The Pasha of Tripoli had in the meantime apparently become convinced that he was to receive no satisfactory concessions from the United States, for during the month of April, 1801, he not only hastened the preparation of a stronger naval force but would have little communication with Consul Cathcart.1 The latter therefore busied himself in despatching letters which warned Americans throughout the Mediterranean against sailing without convoy.2 "I am at this moment in a crisis," he wrote on May 13; "If our flagstaff should be taken down tomorrow, you will see me in about forty days afterwards. The Pasha has it not in his power to keep me unless in jail."3 On the following day Yusuf formally declared war in the manner indicated above; whereupon Cathcart entrusted the oversight of United States affairs to the Danish consul, Nicholas C. Nissen, and departed from Tripoli.4
On July 1, Commodore Dale reached Gibraltar. Here he found at quarantine two Tripolitan vessels commanded by Murad Reis, a notorious pirate. Although this individual protested that he was not on a cruise for Americans, Dale became convinced that he was, and therefore left the "Philadelphia," Captain Samuel Barron, to prevent the escape of the corsairs.5
p107 After leaving Gibraltar the Commodore proceeded to Algiers. Here he found a considerable amount of dissatisfaction on account of non‑payment of annuities. Consul O'Brien was certain that the appearance of the American frigate at such an opportune time would have a more beneficial effect upon the Dey than would the coming of a storeship. Curiously enough, however, the consul did not think the time propitious for negotiations with the Dey for a commutation of naval stores to a money payment.6 The desirability of such a commutation had been emphasized by the Secretary of State in his instructions to O'Brien,7 and it would seem that, if the Dey had been greatly impressed by the arrival of the American flagship, it would have been well to seek immediately a modification of the stipulation. It would appear, too, that O'Brien had brought little or no pressure to bear on the Dey to make good his guarantee that the Pasha would abide by the treaty of 1796.8 If any extenuation for this omission be required, it is to be found in evidence which the Dey had already provided that his guarantee was worthless. In January, 1801, when Cathcart was surrounded by difficulties at Tripoli, the Dey wrote to Yusuf in the interest of the United States; but immediately thereafter informed O'Brien that the latter must pay him for this service.9 In April the Dey despatched a second letter;10 yet in May the United States flag at Tripoli came down. By July 22 a third letter had proved to be equally valueless, the reason being, according to the Algerine ministry, p108 that "the United States would not aid said letter with money."11
Proceeding eastward on his tour of inspection, Dale next stopped at Tunis. Here he delivered to Eaton a letter informing him of the motives which had actuated the sending of a naval squadron into the Mediterranean, and instructing him to inform the Bey that a vessel was being fitted out in America to transport "the regalia due to him."12 On the day after Dale's arrival the "Essex" appeared, convoying an American vessel, the "Grand Turk." Inasmuch as the Bey had been expressing a great deal of displeasure about the treatment which the United States had accorded him, Eaton and Dale anticipated that the arrival of these vessels would have a beneficial effect upon him.13 That some such influence was sorely needed is evidenced by a number of the Bey's demands. On April 15, he had written a letter to the President requisitioning cannon to the number of forty twenty-four pounders, and forty other pieces.14 During the following month he had told Eaton that first the United States did not settle Tunisian claims against them within four months, he would send the American consul away from Tunis.15 In June, after a fire had destroyed fifty thousand stands of arms belonging to him, the Bey proportioned the loss "among his friends," and allotted the providing of ten thousand stands to the United States.16
p109 The Commodore reached Tripoli July 24, 1801, and, in the absence of an American representative in that city, communicated with the Pasha through Mr. Nissen, the Danish Consul.17 The Pasha wanted to know whether Dale desired peace or war, to which the Commodore replied that his "intentions in the first instance were friendly; but the act of his excellency in declaring war against the United States had put that disposition out of [his] power." He would, therefore, capture the Pasha's vessels and subjects at every opportunity. He wished to learn, however, on what grounds the Pasha had gone to war and on what principles he expected to make peace. The Pasha's answer he promised to communicate to the government of the United States for its consideration inasmuch as he himself did not have the authority to make peace.18 To this the Pasha replied that his objections had been to the provisions of the old treaty which related to the Dey of Algiers. The subsequent negotiations of necessity accomplished little. Dale captured a number of the Pasha's subjects, and succeeded in exchanging them for six Americans who had been imprisoned in Tripoli. In the meantime his provisions were running low and sickness was quite prevalent on board; consequently he soon lifted the blockade and returned to Gibraltar.19 Throughout the remainder of the year little was accomplished by his squadron beyond blockading the two Tripolitan vessels at Gibraltar and providing convoy for merchantmen.20
The outstanding American achievement in the Mediterranean during the first year of the war was the capture of a Tripolitan polacca by Lieutenant Andrew Sterrett p110 and crew of the schooner "Enterprise." A bitterly-contested three hour engagement on August 1 preceded the capture. The opposing forces were evenly matched but the skillful maneuvering of the "Enterprise" prevented the pirates from blockading her, and enabled her gunners to deliver broadsides which the enemy could not withstand. The polacca was captured; most of her equipment was thrown overboard; then in her battered condition she was permitted to limp back to Tripoli. Arriving there her commander had showered upon him many indignities, not least of which was a bastinadoing.21
On the day that Sterrett won his brilliant victory, William Eaton wrote that he had, upon his own responsibility, declared Tripoli to be in a state of blockade. He wished, therefore, to secure the Commodore's approval of this measure, which was creating a furor in Tunis.22 To this Commodore Dale replied that he heartily approved of Eaton's action;23 then when he subsequently visited Tunis, instructed him "to keep up the colour of a blockade." How Eaton fulfilled his instructions he tells us in the following words: "I kept the enemy three months in a state of blockade when we had not a ship of war within three hundred leagues from his port; his chief commerce and whole supplies of provisions depending on Tunis, and my passports still being withheld."24
While Eaton was thus maintaining his "paper blockade," he and Cathcart were planning a revolutionary stroke of great proportions. It comprehended, in brief, the employment of the ruling Pasha's brother, Hamet Karamanli, to secure three objects: (1) The Commodore's ship would be used to convey Hamet to Constantinople where he would secure recognition from the Sultan p111 as the lawful ruler of Tripoli; and, in the meantime, United States agents accompanying him would conclude a treaty with Turkey. (2) The American Mediterranean squadron would then support Hamet's military operations in Tripoli by attacking his brother from the sea, and, as a result of these combined efforts, the usurper would be dethroned. (3) Hamet would in the meantime become so obligated to the United States by virtue of these services that a protection of American interests throughout his dominions would be made permanently secure.25
After Eaton had outlined this plan to the Secretary of State, he went to Naples and there obtained permission from the King of Sardinia for the United States to obtain supplies at Sardinian ports; then in February, 1802, he returned to Tunis upon receipt of news that Hamet was on the verge of accepting an offer to assume the governorship of the province of Derne. Such a move on Hamet's part, thought Eaton, would seal the exile's fate, for he would probably be murdered soon after returning to Tripolitan territory. Again at Tunis, Eaton explained this apprehension to Hamet, who finally agreed to refuse his brother's offer and to await developments at Malta. Eaton in the meantime had secured the coöperation of the chief minister of Tunis by promising him ten thousand dollars in the event of success in accomplishing a revolution at Tripoli. To Cathcart Eaton wrote that if the plan succeeded, Yusuf would have to pay the Sapitapa, and the United States would "gain a million"; if it failed, there would be no loss "on either side."26
p112 In the spring of 1802 steps were taken by the United States government to carry on the war with greater vigor than that which had marked the operations of the preceding year. Since the term for which the men under Dale's command had enlisted would soon expire, a relief squadron was formed and sent to the Mediterranean under the command of Commodore Richard V. Morris.27 The Commodore's first instructions were issued on February 18 and March 20. They directed him to wage war against Tripoli; to respect the rights of other nations; to send prizes to the United States; to exchange prisoners if possible; to aid Americans who might be in need; and to make whatever distribution and disposition of his forces he might think necessary. Later instructions, dated April 20, but not reaching the Mediterranean until July, stated that the President thought the time favorable to open peace negotiations with the Pasha. Morris was at this time directed to coöperate with Cathcart, who had been given authority to conclude a treaty of peace; by August 28, however, such coöperation was made merely optional.28 To Cathcart the Secretary of State wrote, on April 18, that it was desirable to have the first overtures p113 come from the Pasha, and that for such an event the consul should allow to elapse a reasonable amount of time. If the Pasha did not then voluntarily make overtures, Cathcart should seek to open negotiations. All expectations on the Pasha's part of obtaining "the smallest contribution . . . as the price of peace," the consul should proceed to stifle.29
Before all of Morris's relief squadron reached the Mediterranean certain circumstances indicated that in Tripoli the war was not popular. In December, 1801, Eaton reported that he had learned from the Danish Commodoreº that the Tripolitans were eager for peace and for "the restoration of their rightful sovereign, who is a mild man of peaceful disposition."30 In January the Algerine ministry proposed to Consul O'Brien that inasmuch as a Tripolitan envoy was then at Algiers the time was auspicious to establish peace through Algerine mediation. These advisers informed O'Brien, however, that the proposed negotiations would of necessity involve some expense on the part of the United States. The consul replied that his government had "had sufficient of the bad faith of Tripoli," and would pay nothing for a treaty of peace.31 In March it was reported that there was a shortage of provisions in Tripoli; that storms had wrecked a number of Tripolitan vessels; that many Arabs within the Pasha's dominions had rebelled; and that the chief admiral had p114 deserted his ships.32 Similar despatches were sent from Barbary during the succeeding months.33 In May the chief minister of the Bey of Tunis approached Eaton with a proposal for Tunisian mediation. Like the Algerine offer it was accompanied with a request for money, to grant which Eaton considered as inadmissible. The minister assured him that there could be nothing dishonorable about giving a present to the government of Tripoli, particularly since it could "not subsist without the generosity of . . . friends." Eaton's answer was that the Pasha had by his actions forfeited his right to American friendship; the matter was at this point permitted to drop.34
On May 25 Commodore Morris arrived at Gibraltar, and there he found it expedient to remain until late in August. This action was dictated by a number of circumstances: the necessity for refitting the flagship, "Chesapeake"; delay in receiving expected instructions; the need of one or more vessels to blockade a Tripolitan cruiser at Gibraltar;35 and the menacing utterances of the Emperor of Morocco. The last-named item occasioned considerable alarm although Muley Soliman did not, in January, 1801, have a single vessel of war afloat. At that time, however, two frigates were under construction at one of the Moroccan ports.36
p115 The dissatisfaction of the Emperor was primarily due to the war with Tripoli, which prevented his sending grain to the people of that State. In February, 1802, a Tripolitan ambassador requested permission to send wheat to Tripoli, and received a favorable reply. The ambassador also sought aid in securing the release of the vessel blockaded at Gibraltar, and again received an affirmative answer, the Emperor consenting "to give a crew and provisions for that purpose."37 The matter was thereupon referred to Commodore Dale who refused to grant passports in either case.38 Morris pursued the same course of action, justifying it to Consul Simpson on the ground that it would be absurd to maintain a blockade if vessels were permitted to take supplies into the blockaded area. Although Simpson thought the withholding of passports in the case of Morocco unwise, he found the Commodore impervious to his arguments.39
As a result of the uncompromising attitude of Dale and Morris the Emperor declared war upon the United States. Simpson received the news on June 22, and three days later he crossed over to Gibraltar. A general warning was issued to merchantmen bound for the Mediterranean to sail to Cadiz and there to await convoy.40
This precautionary step had hardly been taken when word was received from the Emperor that Simpson would be permitted to return to Tangier for a period of six months during which time there might be effected a settlement p116 of points in dispute.41 The consul returned to his post; and soon thereafter received from the Secretary of State a letter informing him that the President had decided to send the Emperor a present of one hundred gun carriages, for which the latter had at various times expressed a desire.42 Simpson communicated this information by special messenger to the ruler, who soon thereafter appeared somewhat mollified; consequently on August 16 Morris received word from Simpson that peace had been restored.43 The following day he left one frigate, the "Adams," at Gibraltar and spent the remainder of the year in providing convoy and in having the "Chesapeake" repaired. He appears to have made no attempt to blockade Tripoli, and, on account of there having been an abundant harvest there, he authorized Simpson to issue passports to the Emperor's grain vessels.44
Throughout the entire period of the war Americans had carried on an extensive Mediterranean trade. In July, 1801, Cathcart wrote that "Many of our merchants and captains dispute the consul's authority to detain their vessels in port notwithstanding the national consequences of their capture being fully explained to them."45 Many other letters of a similar character represented the volume p117 of trade as being quite large, and requested that the executive take steps to restrict it so long as the blockade of Tripoli remained ineffective. "I am exceedingly distressed," wrote Cathcart in November, "lest some of the Tripolines put to sea, as Mr. Eaton informs me that the enemy's coast is abandoned by our ships of war and that the whole squadron has proceeded to Gibraltar."46 At Leghorn Cathcart in a single day observed twenty-four American vessels, two‑thirds of which were unarmed.47 Eaton reported that the Mediterranean was covered with American adventurers who would "neither have regard to their own safety nor the general interest of the United States . . . one single merchantman's crew, in chains at Tripoli, would be of incalculable prejudice to the affairs of the United States in that regency."48
Under such circumstances it was not strange that the Tripolitans succeeded in capturing an American merchantman and its crew of nine men. The vessel in question was the brig "Franklin," Captain Andrew Morris, seized off Cape Palos on June 17.49 It was taken to Algiers by its captors, who presented to the Dey some Christian and negro slaves as presents. The Dey gave the Tripolitan captain a lecture regarding the Pasha's failure to remain at peace with the United States but about the same time ordered a cargo of wheat to be sent to Tripoli.50 O'Brien requested the aid of the Algerine ministry in securing the release of the brig and her crew but received p118 slight encouragement. He then appealed to the Dey who offered to pay the Tripolitan commander five thousand dollars as a ransom for the prisoners. The officer replied that he had strict instructions to return all prisoners to Tripoli; whereupon the Dey announced that the "Franklin" and her crew must be removed from Algiers.51 On July 9, Eaton wrote that on the preceding day the brig and her cargo had been auctioned off at Tunis but that the master and crew were "destined for Tripoli."52 There they arrived July 19, and according to Captain Morris's account, entered the harbor "in view of a Swedish and American frigate, who never made the least effort to obstruct our progress when it was certainly in their power to capture or run the pirate on shore before it was possible for them to be protected from their batteries . . . this transaction was in open day in sight of thousands amongst which the consuls of different nations can testify."53 Five of the prisoners, who were not Americans, were soon released, the remainder being held until October. They were then liberated as a result of Algerine intervention, which cost the United States sixty-five hundred dollars.54
In the meantime trouble was brewing in Tunis. The soothing effect which a present of jewels and cloths had p119 wrought upon the Bey early in the year55 had soon worn off, and throughout the summer and autumn he clamored for a frigate. "Yesterday," wrote Eaton in August, "I was called to the palace. The minister formally demanded of me a frigate of 36 guns. It need not be thought strange to see me in America this winter. I can neither yield to nor get rid of the demand."56 The consul had frequent clashes with Tunisian officials regarding the blockade of Tripoli; and the chief minister repeatedly informed him that the Bey wanted a consul who was "more friendly to the Barbary interests."57 So disagreeable and apparently futile did Eaton's task become that in December he wrote to Madison, "I cannot serve another summer in this station."58
From Algiers, too, came loud complaints with respect to a United States consul and to the payment of annuities. In April, 1802, Cathcart was appointed Consul-General at Algiers to succeed O'Brien;59 then a few weeks later was authorized to expend a maximum sum of four thousand dollars in providing a consular present.60 The Dey, however, refused to receive him on the ground that Cathcart's p120 character was not suitable. In this frame of mind the ruler persisted until, in March following, Madison informed O'Brien that another consul would be appointed.61 With respect to every proposal made by Morris or O'Brien that the annual tribute be paid in cash the Dey was equally inflexible.62 He was not in need of money; he wanted military and naval stores, and for these he would accept no substitutes.63 In January, 1803, he announced that his patience was almost exhausted and that since the stipulated supplies had not arrived, he saw no need for O'Brien to remain in Algiers or for himself to continue at peace with the United States.64
That little headway was being made in bringing Tripoli to terms or in lessening pretensions throughout the greater part of Barbary is clearly shown by consular despatches from all along that coast. In August, 1802, Eaton expressed a conviction that the American Mediterranean operations thus far had produced only "additional enemies and national contempt."65 O'Brien, too, deplored the lack of energy displayed in the dealing with Tripoli, "the most insignificant of powers."66 Cathcart was of the opinion that unless more action were resorted to the United States would lose what little importance they had assumed in the estimation of the barbarians.67 Letters from Nissen indicated that the Pasha's expectations for Tripolitan p121 success had increased rather than diminished.68 Such hopes were founded not only upon ineffective American operations throughout the Mediterranean; they had a substantial basis in the fact that Tripoli was again abundantly supplied with provisions, that Hamet had accepted the governorship of Derne, that the Pasha had formed a favorable treaty with Sweden, and that reports from Malta represented the United States as ready to pay large sums for a treaty of peace.69
What part, it may be inquired, did Europeans play in the activities hitherto described? Against the English consul at Tripoli, Bryan McDonough, Cathcart, Eaton, and Dale brought charges of conduct which had in large measure brought on the war. McDonough, it was alleged, sought to induce the Pasha to confiscate certain American property, to expel Cathcart, and to secure for McDonough the management of United States affairs at Tripoli.70 Rufus King presented the charges to Lord Pelham in November, 1801,71 and received an answer to the effect that if the consul was guilty of the misconduct with which he was charged, he had acted in an unauthorized manner. The minister then assured King that if McDonough were "likely to continue in his present station, the circumstances of the charges against him . . . should p122 certainly undergo a full investigation, but as he is almost immediately to be superseded, such investigation is unnecessary."72 In fairness to McDonough it should be noted that O'Brien and the Pasha denied that the Englishman's attitude had been hostile to American interests. The charges brought against him were never proved.73
When the first American squadron reached the Mediterranean, a struggle between Sweden and Tripoli was in progress.74 Colonel Tornquist, who was in command of the Swedish squadron in the Mediterranean, was instructed to coöperate with the American forces and to provide convoy for American merchantmen.75 Moreover, Cathcart received instructions from the Secretary of State to cultivate an understanding with the Swedish officers engaged in dealing with Tripoli, and, if possible, to make the negotiations of the United States and Sweden go hand in hand. Any treaties which might be formed, however, were to be kept "unconnected and independent, both in view of the Bashaw and of Sweden, as if formed without the least understanding between the United States and Sweden."76 That Cathcart had been opposed to a policy of coöperation with Europeans to end American difficulties with Tripoli is shown by his despatches. He had, in 1801, discouraged the formation of a coalition on the ground that independent action would tend "to establish a national character, which we must do without the assistance of any of the powers of Europe."77 Other letters which he wrote to Dale and p123 Madison reflect the same spirit and indicate a conviction that Sweden would at the first opportunity conclude a peace which the United States would regard as humiliating.78 Eaton, too, was of the opinion that his government should rely solely upon American resources in the struggle with Tripoli.79 Cathcart's prediction that Sweden would soon make peace was fulfilled during the summer, 1802; consequently the possibility of employing further coercive measures in concert with the United States was definitely eliminated.80
1 Corr. of J. L. Cathcart, Cathcart to Pasha of Tripoli, April 26, 1801.
3 Corr. of J. L. Cathcart, Cathcart to ?, May 13, 1801.
4 Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs, p91. The naval force of Tripoli at the time of Cathcart's departure consisted of "seven sail vessels carrying 106 guns, fours, sixes, and nines, and 840 men very badly equipt."
7 Am. State Pap., For. Rel., II, 348, Sec. of State to O'Brien, May 20, 1801.
8 Ibid. O'Brien was instructed to impress upon the Dey the fact that the United States "expect from his good faith an efficacious interposition, according to our treaty with him, for guarantying the treaty with the Bashaw of Tripoli."
9 Despatches, Algiers, VI, O'Brien to Wm. Smith, Jan. 10, 1801.
10 Ibid., O'Brien to Sec. of State, June 24, 1801.
11 Ibid., O'Brien to Sec. of State, July 22, 1801.
12 Am. State Pap., For. Rel., II, 347, 348, Sec. of State to Eaton, May 20, 1801.
14 Am. State Pap., For. Rel., II, 358, Bey of Tunis to Pres. of U. S., April 15, 1801. For Eaton's comments on, see Despatches, Tunis, I, Eaton to R. King, May 23, 1801. For answer to President, see Am. State Pap., For. Rel., II, 3581, Pres. of U. S. to Bey of Tunis, Sept. 8, 1801.
15 Ibid., Eaton to R. King, June 1, 1801.
16 Ibid., Eaton to Sec. of State, June 28, 1801.
18 State Papers and Public Documents (ed. T. B. Wait), IV, 383, 384, Dale to Sec. of Navy, Aug. 18, 1801.
21 Ibid., pp95, 96.
22 Despatches, Tunis, I, Aug. 1, 1801.
23 Ibid., Dale to Eaton, Aug. 28, 1801.
24 Ibid., Eaton to Speaker of House of Representatives, U. S. Congress, Feb. 29, 1804.
25 Despatches, Tripoli, I, Cathcart to Thos. Appleton, June 2, 1801; Am. State Pap., For. Rel., II, 699, Cathcart to Sec. of State July 2, 1801; Ibid., Eaton to Sec. of State, Sept. 5, 1801.
26 Despatches, Tunis, I, Eaton to Cathcart, March 28, 1802; Ibid., Cathcart to Eaton, April 10, 1802. In the latter communication Cathcart the originator of the plan, outlined above, suggested to Eaton means of strengthening Hamet's morale and of securing protection of American interests. Eaton should impress upon Hamet the necessity of completely extirpating the reigning family of the Karamanli branch. Moreover, special emphasis was to be placed upon the idea that Hamet was predestined to be "the deliverer of his country." "Explain to him," wrote Cathcart, "the improbability of a nation so remote from Tripoli as America is sending a naval force to espouse his cause unless influenced by an omnipotent decree, no doubt by the intercession of the Great Prophet."
27 Goldsborough, op. cit., pp200, 201; Paullin, op. cit., pp62, 63; Allen, op. cit., pp105, 106. The command was offered to Commodore Truxtun but he declined; therefore, Morris was placed in command. The new squadron consisted of six vessels the first of which sailed from the United States on February 8; the last, September 18, 1802. They were, in order of sailing, the "Chesapeake," "Enterprise," "Constitution," "Adams," "New York," and "John Adams."
28 Morris, Defence of Commodore Morris, pp15‑17, 33, 34. Text of instructions are here quoted.
29 Despatches to Consul, Instructions, I, 127‑31, Madison to Cathcart, April 18, 1802; Ibid., I, 137, Madison to Cathcart, May 10, 1802. In this second letter Madison wrote that "However able this country may be to carry on the war with effect, the expense and trouble of it, and the increased risk whilst at war with one of the Barbary powers, of getting into war with the others, are with the President just motives of solicitude for the success of your negotiation."
30 Am. State Pap., For. Rel., II, 463, Eaton to Sec. of State, Dec. 13, 1801.
31 Despatches, Algiers, VI, O'Brien to Sec. of State, Feb. 1, 1802. O'Brien reported the above overtures to have been made on January 20.
32 Despatches, Tripoli, II, Cathcart to N. C. Nissen, March 15, 1802. The ships referred to above were those blockaded at Tripoli. Murad Reis and the men under his command abandoned their vessels and returned to Tripoli as best they could.
33 Am. State Pap., For. Rel., II, 462, Nissen to Cathcart, April 30 and May 10, 1802.
34 Despatches, Tunis, I, Eaton to Madison, May 25, 1802; Despatches, Tripoli, II, Cathcart to Madison, July 4, 1802; Ibid., Nissen to Cathcart, July 8, 1802.
35 Morris speaks of only one Tripolitan vessel at Gibraltar; what had become of the other is not clear.
36 Despatches, Tangier, I, Simpson to Sec. of State, Jan. 8, 1801. Simpson wrote that "at Salle two frigates of about 20 guns are building and may probably be launched next spring." The consul also mentions "an old half-galley to carry two bow guns and fifty men . . . This is all the navy."
37 Ibid., Simpson to Sec. of State, Feb. 20, 1802.
38 Ibid., Simpson to Sec. of State, March 19, 1802; Morris, op. cit., pp22, 23, Sec. of Navy to Morris, April 13, 1802. In this letter the Secretary expressed great approval of Dale's action, and urged Morris to employ "precautionary vigilance with respect to the Emperor's movements."
39 Morris, op. cit., pp30, 31, Morris to Simpson, June 19, 1802; Despatches, Tangier, I, Simpson to Sec. of State, June 26.
40 Ibid., pp32, 33.
41 Am. State Pap., For. Rel., II, 466, Simpson to Sec. of State, July 3, 1802.
42 Despatches to Consuls, Instructions, I, 132, Sec. of State to Simpson, April 20, 1802. In another letter (Ibid.), March 26, 1803, Madison wrote to Simpson that the hostile attitude of the Emperor had prevented the forwarding of the gun carriages. If the Emperor continued to request them, Simpson should secure them in Europe "or offer cash or other convenient articles in lieu of them."
43 Morris, op. cit., pp36, 37, Simpson to Morris, Aug. 16, 1802.
44 Ibid., p40, Morris to Sec. of Navy, Oct. 15, 1802. Morris wrote as follows: "Knowing the immense injury the commerce of the United States would receive from a war with Morocco, I have authorized Captain Murray to instruct Mr. Simpson . . . to grant passports to vessels bound to Tripoli laden with wheat."
45 Am. State Pap., For. Rel., II, 461, Cathcart to Sec. of State, July 21, 1801; Ibid., Cathcart to Sec. of State, July 15, 1801.
46 Despatches, Tripoli, II, Cathcart to Dale, Sept. 7, 1801; Ibid., Cathcart to Dale, Dec. 28, 1801; Ibid., Cathcart to Madison, Nov. 6, 1801.
47 Ibid., Cathcart to Madison, July 4, 1802. Reference is to "last year."
48 Am. State Pap., For. Rel., II, 463, Eaton to Sec. of State, Feb. 3, 1802.
49 Despatches, Tripoli, II, Capt. A. Morris to Cathcart, July 22, 1802.
50 Despatches, Algiers, VI, O'Brien to Sec. of State, Feb. 1, 1802. The "Franklin" arrived at Algiers on January 19, 1802.
51 Ibid., O'Brien to Madison, June 26, and 29, 1802.
52 Despatches, Tunis, I, Circular issued by Eaton, July 9, 1802; Ibid., Eaton to Sec. of State, Aug. 5, 1802. Eaton in the latter communication reported the Bey as having indulged in sarcastic remarks over the capture of the brig: " 'You keep,' said the Bey to Eaton, 'a very close blockade over Tripoli — your frigates appear to be very vigilant — But supposing you were to undertake to blockade a thousand miles of seacoast how many such vigilant frigates would you employ?' "
53 Despatches, Tripoli, II, Capt. Morris to Cathcart, July 22, 1802.
54 Despatches, Algiers, VI, O'Brien to Sec. of State, Oct. 11, 1802; Despatches, Tripoli, II, Cathcart to Madison, Jan. 25, 1803. Cathcart here wrote that the above sum was charged on O'Brien's account and that its payment was not compatible with the Dey's allegation that he had given the prisoners to the United States as "a present."
55 Am. State Pap., For. Rel., II, Jno. Gavino, U. S. Consul at Gibraltar, to Sec. of State, Jan. 11, 1802; Despatches, Tunis, I, Eaton to R. King, March 18, 1802; Despatches, Tripoli, II, Eaton to Cathcart, March 28, 1802. In the last cited despatch Eaton wrote as follows: The Regalia given by the Spaniards and Danes are both rejected and returned in consequence of the superior quality of the American."
56 Despatches, Tunis, I, Eaton to Sec. of State, Aug. 28, 1802.
57 Despatches, Tripoli, II, Eaton to Cathcart, April 26, 1802.
58 Despatches, Tunis, I, Eaton to Madison, Dec. 20, 1802.
59 Despatches to Consuls, Instructions, I, 131, Madison to Cathcart, April 18, 1802. Unlike his predecessor, however, Cathcart was not to superintend the activities of the other U. S. consuls in Barbary. His salary was fixed at two thousand dollars per year, a smaller sum than O'Brien had received.
60 Ibid., I, 136, 137, Madison to Cathcart, May 10, 1802. "If a present be unavoidable," wrote Madison, "it will be less disagreeable in the simple form of cash, than in the troublesome form of jewelry &c."
61 Ibid., I, 157, Madison to O'Brien, March 3, 1803. The communication ran in part as follows: "The President in compliance with the usage which admits of the refusal of a consul on grounds peculiar to the person, will shortly appoint another for Algiers to succeed you."
62 Morris, op. cit., pp48 ff.
63 Despatches, Algiers, VI, O'Brien to Sec. of State, Nov. 23, 1802 and Jan. 9, 1803.
64 Ibid., O'Brien to Sec. of State, Jan. 18, 1803.
65 Despatches, Tunis, I, Eaton to Sec. of State, Aug. 23, 1802. "The [Tunisian] minister," he wrote, "puffs a whistle in my face, and says, 'We find it is all a puff!! We see how you carry on the war with Tripoli.' "
66 Despatches, Algiers, VI, O'Brien to Sec. of State, Sept. 16, 1802.
67 Despatches, Tripoli, II, Cathcart to Madison, Jan. 25, 1803.
68 Ibid., Nissen to Eaton, Jan. 30, 1803.
69 Despatches, Tunis, I, Eaton to Madison, Jan. 2, 1803. "The favorable moment is lost," wrote Eaton, "His [the Pasha's] success with Sweden exalts his pride — possession of his brother relieves his fear — our relations with the other regencies animate his fortitude — and the operations of our force inspire his contempt." See also, Despatches, Tripoli, II, Eaton to Cathcart, Jan. 18, 1803; Ibid., Nissen to Eaton, Jan. 30, 1803.
70 Despatches, Tripoli, II, Cathcart to Sec. of State, June 14, 1801; Despatches, England, IX, King to Lord Pelham, Nov. 28, 1801. Here appears a certificate from Dale; Ibid., Eaton to Major Perkins, Magra, Sept. 11, 1801.
74 Ibid., O'Brien to M. Gavino, May 27, 1801.
75 Despatches, Tunis, I, N. Frumerie, Swedish chargé d'affaires at Tunis, to Eaton, October 14, 1801.
76 Despatches, to Consuls, Instructions, I, 127‑31, Madison to Cathcart, April 18, 1802.
77 Corr. of J. L. Cathcart, Cathcart to O'Brien and Eaton, July 1, 1801.
78 Despatches, Tripoli, II, Cathcart to Dale, Aug. 10, 1801.
79 Despatches, Tunis, I, Eaton to Messrs. Summert and Brown, July 9, 1802.
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