p27 1 When men set out from their own country to encounter strife and perils in foreign lands and some disaster befalls them by land or sea, the survivors still have left their native soil, their city, and their fatherland, so that they are not all utterly destroyed. 2 But for those who are to incur peril in defence of what they most prize, shrines and country, parents and children, and all else, the struggle is not the same nor even similar. For if they save themselves by a stout defence against the foe, their enemies will be intimidated and disinclined to attack them in the future, but if they make a poor showing in the face of danger, no hope of safety will be left. 3 Those, therefore, who are to contend for all these precious stakes must fail in no preparation and no effort, but must take thought for many and varied activities, so that a failure may at least not seem due to their own fault. 4 But if after all a reverse should befall them, yet at all events the survivors may p29 some time restore their affairs to their former condition, like certain Greek peoples who, after being reduced to extremes, have re‑established themselves.
1 Now the disposition of the troops is to be made with reference to the size of the state and the topography of the town, its sentries and patrols, and any other service for which troops are required in the city, — in view of all this the assignments are to be made. 2 So men who are going to fight outside the walls must be drawn up in a manner suitable to the country along their line of march, according as they are to march past dangerous or fortified places, through narrow passes or across plains, past higher ground upon the right1 and points exposed to ambush, with reference also to the river-crossings and the formation of a line of battle under such conditions. 3 But the forces which are to defend the walls and keep watch over the citizens2 need not be so arranged, but rather with reference to the positions within the city and to the immediate danger. 4 First, then, it is necessary to select the most prudent citizens and those most experienced in war for attendance upon the civil authorities.3 p31 5 Next one must pick out men capable of the greatest physical exertion and divide them into companies, that there may be ready for sallies, for patrolling the city, for the relief of those hard pressed, or for any other similar service, these who are picked men and able to give assistance.4 6 They must be both loyal and satisfied with the existing order, since it is a great thing to have such a group acting like a fortress against the revolutionary designs of the other party, for it would be a terror to the opposition inside the city.5 7 And let the man who is to lead and have charge of them be not merely prudent and vigorous, but also one who would run the greatest risks from a change of government. 8 From the rest the strongest, in the prime of manhood, should be chosen for the watches and the walls, while the remainder should be divided and apportioned according to the length of the nights and the number of the watches. 9 Of the common soldiers some should be stationed in the market-place, some in the theatre, and the rest in the open places in the city, so that as far as the city's power permits no part may be unguarded.
1 And that there may be no need of troops to guard them, it is best to block up the useless open places in the city by digging ditches6 and by p33 making them as inaccessible as possible to any who might wish to start a revolt and begin by taking possession of them. 2 So, when the Thebans had broken in, the Lacedaemonians, some here and others there, filled baskets with earth and stones from the nearest houses, which they tore down, and from fences and walls, making use also, it is said, of the many massive bronze tripods from the temples, and with these they managed, in advance of the Thebans, to block up the entrances and passages and open places and kept them out when they tried to break into the city proper.7
3 On another occasion, when the Plataeans became aware during the night that the Thebans were in the city, they perceived that there were not many of them and that they were taking none of the proper precautions because they fancied that they were in possession of the town.8 The Plataeans concluded, therefore, that they could easily defeat them by an attack, and so promptly devised the following scheme. 4 Some of the authorities engaged the Thebans in the market-place in a discussion of terms, while others were secretly passing the word around to the rest of the citizens not to go out of their houses singly, but one or two at a time to break through the party-walls and assemble stealthily in one another's houses. 5 When a sufficient fighting force was ready, they blocked up the streets and alleys, using wagons without the draft-animals, p35 and rushing together at a given signal, fell upon the Thebans. 6 At the same time the women-folk and the house-slaves were on the tile-roofs.9 The result was that when the Thebans wished to act and to defend themselves in the darkness they suffered no less harm from the wagons than from their assailants, since they fled without knowing which way to turn for safety because of the barricades of wagons, while their pursuers, being acquainted with the ground, soon killed many of them.
7 Yet it is necessary to set forth also the reasons which make against this practice, such as the great danger to the besieged if there is only one open place and the conspirators are the first to seize it. For when there is only one such common spot, the advantage would lie with those who first take it. But if there are two or three such places, there would be these advantages: 8 If the conspirators should seize one or two there would still be one left for their opponents; and if they should seize them all, by separation and division they would be weaker in the face of their united opponents, unless indeed each division were numerically superior to the defenders of the city. In the same way in all other decisions one should consider the inherent objections to the prescribed rules, that one may not inadvisedly adopt another course.
1 When sudden fear falls upon a city without military organization, one could most speedily organize the citizens for its defence by allotting p37 to each ward a section of the wall to which it is to hurry and mount guard, letting the number of the inhabitants of the ward determine the extent of that section of the wall to whose defence it is appointed. 2 The next step is to assign the able-bodied men from each ward to duty at the market-place, upon patrols, and wherever else such men may be needed. 3 Similarly when a stronghold is occupied by allies, let a section of the wall be given to each contingent of the allies to defend. Should the citizens, however, suspect one another, trustworthy men should be stationed at the several places for ascending the wall, who, if anyone else attempts to mount, will prevent him from doing so. 4 In peace, also, the citizens ought to be organized in the following manner. First of all one should appoint as captain of each precinct the most capable and prudent man, to whom the citizens are to rally if anything unexpected occurs at night. 5 The precinct captains should muster at the market-place the men of those precincts nearest the market-place, at the theatre the men of those precincts nearest the theatre, and so for the other open places the precinct captains with the armed men who have reported to them should gather, each in the one that lies nearest to him. 6 For this is the quickest way by which each group would both reach their stations and be near their own homes, and so, as heads of families, could communicate with their households, that is, with their children and wives, because stationed not far from them. And it should be determined beforehand by lot to which p39 quarter each of the authorities should go and send detachments of troops to the battlements. Moreover, there will be leaders to look after everything else, provided that they thus assume immediate command.
1 As quickly as possible the besieged must be provided with signals, so that they will not fail to recognize those who approach them. For this is the sort of thing that has happened: Chalcis on the Euripus10 was captured by a fugitive operating from Eretria, aided by one of the inhabitants of the town who practised a stratagem of the following description. 2 To the most deserted part of the city, where the gate was regularly closed, he kept bringing a firepot, and by keeping the fire going day and night he secretly one night burned through the bar of the gate and admitted soldiers at that point.11 3 When about two thousand men had gathered in the market-place, the alarm was hastily sounded and many of the Chalcidians were killed because they were not recognized, for in their panic they aligned themselves with their enemies as though they were their friends, each thinking that he was late in coming up. 4 In this way, then, most of them perished by ones and twos, and the city had been in the hands of the enemy for some time before the citizens knew what was happening. 5 It is necessary, p41 then, in time of war, especially when the enemy is near at hand, first, that the forces which are being sent from the city on some enterprise by land or sea should be furnished with signals for use both by day and by night to those who remain, in order that the latter, if the enemy appear in the meantime, may not be unable to tell friend from foe. 6 And, secondly, after their departure upon the enterprise, persons who will recognize the signals should be sent to watch, so that the men at home may get information of this kind while those returning are still a great way off. For it would be a great advantage to make preparations long beforehand for what is impending. 7 What has befallen those who did not take such precautions will be clear from some actual incidents which may be told in passing as illustration and definite evidence. 8 Word was brought to Peisistratus, when he was general at Athens,12 that the Megarians would come in ships, and attempt a night attack upon the Athenian women while they were celebrating at Eleusis the festival of Demeter. On hearing this Peisistratus set an ambush ahead of them, 9 and when the Megarians disembarked, in secrecy as they supposed, and were some distance from the sea, he rose up and overcame those who had been trapped, killed most of them, and captured the ships in which they had come. 10 Then after quickly filling the ships with his own soldiers, he took from among the women those best fitted to p43 make the voyage, and late in the day landed at Megara at some distance from the city. 11 Now many of the Megarians, officials and others, when they caught sight of the ships sailing into the harbour, went out to meet them, wishing, no doubt, to see as many women as possible brought in as captives. [Then the Athenians were ordered to attack the enemy], and disembarking with daggers in their hands to strike down some of the Megarians, but to bring back to the ships as many as possible of the most prominent men; and this they did. 12 From what has been said, then, it is clear that for the conduct of musters and expeditions it is necessary to have prearranged signals, and those of a kind that cannot be misunderstood.
1 In the next place, no chance persons should be appointed keepers of the gates, but only discreet and sagacious men always capable of suspecting anything brought into the city; and besides they should be well-to‑do and men who have something at stake in the city, that is to say, wife and children; but not men who, because of poverty, or the pressure of some agreement, or from other stress of circumstances, might either be persuaded by anyone or of themselves incite others to revolt. 2 Leuco, the tyrant of Bosporus,13 used to discharge even those among his guards who were in debt as a result of dice-playing or other excesses.
1 Day scouts also must be stationed before the city on a high place visible for as long a distance as possible. At least three scouts should be at each place, not chosen at random, but men skilled in warfare, so that a single scout may not ignorantly form an opinion and signal or announce it to the city and trouble the inhabitants to no purpose. 2 Persons inexperienced in military formations are likely to do this through not knowing whether the enemy's acts and deeds are intentional or only accidental, 3 but the experienced man, understanding the preparations of the enemy, his numbers, line of march, and other movements, will report the truth.
4 If there are no such places from which the signals may be given to the city, there must be relays of persons at different points to receive the signals as they are raised and pass them on to the city. 5 The day scouts must also be swift of foot so that they can come quickly and report, even from great distances, matters which cannot be signalled but must by all means be reported by one of them.
6 If there are at hand horses and places fit for the use of horses, it is best to employ relays of horsemen so that messages may be conveyed more quickly. The day scouts must be sent from the city at dawn or while it is still night, lest they be seen by the scouts of the enemy as they go by daylight to their posts. p47 7 They must not have the same watchword . . . so that if they are captured by the enemy they may be able neither willingly nor unwillingly to reveal the watchword of those in the city. The day scouts should be told to raise their signals now and then just as the night scouts raise their torches.
1 Whenever it is harvest time in the country and the enemy is not far away, many of those in the city are likely to tarry in near‑by places, eager to save the crops. 2 These persons must be gathered into the city thus. First, they must be signalled to come into the city by sunset, but if they are scattered over too much territory signals must be given by relays, so that all, or most of them, may reach the city. 3 When the signal is given for them to leave the fields, one must also be given to those in the city to prepare the evening meal. Third, the guard must be signalled to go and take their posts. 4 How this is to be done and how they are to raise the signal fires14 is treated more fully in the book on Military Preparations. One must get his information from that, so that I may not have to write twice about the same matters.
1 Next, if the invasion of a more numerous and larger force of the enemy is expected, first, the region must be made difficult for the enemy to attack, to encamp in, and to forage in, and the rivers must be made hard to ford and swollen.15
2 The number and kinds of stratagems to be employed against enemies disembarking on sandy and rocky shores; what kind of barriers must be ready against them at the harbour of the country or of the city so that vessels cannot enter, or, if they do, cannot sail out; 3 how to make useless the material voluntarily left in the country which might be useful to the foe, for example, that for building walls or huts, or any other enterprise; 4 or, if it is not destroyed, how to conceal both food and drink, the products of the fields and other things in the country; and how one must make standing16 waters undrinkable, and places fit for cavalry movements unfit for them, — 5 the particular treatment of all these subjects is for the present omitted, to avoid explaining them at this point, since they are too numerous. They have been fully treated in the book on Military Preparations.
1 If the invaders try to overawe you, your first action must be to occupy certain places in your own country with men, and calling an assembly of your own soldiers or citizens, explain the situation to them, telling them that there is some operation on hand for them against the enemy and that when a signal is given by trumpet at night those of military age are to be ready to take arms, gather in an appointed place, and follow their leader. 2 So when this is reported to the camp of the enemy, or to their city, you can divert them from what they are attempting to do. 3 If these things are so done you will inspire your friends with courage by your initiative and fearlessness and arouse fear in your enemies so that they will remain quickly at home.
1 One must also notify those citizens who own cattle or slaves to place them in safety among neighbours, since they cannot bring them into the city. 2 The authorities at public expense must place such property with neighbouring peoples and provide means for its support if the owners have no friends to whom they may entrust it.
3 Furthermore, proclamations such as these are to issued from time to time to frighten and deter conspirators: The free population and the ripe crops are to be brought into the city, authority being given to anyone so disposed to lead away or carry off from the country, without fear of punishment, the possessions of anyone who disobeys this regulation. 4 The usual festivals are to be celebrated in the city,17 and private gatherings shall not take place, either by day or by night, but those which are really necessary may be held in the town-hall, the council-chamber, or other public place. A soothsayer shall not make sacrifice on his own account without the presence of a magistrate.18 5 Men shall not dine in common but each in his own house, except in the case of a wedding or a funeral feast,19 and then only upon previous notice to the authorities.
If there are any citizens in exile, announcement is to be made what is to be done with each citizen, stranger, or slave who may try to leave.20 6 And if any person associate with any of the exiles, or in dealing with any of them send or receive letters, there is to be a definite risk or even a penalty awaiting him. Outgoing p55 and incoming letters shall be brought to censors before being sent out or delivered.21 7 Men who have more than one equipment of arms shall return a list of them, and no one shall send any weapon out of the city or receive such as security. Soldiers may not be hired nor may one serve for hire without the permission of the authorities. 8 No citizen or resident alien shall take passage on a ship without a passport,22 and orders shall be given that ships shall anchor near gates designated in what follows. 9 Strangers arriving shall carry their weapons unconcealed and ready at hand, and immediately upon arrival shall be disarmed, while no one, not even the innkeepers, shall receive them without permission from the authorities, who shall record also in whose house any persons are, when they take lodging; 10 and at night inns must be locked from the outside by the authorities. From time to time vagrants among these strangers shall be publicly expelled. 11 Citizens of neighbouring states, however, residing in the city for the sake of education23 or for some other special purpose, shall be registered. Not everyone who wishes may converse with public embassies representing cities, princes, or armies, but there must always be present certain of the most trusted citizens who shall stay with the ambassadors p57 so long as they remain. 12 For the importer of whatever the city lacks, grain or oil or anything else, profits shall be specified in proportion to the amount of his importations,24 and he shall be honoured with a crown, and the shipmaster shall be granted allowance for the hauling up and down of his vessel.25 13 Frequent calls to arms shall be given and all strangers in the town shall at this time assemble in a specified place or remain indoors; if, however, one of them shall appear elsewhere, a penalty shall be prescribed for him as a malefactor. 14 At a given signal their stores and shops shall be closed and their lights extinguished, and no one else shall come in. 15 Whenever it is necessary for anyone, he may go out with a lantern, until orders are issued to the contrary. For whoever points out anyone conspiring against the city, or reports anyone as doing any of the things above-mentioned, a reward in money shall be announced, and the reward shall be displayed openly in the market-place or on an altar or in a temple, in order that men may the more readily venture to report any violation of the provisions mentioned.
16 Concerning a sovereign, a general, or a fugitive ruler one should make also the following proclamations:26 p59 If the tyrannicide himself come to grief, the reward announced shall be paid to his children, and if he have none, to his next of kin. 17 And if anyone of the associates of the exile or sovereign or general do some [service to the state, one‑half of] the reward shall be paid him and a return to his home shall be granted, for because of these considerations he would the more readily make the attempt. 18 In a mercenary force, after a call for silence, the following shall be proclaimed in the hearing of all: 19 If anyone is displeased with the existing conditions, and wishes to withdraw, he may do so, but afterwards . . . he will be sold into slavery. For offences less than these imprisonment shall be the penalty, according to the existing law. If anyone be shown to be injuring the army or demoralizing the camp, death shall be the penalty. 20 Then attention shall be given to the other classes. First, one must note whether the citizens are of one mind, since that would be of greatest advantage during a siege. If not, one must, without arousing suspicion, remove [the most p61 influential of] those out of sympathy with the existing order of things, especially those who might become leaders and responsible for action in the city, sending them away somewhere on a plausible pretext, as ambassadors or on other public business. 21 For instance, Dionysius did this in the case of his brother Leptines, when he saw that he was popular with the people of Syracuse and in many ways influential. Becoming suspicious of him and desiring to get rid of him, he did not openly attempt to expel him, for he knew that he would have great support and favour and that a revolution might ensue, so he devised this scheme. 22 He sent him with a few mercenaries to a city named Himera, directing him to bring back part of its garrison and reorganize the rest. When he arrived at Himera, Dionysius sent him word to stay there until he sent for him.27
23 When a city has given hostages and a campaign is made against it, the parents and next of kin of the hostages should depart from the place until the siege is over, in order that they may not, in the assaults by the enemy, see their own sons brought forward and meeting a cruel end. For it is possible that these people, if they were in the city, might go p63 so far as to engage in some act of opposition. 24 If, however, it prove difficult to send such persons out on these pretexts, they must continue in the city but share in only the fewest possible works and undertakings, and they must not know in advance where they are to be or what they are to do, being as little as possible their own masters by night and day. And on one duty and special service after another, without raising suspicion, many persons should keep coming and going about them, in whose company they will be under guard rather than on guard.
1 Because this was the side unprotected by their shields. Approaches to city gates in particular were frequently so constructed as to compel assailants to expose their right sides to missiles hurled by the defenders, for example, the main entrances at Tiryns and at Mycenae. Such also was undoubtedly the character of the famous "Scaean (i.e. left-hand) Gate" of Troy.
3 These men constitute a staff of military devisers, the remote prototype of the modern General Staff. Köchly and Rüstow seem to be in error in identifying these men with the body of troops mentioned in 16.7; 17.6; 26.10; 38.2, for these latter are selected for some particular purpose, or else are the same as the reserves mentioned in §§ 6 and 7 below. In some of the more highly organized Greek states military control was vested in a permanent board of Generals, ten in number (as at Athens), elected directly by the citizens. Liv. XXIV.28 gives an example of how this precept of Aeneas was put into practice during the confusion at Syracuse in 214 B.C.
4 Compare the modern equivalent in the shape of Arditi, Stoss-Truppen, and Battalions of Death.
6 That is, across the entrances to them.
7 This occurred in the summer of 362 B.C., shortly before the battle of Mantinea, in which Epaminondas lost his life.
8 This was the famous night attack upon Plataea in the spring of 431 B.C. which opened the Peloponnesian war. It is described in detail by Thucydides II.2 ff., whose account is closely followed by Aeneas.
9 From this vantage-point they joined in the outcry and hurled tiles upon the enemy in the streets below.
10 This incident probably took place during the war over the Lelantine plain in the latter part of the seventh century B.C.
11 In this difficult passage we follow Wünsch and Behrendt (see the latter's dissertation, pp78 ff.). The word translated "firepot" occurs nowhere else in Greek, but there are close parallels and the general sense of the passage is clear.
12 This incident occurred during the long series of wars with Megara in which Salamis was first lost by Athens and then recovered for her by Solon, and Peisistratus captured Nisaea, the haven of Megara. As Peisistratus at the time of the adventure here described was not yet tyrant, it must have occurred prior to 561‑60 B.C.
13 This was the region about the Cimmerian Bosporus (the entrance to the Sea of Azov) over which Leuco, an able and honourable man, ruled from 393 to 353 B.C.
14 For one of the recommendations of Aeneas upon this point see the long quotation from Polybius given as Frag. 3 at the end of this text. This, the earliest form of telegraphy, seems to have been employed first by the Persians in 490 B.C. (Ephorus, Frag. 107, in Fragm. Hist. Graec.), then by the Greeks at Artemisium in 480 B.C. (Herodotus VII.183),º and became a common thing in the Peloponnesian war. Readers will be reminded of the brilliant description of such a beacon signal given by Aeschylus in the Agam. vv. 281‑316. Compare in general A. C. Merriam, "Telegraphing among the Ancients"; Papers of the Archaeolog. Inst. of America, III.1, 1890.
15 For this idiomatic use of πολύς for a thing in violent motion compare especially Demosthenes, De corona, 136 πολλῷ ῥέοντι, and Plutarch, Agesilaus, 32 ἐρρύη δὲ πλεῖστος . . . ὁ Εὐρώτας. The manoeuvres intended are probably damming up stream courses or breaking dikes, so that the rivers would occupy more beds, channels, or depressions, and thus become literally 'larger.' Notable examples of the same thing in the recent war have occurred on the Yser, the Piave, and the Scarpe.
16 That is lakes, pools, wells, and cisterns; not 'stagnant' water.
17 That is, within the walls, since many Greek festivals, then, as now, were held at sacred spots in the countryside.
18 So as to avoid unauthorized efforts to foretell the future. The unwelcome prophecies of those who did not represent the 'patriotic' point of view, might be very disconcerting, as well-known instances from the Old Testament show. Similarly under the Roman Empire the charge of merely having had a horoscope prepared was sometimes regarded as sufficient warrant for putting a prominent and ambitious man out of the way.
19 The exception made is due to the marked religious character of these particular feasts. The meal, attended by large numbers of guests, was an essential feature, serving originally, no doubt, to secure as many competent witnesses as possible to the fact and the good faith of the transaction. Even after a battle the funeral meal might be held in the house of some private person very closely associated in some responsible way with the enterprise. Thus after the battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C. the funeral feast was held in the house of Demosthenes (De corona, 288).
20 For the purpose namely of getting in touch with those exiles, the most dangerous class of enemies to the established government.
21 Plautus in the Trinummus (from Philemon † c. 263 B.C.), vv. 793‑5 makes mention of portitores who even in time of peace might break the seals and inspect letters.
22 The first mention of such a passport is in the Birds of Aristophanes (414 B.C.), vv. 1212‑15, where it would seem that a σφραγίς or visé by an officer was also required.
23 That is, in the larger places mainly students, but in the ordinary cities for which Aeneas wrote more likely visiting sophists, philosophers, music teachers, and the like.
24 This seems to be the earliest instance of profit-fixing (and hence price-fixing) as a special war measure. Casaubon thought that the purpose was to prevent profiteering; Köchly and Rüstow on the other hand that it was to encourage capitalists to undertake the serious risks involved in supplying a city during war‑time. It seems most reasonable to suppose that the setting of a fix percentage of profit which must have been guaranteed by the state would act both to "encourage production," that, in this case, importation, and to keep down prices as well.
25 In ancient times, as now, the bulk of the foodstuffs transported in Greece was carried in light coasting vessels which were pulled up on shore when not in use. Aeneas probably has in mind the charges for this hauling up and down, and not ordinary harbour tolls, as is generally assumed.
26 Obviously the reward of the assassin has been lost here, the general character of which can be learned from other sources. Thus in the decree of Demophantus at Athens, in 410‑9 B.C., the assassin was to be regarded innocent of all crimes or guilt and to receive one‑half of the confiscated estate of the tyrant, while if he perished in the attempt his children were to be treated like the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, that is, maintained and honoured at the public expense (Andocides, De mysteriis, 93 ff.; Demosthenes XX.159). At Ilium, early in the third century, the rewards are most detailed and explicit. The tyrannicide is to receive a talent of silver and have a bronze statue erected in his honour; he shall be kept at the public expense; at contests called to the front seat by name; and receive a pension of two drachmas a day as long as he lives. A foreigner is to receive citizenship in addition to these rewards, while a slave is given his freedom, one half talent of silver, and (probably) one drachma a day as pension (Inscr. in Dittenberger's Orientis Graeci Inscr. Sel. no. 218, ll. 19 ff.). Fragments of a similar decree from Eretria at about the middle of the fourth century B.C. have also been published (see A. Wilhelm, Jahresh. d. österr. arch. Inst. 8 (1905), pp13 ff.), and for Erythrae, in the age of Cimon (I. G. I.9). For a general discussion of such legislation see Recueil des inscr. jurid. grecques II (1898), pp25‑57.
27 The Dionysius mentioned here is the first of that name (405‑367). The event mentioned occurred probably in 397 B.C., the year in which Himera came over to Dionysius (Diodorus, XIV.47.6), or soon thereafter, at all events before the battle of Cronium, in 383 B.C., in which Leptines lost his life (Diodorus XV.17.1). From the phrase used by Diodorus, μέθ’ οὗ Ἱμεραίους μετεπέμψατο (XIV.47.6), it would seem that this might be the very occasion referred to by Aeneas, although it is possible that year 386 B.C. is meant, at which time Dionysius I sent Leptines and Philistus into exile (Diodorus XV.7.3).
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