If you want to follow along on the author's maps, they're here. (They'll open in another window, so you won't lose your place.)
On the American frontier, as well as in diplomacy and commerce, the French Revolution did much to shape the course of Spanish-American relations in the period 1793‑95; and for a long time it was uncertain whether Spain or the United States, or either, would be the gainer. There were two ways in which the American settlements between the Ohio and Tennessee were affected by the European cataclysm. In the first place, fresh currency was given to two ideas already familiar to the frontiersmen, namely, particularism and natural rights; in the second place, boundless possibilities of violence were opened up by the alliance between Great Britain, controlling the Lakes, and Spain, controlling Mississippi, against France, which was the ally of the United States and from which the frontiersmen had for the past decade expected aid in opening the Mississippi.
It seemed very doubtful, in the summer of 1793, whether either Spain or the United States would be able to derive any benefit from the situation thus created. On the one hand, the danger of an invasion of Louisiana by the Kentuckians, long the nightmare of the Spaniards at New Orleans, was increased tenfold. "Natural right" was the frontiersman's chief argument in support of his claim to the free navigation of the Mississippi, and the weighty authority given the idea of natural right by the French Republic increased the frontiersman's sense of injustice, his indignation against the Spanish tyrants who made him pay a six p186 per cent duty at New Orleans. It was not likely that the federal government, which had never forgotten Louisiana, would neglect this opportunity to capitalize the Kentuckians' resentment: nor, as it proved, was the opportunity neglected. At the same time, the fever of the French Revolution stirred up sedition among the numerous French creoles of Louisiana and insubordination among the slaves; and the Spanish government, with so many other demands on its feeble energy, was able to do little or nothing for its exposed frontier provinces.
It might be supposed that an international situation so embarrassing to Spain would have been correspondingly advantageous to the United States; but this was not the case. The American government had relied on a European war to enable it to bring Spain to terms; but this war was too gigantic a thing to be manipulated by so puny a power as the infant republic. The character of the European struggle divided the sympathies of the Americans, making it impossible for them to take a decided part, and in 1793 no power was willing to pay a high price for their neutrality. The alliance of their immediate neighbors in North America, Great Britain and Spain, was formidable, in appearance at least, throughout 1793 and 1794. At the same time, frontier particularism received from the French Revolution a new form of expression in the Democratic Societies, several of which were organized in Kentucky from August to December, 1793.1 The partitioning of Poland was in progress, and the interests of both England and Spain would be served by a partition of the United States. Altogether, the situation was fraught with great danger to the Union in view of the possibility of a secessionist movement in the West, and of the p187 recovery of Louisiana by France2 and of the Floridas by England.
The greatest danger of all lay in the particularistic tendencies of the frontiersman. Natural in their situation, these tendencies were intensified at this juncture by their dissatisfaction with certain measures of the federal government, such as the assumption and excise acts, and the neutrality proclamation of 1793, and by their resentment at its aristocratic tone and its failure to secure the free navigation of the Mississippi. "Neglectful" and "contemptuous" were adjectives with which the Kentuckians described the attitude of Congress towards them. So obdurate were they in their discontent, and so exasperated was President Washington with their obdurateness that he wrote in August, 1794: "There must exist a predisposition among them to be dissatisfied."3
When Edmund Genêt proclaimed a holy war against Spanish tyranny he found a ready response among the frontiersmen from Georgia to Kentucky. George Rogers Clark, O'Fallon, Lachaise, Depeau and Michaud in Kentucky; Elijah Clarke, the Hammond brothers, Tate and Mangourit in Georgia and South Carolina, were his agents in the summer and fall of 1793 in raising legions for the conquest of Louisiana and the Floridas.4 George Rogers Clark was moved by the bitter discontent of a neglected hero, the Hammonds by a desire to supplant Panton, Leslie and Company in the Southern fur trade, others by love of excitement, by the prospect of plunder, by resentment at Spain's long denial of their "natural rights." Above all, the frontiersmen were opportunists, ready to try any expedient, and Genêt offered them a means of opening the Mississippi. At the same time, there is every evidence of a p188 deep and widespread sympathy among the frontiersmen for the French Revolution. Where sympathy for France had been weakened in the United States since the close of the American Revolution, it was generally due to the influence of merchants trading with England, of Congregationalist preachers scandalized by French deism and immorality, or of Jay and Adams, with their charges of French duplicity in the negotiations of 1782.5 On the frontier, there was no Jay or Adams, preachers of any denomination were few, and the mercantile interests of the Mississippi Valley settlements demanded the free navigation of the Mississippi, which Genêt offered them. Where there was one William Blount in the West in the 1790's to denounce the Jacobin incendiary Genêt, "there were a dozen Andrew Jacksons to hail the liberator "Boneparte."º
The joint land and sea expeditions against Louisiana projected by Genêt in 1793 caused great alarm to the governments of both Spain and the United States. With all his French sympathies, Jefferson looked with favor on the project only as a means of securing the Floridas for the United States.6 By this stroke the controversy with Spain over the boundary, the navigation of the Mississippi, fugitive slaves and Indian relations would be settled once for all, and the United States would have made a good start towards taking Spain's North American possessions from her "piece by piece," as Jefferson had prophesied in 1786. Washington and Hamilton, however, looked on Genêt's plans in another light, and Jefferson's hopes came to nothing. In December, 1793, he resigned his office, and the Westerners felt that they had lost a friend at court.
The year that followed Jefferson's retirement from the state department was an acutely critical one in the p189 relations of the United States government with its frontiersmen. The chief danger was the possibility of a general insurrection in the West. The remedy lay in the diminution of the frontiersman's grievances, and the magnitude and complexity of the problem required systematic treatment. Accordingly diplomacy was enlisted. One of the principal aims of John Jay's mission to England (April, 1794) was to secure the surrender of the Northwest posts. Monroe, who was sent to France at the same time, was instructed to exert every effort to persuade the victorious republic to extort from Spain the terms desired by the United States. In order to facilitate the Spanish negotiation, William Short was given sole charge of it with the rank of minister to Spain, and Carmichael, no longer a persona grata at court, was recalled.7 In the United States itself a show of force was made to intimidate the seditious when Hamilton and Washington marched against the distillers of western Pennsylvania. To Kentucky, where the situation was more dangerous, the administration wisely sent not troops but a diplomat, James Innes, attorney-general of the state of Virginia and brother of the Spanish conspirator, Judge Harry Innes, to convince the governor and people of that state that the federal government was doing all in its power to secure the free navigation of the Mississippi.8
Still more perturbed by the Kentucky ferment was the timorous Carondelet. He was terrified by the vision of Genêt's simultaneous invasions of Louisiana from the Gulf and from Kentucky, aided by the rebellious French inhabitants, who later, in their version of the "Carmagnolle," dubbed Carondelet "Cochon de lait" p190 and promised him first place on the guillotine.9 These dangers induced him to revive the moribund Kentucky intrigue. While the promise of lasting benefit to Spain was even less than when Miró conspired with Wilkinson, this second conspiracy was fraught with great danger to the United States. The widespread unrest, the dominant political ideas of the day and the instability common to frontier societies made secession far from impossible. While two of the communities that were involved in the first intrigue, Franklin and Cumberland, took no part in this second conspiracy, the conspirators in Kentucky were more numerous and seemed to press the affair with more seriousness than in 1788, and Carondelet hoped, as had Miró, that the other frontier communities would follow the lead of the Kentuckians.
It was James Wilkinson, as we should expect, who was immediately responsible for the revival of the conspiracy. His correspondence with Miró and Carondelet from 1791 to 1793 had been languid; but in January and February, 1794, while Clark was raising his French legion in Kentucky, Wilkinson wrote Carondelet that the time had come when Spain must take a decisive stand in its relations with the Kentuckians. The people of that state, he said, had at last lost patience with their incompetent federal government and were determined to open the Mississippi at once, whether by secession from the Union or by the conquest of Louisiana. It depended upon Spain which course they should follow. Once a revolution was begun in Kentucky, it would be easy, he said, to turn it to Spain's advantage.10 There was nothing novel in this information, for it was substantially what Wilkinson had been writing for several years. What made it impressive was that he now assured Carondelet that what had long p191 been threatened was at last to be executed, that the critical moment was at hand, and that the decision between secession and conquest would be made within the next few months. Carondelet had already been deeply impressed by a similar warning from Michel Lacassagne, a French merchant in Kentucky, who had come down to New Orleans in the winter of 1793‑94 to collect six thousand dollars on Wilkinson's pension account, and whom Carondelet described in his letters to Godoy as one of the richest and most influential men in Kentucky.11
In a series of letters to the secretary of state, Godoy, from April to July, 1794, Carondelet warned him of the dangerous ferment in the settlements of the American West, which, he said, could put 60,000 armed men in the field. He declared that there were only two means by which Spain could preserve Louisiana and the Floridas. The first was the strengthening of its military defences, the repair and construction of forts, the sending of reinforcements, and the stirring up of the Indians against the American frontier. He urged Godoy to secure the coöperation of the British in Canada, for, as he wrote a few months later, Lord Dorchester's notorious speech to the Indians at Detroit showed that the Spanish and English governors were pursuing the same Indian policy. Realizing, however, that the war in Europe might not permit Spain to undertake so expensive a policy, he proposed as an alternative the separation of Kentucky from the Union. All the other Western settlements of the United States, he declared, would follow Kentucky's lead, and thus the colossal republic would be split into two rival powers, which Spain could play off against each other for her benefit, and especially for the protection of Louisiana and p192 Mexico. Kentucky's separation could easily be brought about, though at no inconsiderable cost to Spain, for Wilkinson's pension must be increased, other leading Kentuckians must be granted pensions, and munitions must be sent to support the revolution. Once the revolution was begun, said Carondelet repeating Wilkinson's assurance, it could easily be given a direction favorable to Spain by the negotiation of a treaty between that power and the Kentuckians opening the Mississippi as far south as New Orleans.12
The governor's reasons for urging the Kentucky project on Godoy were, as the foregoing summary indicates, that Louisiana's critical situation, in the face of the Clark-Genêt projects, made some defensive measure an immediate necessity, that a purely military defence would probably be too expensive, and that the only alternative was the revolutionizing of Kentucky. Other considerations, however, seem to have influenced the Baron strongly to urge the Kentucky project upon his government with such vigor. One of these considerations was that to his amazement and chagrin he had just received from Gardoqui, minister of finance, an order removing him from the post of intendant, which, since Martin Navarro's return to Spain in 1788, had been united with the governorship of the province. The loss of pay and prestige led him to protest bitterly to Godoy, who curiously enough knew nothing of the change until he received Carondelet's complaint.13 This reverse doubtless convinced Carondelet that he must render some signal service that would offset his failure in the intendancy and secure his promotion at the end of his five-year term in Louisiana. An opportunity for such a service was offered by the Kentucky intrigue.
p193 Another consideration that led him to urge the project was his desire to secure free trade privileges for the port of New Orleans, that is, to have it thrown open to the commerce of all friendly nations subject to a six per cent import and export duty. Navarro had urged this measure as early as 1780 and repeatedly thereafter, and Miró had renewed the recommendation.14 All of them saw the economic and political possibilities of the Mississippi Valley and wished to make Spain the beneficiary. Local circumstances had already led Carondelet to relax the commercial restrictions in Louisiana as far as his discretionary powers extended. By a very liberal interpretation of the royal order of December 1, 1788, he reduced the duty on all importations from Kentucky from fifteen to six per cent. He granted frequent "special permissions" to ships to call at the ports of the United States, and strongly supported the New Orleans cabildo's memorial against the commercial regulations of 1793. It was indeed his economic liberalism that brought about his removal from the intendancy of Louisiana, but even then he stuck to his guns and assured Godoy that the economic welfare as well as the loyalty of Louisiana required that New Orleans be made a free port.15
The renewed intrigue with Kentucky opportunely enabled the governor to advance another and a compelling argument in favor of this measure. Kentucky, he pointed out, should by all means receive its imports as well as despatch its exports by way of New Orleans. All economic intercourse between the American West and the Atlantic States must cease. New Orleans merchants must undersell those of Philadelphia in Kentucky. In order that this might be done, the cost of European goods in New Orleans must be reduced, p194 and this reduction in turn would be secured if New Orleans were made a free port and its market thrown open to the competition of the merchants and manufacturers of all countries. This was the only means, asserted Carondelet, of converting a fugitive intrigue with the Kentuckians into a firm friendship and lasting alliance.
Before writing these despatches to Godoy, he had received encouragement from other quarters in Kentucky. Judge Harry Innes wrote Gayoso in January, 1794, expressing a willingness to negotiate with Spain, but warning Gayoso that the vague promises hitherto received from Louisiana must be converted into precise assurances before the Kentuckians would take a step.16 In the correspondence that ensued there was a sharp disagreement between Innes on the one hand and Gayoso and Carondelet on the other as to procedure, but they made some progress towards an agreement.17 Other correspondents of Spain were Michel Lacassagne, whom we have already mentioned; another French merchant of Louisville, Benjamin Tardiveau, and one of Wilkinson's associates in the earlier intrigue, Benjamin Sebastian, who offered as his chief gage of loyalty to Spain his Spanish surname.
So great was Carondelet's confidence in a favorable decision by Godoy that, without awaiting further orders, he sent Wilkinson large sums of money and urged him to come down in person or to send authorized deputies to conclude the treaty of alliance and commerce with Spain on behalf of Kentucky. The messengers employed by Wilkinson in this correspondence were Henry Owens, a quondam schoolmaster; Henry Collins, whom Wilkinson once described as an "unpolished diamond" and later as a "great villain;" p195 Thomas Power, the most indefatigable traveler of them all; and the notorious Philip Nolan, "my young friend . . . honorable, discreet, courageous and active."18
Despite Carondelet's eagerness to give and Wilkinson's to receive, not all went well. Of the $16,000 sent "our Brigadier" by the Baron in 1794, only $5100 actually reached its destination. Lacassagne pocketed $1400 of the $4000 sent by him. In June, 1794, Carondelet sent another $12,000, half of it by Owens and the other half by Collins, ostensibly in payment of a balance long overdue on a legitimate commercial transaction, but actually to reimburse Wilkinson for his alleged expenses in buying off George Rogers Clark and to provide funds for the prosecution of the intrigue. Owens, who returned to Kentucky by way of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, was murdered by the Spanish crew sent with him, and the money was never recovered. Some of the murderers were captured and brought before Judge Harry Innes, who hastened to hand them over to Wilkinson, and he in turn sent them on to the Spanish commandant of St. Louis lest their trial in Kentucky should lead to unpleasant revelations.19 Collins, going by sea with the other $6000 to Charleston, South Carolina, returned safely as far as Pittsburg, and finally paid Wilkinson $2500 of the $6000.20 "Our brigadier" in his turn disappointed the Baron, for he failed either to descend to New Orleans or to send authorized deputies, and Gayoso detected disturbing contradictions between Wilkinson's statements and those of Innes. Wilkinson explained, however, that the Indian campaign had required his attention, and that more time and money were necessary to prepare the ground in Kentucky, and renewed his assurances p196 of ultimate success. Carondelet accepted his explanations, overlooked the contradictions, and, under the influence of proposals from the "Secret Committee of Correspondence of the West," repeated his fervent representations to the Court for instructions and funds.
Jáudenes and Viar were responsible for the address of the committee just referred to. When in August, 1793, the Spanish agents in parish learned of Genêt's projects against Louisiana, they sent Carondelet a warning by sea, and despatched as their messenger to New Madrid and St. Louis a young man by the name of Thomas or Medad Mitchell. Since Mitchell was known to Gayoso and Carondelet, Jáudenes and Viar gave him important despatches to the Spanish commandants of Upper Louisiana. Having delivered his despatches punctually, Mitchell continued down the Mississippi to New Orleans, and asked for an appointment in the Spanish service; but Carondelet, after conversing with him, came to the conclusion that he was a reckless, unreliable young man, and used the pretext of important despatches for Jáudenes and Viar to send him back to Philadelphia. From Philadelphia Mitchell was once more despatched on a Spanish mission, this time to the American settlements on the Ohio, where he had a conference with David Bradford of Whiskey Rebellion fame, and still more important conversations with the Spanish conspirators in Kentucky. On his arrival in Philadelphia, he wrote out from memory, since he had feared to bring it in writing, the representation of the "Secret Committee of Correspondence of the West." This committee, as we learn p197 from Carondelet's correspondence, was composed of Wilkinson, Innes, Sebastian and James Murray. They put their case bluntly. The coming year (1795) would see either a pro-Spanish revolution in Kentucky or the invasion of Louisiana by the Kentuckians, for the latter were determined to have the Mississippi opened to their traffic. If Spain wished to avert an invasion, she must aid the revolution, sending arms and munitions for ten thousand men, extending liberal credits to the Kentuckians, and opening the Mississippi to them duty free. Definite assurances of Spain's agreement to these terms must be returned to Kentucky by April 1, 1795; otherwise, Louisiana would be invaded without delay. In return for Spain's aid, they offered to guarantee to that power all the territory south and west of the Tennessee River and north and west of the Illinois.
Jáudenes was deeply impressed. Sending a copy of this representation by sea to Carondelet, he despatched another to Godoy, together with a long letter urging this intrigue as an alternative to the negotiation with the United States government.21 Unlike the timorous Gardoqui of 1788, he wished to direct the intrigue himself, instead of turning it over to the governor of New Orleans.
It was just after the Council of State of July 7, 1794 had approved Godoy's proposals and had directed him to make fresh overtures to the United States and just before the consequent orders were issued that Godoy received Carondelet's letters of April 7 and May 1, 1794, promising the certain success of the renewed intrigue. Corroborated by Jáudenes and Viar, Carondelet's optimistic interpretation of the delicate p198 situation in the American West posed directly before Godoy the question of Spain's policy towards the United States and its frontier. Should he carry out his plan of conciliating the American government? This he had every reason to know could be done only at the cost of extensive concessions. Or should he seize the heaven-sent alternative, revolutionize the American West, split the United States into two hostile camps, and so retain control of the east bank of the Mississippi, of the southern Indians and their trade, and of the commerce on the Mississippi?
Such a momentous question was not for one man to decide, and so Godoy laid it before the Council of State on July 25, 1794. After a lengthy discussion, but with no sign of hesitation or dissent, the council advised and the king ordered that the diplomatic démarche resolved upon a fortnight earlier should be executed without modification.22 The Kentucky intrigue was not to be abandoned altogether, but it was subordinated to the negotiation with Washington's government, that is, it was to be continued in order to prevent an invasion of Louisiana while the negotiation was pending and as a last resort in case the negotiation failed. On the following day, July 26, Godoy despatched to Jáudenes the order resolved upon in the Council of July 7 directing him to lay before Washington the new treaty proposals.23
Once the decision was made, Godoy adhered to it resolutely, despite the increasingly optimistic tone of the despatches of both Carondelet and Jáudenes. Carondelet's confidential despatch of June 3, 1794, informed Godoy of Harry Innes's overtures and spoke of the success of the intrigue as "infallible." Godoy remained unmoved. His decision, contained in a marginal p199 note on this letter dated September 12, 1794, directed that the results of the proposals of the preceding July to Washington be awaited. Again in a letter of October 8, 1794, Carondelet wrote urgently on the same subject, and again Godoy turned a deaf ear to his entreaty. Even when the secretary of state had read the letter of Jáudenes and Viar enclosing the proposals of the "Secret Committee of Correspondence of the West," he would do no more than authorize Jáudenes to open negotiations with the Kentuckians for the very limited purpose, carefully stated by Godoy, of preventing the spread of ideas unfavorable to Spain and of weakening England's influence with the Kentuckians. Jáudenes was instructed that his course must be in conformity with the order of July 26, 1794. Orders to this effect were sent to Carondelet as well as the envoy in February, 1795.24
There are several indications of the considerations that guided the Council of State and Godoy in their decision on this matter. In the first place, the project of making New Orleans a free port, which Carondelet linked inseparably with the Kentucky intrigue, was too progressive a measure for the Spanish court, especially at a time when the very word "free" was in disfavor with all the courts of Europe. Even the scanty privileges accorded Louisiana by the cédula of 1782 had excited great opposition in Spain, and although in 1793 they were made somewhat more extensive, it was specified that the use of the word "free" should be avoided, because of its republican connotation. In any case, the Council of State could not bring itself to grant free trade out of hand to New Orleans, and merely referred the question to Gardoqui for a report which, as far as the records show, was never made. It was therefore impossible p200 to adopt Carondelet's proposals for revolutionizing Kentucky, since he insisted that the success of the measure was impossible without the simultaneous grant of free trade to New Orleans.
Other weighty considerations against fomenting a revolution in Kentucky were suspicion of Wilkinson, the fear of a war with the United States, with England and with England's Indian allies, and the great expense that the intrigue and revolution would entail, even if Spain were not drawn directly into the revolutionary war.25 Spain's finances were in disorder and were inadequate to the military activities already undertaken. Additional burdens could not be borne. At the very same meeting of the Council (July 25, 1794) at which Carondelet's proposals were rejected, Gardoqui, as minister of finance, presented a report showing the staggering expenses of the current campaign and the great difficulties that would attend the raising of funds for another.
Defeated in the competition with the American frontier for immigrants, Spain was forced to reject her successes in other phases of the frontier struggle. The Indian alliances and the Kentucky intrigue were painstakingly brought to fruition by Carondelet, only to be discarded by his more discreet superiors in the moment of success. Where success itself was failure, Spain might as well yield; and so, as we shall see, Godoy finally surrendered the last of Carondelet's gains, the territorial, and with it the points that had given rise to this now hopeless conflict.
p242 1 E. M. Coulter, "The Efforts of the Democratic Societies of the West to Open the Navigation of the Mississippi," in MVHR, XI, 376; W. Jay, Life of John Jay, II, 233.
2 F. J. Turner, "The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley," in AHR, X, 249, and "Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791‑97," in Am. Hist. Assn., Report, 1903, II.
3 Washington, Writings, XII, 450‑53.
4 F. J. Turner, "The Origin of Genêt's projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas," in AHR, III, 650; and "The Correspondence of Clark and Genêt," Am. Hist. Assn., Report, 1896, I, 930‑1107; ib., Report, 1897, p569; AI, PC, l. 1469, Las Casas to the encargados at Philadelphia, May 6, 1794, draft, relative to Abner Hammond.
5 B. Faÿ, L'Esprit révolutionnaire en France et aux États‑Unis à la fin du XVIIIe siècle.
6 Jefferson, Writings, VI, 206; cf. A. S. P., F. R., I, 454‑55.
7 AHN, E, l. 3889 bis, exp. 11, minuta, unsigned and undated, relating to Short's status; B. W. Bond, The Monroe Mission to France, 23; S. F. Bemis, Jay's Treaty.
8 Washington, Writings, 451, note; A. S. P., F. R., I, 454; E. M. Coulter, loc. cit., 388; Calendar of Virginia State Papers, VII, 373‑75. Wilkinson sent Carondelet a newspaper containing the correspondence between Col. Innes and Gov. Shelby: AI, PC, l. 3899, Carondelet to Alcudia, July 1, 1795, No. 54 res.
9 AHN, E, l. 3899, Carondelet to Las Casas, May 3, 1795, muy res.
10 This is the most neglected period of Wilkinson's long intrigue with Spain, and the abundant Spanish sources have hardly been touched. See Gayarré, 358‑65; Wilkinson, Memoirs, II, Appendix, Nos. XXXIX‑XLVI; Green, op. cit., 327‑35, 342‑69; Bodley, xcv‑cxvi; M. Serrano y Sanz, El Brigadier Jaime Wilkinson, etc.
11 AI, PC, l. 126, M. Lacassagne to Carondelet, Jan. 20, 1794.
p243 12 AHN, E, l. 3899, Carondelet to Alcudia, No. 31 res., April 7, 1794; AI, PC, l. 2363, same to same, July 9, 1794, No. 38, res., copy; ib., l. 1447, Carondelet to Las Casas, Aug. 18, 1794, No. 123 res.
13 AHN, E, l. 3899, Carondelet to Alcudia, March 11, 1794, autograph, personal, endorsed by Godoy, "Ignoro esto . . ." Other documents relating to this subject are in AI, 86‑6‑10.
14 AI, 87‑1‑19, Navarro to José de Gálvez, July 20, 1781, No. 62; 87‑3‑19, Navarro to Valdés, April 26, 1789, No. 3, copy; 86‑6‑8, Miró and Navarro to Valdés, April 1, 1788, No. 55.
15 AI, 87‑3‑21, Carondelet to Gardoqui, May 16, 1793, No. 75 res.; same to same, Dec. 15, 1793, No. 94; 86‑7‑15, same to same, Aug. 27, 1792; 87‑3‑21, note by the mesa on the letter of Don Honratio Fortier.
16 AI, PC, l. 2371, Harry Innes to Gayoso, Feb. 14, 1794. The two letters of Innes cited in this and the following note seem to me to demolish completely the case that Mr. Bodley has built up for him in op. cit.
17 AI, PC, l. 2371, Gayoso to Innes, July 27, 1794, and duplicate dated Aug. 23, 1794; Harry Innes to Gayoso, Dec. 11, 1794; (Gayoso) to Carondelet, March 24, 1795, draft.
18 AHN, E, l. 3899, Carondelet to Alcudia, Aug. 18, 1794, No. 43 res.; AI, PC, l. 2374, Wilkinson to (Gayoso), May 25, 1790.
19 AI, PC, l. 2374, Wilkinson to (Carondelet), Jan. 12, 1795, in cipher, and deciphered copy.
20 AI, PC, l. 211, statement of Wilkinson's account, copy in English; see Bemis, illustration facing p346; cf. Wilkinson, Memoirs, II, 1‑120, especially 117‑19 and note.
21 AHN, E, l. 3895, Jáudenes and Viar to Alcudia, Oct. 16, 1793, No. 198; AI, PC, l. 2371, M. Mitchell to Gayoso, June 20, 1794; AI, Estado, Audiencia de Sto. Domingo, l. 5, Las Casas to Campo de Alange, Jan. 26, 1795, No. 468, enclosing a copy of the committee's representation; AI, PC, l. 211, David Bradford to Gayoso, Natchez, Jan. 22, 1795.
22 AHN, E, ACE, July 25, 1794.
23 AME, Archivo de la Legación de S. M. C., Washington, D. C., l. 201, Alcudia to Jáudenes and Viar, July 26, 1794, principal and duplicate, and two deciphered copies.
24 AHN, E, l. 3899, Carondelet to Alcudia, June 3, 1794, No. 36 res., with índice in Carondelet's handwriting stating that the p244 success of the Kentucky negotiation "le parece infalible," and minuta with Godoy's autograph note; same to same, Oct. 8, 1794, No. 47 res., and draft of Godoy's reply, dated Jan. 24, 1795; same to same, Aug. 18, 1794, No. 43 res., with autograph note by Godoy on cover; AHN, E, l. 3895 bis, draft of letter from Alcudia (Godoy) to Jáudenes, Feb. 24, 1795.
25 AHN, E, l. 3895 bis, fragment of an informe, undated, on various letters from Jáudenes and Viar of June 4, 1794.
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