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This webpage reproduces part of
Civil Wars

Julius Caesar

Loeb Classical Library

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Civil Wars

Book I (chapters 30‑58)

p47 30 So for the present he gives up his plan of following Pompeius and determines to go into Spain. He bids the officials of all the municipal towns to find ships and see that they are conveyed to Brundisium. He sends his legate Valerius into Sardinia with one legion and Curio as propraetor into Sicily with two, and bids him on recovering Sicily to transport his army forthwith to Africa. M. Cotta was in control of Sardinia and M. Cato of Sicily; Tubero ought by the allotment of offices to have been in command of Africa. The people of Caralis, as soon as they heard hat Valerius was being sent to them, before he had quitted Italy, of their own accord eject Cotta from the town. Terror-struck, because he gathered that the whole province was in accord with them, he flies from Sardinia to Africa. Cato in Sicily was repairing the old warships and requisitioning new ones from the communities, devoting much zeal to the performance of his task. Among the Lucani and Bruttii he was raising levies of Roman citizens through his legates, and was exacting a fixed number of cavalry and infantry fron the townships of Sicily. When these measures were almost completed, hearing of the approach of Curio he complains in a public meeting that he had been flung aside and betrayed by Gn. Pompeius, who, while utterly unprepared in every particular, had undertaken an unnecessary war, and when questioned by himself and the rest in the senate had assured them that he had everything fit and ready for war. After making these complaints in the assembly he fled from the province.

31 Finding Sardinia and Sicily bereft of military control, Valerius and Cotta proceed thither with their armies. Tubero on reaching Africa finds Attius Varus in the province in military command; he, as p49we have explained above, after the loss of his cohorts at Auximum had immediately fled and gone to Africa and had on his own account seized on the vacant province. By raising a levy he had made up two legions, having by his knowledge of the people and the district and his familiarity with the province gained an opening for engaging in such undertakings, as he had held the province a few years previously after his praetorship. He prevents Tubero on arrival at Utica with his ships from approaching the port and the town, and does not allow him to land his son who was stricken with illness, but compels him to weigh anchor and quit the district.

32 Having carried out these measures, Caesar withdraws his men into the nearest towns that for the rest of the time they might have some intermission of toil. He himself proceeds to the city.1 Having called the senate together, he recounts the wrongs done him by his personal enemies. He explains that he had sought no extraordinary office, but, waiting for the legitimate time of his consulship, had been content with privileges open to all the citizens. A proposal had been carried by the ten tribunes while Pompeius himself was consul that he should be allowed to compete in absence, though his enemies spoke against it, while Cato opposed with the utmost vehemence and after his old habit spun out the days by obstructive speech.2 If Pompeius disapproved, why did he allow it to be carried? If he approved, why did he prohibit him from taking advantage of the people's kindness? He sets forth his own patience when under no pressure he had made the p51request about the disbandment of the armies, a point in which he was ready to make a personal sacrifice of dignity and position. He tells them of the bitterness of his foes who refused in his case what they demanded in the other, and preferred utter confusion to the surrender of military power and armed force. He tells of their injustice in robbing him of his legions, of their cruelty and insolence in infringing the rights of the tribunes; he enumerates the terms that he had offered, the conferences asked for and refused. On these considerations he exhorts and charges them to take up the burden of state and administer it with his help; but if they shrink through fear he will not burden them, and will administer the state himself. Envoys should be sent to Pompeius to effect a settlement, nor was he afraid of the remark made by Pompeius a little before in the senate, to the effect that undue influence is attributed to those to whom envoys are sent and fear argued on the part of those that send them. Such considerations seemed to belong to a poor and weak spirit. His own wish was to be superior to others in justice and equity as he had striven to surpass them in action.

33 The senate approves his proposal about the sending of envoys, but no one was found to be sent, each refusing for himself the duty of this embassy mainly through fear. For Pompeius when quitting the city had said in the senate that he would regard in the same light those who remained at Rome and those who were in Caesar's camp. Thus three days are spun out with discussion and excuses. Also L. Metellus, the tribune, is put up by Caesar's enemies to thwart this proposal and to hinder everything else that he proposed to do. When his design p53was understood, several days having been already wasted, Caesar, in order to avoid throwing away any more time, having failed to do what he had proposed, leaves the city and goes into further Gaul.

34 On his arrival there he learns that Vibullius Rufus, whom he had captured at Corfinium and dismissed a few days before, had been dispatched by Pompeius;3 also that Domitius had gone to seize Massilia with seven merchant-vessels which he had requisitioned from private persons at Igilium and in Cosanum, and had manned with his own slaves, freedmen, and tenants; and also that some Massilian envoys had been previously sent home, youths of noble birth, whom Pompeius when quitting the city had exhorted not to let Caesar's fresh services drive from their minds the memory of his own earlier kindnesses. Receiving these instructions, the people of Massilia had closed their gates against Caesar, and had called to their aid the Albici, a barbarian tribe, who owed allegiance to them from olden times, and inhabited the hills above Massilia; they had collected and brought into their town cornº from the neighbouring districts and from all the strongholds; they had set up manufactories of arms in the town, and were engaged in repairing their walls, gates, and fleet.

35 Caesar summons fifteen of the chief men of Massilia. He pleads with them not to let the first outbreak of hostilities come from the Massilians; they ought to follow the authority of the whole of Italy rather than be subservient to the will of one man. He leaves no point unmentioned that he thought adapted to restore their minds to sanity. The envoys report his speech, and bring back to Caesar the following authoritative reply: "We understand that the Roman people is p55divided into two parties. It is not within our discretion or our power to discriminate which side has the juster cause. The leaders of the two sides are Gn. Pompeius and G. Caesar, patrons of our state, one of whom has officially granted us the lands of the Volcae Arecomici and of the Helvii; the other, after conquering the Sally es by armed force, has assigned them to us and increased our revenues. Wherefore it is our duty to show them equal goodwill, as their benefits are equal, and to aid neither of them against the other, nor to receive either within our city or ports."

36 While they are engaged on these proceedings, Domitius, arriving by sea at Massilia, is received by the inhabitants and put in command of the city; the whole control of the war is placed in his hands. Under his authority they send the fleet in every direction; they seize all the merchant-ships they can find and bring them into the harbour. Those which are insufficiently provided with bolts or timber, and with tackle, they use for fitting out and repairing the rest. All the corn that they can find they collect for the general use. The rest of the merchandise and provisions they reserve for the blockade, if it should ensue. Stirred by these wrongs, Caesar conducts three legions to Massilia; he determines to bring up towers and penthouses for the siege of the city, and make twelve warships at Arelate. These having been made and equipped within thirty days from the day on which the timber was first cut down, and having been brought to Massilia, he puts D. Brutus in command of them, and leaves his legate, G. Trebonius, to conduct the siege of Massilia.

37 While arranging and carrying out these measures he sends forward his legate, G. Fabius, into Spain p57with three legions, which he had stationed at Narbo and elsewhere round that district in winter quarters, and gives orders that the Pyrenean passes, which were then held with outposts by the legate L. Afranius, should be at once seized. He orders the rest of the legions, which are wintering further off, to follow up. Fabius, in obedience to orders, acting with promptitude, drove the outpost from the pass, and hurried by forced marches to the army of Afranius.

38 On the arrival of L. Vibullius Rufus, who, as we have shown, was sent by Pompeius into Spain, Afranius and Petreius and Varro, legates of Pompeius, of whom one held hither Spain with three legions, another further Spain from the pass of Castulo to the Anas with two legions, a third the district of the Vettones from the Anas and also Lusitania with an equal number of legions, divide their tasks in such a way that Petreius should march from Lusitania through the Vettones with all his forces to join Afranius, while Varro should protect the whole of further Spain with the legions under his command. When these arrangements were made Petreius requisitions cavalry and auxiliary troops from the whole of Lusitania, Afranius from Celtiberia, the Cantabri, and all the barbarous tribes that extend to the ocean. When they were collected Petreius quickly makes his way through the Vettones to Afranius, and with common consent they agree to wage war at Ilerda owing to the natural advantages afforded by the position.

39 There were, as I have explained above, three legions belonging to Afranius, two to Petreius, besides about eighty cohorts, some heavy-armed4 from the p59hither province, others light-armed from further Spain, and about five thousand cavalry from each province. Caesar had sent forward six legions into Spain, five thousand auxiliary infantry and three thousand cavalry which he had had with him during all his former wars, and an equal number from Gaul, which he had himself pacified, having specially called to arms all the men of conspicuous rank and bravery from every state; to these he had added men of the best class from among the Aquitani and the mountaineers who border on the province of Gaul. He had heard that Pompeius was marching at the head of his legions through Mauritania into Spain and would very soon arrive. At the same time he borrowed sums of money from the tribunes and centurions and distributed them among the soldiers. By this proceeding he gained two results: he established a lien on the loyalty of the centurions and purchased by the bounty the goodwill of the troops.

40 Fabius was tampering with the loyalty of the neighbouring communities by letters and messengers. Over the River Sicoris he had constructed two bridges four miles apart. Over these he kept sending supplies, because during the preceding days he had exhausted all that there was this side the river. The generals of the Pompeian army were doing pretty much the same thing and for the same reason, and they were engaged in constant cavalry skirmishes. When two Fabian legions, going out to protect the foragers according to their usual custom, had crossed the river by the nearer bridge, and the pack-horses and the whole cavalry force were following them, the bridge was suddenly broken down by a storm of wind and a great rush of water, and a large force of cavalry that remained behind was cut off. When p61Petreius and Afranius discovered what had happened from the earth and fascines which were being carried down the river, Afranius immediately threw across four legions and all his cavalry by his own bridge with which he had joined the town and his camp, and goes to meet the two Fabian legions. On the news of his approach L. Plancus, who was in command of the legions, under the stress of necessity occupies the higher ground and draws up his lines facing in opposite directions that he might not be surrounded by cavalry. So going into action with unequal numbers, he sustains impetuous charges of the legions and cavalry. After the cavalry had engaged, the standards of two legions are seen by each side some little way off. These Fabius had sent by the further bridge to support our men, suspecting that what actually occurred would happen, namely, that the commanders on the other side would employ the opportunity which a kind chance afforded them of crushing our men. On their arrival the battle is broken off and each leader marches his legions back to camp.

41 Within two days Caesar reached the camp with nine hundred horsemen whom he had reserved as a bodyguard for himself. The bridge which had been broken down by the storm was almost repaired: he ordered it to be finished at night. Having made himself acquainted with the character of the country, he leaves six cohorts to guard the bridge and the camp together with all his baggage, and on the following day, with his whole force drawn up in three lines, he sets out for Ilerdaa and halts close to the camp of Afranius, and, having waited there for a little while under arms, offers his foe an opportunity of fighting on level ground. The opportunity being thus allowed him, Afranius leads out his forces and posts them half p63way up the slope under shelter of his camp. When Caesar learned that it was only owing to Afranius that a pitched battle was not fought he determined to pitch his camp at an interval of about four hundred paces from the lowest spurs of the mountain, and in order that his men might not be panic-stricken by a sudden onset of the foe while engaged on their task and so be prevented from working, he forbade the erection of a rampart, which could not fail to be prominent and visible from a distance, but ordered a ditch of fifteen feet width to be constructed facing the enemy. The first and second line remained under arms as they had been posted at first; behind these the work was being secretly done by the third line. So it was all completed before Afranius could become aware that the camp was being fortified. Towards evening Caesar withdraws the legions within the fosse and bivouacs there under arms the following night.

42 On the following day he keeps the whole army within the fosse and, as material for earthworks could only be procured at a distance, he arranges a similar method of work for the present and assigns the fortifying of each side of the camp to a single legion, ordering fosses of a similar size to the first to be constructed; the rest of the legions he draws up under arms lightly equipped over against the enemy. Afranius and Petreius, with the object of causing alarm and so impeding the work, draw out their forces towards the lower spurs of the hill and harass our men. Caesar, however, does not on that account interrupt his work, trusting in the protection of the three legions and the defensive nature of the fosse. The enemy, without staying long or advancing further from the bottom of the hill, withdraw their forces p65into camp. On the third day Caesar strengthens his camp with a rampart and orders the rest of the cohorts which he had left in his previous camp, and their baggage, to be brought over to him.

43 Between the town of Ilerda and the nearest hill on which Petreius and Afranius were encamped was a plain about three hundred paces in width, and in about the middle of this space was a rather high mound. Caesar was confident that if he occupied and fortified this he would cut off his adversaries from the town and the bridge and from all the stores which they had brought into the town. In this hope he leads out of the camp three legions, and having drawn up the line in a suitable position, he orders a picked advance guard from one legion to charge and occupy the mound. This movement being quickly discovered, the cohorts of Afranius which were stationed in front of the camp are sent by a shorter route to occupy the same position. A battle is fought, and as the Afranians had reached the mound first, our men are driven back and, fresh supports being sent up, are compelled to turn and retreat to the standards of the legions.

44 The method of fighting adopted by the enemy's troops was to charge at first at full speed, boldly seize a position, take no particular trouble to preserve their ranks, but fight singly and in loose order; if they were hard pressed they did not consider it a disgrace to retire and quit their position, for, waging a continuous warfare against the Lusitanians and other barbarous tribes, they had become used to a barbarous kind of fighting, as it usually happens that when troops have spent a long time in any district they are greatly influenced by the methods of the country. It was this system that now threw p67our men into confusion, unaccustomed as they were to this kind of fighting; for as the enemy kept charging singly they thought that they were being surrounded on their exposed flank. As for themselves, they had judged it right to keep their ranks and not to desert their standards nor to give up without grave cause the position they had taken. And so when the vanguard was thrown into confusion the legion posted on that wing could not stand its ground and withdrew to the nearest hill.

45 Finding nearly the whole of his line panic-stricken — an event as unusual as it was unexpected — Caesar exhorts his men and leads the Ninth Legion to their support. He checks the foe who are pursuing our men with insolent daring, and compels them again to turn and retreat to the town of Ilerda and halt beneath the walls. But the men of the Ninth Legion, carried away by zeal in their desire to repair the loss received, rashly pursuing the flying foe too far, get into unfavourable ground and approach close under the hill on which the town of Ilerda was situated. When our men wished to retreat from this position, the enemy in turn kept pressing them hard from the higher ground. The place was precipitous with a steep descent on either side, and extended only so far in width as just to give room for three cohorts drawn up in battle array, so that supports could not be sent up on the flanks nor could cavalry be of any use if the men were in difficulties. But on the side of the town sloping ground with a slight descent stretched to the length of about four hundred paces. In this direction our men stood at bay, since, carried forward by their zeal, they had recklessly advanced thus far. The fighting took place in this spot, which was unfavourable both from its confined limits and because p69they had halted just under the very spurs of the mountain, so that no missile failed to reach them. Nevertheless they strove with valour and endurance and sustained every description of wound. The forces of the foe were increasing and cohorts were continually being sent up to them from the camp through the town so that the unexhausted were always taking the place of the exhausted. Caesar was obliged to adopt the same course of withdrawing the exhausted and sending up supporting cohorts to the same place.

46 When they had fought in this way continuously for five hours, and our men were being grievously harassed by superior numbers, having spent all their missiles, they draw their swords and, breasting the hill, charge the cohorts, and after laying a few low, they force the rest to retreat. When the cohorts were thus pushed close up to the wall, and to some extent driven by terror to enter the town, an easy withdrawal was allowed our men. Our cavalry, however, on each flank, though it had been stationed on low-lying ground at the foot of the cliff, yet forces its way with the utmost valour to the ridge, and, riding between the two lines of battle, allows our men a more convenient and safer withdrawal. Thus the contest was waged with varying fortune. At the first attack about seventy of our men fell, among them Q. Fulginius, a principal centurion of the Fourteenth Legion, who by his remarkable valour had risen to that post from the lower rank of centurions, and more than six hundred are wounded. Among the Afranians, T. Caecilius, a centurion of the first company, is slain, and besides him four centurions and more than two hundred men.

47 But the commonly received view of the day's events was that each side thought it had come off p71superior; the Afranians because, though they were generally deemed inferior, they had stood their ground so long in close combat and borne the assault of our men, and at the outset held the position and the mound which had been the object of the battle, and at the first encounter had compelled our men to retreat; our troops, on the other hand, claimed the victory because, engaging the foe on unfavourable ground and with unequal number, they had sustained the fight for five hours, had mounted the hill with drawn swords, had compelled their adversaries to retreat from a higher position, and had driven them into the town. The enemy fortified the hill, for possession of which they had fought, with great works, and placed a garrison on it.

48 There also happened an unforeseen disaster within two days of these occurrences. A storm of such intensity springs up that it was agreed that there had never been a greater rainfall in that district. On this occasion it washed down the snow from all the mountains, overtopped the banks of the river, and in one day broke down both the bridges which G. Fabius had made. This caused serious difficulties to Caesar's army. For the camp being situated, as has been explained above, between the two rivers Sicoris and Cinga, thirty miles apart, neither of these could be crossed, and they were all necessarily confined in this narrow space. The states which had entered into friendly relations with Caesar could not supply provisions, nor could those who had travelled some distance for forage return, being cut off by the rivers, nor could the huge supplies which were on their way from Italy and Gaul reach the camp. It was, moreover, the most difficult season of the year, when there was no corn in the winter stores and the p73crops were not far from being ripe, while the communities were exhausted because Afranius had conveyed nearly all the corn to Ilerda before Caesar's arrival and whatever there was left Caesar had consumed during the previous days; and the cattle which could have served as a second reserve against want had been removed to a distance by the neighbouring states because of the war. The men who went out to collect fodder or corn were followed by light-armed Lusitanians and skirmishers from hither Spain acquainted with the district; and for them it was easy to swim across the rivers, it being their general custom never to join the main army without bladders.

49 But the army of Afranius had abundance of provisions of every kind. Much corn had been provided and collected previously, much was being brought together from every province, and there was a great supply of fodder. The bridge at Ilerda and the untouched districts across the river, which Caesar was quite unable to approach, gave opportunities for all these measures without any risk.

50 The above-mentioned floods lasted several days. Caesar made an attempt to repair the bridges, but the strength of the current did not allow it, nor did the cohorts of the enemy, distributed along the bank, suffer the work to be completed. It was easy for them to prevent it from the character of the river itself and the excessive flood, and also because from all along the banks missiles were being discharged at one narrow spot, and so it was difficult, owing to the extreme rapidity of the current, at once to carry on the work and avoid the missiles.

51 Word is brought to Afranius that the great supplies on their way to Caesar are stopped by the stream. p75There had come thither archers from the Ruteni and horsemen from Gaul with a number of wagons and heavy baggage, after the Gallic custom. There were, moreover, about six thousand men of every class with their slaves and children, but there was no method, no fixed authority, each following his own devices, and all journeying without fear, adopting the licence of earlier days and journeys. There were a number of honourable youths, sons of senators or of the equestrian order; there were deputations from the states; there were envoys from Caesar. All these were checked by the rivers. To crush them Afranius sets forth at night with all his cavalry and three legions, and sending his horsemen on in front attacks them off their guard. Nevertheless the Gallic horsemen quickly rally and join battle. Though few, they stood their ground against a great number of the enemy, so long as an encounter on equal conditions was possible; but when the standards of the legions began to approach, after the loss of a few men, they withdraw to the nearest hills. This period of the battle was of great moment for the safety of our men, for by getting free room they withdrew to higher ground. On that day about two hundred archers were lost, a few horsemen, and a small number of camp followers and beasts of burden.

52 Nevertheless in all these circumstances the price of provisions rose, a difficulty which is wont to increase, not merely from the immediate dearth, but also from fear for the future. Already the price of corn had risen to fifty denarii a peck,5 and the lack of it had p77diminished the strength of the soldiery and their troubles were increasing daily. So completely had the situation been reversed in a few days and such had been the shifting of the balance of fortune, that our men were being oppressed by a serious deficiency of necessaries, while the enemy had abundance of everything and were in an acknowledged position of superiority. The supply of corn being too small, Caesar began to requisition cattle from the states which had gone over to his side, sent sutlers to the more distant communities, and himself endeavoured by all possible resources to meet the present want.

53 Afranius and Petreius and their friends wrote to their partisans at Rome an amplified and exaggerated account of these events. Rumour added much, so that the war seemed almost finished. When these letters and messages were conveyed to Rome great crowds thronged the house of Afranius and hearty congratulations were offered. Many set out from Italy for Gn. Pompeius, some that they might show themselves the first to bring him such news, others that they might not appear to have waited for the issue of the war and to have been the last of all to come.

54 As things were reduced to such a strait and all the roads were blocked by the Afranian soldiers and horsemen and the bridges could not be completed, Caesar orders his men to build ships of the kind that his experience in Britain in previous years had taught him to make. The keels and the first ribs were made of light timber, the rest of the hull was wattled and covered with hides. These when finished he conveys by night on coupled wagons6 p79to a distance of twenty-two miles from the camp and transports his men in them across the river and occupies unobserved the hill adjoining the bank. This he fortifies hastily before the foe should find it out. Hither he afterwards transfers a legion and sets about making a bridge from either side, finishing it in two days. Thus he recovers in safety the stores and the men who had gone out on the foraging expedition, and begins to settle the difficulties of his food supply.

55 On the same day he threw a great part of his cavalry across the river, who, attacking the foragers when off their guard and scattered about without any fear of danger, cut off a great number of men and beasts; and when some light-armed cohorts had been sent in support of the foe they skilfully distribute themselves into two divisions, some to guard the plunder, others to resist and repel aggressors; and one cohort, which had rashly advanced from the main body before the others, they cut off from the rest and surround it and put it to the sword, and return to the camp by the same bridge, unharmed, with much booty.

56 While this is going on at Ilerda the Massilians, following the advice of L. Domitius, equip seventeen ships of war, of which eleven were decked. To these they add many smaller vessels, so that our fleet may be terrified by the mere multitude. On board they put a great number of archers and of the Albici, about whom I have explained before, and stimulate them by prizes and promises. Domitius demands special ships for himself, and mans them with farmers and herdsmen whom he had brought with him. Their fleet thus fully equipped, they advance with great confidence against our ships, of which p81D. Brutus was in command. These ships were stationed by the island which lies over against Massilia.

57 Brutus was far inferior in number of ships, but Caesar had assigned to his fleet the bravest men, front-line men and centurions, picked from all the legions, who had demanded this charge for themselves. They had prepared iron claws and grapplings and had furnished themselves with a great number of javelins, looped darts, and other weapons. So, having learnt of the arrival of the enemy, they bring their ships out of port and join battle with the Massilians. The fight was maintained with the utmost bravery and impetuosity on both sides, nor did the Albici, rough mountaineers trained in arms, fall far below our men in valour, and having lately come from the Massilians, they kept in mind their recent promises, while the herdsmen of Domitius, stimulated by the hope of liberty, were eager to display their zeal before their master's eyes.

58 The Massilians themselves, trusting in the speed of their ships and the skill of their pilots, eluded our men and parried their attacks, and so long as they were free to make use of a wider space they extended their line to some distance and strove to surround our men, or to attack single ships with several, or to run by them and if possible sweep off their oars. Whenever they were forced to come to close quarters, instead of the skill and devices of pilots they had recourse to the valour of mountaineers. Our men had not only to employ less well-trained rowers and less skilled pilots who had suddenly been taken out of merchant ships, not yet knowing even the names of the various tackle, but were also retarded by the slowness and heaviness of their ships. For, having been made in a p83hurry of unseasoned timber, they did not display the same handiness in respect of speed. And so, provided that an opportunity of fighting hand to hand were given them, with quiet courage they confronted two ships with one, and throwing aboard the iron claw and holding each ship fast, they fought on opposite sides of their vessel and so boarded the enemy's ships; and after slaying a large number of the Albici and the herdsmen they sink some of the ships, take others with their crews, and drive the rest into port. On that day nine ships of the Massilians are lost, including those that were captured.

The Loeb Editor's Notes:

1 Rome.

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2 The phrase was used of those who were excused a personal canvass for the consulship owing to absence from Rome.

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3 To Spain, see 38, § 1.

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4 The scutum was a long heavy wooden shield; the cetra was a light round leather shield. The cetrati are frequently mentioned in the Commentaries.

Thayer's Note: Some additional information is given in the article Cetra of Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities.
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5 The ordinary price of corn was from 3½ to 4 sesterces the peck. It was now 200 sesterces, equivalent to about thirty-five shillings.

Thayer's Note: To bring this into focus: in January 2013 at the time I put this text onsite, the spot price of wheat was $9.25/bushel. If that had been the ordinary price in Caesar's time, the inflated price mentioned in the text would have been about $460‑530/bushel. The inflated price of the standard American loaf of bread would have been around $125.
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6 Two wagons coupled together, one in front of the other.

Thayer's Note:

a Although the Loeb edition has no footnote here, it includes the following map at the end of the volume, to which I've added the Google map of the area today (slightly different scale and orientation):

[image ALT: A map of Ilerda.]

[image ALT: Valid HTML 4.01.]

Page updated: 28 Oct 13