The great period in the expansion of the United Netherlands was the first half of the seventeenth century. What gave unique character to Dutch overseas enterprise in this period was the unprecedented scale upon which it was undertaken and the remarkable success which it achieved. Its beginnings represented chiefly a desire and a need to extend the Dutch commercial sphere beyond Europe. To do so, however, meant intruding into the colonial world, still exclusively claimed and effectively controlled by the sea power, bases, and the numerous colonies of the enemy, the Spanish-Portuguese Empire.1 To engage in overseas trade, therefore, the Dutch had to embark upon overseas war. It was their success in combining war and trade, conducted in widely separated theaters simultaneously, which by 1641 had won them a vast commercial-colonial empire in Asia, Africa, and the Americas.
Overwhelming superiority in capital resources, ships, and seafaring men over all other European powers gave the Dutch colonial offensive in the seventeenth century an advantage which the Anglo-French challenge in the preceding century lacked.2 This advantage enabled the Dutch to strike on almost all fronts at once, and it immensely complicated the Spanish-Portuguese problem of defense. Incidentally, Iberian preoccupation with defense against the Dutch in the tropical colonial world proper enabled the English and the French in the wake of the Dutch offensive to occupy, virtually unmolested, such exposed fringes as the Lesser Antilles and the Atlantic seaboard of North America.
The first phase of the Dutch outward thrust, covering the years 1585‑97, was exploratory and entirely commercial. It was essentially a branching out to obtain the very commodities which the Dutch had previously p30secured exclusively in southwestern Europe. The first article which they sought beyond the immediate confines of Europe was salt.3 Immense quantities of this staple were required in the Netherlands for the herring fishery, the dairying industry, and for domestic consumption, as well as for reëxport to the Baltic. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the traditional sources of supply for Dutch salt were the Bay of Bourgneuf and Brouage in France, and Setubal and Cadiz in the Iberian Peninsula.4 After the revolt of the Netherlands against Spain in 1568, the rebel Dutch continued as formerly to come to the Peninsula with hundreds of ships annually to get salt and other commodities. Contrary to a prevalent misconception, Dutch commerce with Spain and Portugal was never long interrupted in all the decades of the Dutch war against the Spanish-Portuguese Empire.5 Insufficient supply of, rather than lack of access to, the goods which the Dutch were accustomed to obtain in the Peninsula was the chief motivation for their overseas expansion. Nevertheless, temporary arrests of Dutch ships in Iberian ports, or other obstacles in the path of trade there, led to the opening of new trade routes. Such was the case in 1585. On May 29 of that year, Philip II, in an attempt to obtain needed supply ships for the projected Spanish Armada, arrested a great number of Dutch, German, and English ships in Peninsular harbors.6 How many Dutch ships were affected is not known statistically, but the city of Hoorn alone had more than thirty at Setubal and Lisbon.7 This arrest temporarily raised the price of salt in the United Netherlands, which in turn motivated "some Holland ships," among them four from Hoorn, to sail to the Cape Verde islands for this commodity.8 Thus a new trade route was opened and one of the first steps toward the colonial world taken. Apparently by 1585 the Dutch had also begun to sail to the less distant island groups, such as the Canaries and Madeira, which were famous for their sugar and wines.9
p31 The first branch of Dutch overseas trade was that to Brazil.10 It began when Dutch ships and crews present in Portuguese harbors were employed by Portuguese merchants to transport European merchandise to Brazil and to bring back the bulk cargoes of sugar and dyewood. The earliest record we possess of a Dutch ship in Brazil is that reported in 1587 by the English freebooter Robert Withrington, who that year captured a ship from Flushing in the harbor of Bahia.11 An offshoot of this Dutch trade to Brazil was that to Guinea, which began in 1592 or 1593.12 Two years later the first Dutch ships appeared at Cumaná on Tierra Firme and at Santo Domingo in the West Indies.13 From 1595 dates also the first Dutch fleet of four ships around the Cape of Good Hope to the East Indies under Cornelis de Houtman.14 In 1598 the first Dutch vessels explored and traded along the rivers of Guiana, from the Amazon to the Orinoco.15 By the last-named year all Dutch tropical trades in Asia, Africa, and America had thus been opened.
The second phase of Dutch overseas activity, covering the years 1598 to 1605, was characterized by tremendous growth of all the trades. In this period twenty to twenty-five ships went annually to West Africa, returning with rich cargoes of gold, pepper, and ivory.16 A similar number of ships engaged in the smuggling trade with the towns of Tierra Firme, Cuba, and Española.17 Here European merchandise was bartered to both Spanish colonists and Indians in exchange for hides, sugar, ginger, pearls, and pieces of eight. The first indication, and that not too well authenticated, that Negro slaves played a part in this traffic dates from 1606.18 Easily the most important branch of Dutch navigation to America in p32these years was the salt-hauling at Punta de Araya in Venezuela. From Spanish sources we have complete statistics concerning the number of Dutch ships which came to the Araya salt plans. In his letters covering the years, 1600‑1605, the Governor of Cumaná, Don Diego Suarez de Amaya, reported the arrival there of a grand total of almost six hundred Dutch salt ships, besides more than fifty Dutch smuggling vessels.19
East of the Cape of Good Hope Dutch navigation in the period, 1598‑1605, also experienced phenomenal development. In the four years, 1598‑1601, twelve fleets went in the wake of De Houtman to the East Indies and to the Asiatic mainland.20 In addition, during these same years two Dutch expeditions chose the Straits of Magellan route to the East, breaking the monotony of their voyage, as did Francis Drake and Thomas Cavendish, by preying on Spanish shareholding along the Pacific Coast of America.21 Numerous East India companies arose in the United Netherlands, but these soon engaged in destructive competition, and prevented concerted action against the Spanish-Portuguese power in the East. The United Dutch East India Company was therefore formed, capitalized at approximately seven million florins, and granted a monopoly charter. Throughout the seventeenth century it was the greatest commercial company in the world.22 Moreover, until 1648 it operated as the right arm of the Dutch state in its offensive against the Iberian powers. By 1605 the Company had factories on Java, Sumatra, Borneo, the Spice Islands, the Malay Peninsula, and the mainland of India. It won its first sovereign rights on Amboina in 1605, and on Ternate two years later.23 Annually large fleets sailed from the Netherlands to the East, and squadrons returned with fabulous cargoes of spices, porcelains, and silks which in value more than matched the Spanish West Indian galleons.24
The Dutch East Indiamen were massive ships from five hundred to a thousand tons burden, designed and equipped both to fight and to trade.25 They represented a naval power in the Far East which the combined p33naval forces of the Spanish at Manila and the Portuguese at Malacca and Goa were never able to match, and therefore these were forced to give ground constantly to the Dutch intruders in the Indian Ocean. In the Atlantic the Dutch possessed no such privately maintained naval force to support their African and American enterprises in the years before 1605; in fact, a Dutch West India Company was not formed until 1621. The Dutch western offensive therefore lacked concentrated force, and, being sprawling and decentralized in character, was vulnerable to counterattack. This defect was compensated for, in part, by the naval support afforded by the Dutch privateers and the occasional punitive expeditions which the States General outfitted. The fighting navy of the United Netherlands first appeared south of the Equator in 1599, when an expedition of seventy-three sail captured and briefly held the Canary Islands and San Thomé Island in the Gulf of Guinea, and a single squadron raided Bahia in Brazil.26 Again in 1604 the States General dispatched a fleet of seven vessels under Paulus van Caerden to harass the Brazilian coast.27
By 1605, the Spaniards and the Portuguese, after noting with dismay the mounting tempo of Dutch commercial-naval expansion, determined upon a concerted and far-flung counteroffensive. In November, 1605, Don Luis Fajardo with fourteen galleons and four auxiliary vessels appeared before Punta de Araya, where he surprised and destroyed some twenty Dutch salt ships and emphasized the object lesson by killing or imprisoning the crews.28 A squadron of Fajardo's fleet followed up this blow in February, 1606, by dispersing a smuggling fleet of twenty-four Dutch ships, six French ships, and one English vessel off the east coast of Cuba.29 In 1605, moreover, military and naval reinforcements were sent from Acapulco in New Spain to Manila, and from Lisbon to Goa and Malacca. The first detachment formed the nucleus of the strong expedition which Don Pedro de Acuña, Governor of the Philippines, directed from Manila against the Moluccas in the spring of 1606.30 There the p34Dutch fort on Tidore and the western half of Ternate were recaptured by the Spanish. A few months later, in August, 1606, a Portuguese fleet of sixteen great galleons raised a four-month Dutch siege of Malacca, although at the cost of more than half of the Portuguese ships, lost in naval actions against the Dutch admiral, Cornelis Matelief, who was besieging the port.31
The Spanish counteroffensive now turned the Dutch to renewed exertions. Partly to avenge the rough treatment meted out by Fajardo to the Dutch salt carriers, 130 Dutch privateers sailed into the Atlantic by March, 1606.32 The ensuing summer Admiral Willem Haultain with a fleet of some twenty sail harassed the coasts of Spain and Portugal and kept on the lookout for a Spanish West Indian fleet.33 The next year Admiral Jacob van Heemskerck with twenty-six vessels won a smashing victory in the Bay of Gibraltar, destroying or disabling nearly all the twenty-odd galleons which Don Juan d'Alvarez de Avila led out against him.34 Also in 1607 Cornelis Matelief regained in the Moluccas much of what had been lost as a result of the Spanish thrust from Manila under Pedro de Acuña the year before; a new and powerful Company war fleet sailed under Pieter Verhoeff from the Netherlands to the East Indies, and Admiral François Wittert fought a furious naval engagement, although against odds and unsuccessfully, against the Spanish in the Philippines.35
In 1608 the negotiations began between the United Netherland and Spain which resulted in the following year in the signing of the Twelve Years' Truce. The chief bone of contention in the long conferences which were held was the question of the Dutch trade to the two Indies. Since the Spanish were uncompromising in their demand that the Dutch relinquish their overseas navigation, and the Dutch equally insistent upon maintaining it, a specious and meaningless clause was finally inserted in the treaty, whereby a truce was declared which was honored, with exceptions, in the Atlantic, but which never went into effect in the Indian and Pacific oceans.36
The Twelve Years' Truce in no way really halted the Dutch encroachments upon the Iberian colonial world. If Dutch activity lessened anywhere, p35it was in the Caribbean; for, with Dutch trade to the Iberian Peninsula now entirely unimpeded, certain American products could more easily and safely be obtained there than overseas. There is no evidence, for example, that the Dutch salt trade at Punta de Araya, which suffered a severe blow in 1605, was revived during the Truce period.37 Dutch smuggling in the Caribbean may have continued on a moderate scale during these years, but the evidence is meager.
Dutch trade in Brazil during the Truce years was quite a different story. In the United Netherlands there was domiciled a number of Portuguese merchants, some married into Dutch families, others refugee Portuguese Jews, with relatives and intimate commercial connections in Lisbon, Viana, and Oporto. It was this link which made possible the continuation, and indeed extension, of Dutch-Brazilian trade during the Truce. In 1621 ten to fifteen ships were built annually in the United Netherlands exclusively for the Brazil trade, forty to fifty thousand chests of Brazilian sugar a year were imported, and twenty-nine sugar refineries in Holland were kept busy as a result of the traffic. It was then authoritatively stated that from one-half to two‑thirds of the carrying trade between Brazil and Europe was in Dutch hands.38
Elsewhere in the Americas the Dutch during the Truce pursued the policy of seeking out trade and planting colonies in areas unoccupied by the Spanish and Portuguese. The year that the Truce was signed Henry Hudson, in the employ of the Dutch East India Company, discovered and explored the river which bears his name. In the years immediately following, Dutch private traders began to exploit the fur wealth of the Hudson River region, and in 1614 a four-year charter was granted to the Company of New Netherland. In the last-named year Fort Orange, trading post and infant colony, was founded on the Hudson near present-day Albany, and the fur hinterland of the Five Nations began to be tapped.39
In Guiana, from the Essequibo to the Amazon, Dutch colonization was also promptly undertaken and in part rendered successful. Some of the Dutch trading factories there from an earlier time were transformed into European settlements, apparently during 1610‑11. Two colonial grants for 1612 confirm the fact that there were groups of Dutch settlers p36established on the Corentine and Surinam rivers in that the year.40 The Corentine colony, however, was destroyed in 1614 by Spaniards from the island of Trinidad. Despite this setback, the following year new Dutch settlements were founded on the Cayenne, the Wiapoco, and the Amazon.41 In 1616 their first permanent colony arose on the Essequibo, the nucleus of what long was Dutch and today is British Guiana.42
Far towards the poles the Dutch in these years were also active. Dutch whalers stalked their marine prey from Spitsbergen to Greenland, and in 1615 they probably explored Davis Strait beyond 80° north latitude.43 Towards the opposite pole Jacques Lemaire led an expedition which in 1616 discovered and rounded Cape Horn, opening an important route into the Pacific Ocean.44 Meanwhile, in Africa commerce continued and prospered, and in 1612 the Dutch won by force their first base, Fort Mouree, on the Guinea Coast.45
So much for the Atlantic, where the Truce period witnessed only minor Dutch-Iberian hostilities. East of the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Straits of Magellan, however, the war continued and even increased in intensity. While Spanish-Portuguese naval forces were temporarily free in Europe, the Dutch East India Company stood exposed to the full fury of Iberian counterassault. The Company, therefore, appealed to the States General for subsidies of money and ships.46 These the national government indeed repeatedly granted, for it wished to create a counterweight to the reinforcements which the Spanish after 1609 were sending from Mexico to Manila, and the Portuguese from Lisbon to Malacca and Goa.47 In a belated attempt to threaten the Spanish on the Pacific Coast and thus to prevent them from strengthening the Philippines from Acapulco, the Dutch East India Company in 1614 sent a fleet of five powerful ships under Joris van Spilbergen to the Far East via the Straits of Magellan and the coast of Peru. Spilbergen's instructions were to strike the enemy wherever he might be found. In July, 1615, he encountered and effectively defeated the Spanish Pacific armada under Don Rodrigo de Mendoza p37at Cañete off Peru. Spilbergen then bombarded Paita, intimidated the garrison of Acapulco, skirmished with Sebastian Vizcaino at near-by Zalahua, and finally appeared before Manila.48
There Don Juan de Silva, Governor of the Philippines, had just set out with the most powerful armada ever assembled in Manila to go via Macao to the Moluccas.49 Supporting Portuguese galleons were to join him at Macao, but Admiral Pieter van der Hagen destroyed these while they were still at Malacca. Shortly thereafter De Silva died at Macao, and the proposed attack upon the Dutch in the Moluccas did not materialize. In the following year, 1617, a strong fleet under Jan Dircksz Lam, aimed against the Philippines, was defeated in Manila Bay.50 However, despite constant Spanish-Portuguese opposition during the Truce years, the Dutch East India Company steadily expanded its factories and influence all the way from Arabia and Persia to the Moluccas and Japan.
While the Dutch East India Company was thus consolidating its position in the Far East, another threat to its power appeared. This was the English, who in 1601‑4 made their first commercially successful voyage to the East Indies.51 In the sheltered wake of the Dutch offensive they gradually in subsequent years developed trade there. Although they possessed but a fraction of the Dutch resources in capital, ships, and sea-faring men, they demanded equality with the Dutch in the East Indies.52 This demand the Dutch Government found difficult to refuse, for the English were Protestant allies in Europe and lay geographically athwart the European lanes of Dutch communication. But the Dutch East India Company, having borne the brunt of the offensive against the Iberian powers in the East, was reluctant to share the fruits of victory there, contending that the English sought to reap where the Dutch had sown. At Bantam on Java and in the Banda Islands, Anglo-Dutch rivalry after 1615 flared into open strife.53 The fiery governor general, Jan Pietersz Coen, gave notice that the Dutch East India Company meant to maintain its monopoly at all costs, but only after blood had been shed did the English prepare to submit. Then, in 1620, before the heat of battle had p38even died down, news came to Batavia that the States General, desirous of retaining English friendship as the renewal of war with Spain approached, had approved a pact whereby the Dutch and English East India companies were to coöperate in exploitation and defense beyond the Cape of Good Hope.54 But the English East India Company lacked the resources to capitalize on this opportunity, and Coen checkmated English trade expansion everywhere in the Archipelago. In 1623 the English closed their factory in Japan, and shortly thereafter ceased to play an important role in the East Indies.55
The Twelve Years' Truce expired in 1621, and the Dutch-Iberian conflict was now renewed in all quarters of the globe. To give power and direction to a new western offensive, the mammoth Dutch West India Company, capitalized at more than seven million florins, was chartered. It was the counterpart to the Dutch East India Company, which to Dutch statesmen and merchant princes alike had long since justified its existence as an instrument of national commercial and military policy. In the next twenty years, 1622‑41, the Dutch navy in European waters, and the two militant commercial companies overseas, were to break the last vestiges of the Iberian colonial monopoly and to raise the power of the United Netherlands to its peak.
The Dutch West India Company, although chartered in 1621, did not strike its first important offensive blow until three years later. Meanwhile, hundreds of Dutch salt ships reappeared at Punta de Araya, and scores of Dutch privateers in the Caribbean.56 Here the first renewed hostilities occurred, for the Spanish, perturbed at this large-scale intrusion, struck back by building a strong fort at Araya in 1622, and thereby closed the salt pans to future Dutch exploitation. From Belém in northern Brazil the Portuguese the following year also moved against the Dutch, destroying their plantation settlements and expelling them from the entire Amazon estuary.57 Then came the Dutch West India Company's blow against Bahia, the capital of Brazil. Attacked by a military-naval force of twenty-six ships and 3300 men, the city fell in May, 1624.58 Simultaneously, the Nassau fleet of eleven ships and 1650 men, outfitted by the States General and the Dutch East India Company, tried to take Callao p39de Lima in Peru, but a three-month blockade failed through poor leadership. Then Guayaquil was burned, Acapulco disturbed, and the Pacific crossed.59 In the Far East the year 1624 saw Pieter Muyser's fleet preying on Spanish commerce off Manila, a Portuguese armada defeated by an Anglo-Dutch fleet off Ormuz on the Persian Gulf, and the Dutch occupation of Formosa.60
The year 1625 was more fortunate for the Iberian cause. A tremendous Spanish-Portuguese armada of sixty-three ships and 13,000 men under Don Fadrique de Toledo recaptured Bahia from the Dutch,61 while two Dutch West India Company expeditions under Boudewijn Hendricksz and Andries Veron, against Puerto Rico and the Portuguese African stronghold S. Jorge da Mina, respectively, failed.62 In 1625 the Dutch founded New Amsterdam on Manhattan Island, but that was a small event in its time.
It was the Dutch West India Company's privateering successes in the Caribbean, 1626‑29, which revived their American offensive and generally weakened Iberian resistance all over the world. With fourteen ships Piet Heyn in 1626‑27 boldly sailed under the guns of Bahia and dragged away twenty-three loaded sugar vessels. In the last-named year Dirck Simonsz van Uytgeest captured a rich Honduras galleon. In 1628 Pieter Adriaensz Ita took two Honduras galleons, and Piet Heyn with thirty-one ships and four thousand men captured an entire Spanish Silver Fleet, a feat not previously duplicated. The cargo sold for fifteen million florins, wherewith the Dutch West India Company paid all its debts, declared a fifty per cent dividend, and planned a major drive against Brazil.63 This was also the year that five hundred Puritans settled at Massachusetts Bay, because religious-political persecution and economic depression in their homeland made exile therefrom seem preferable to continued residence in it.
In the 1630's the Dutch colonial offensive came into its full stride. In the Americas the decade opened with the capture of Pernambuco by Hendrick Loncq with sixty-five ships and eight thousand men.64 During the next seven years, four of the captaincies, or provinces, of northern p40Brazil came into Dutch hands, and Dutch occupation of Curaçao, Bonaire, Aruba, and St. Martin in the West Indies was begun.65 The able and enlightened Count John Maurice of Nassau became Governor General of Dutch Brazil. He nurtured the colony and at the same time extended the Dutch conquests. He added Ceará as the fifth captaincy to Dutch Brazil in 1637, and the same year sent an expedition to Africa which wrested S. Jorge da Mina from the Portuguese.66
In the Far East after 1630 the Dutch East India Company also became increasingly prosperous, powerful, and aggressive. Virtually supreme in the Archipelago, the Company turned to conquest at the expense of the Portuguese on the Asiatic mainland. After 1633 Company fleets cruised the Strait of Malacca annually, preying on Portuguese shareholding and ruining Malacca as a transit market. After 1636 Dutch fleets annually blockaded Goa and the entire Malabar Coast. Company factories dotted the coast line of the subcontinent of India from Surat to Bengal. Its single factory in Japan in 1636 brought in an estimated net profit of three million florins. But possessors, whether nations, companies, or individuals, too frequently still desire more. There remained the Portuguese-controlled island of Ceylon, richest cinnamon land in the world. In 1637 the Company entered into alliance with the Sultan of Ceylon, who wanted freedom from the Portuguese yoke but who was blind to the danger of falling under another. Thus the Dutch conquest of Ceylon began. Baticalo fell in 1638; Trincomali in 1639; and Negombo and Punto de Gale in 1640.67
Meanwhile, in Europe and Brazil the Spanish-Portuguese determined upon a last supreme effort. In October, 1639, a Spanish-Portuguese armada of sixty-seven galleons and supply vessels and 24,000 men under Antonio de Oquendo appeared in the English Channel, but with almost one hundred somewhat smaller ships the great Dutch admiral, Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp, virtually annihilated it off the Downs.68 A second Spanish-Portuguese armada of eighty-six ships and 12,000 men meanwhile had crossed to Brazil, but in January, 1640, it in turn was disabled and dispersed in a four-day running battle by a fleet of forty-one Dutch West India Company vessels.69
p41 The year 1641 saw the climax of the Dutch world offensive. The forces of Count John Maurice in that year made Maranhão into the seventh Dutch captaincy in Brazil. The Dutch now held the territory from the Rio São Francisco to the Amazon, a distance of •more than a thousand miles. Simultaneously, the famous Dutch privateering commander, "Peg-Leg" Jol, captured the slave depot S. Paulo da Loanda, on the mainland of Africa, and the sugar islands of S. Thomé and Annobom in the Gulf of Guinea.70 In Asia the Dutch East India Company in 1641 also attained a long-sought goal. On August 2, 1640, its military and naval forces began the siege of Malacca for the third time.71 One hundred and sixty-five days later this key stronghold fell and with it virtually the last Portuguese hope of stemming the Dutch ascendancy in the Far East. This was unmistakably the end of an epoch, not only in Far Eastern but in world history. A half century of vigorous, aggressive Dutch expansion had done more than anything else to shatter an ancient status quo, the Iberian colonial monopoly. Masters of the East, with vast territorial holdings in the West, enjoying commercial and naval supremacy in Europe, and recognized as leaders in science and art, the United Netherlands had virtually reached the crest of its power and influence.
University of California
* A paper read at the meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association at Eugene, December 29, 1941 [Editor].
1 It is worth stressing that at the close of the sixteenth century not one bit of overseas territory had passed from the control of the Iberian powers into that of the late-comer nations: England, France, and the United Netherlands.
2 One of the best indexes of the size of the Dutch merchant marine is to be found in the published Danish Sound Toll records: Nina Ellinger Bang, ed., Tabeller over skibsfart og varetransport gennem öresund, 1497‑1660 (Köbenhavn, 1906). Cf. Walther Vogel, "Zur Grösze der europäischen Handelsflotten im 15., 16. und 17. Jahrhundert," Forschungen und Versuche zur Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit: Festschrift Dietrich Schäfer (Jena, 1915).
3 Herbert Boynton Leggett is now writing from Spanish and Dutch manuscript sources a doctoral dissertation at the University of California, Berkeley, on the subject of the Dutch salt trade outside of Europe, particularly in the Caribbean area. I am indebted to Mr. Leggett for several facts incorporated in this paper relating to this subject.
4 Arthur Agats, Der hansische Baienhandel. Heidelberger Abhandlungen zur mittleren und neueren Geschichte, V. (Heidelberg, 1904).
5 J. H. Kernkamp, De Handel op den Vijand, 1572‑1609 (2 v., Utrecht, [1931‑1934]).
6 Ibid., I, 156.
7 D. Velius, Chroniick van Hoorn (Hoorn, 1648), 258.
8 Ibid., 259.
9 J. W. Ijzerman, ed., Journael van de reis naar Zuid-Amerika, 1598‑1601. Werken uitgeven door de Linschoten-Vereeniging, XVI ('s‑Gravenhage, 1918), xxvii; J. W. Ijzerman, "Amsterdamsche Bevrachtings-contracten, 1591‑1602: I. De Vaart op Spanje en Portugal," Economisch Historisch Jaarboek, XVII ('s‑Gravenhage, 1931), 163‑291.
10 J. K. J. de Jonge, De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indie, I ('s‑Gravenhage, 1862), 35 ff.
11 Richard Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, Voyages and Discoveries of the English Nation, XI (Glasgow, 1904), 227 ff.
12 Geeraerdt Brandt, Historie der vermaerde Zee-en Koop-stadt Enkhuisen (Hoorn, 1747), 262‑63.
13 V. T. Harlow, ed., The Discoverie of the large and bewtiful Empire of Guiana by Sir Walter Ralegh (London, 1928), 57; Hakluyt, op. cit., X, 216‑17; De Jonge, op. cit., I, 46‑47; John Roche Dasent, ed., Acts of the Privy Council of England, n. s., XXV (London, 1901), 466.
14 J. C. Mollema, De Eerste Schipvaart der Hollanders naar Oost-Indië, 1595‑1597 ('s‑Gravenhage, 1935).
15 United States Commission on Boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana, Report and Accompanying Papers: Extracts from Archives, II (Washington, D. C., 1897), 9‑22.
16 Everhard van Reyd, Historie der Nederlantscher Oorlogen Begin ende Voortganck tot den Jaere 1601 (Leeuwarden, 1650), 350.
17 Emanvel van Meteren, Historie der Neder-landscher ende haerder Na-buren Oorlogen ende Geschiedenissen tot den iare M.VICXII ('s‑Gravenhage, 1614), 588.
18 James A. Williamson, English Colonies in Guiana and on the Amazon, 1604‑1688 (London, 1923), 62.
19 Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, Santo Domingo 187, MS. letters.
20 H. Terpstra, De Nederlandsche Voorcompagnieën. Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, II (Amsterdam, 1938), 321‑460.
21 Ibid., 397‑419.
22 The English East India Company did not catch up with its Dutch rival until the eighteenth century. The standard history of the Dutch East India Company is Pieter van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, F. W. Stapel, ed. (4 v., 's‑Gravenhage, 1927‑32).
23 F. W. Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië (Amsterdam, 1930), 49.
24 C. De Heer, Bijdrage tot de Financieele Geschiedenis der Oost Indische Compagnie ('s‑Gravenhage, 1929).
25 Pieter van Dam, op. cit., Eerste Boek, Deel I, 450‑511. Cf. Nicolaes Witsen, Aeloude en Hedendaegsche Scheeps-Bouw en Bestier (Amsterdam, 1671).
26 J. H. Abendanon, "De Vlootsaanval onder Bevel van Jhr. Pieter van der Does op de Canarische Eilanden en het Eiland Santo Thomé in 1599 volgens Nederlandsche en Spaansche Bronnen," Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde. Vijfde Reeks, Achtste Deel ('s‑Gravenhage, 1921), 14‑63.
27 Ijzerman, Journael van de Reis naar Zuid-Amerika, 191‑215.
28 Governor Diego Suarez de Amaya to the King of Spain from Cumaná, November 22, 1605. Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, Santo Domingo 187.
29 Juan Alvares de Aviles to the King from Havana, April 1, 1606, Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, Indiferente General 1867.
30 Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, eds., The Philippine Islands, XIV (Cleveland, 1904), 53‑69, 173‑81.
31 F. W. Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië III, 54‑55.
32 Kernkamp, op. cit., II, 316.
33 Van Meteren, op. cit., f. 558‑59; J. C. de Jonge, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen, I (Haarlem 1858), 205‑6.
34 Ibid., 207‑12.
35 P. A. Tiele, "De Europeërs in den Maleischen Archipel," Bijdragen voor Taal- Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië. Vierde Volgreeks. Achtste Deel ('s‑Gravenhage, 1884), 49‑118.
36 Van Meteren, op. cit., ff. 585‑89.
37 Governor Diego de Arroyo Daza to the Casa de Contratación from Cumaná, January 31, 1622. This letter is printed in Irene A. Wright and C. F. A. van Dam, eds., Nederlandsche Zeevaarders op de Eilanden in de Caraïbische Zee en aan de Kust van Columbia en Venezuela, I (Utrecht, 1934), 19‑20, 22‑26.
38 Ijzerman, Journael van de Reis naar Zuid-Amerika, 96‑106.
39 Mrs. Schuyler van Rensselaer, History of the City of New York, I (New York, 1909), 23.
40 MS. grants dated September 18, October 15, 1612. Koninklijk Huisarchief, 's‑Gravenhage, Commissie Boek van Maurits.
43 S. Muller Fz, Geschiedenis der Noordsche Compagnie (Utrecht, 1874), 381.
44 R. C. Bakhuizen van den Brink, "Isaac Lemaire," Studien en Schetzen over Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Letteren, IV ('s‑Gravenhage, 1877), 225‑90.
45 S. P. l'Honoré Naber, De Nederlanders in Guinee en Brazilië. Geschiedkundige Atlas van Nederland ('s‑Gravenhage, 1931), 11.
46 Pieter van Dam, op. cit., Eerste Boek, Deel II, 484‑550.
47 Blair and Robertson, op. cit., XVII, XVIII, passim.
48 J. A. J. Villiers, ed., The East and West Indian Mirror. Works of the Hakluyt Society, ser. 2, v. 18 (London, 1906), 11‑160.
49 Blair and Robertson, op. cit., XVII, 251‑80.
50 P. A. Tiele, Bouwstoffen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanders in den Maleischen Archipel. Eerste Deel ('s‑Gravenhage, 1886), 170‑83.
51 Clements R. Markham, The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster, Knt., to the East Indies. Works of the Hakluyt Society, ser. 1, v. 56 (London, 1877).
52 William Foster, England's Quest of Eastern Trade (London, 1933); Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, III, 117 ff.
53 H. T. Colenbrander, Koloniale Geschiedenis, II ('s‑Gravenhage, 1925), 105‑12.
54 This agreement had been reached on July 17, 1619. Ibid., 113.
55 The English henceforth concentrated their efforts increasingly on the mainland of India.
58 S. P. l'Honoré Naber, ed., Joannes de Laet: Iaerlyck Verhael van de Verrichtinghen der Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie. Eerste Deel, Boek I‑III ('s-Gravenhage, 1931), 1‑30.
59 Iournael vande Nassausche Vloot (Amsterdam, 1643).
60 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, III, 205‑29.
61 Juan de Valencia y Guzmán, Compendio historial de la jornada del Brasil . . . . Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España, LV (Madrid, 1870), 43‑200.
62 Naber, op. cit., 114 ff.; Fernando J. Geigel Sabat, Balduino Enrico (Barcelona, 1934), 155‑200.
63 De Laet, op. cit., Tweede Deel, Boek IV‑VII ('s‑Gravenhage, 1932), 1‑85; S. P. l'Honoré Naber and Irene A. Wright, eds., Piet Heyn en de Zilvervloot (Utrecht, 1928).
64 De Laet, op. cit., 125‑58.
65 J. H. J. Hamelberg, De Nederlanders op de West-Indische Eilanden (4 v., Amsterdam, 1901‑9).
66 S. P. l'Honoré Naber, ed. and tr., Caspar Barlaeus: Nederlandsche Brazilië onder het Bewind van Johan Maurits Grave van Nassau, 1637‑1644 ('s‑Gravenhage, 1923).
67 Stapel, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië, III, 251‑59.
68 C. R. Boxer, ed. and tr., The Journal of Maarten Harpertszoon Tromp (Cambridge, England, 1930).
69 Naber, Caspar Barlaeus, 221‑38.
70 Ibid., 261‑323.
71 N. MacLeod, De Oost-Indische Compagnie als Zeemogendheid in Azië (2 v., Rijswijk, 1927), II, 211‑18.
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