, no sooner would he hear the challenge of distant guns than a courier would ride up with a dispatch from Stuart explaining what was afoot, but now — where was Stuart and what did the firing mean? Lee could not altogether conceal his impatience and admitted frankly that he had been in the dark since he had crossed the Potomac.66
As they approached the crest of the divide, the sound of firing came insistently from the east.67 Lee could restrain himself no longer. Bidding Longstreet farewell,68 he quickened Traveller's pace and hurried on to Cashtown, where he met A. P. Hill,69 sick and very pale.70 Hill knew little, except that Heth's division had gone ahead under instructions not to force an action, if it encountered the enemy, until the rest of the army came up.71 Soon Hill galloped off to see for himself what the cannonade meant.
Hearing that Anderson's division was in the town, together with the reserve artillery of the Third Corps, Lee thought that p67 Anderson might know something further, and he sent for him. As he waited, he listened intently to the sound that drifted sullenly over the rolling hills. He continued to listen for a moment after Anderson came up. Then he said, more to himself than to the General: "I cannot think what has become of Stuart. I ought to have heard from him long before now. He may have met with disaster, but I hope not. In the absence of reports from him, I am in ignorance as to what we have in front of us here. It may be the whole Federal army, it may be only a detachment. If it is the whole Federal force, we must fight a battle here. If we do not gain a victory, those defiles and gorges which we passed this morning will shelter us from disaster."72
Anderson had no information that Lee had not already received. After a few more words, he left Anderson and started onward again toward the sound of the guns, the opening guns of Gettysburg.
1 F. W. Dawson, 91.
3 A. J. L. Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States, New York edition of 1864 (cited hereafter as Fremantle), p236.
4 Fremantle, 235.
5 F. W. Dawson, 91.
6 Leighton Parks, loc. cit.
7 Marginalia, 21.
8 Jacob Hoke: The Great Invasion of 1863 (cited hereafter as Hoke), 160‑62. Hoke stated that Lee arrived about 9 o'clock. If he was correct as to the hour, Lee left Williamsport much earlier than the time, 11 A.M., at which Fremantle had been told he had started north.
9 W. H. Stewart: A Pair of Blankets, 94.
10 Hoke, 169.
11 Fitzgerald Ross: A Visit to the Cities and Camps of the Confederate States (cited hereafter as Ross), 43.
12 26 S. H. S. P., 119.
15 Our Living and Our Dead, vol. 3, pp672‑73; Hoke, 175‑78; Fremantle, 242 ff.
17 Fremantle, 242.
18 F. W. Dawson, 92; Our Living and Our Dead, 3, 673.
19 Hoke, 178.
22 Leighton Parks, loc. cit.; Welch, 58: "I have never seen our army so healthy and in such gay spirits."
24 Leighton Parks, loc. cit.
25 Trimble, in 26 S. H. S. P., 121, said he was confident that he quoted Lee almost verbatim. He wrote, however, probably twenty years after the events and when he was an old man. A copy of the map that Lee used in this campaign is reproduced on a reduced scale as Plate CXVI, No. 2 in the Atlas of the Official Records.
26 Hoke, 197‑99, quoting Lee's interviewer, Mrs. Ellen McLellan, widow of William McLellan of Chambersburg.
27 Marshall, 217.
29 There is some confusion as to Hill's order. He said (O. R., 27, part 2, p606) that he was to move eastward and northeastward to cross the Susquehanna and to seize the railroad connecting Harrisburg and Philadelphia. Longstreet, op. cit., 348, stated that Hill misconstrued his orders on the 28‑29th, but he also noted (ibid., 340), in another reference, that Hill was to follow Ewell's "eastern column," Early's, along the route Hill mentions. Lee simply reported (O. R., 27, part 2, p316), that "orders were . . . issued to move upon Harrisburg." The most probable explanation is that the original orders for Hill to follow Early were suspended during the wait at Chambersburg and that, when he received instructions to move east of the mountains, Hill assumed this advance was in accordance with his former orders.
30 Longstreet, 347.
31 John W. Fairfax to Mrs. James Longstreet, Oct. 12, 1904 — Fairfax MSS.
32 For a description of this mysterious man, see Longstreet in 3 B. and L., 244. In his last version of Harrison's arrival, General Longstreet charged (From Manassas to Appomattox, (p61)347) that Lee refused to see the spy and discredited his report. Colonel Fairfax, loc. cit., was of the same opinion, but Colonel Marshall mentioned casually in his narrative of Gettysburg (op. cit., 218) that he saw Lee sitting and talking with Harrison. General Sorrel said, op. cit., 161, that "the general heard him with great composure and minuteness." Evidently Lee sent for Harrison after Major Fairfax left. The scout may have returned with Sorrel.
33 In his first account of this famous incident (3 B. and L., 250), General Longstreet did not mention the troops that Harrison met near South Mountain, but Marshall's statement of what Lee told him of Harrison's report (op. cit., 219) indicates that Longstreet was correct when he remarked in From Manassas to Appomattox that Harrison had encountered Federals near the mountains.
34 Sorrel, 161.
35 Marshall, 219.
37 Long, 275.
40 O. R., 27, part 3, p943. This letter to Ewell is dated "June 28, 1863 — 7:30 A.M." but there is a note in Lee's letterbook that the text was copied from memory. In the copying, the date was wrongly given. As Doctor McKim has shown in 37 S. H. S. P., 212, the paper was certainly written on the 29th. Mosby's efforts to prove the contrary in his Stuart's Cavalry are unconvincing.
42 Marshall, 225.
43 33 S. H. S. P., 139.
44 Long MS.; 4 S. H. S. P., 156; Taylor's General Lee, 187.
45 H. B. McClellan, 336‑37.
46 Hoke, 205‑6. It is certain that Hoke's informant, Doctor J. L. Suesserott, was guilty of unintentional exaggeration when he wrote in his old age that Lee "with his hands at times clutching his hair, and with contracted brow . . . would walk with rapid strides for •a few rods and then, as if he bethought himself of his action, he would with a sudden jerk produce an entire change in his features and demeanor and cast an enquiring gaze on me, only to be followed in a moment by the same contortions of face and agitation of person."
47 Hood, 55.
48 Longstreet, 383n, quoting Doctor J. S. D. Cullen.
49 Long, 274.
50 Eggleston, 145‑46.
57 4 S. H. S. P., 157.
59 Colonel William Allan, quoted in Marshall, 250.
60 Cooke, 301.
61 Longstreet, 351.
62 Walter H. Taylor, June 29, 1863; Taylor MSS.
63 Alexander, 381.
64 Longstreet, 351‑52.
65 Longstreet, 352.
66 Long, 275.
68 Longstreet, 352.
69 Taylor's Four Years, 92.
70 Fremantle, 254; Cooke, 301‑2.
71 Taylor's Four Years, 93.
72 Anderson, quoted in Longstreet, 357.
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