When April 6, 1917, tossed the American spectators onto the European gridiron, they had not even a high school squad to meet the professionals. The 1916 Defense Act had been merely the promise of a team for which only a few freshmen had reported. The army had no large tactical units in a modern sense, few weapons, a dearth of officers, no experience with trench warfare, little training and less strength. It had 9,750 officers of all grades and experience, while 180,000 of the utmost efficiency were immediately necessary.
On the other hand, it had received a signal blessing in disguise. Few have ever regarded Pancho Villa as a benefactor. But his crossing our border the previous year had given our President the excuse of training a large portion of the Regular Army and about 150,000 National Guardsmen on the Mexican border. The hardening, discipline and schooling in the field were the finest to date for the army and made possible later the ability of the American forces, especially the First, Second, Twenty-sixth and Forty-second Divisions, to turn the tide in March, 1918, in France. There has been much speculation since as to what might have happened had not Mr. Villa done us this temporary or ultimate ill‑turn or favor.
1917 The main antidote to our preparing after declaring came forty days and forty nights after our entry. The Congress executed a single piece of legislation to implement the entire American war effort. It consisted of two main advances: the first equitable draft legislation in our history, and adequate provision for training camps for officers. Major General Leonard Wood had been the army impulse behind the officers' training camps, and Major Douglas MacArthur had been the propulsion for the relief behind the newspapers.
The law caused the regular army to be brought up to full war p464strength by providing immediately the five annual instalments of the 1916 Act. It also authorized drafting into the military service any number of National Guard reserves, who were to be organized under proper officers at once. It allowed an additional force of 500,000 enlisted men to be raised and drafted for a national army, and gave the President authority to increase or decrease the size of the units of the regular army to suit the conditions to be met in Europe. It stipulated that all officers above the grade of colonel were to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. It caused machine‑gun units to be created. This force of 1,000,000 men in round numbers could be called out, organized, and trained as soon as the President saw fit. He was further authorized to raise and maintain by voluntary enlistment not to exceed 4 infantry divisions. The enlisted men for the regular army, if possible, were to be gained by recruiting those who volunteered or by resorting to the selective draft. All other forces were to be raised and maintained by the selective draft exclusively. The whole contingent was to be placed uniformly under the regulations governing the regular army. The President was authorized to raise and maintain in addition any special and technical troops he might deem necessary. It was particularly provided that no bounty should be paid to any one as an inducement to enlist in the regular service. No person was allowed to furnish a substitute. All male persons between the ages of twenty‑one and thirty, except those who were especially exempted by the law, were subject to registration and draft. All officers and enlisted men of the forces raised were to be upon the same footing in regard to pay and allowances as the regular army. All enlisted men of the army of the United States, meaning all the forces obtained under this law, were to have their pay raised.1
p465 The President was also authorized to make regulations concerning the prohibition of alcoholic liquors in or near military camps. He was also virtually required to prevent the setting up of houses of ill fame or brothels within such distances of any camp, station, fort, post, cantonment, training, or mobilization place as he might see fit.
Three days after the President signed this bill, 40,000 civilian candidates for commissions appeared at 16 large cantonments throughout the country — willing, green, and soft. To receive them at each camp were from 10 to 12 regular officers, scattered barracks, a few partially constructed shacks, and the open air. The average instructor had to teach, train, select, and recommend for commission about 150 men in less than three months. Second and third sets of training camps were later set up similarly.
Under such haste and pressure the products were named "90‑day wonders." Although they humorously gave themselves this nickname, probably no nation ever saw any finer contrast assembled. Their performances, despite the limited training their country allowed them, are brilliant pages in the records of the War Department, and their sacrifice because of their limited training lies underneath the crosses in France. But haste characterized the efforts to obtain enlisted men as well as officers.
For the immediate enforcement of the draft law, Major General E. H. Crowder was appointed provost marshal general.
1917 A registration day was at once fixed, and some 4,000 civilian registration boards over the country with a personnel of registrars and assistants to the number of 125,000 were appointed and organized. Registration day saw the enrolment of 10,000,000 names.
The manner of calling out these drafted men was the next problem. A great lottery was established in Washington which fixed the order of call for the whole.
1917 When this feature had been determined, the boards were required to call in the names according to the lists of numbers and have the recruits examined physically in order to complete the first national quota of 687,000 men. Shortly, the selective service system was ready to deliver to the national cantonments 180,000 men. Sept. 1
1917 In less than three months the nation had accepted and vigorously executed without any p466serious friction that miraculous thing in a democracy — a compulsory service law.
To accommodate the organization of these inducted men into divisions for overseas, camps had to be built at once for 41,000 men each. The difficulties presented to the army in construction work were formidable. The enlargement that fell to the lot of the Quartermaster Corps alone was colossal. The country had no rendezvous such as our enemies had had long before the war, because of the denial of such a thing in the previous decades. While the old world had learned to take things pretty much as they are, we were still counting on things as they ought to be.2
As we had no place for a large army here, so we had no maneuver space, possible battlefields, or enough munitions. We had to go beyond the seas for them. There was an insufficiency of training schools and almost a total lack of artillery and airplanes. The government had to adopt the French auto‑gun, machine gun, 37‑millimeter gun, the rifle grenade (V. B.), the 240‑millimeter trench mortar and the Stokes mortar, which were mostly supplied from abroad. Since nearly all of the regular officers had been deprived of experience and of observation of the World War I, the main instruction they could give the candidate was found in pre‑wartime regulations. So many blank forms were necessary that some had to be dug up which dated back to the 80's. The foremost necessity and possibility in the limited time was to instill in young officers the element of discipline and loyalty, if possible. It was impossible to teach young men from all walks of life any deep military technic and art in these short months and under such conditions. There were officers commissioned in the artillery who had never fired a gun, in the ordnance who had never seen an arsenal, and in the infantry who had p467never been in command of men anywhere. This condition was the fault of no single person but rather the mass of the country during the preceding five years.3
Scarcely had this Selective Service bill become a law, when
1917 General Pershing in command of the American Expeditionary Forces sailed with 53 officers and 146 enlisted men from the United States. June 26
1917 The next contingent to arrive in France was the division under Major General William L. Sibert consisting of the Sixteenth, Eighteenth, Twenty-sixth and Twenty-eighth Infantry, together with the Fifth Marines. Most of these units had but a month before been guarding the Mexican border. They were practically all the trained troops in the country that could be put at war strength and sent abroad. Sept.
1917 It was not until much later that other divisions began to arrive.
1918 At the beginning of the next year 1,325,000 men had been enrolled. Forty‑two divisions had been organized, 8 of which were Regulars, 17 National Guard and 17 National Army. Out of these only 6 had been landed in France. Only 4 on French soil could be classified as fighting divisions by having completed their training abroad. They were the First and Second Divisions p468of Regulars and the Twenty-sixth and Forty-second Divisions of National Guard.
Since these units had exhausted the first quota of men called to the colors, General Crowder had to draft the remainder of the Class 1 men, while the War Department was setting in motion plans for other training camps. The effort on this side of the waters grew acceleratingly to fill General Pershing's requests for more and more supplies and men. But to get them over there was another story.
Throughout the year, transportation was an intricate problem with little tonnage on hand and with a sea infested with submarines. Both the general staff and the ports of embarkation were taxed to the extreme. 1918 It was not until the middle of the summer of our second year that facilities were brought into full swing toward bearing troops across the Atlantic.
Could an American army of any size be transported to France, properly staffed, organized, and made of any consequence in the fight? Such was the challenge to General Pershing. Many Allied generals and others were highly skeptical of such a possibility. Indeed, it appeared they were right when not a fraction of physical aid arrived on the Western Front until
1917 seven months after our declaration, and then but 1 regiment, the Eleventh Engineers at Passchendaele Ridge. Jan. 19
1918 Over nine months after we entered the war a division, the First, took over a quiet sector north of Toul. Similarly, a month later the Twenty-sixth Division appeared at Soissons and the Forty-second near Lunéville. Mar. 18
1918 The following month the Second went into line near Verdun, over eleven months after our entry — and, except for the excellent achievements of the small body of engineers, we had really not yet entered the fight. The French and British were disappointed and resentful. The American strength was a myth. In addition, General Pershing, following instructions with a steadfast backbone, was holding aloof in order to organize an American army instead of amalgamating in small groups with the British and French.
Whereas our late aid had been the fault of the American people in their habitual supineness before all our wars, General Pershing's reluctance to fight on any other conditions than as an American army was the wisest course in the long run because
p469of the morale and genius of our people. To be known as part of a British or French unit was nausea to the American soldier. Yet both the tardiness of active entry and the aloofness until we were organized and trained as an army were plain betrayals in the eyes of our Allies. The American soldiers professed much but did little.
1918 Already there were a quarter of a million of them in France. And wasn't it nearly a year since they had been so noisy about the Yanks coming?
General Pershing saw the serious consequences and compromised temporarily.
1918 When the German assaults made more reserves a question of victory or defeat, he placed his forces unhesitatingly at the disposal of Marshal Foch. May 28
1918 The organization of a distinct American army languished, but the heroic actions of the First Division at Cantigny, the Second and Third Divisions at Château-Thierry June 4‑
1918 and the Second Division at Belleau Woods, Bouresches and Vaux put an end to any question as to the effectiveness of American troops.
Although General Pershing promptly turned over his units to Marshal Foch, he tenaciously clung to the formation of a separate army whenever it could be safely achieved.
1918 He had by mid‑summer taken pains to organize four army corps, the I, II, III and IV.4 June 6
1918 In early summer he had gained permission from Marshal p470Pétain to form an American army corps on the Château-Thierry front. Between then and midsummer he had worked vigorously on building the First American Army, which was completed in time for the next big offensive. July 24
1918 The day after he took over his organized army headquarters, it was decided in a conference of Allied commanders-in‑chief that the St. Mihiel salient should be reduced. General Pershing's First Army was assigned the principal tas. The bitter contentions and recriminations of over a year were to be buried under the fruits of persistence and weight of American solidarity. Aug. 10
1918 The First Army was secretly concentrated on that front, Liggett's I Corps along the southern face or right side of the triangle, Dickman's IV Corps extending that side to the left, French divisions occupying the apex, and Cameron's V corps well up on the other side.5 It was a steam-shovel movement with the French at the hinge.
1918 In about twenty-four hours after the jump‑off, the First and Twenty-sixth Divisions of the IV and V Corps respectively, met in the middle of the sector, and with the other divisions cut off the bulk of the Germans in the point of the salient, capturing p47116,000 prisoners and much war material. The efficiency, celerity and success of the attack completely vindicated the formation and power of an American army.
Concurrently with the preparations for the St. Mihiel offensive went those for the Meuse-Argonne region. That theater had already been chosen by General Pershing for the fall offensive.
1918 Fifteen divisions were moved thence, including seven that had been in the St. Mihiel battle.
Nov. 1‑11 The three phases of the offensive are well described in various histories of World War I — how the progress of the American soldiers went steadily forward in the face of mud, morass, cooties, machine‑gun hornets, and every harrowing device and obstacle known to the cunning of the Germans — how in the last phase Pershing's armies threatened the German supply lines through Sedan — how intrepidity and desire scrambled certain units in their high endeavor to be the first to reach that city — Nov. 11
1918 and how the very threat was the deciding factor which produced the Armistice.
Similarly, there have been described actions of American forces on other fronts.
1920 Major General William S. Graves' Siberian expedition, consisting mainly of the Twenty-seventh and Thirty-first Infantry, with its three-fold mission of guarding military stores, aiding the Czechs, and helping the Russians, while keeping free from Russian politics, presented cross-currents even more intricate than those of General Pershing in Mexico. With his expedition part of the time under Japanese command, furiously set upon by the Ogre of Chita, double-crossed by supposed Allies, the story of his help to the Czechs and extrication from his unhappy mission is one of the epics of defense against chameleon friend and foe in a far country.
1918 Likewise to aid the Czechs, 143 officers and 4,344 enlisted men of the Eighty-fifth Division then arriving overseas, were sent under Lieutenant Colonel George E. Stewart6 from England to Archangel, North Russia. Sept.
1919 The small force was stretched over •450 miles, in most dismal, lonely, arctic fighting. Its numbers were more than decimated by casualties. Fighting under p472British command its exploits have been obscured and its heroism little exploited. April 9
1919 Later, Brigadier General Wilds P. Richardson7 assumed command. Leaving
1919 The whole force was held in Russia over six months after the Armistice.
On other fronts, the American soldier likewise distinguished himself. The II Corps under Major General George W. Read advanced •about 15 miles and
1918 pierced the Hindenburg Line near Le Cateau. The Second and Thirty-sixth Divisions in succession assaulted Mont Blanc between Rheims and the Argonne successfully and advanced •nearly fourteen miles to the Aisne River. Oct. 2‑Oct. 10
1918 Aiding the Sixth French Army in Belgium, the Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first Divisions with the artillery of the Twenty-eighth, by dauntless attacks, Oct. 30‑Nov. 3
1918 drove the enemy beyond the Escaut and to the Scheldt rivers.a
to Armistice Often forgotten is the work of the Three hundred and Thirty-second Infantry on the Italian front and its aid of the Italians against the Austrians, especially at the crossing of the Piave.
To commemorate the work of the Services of Supply would occupy a volume in itself. Its personnel of 644,540 at the time of the Armistice and its handling of eight million tons of munitions of every type from weapons to beans during the operations gives but a suggestion of the expanse of its task for more than two million men. The value, amount, and importance of its buying, handling, and transportation made it the world's largest single business undertaking up to that time.
Too many times shortages from the United States both in material and manpower hampered the A. E. F. in general and the S. O. S. in particular. The supply of trucks and ambulances was embarrassingly low for the need in midsummer of 1918. Hastily made transportation like the Camion and Caledon were frequently too simplified and undependable. The replacements necessary for building up units to efficient strength caused new p473divisions arriving from the United States to be broken up for such purpose. Esprit and efficiency suffered appreciably for these and similar reasons.
Many of these defects were remedied by the time of the Armistice, when the United States was in a fair way to become militarily competent in its own right.
In retrospect, the war held much that should shame us now. The training of officers and soldiers had to be scant in too many instances. Inexperience and lack of knowledge incident to haste produced in themselves undue loss of life and munitions. Soldiers had to be placed on the line when many of them had not had time to know the use of the weapons they were handling. The assignment of officers and men to the multifarious duties of a modern army could not be made with sufficient appropriateness in the time allotted. Laundrymen in the ordnance department, engineers in the quartermaster corps, mechanics in the infantry, electricians in the provost marshal general's department and lawyers in the signal corps felt themselves to be square pegs in round holes. Had there been opportunity beforehand, had all organization not been compelled to be jammed together toward one, immediate, life-and‑death end, men who were found inefficient in their assigned tasks would have been superior in their particular bent, as they sometimes were when accident or fortune allowed the transfer.
Promotion, too, had to be haphazard when there could exist no agencies for the proper classification of officers and men. As a rule, there were no coördinating offices that could thoroughly check up recommendations, because such an elaborate system had to give place in the rush to more important considerations. To the degree that a nation is late in its discipline and training, to that extent must the sufferings of the individual be increased.
So must the country's extravagances. Having thrust aside sufficient airplane manufacture and manipulation before the war,
1917 Congress hurriedly voted the sum of $44,250,000 after the outbreak of American hostilities. At this time we had altogether 55 serviceable aëroplanes, of which 51 were obsolete and 4 others nearly so. July
1917 A joint army and navy board then made a program for obtaining 19,775 planes, at which Congress, believing money to be the panacea for all ills, voted $640,000,000. Time was required p474in selecting models and in having the machines built. In the spring of the next year it was announced that we were short of aircraft. Where had the money gone? 1918 An investigation was ordered, which came to nothing after 17,000 pages of testimony had been taken down. As a matter of fact, the planes, irrespective of business methods, could not be had in so short a time, a fact which might have been obvious before the investigation. April
1918 One year after the declaration of war, we had in our service abroad only 1 pursuit and 2 observation squadrons of French planes flown by American pilots who had served in the French Army before we came into the conflict. America with its own craft could not before the Armistice have had superiority in the air over the enemy. The story of those vital guns, the 3‑inch field pieces, is about the same in character as that of the aëroplanes. We could not get them in time and therefore were put to the humiliating necessity of making inroads on the French supply of 75‑millimeter weapons. Vast sums appropriated for materials had to be spent when values had risen to many times the height they had stood before 1917 and when it was impossible to get delivery of the quantity to be purchased. As a result, a large proportion of the money voted was poured later into the bilge of post-bellum activities. Meanwhile General Pershing lacked many weapons and machines for effective fighting. Although the quartermaster department executed a prodigious task in constructing great cantonments over the country in the few months allotted it, the buildings and surroundings were not all that could have been expected of them, had our contractors and builders had opportunity for such work a year before the war. Cold and dampness were felt most keenly. Clothing, too, as was the case with weapons and machines, could not be had in sufficient quantities.
1918 But in addition to all these drawbacks of hurry, a greater fact now stands out in bold relief. It took us over a year after we had entered the war to get into any real offensive against the enemy. And then, General Pershing could muster on the Western Front only 6 completely trained divisions in contrast to the 160 that our Allies had placed there. During the first year of our participation in the World War, we could bear no physical aid in the fighting. Even considering the difficulties of transportation p475overseas, it is conceded that we could have been a great factor in stemming the German tide sooner and could have saved thousands of lives and dollars lost during our delay for training purposes, had we as a nation been imbued with discipline and knowledge in the beginning.
To cap all, the selective draft revealed that almost half of the young manhood of our country was either defective or unfit for fighting.8 Had a large percentage of our youth had the opportunity for the development best accorded in military camps, and had such exercises been carried on even for limited periods before the war, no one can doubt that this appalling figure would have been materially reduced. Meanwhile the boy would ordinarily have become more commercially efficient and a more self-reliant citizen.
Facing the problem of building an army on the rotten ruins of smug apathy looked many times hopeless and hapless to Pershing. But in spite of the brakes put on his efforts he did build a mighty fighting machine, which when it reached its peak had to be torn apart and taken down.
Three major tasks confronted the former A. E. F.: to occupy its part of Germany and hold it; to clean up in France, and to demobilize both in France and America.
1918 The first task was put into execution with Pershing's customary celerity. Six days after the Armistice, the Third Army, commanded by Major General Joseph T. Dickman, began its march into Germany. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Thirty-second, and Forty-second Divisions had had no time for rest from the recent battles before the long, wintry marches began into enemy territory. The army established a bridgehead at Coblenz with advance headquarters at Treves. Nov. 22
1918 Later the VII Corps under Major General William M. Wright, consisting of the Fifth, Eighty-ninth, and Ninetieth Divisions, was added to the army. The difficulties in occupied territory were many. The situation was novel for American troops, who acquitted themselves on the whole with dignity, decorum, and decency. The curious factor in this efficient effort was that the army had more trouble with its Allies than with its former enemies.
July 2, 3
1919 In midsummer of the next year it was found expedient to dissolve the Third Army as an army and replace it next day with the name of the American Forces in Germany. Major General Henry T. Allen was designated its commander.9 June 28
1919 Decreasing necessity for such an army among former enemies in Europe became apparent after the Treaty of Versailles. Little by little troops were returned to the United States because control in occupied territory seemed less needed especially by a highly disciplined and weakened people. Five divisions left before fall. Jan. 27
1923 Accordingly, General Allen withdrew the last of his American troops and turned the territorial command over to General Marty, commanding the French troops, four years after the Armistice.
The second problem in France, though little mentioned, was no light one. The Armistice suddenly reversed the whole process of the S. O. S. Men and supplies headed in had suddenly to be headed out. The current and slope of the stream had to be reversed. Construction had to give place to demolition. Over two million men were clamoring for discharge and home.
But there were chores in Europe still to do. Thousands of soldiers had to be repatriated, thousands had to be held against their will, surplus supplies had to be disposed of, myriads of claims had to be adjusted with a temperamental and exacting people, cemeteries had to be surveyed, improved, and reorganized, and a general overhaul and liquidation of the immense A. E. F. had to take place in an efficient and businesslike way. It was a delicate, unlovely, and critical task.
1919 Many of these functions were begun and carried into execution by G. H. Q. of the A. E. F. However, it was dissolved and went home eight months after Armistice. The natural successor to this work was the S. O. S., which had borne the brunt of many of these undertakings. Accordingly, its former chief of staff, Brigadier General W. D. Connor, was selected as chief of the American Forces in France, and all troops there were placed under his command. With dwindling forces and oft‑times increasing difficulties, he carried on the work of leaving the American establishments with no bad trails or smells. Jan. 11
1920 It was not until p477well over a year after the Armistice that he and the last of Americans in France could leave the country after having accomplished a clean‑up of extraordinary self-respect.
The third problem confronted us here in our own country. The involved executive labor and burdens of demobilization which fell upon the shoulders of General Peyton C. March, the chief of staff of the army in the United States, are too often overlooked. The war, of course, in its character, as compared with previous wars, was unique. The immense size of modern armies entailed more complicated systems of supply and broader bases of industrial support at home. A war of position demanded a great outlay of ammunition and elaborate engineering. The advance in invention had caused complicated weapons to appear, whose use was little known at the beginning and whose attributes had to be learned by a multitude of new officers without any familiarity with that sort of thing before 1917.
After nineteen months of concentration of all national activities to one end, that of the production, upbuilding and maintenance of an effective war machine, it was necessary not only to tear down the structures in Siberia, Russia, and France, but to see that the consequent efflux did not interrupt activities in the United States. The welfare of the army and the country demanded that definite provision should be made for the wise distribution of men returned to civilian life. Economic and industrial conditions were absolutely dependent on the manner in which over two million soldiers were thrown back into employment or unemployment. Congestion of idle ex‑soldiers in large cities had to be prevented. Positions had to be assured for discharged men. The disposal of surplus stocks of supply and material had to be judiciously watched.
1919 In spite of the very delicate problems surrounding the discharge of these men, the Chief of Staff in this country had, within two months after the Armistice, demobilized 732,766 men. Feb. 15
1919 In a period of three months and four days afterward, he had methodically discharged 1,246,374 from the service — over twice as many as had been returned home during the same period after the Civil War. Not quite six months after the Armistice nearly two million men had been mustered out with little or no disturbance to business. The strength of the army of the United p478States10 on the day of the Armistice totaled 3,670,888 officers and men. By the middle of the next year 2,723,515 officers and men had been returned to civil life. June 28
1919 The gigantic labor involved in this massive undertaking required a discernment and management that can scarcely be estimated.
While on the one side these forces had to be disbanded skillfully, on the other they should not become civilians in such wholesale numbers as would leave the regular forces with no strength. Would the training of the country, as after all our other wars, be thrown into the discard? To add to the embarrassment, many officers and enlisted men of the permanent establishment had already become parts of organizations due for demobilization. Such a scheme had been found necessary in order to infiltrate an experienced personnel into those units which had had comparatively little training. To what were they to be transferred and what classes were to be absorbed? How many were to be retained and what were the inducements?
Certain factors helped to gain sympathetic and progressive answers to these questions. A vast proportion of the population of the country had actually been in the war or closely allied with it. The hardships and low rates of pay in comparison to the relative ease and high wages at home were generally recognized as unfair. Understanding the needs of soldiers was widespread.
1 "All enlisted men of the Army of the United States in active service whose base pay does not exceed $21 per month shall receive an increase of $15 per month; those whose base pay is $24, an increase of $12 per month; those whose base pay is $31, $36, or $40, an increase of $8 per month; and those whose base pay is $45 or more, an increase of $6 per month: provided, That the increases of pay herein authorized shall not enter into the computation of the continuous-service pay."
2 This principle is illuminated by an incident of an ordnance company arriving in France in 1918. It was marched after reaching Brest to the famous "Caserne de ." Two of the enlisted men speedily found their quarters and ambled through the historic barracks from which Rochambeau's men had started for America over 130 years before. Accustomed to the hasty, wooden shacks of Camp Merritt, they were astonished at the massive stone living quarters of the French Army. One of them remarked, "Its queer how these French regard war as a permanent institution." It was fortunate for America it was allowed this point of view, or was it? (For this anecdote and comment the author is indebted to Dr. Randolph G. Adams, Director of the William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, who was the private.)
3 Much has had to be said on the previous pages of this history concerning what Congress has or has not done at various times. If those facts have amounted to criticism of that body, they are not to be so construed. Our nation has a representative form of government in which the legislator often becomes the echo of his constituents. According to our system he also has to work under the lashes of the whips of his party, or stand alone as a sort of and be discounted, even stultified. So it would be manifestly unjust to rail at Congress for its blunders, when the people are responsible entirely for its systems and oftentimes its votes. Albeit if the whole public wanted a project intensely and vigorously enough, Congress would ordinarily vote for it. Unfortunately active minorities have too frequently overwhelmed negative majorities. A constructive view was stated by a great legislator and statesman to his constituents: "Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a Representative to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him; their opinion high respect; their business unremitted attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs; and above all, ever and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his own. But, his unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you; to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the Law and the Constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your Representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement; and he betrays instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion." (Edmund Burke, Speech at his arrival at Bristol and at the conclusion of the Poll, p14. London, 1774, J. Wilkie, publisher.)
4 General Pershing directed on Jan. 15, 1918 that Major General Hunter Liggett form the I Army Corps at Neufchâteau, giving him his staff (Lieutenant Colonel Malin Craig, chief of staff) and corps troops. General Pershing on Feb. 20, 1918, appointed Lieutenant Colonel George S. Simonds chief of staff of the II Corps, which was to comprise the American troops in the British area, and charged him with evolving the organization of corps headquarters and troops and the amalgamation of the units under American commanders; Major General George W. Read was its first commander, June 13, 1918. Similarly on March 30, 1918, Pershing designated Lieutenant Colonel Alfred W. Bjornstad as chief of staff of the III Corps with duties for our troops on the French front akin to Colonel Simonds' duties for the British; Major General William M. Wright assumed command June 17, 1918. On June 10, 1918, General Pershing designated Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Heintzelman as chief of staff of the IV Corps, to organize it and to relieve the I Corps at Neufchâteau June 21; he appointed Major General Joseph T. Dickman as corps commander, August 16, 1918. On July 7, 1918, General Pershing appointed Major General William M. Wright in command of the new V Corps and the next day Colonel Wilson B. Burtt as its chief of staff. The old III Corps became the new V Corps, except that the staff moved to the aid of the organization of the First American Army. On July 23, General Pershing appointed Major General Omar Bundy as temporary commander of the new VI Corps, and on July 30 he appointed Colonel Briant H. Wells as its chief of staff. On August 16, 1918, General Pershing designated Major General William M. Wright as temporary corps commander of the new VII Corps and appointed Major General George H. Cameron in command of the vacated V Corps. The VIII Corps was formed November 26, 1918, after the Armistice, with Major General Henry T. Allen as commander and Colonel George C. Marshall, Jr., as chief of staff. On November 16, 1918, General Pershing appointed Brigadier General William K. Naylor as chief of staff of the IX Corps and on November 18, Major General Adelbert Cronkhite as corps commander. The headquarters began to function on November 25 at Ligny-en‑Barrois after the Armistice.
5 This was the First Army of which General Pershing initially took command and which Lieutenant Colonel Hugh A. Drum, as its chief of staff, had started to organize July 4, 1918. General Pershing relinquished command on October 16 and turned it over to Major General Hunter Liggett, who became a Lieutenant General on November 1 and retained command until Apr. 20, 1919. Colonel Drum became a brigadier general on October 14 and retained his position as chief of staff until April 16, 1919. The Second Army was started when General Pershing appointed Colonel Stuart Heintzelman to organize it as its chief of staff, September 9, 1918. Major General Robert L. Bullard became its first commander, October 12, 1918. He was promoted to lieutenant general November 1, 1918, and remained in command until April 15, 1919. Colonel Heintzelman was promoted to brigadier general October 13 and remained as chief of staff until April 15, 1919. The Third Army was ordered to be formed November 7, 1918, but was not begun until after the Armistice, on November 15, 2 n. Major General Joseph T. Dickman took command. He remained in that capacity until April 28, 1919, when Major General Edward F. McGlachlin, Jr., took command, relinquishing it to Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett, May 2, 1919, who retained it until July 2. The Third Army's chief of staff was Brigadier General malin Craig from November 15, 1918, to July 2, 1919.
6 Later Colonel. See Dupuy's Perish by the Sword.
7 Later Major General. A curious expedition of railway troops consisting of the One Hundred and Sixty-seventh Operation and One Hundred and Sixty-eighth Maintenance Companies under Major Edward E. MacMorland, Coast Artillery Corps, was put under General Richardson's administration for the purpose of operation and maintenance work on the Murmansk-Petrograd Railway. It arrived at Murmansk March 25, 1919. Operating some "broniviki," the expedition took part in minor engagements as the troops advanced to Lake Onega, •about 600 miles. This contingent started for home July 28, 1919.
8 Out of 2,750,000 young men examined 46.8 per cent could not pass the physical test for front-line soldiers.
9 The troops were the same except that the III Corps had been turned over to the S. O. S., July 1, 1919, for return to the United States.
10 Nov. 5, 1918, the national army, National Guard and regular army were known under the single name of the Army of the United States.
a Sic: but this is the same river under two names, French and Flemish.
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