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I.30‑58

This webpage reproduces part of
Civil Wars

by
Julius Caesar

Loeb Classical Library
1914

The text is in the public domain.

This text has been carefully proofread
and I believe it to be free of errors.
If you find a mistake though,
please let me know!


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II.1‑22

Caesar
Civil Wars

Book I (chapters 59‑87)

p83 59 This news is first brought to Caesar at Ilerda; at once on the completion of the bridge there is a rapid change of fortune. The enemy, terror-struck by the bravery of the cavalry, now roamed with less freedom and audacity; at one time, staying their advance at no great distance from the camp, in order to ensure a speedy retreat, they foraged within narrower limits; at another, taking a wider circuit, they tried to avoid the outposts and cavalry pickets, or, on sustaining some loss or catching sight of the cavalry at a distance, they broke off their march, flung away their packs, and fled. Finally, they made up their mind to stay action for several days and, contrary to the general custom, to forage by night.

60 Meanwhile the inhabitants of Osca, and those of Calagurris who were politically associated1 with them, send envoys to him and promise to do his bidding. These are followed by the people of Tarraco, the Lacetani, the Ausetani, and a few days afterwards the lllurgavonenses, who border on the River Ebro. He begs all of these to assist him with corn.º They p85promise to do so and, collecting all the pack-horses available, bring it into camp. A cohort of the lllurgavonenses also goes over to him on ascertaining the intention of their state and transfers its colours from its quarters. A great change of fortune rapidly follows. The bridge being completed, five important states brought over to his side, the corn supply made easy, the rumours about the auxiliaries of the legions which were said to be coming with Pompeius through Mauritania being suppressed, a number of more distant communities desert Afranius and take the side of Caesar.

61 When the spirits of his adversaries were cowed by these events, Caesar, to prevent the need of always sending the cavalry over the bridge by a long circuitous route, found a suitable spot and decided to construct several ditches thirty feet wide, whereby he might divert some part of the Sicoris and make a ford in the river. When these were nearly completed Afranius and Petreius fall into great alarm lest they should be cut off altogether from collecting forage and fodder, as Caesar was particularly strong in cavalry. And so they determine to quit these districts and to transfer the war to Celtiberia. This design was also favoured by the fact that of the two different classes of states, those which in the earlier war had taken the side of Sertorius and had been conquered feared the name and authority of the absent Pompeius, and those which had remained loyal, having received great kindnesses, were devoted to him, while the name of Caesar was only dimly known among the barbarians. In this district they were expecting to find large reinforcements of cavalry and auxiliaries, and were proposing to prolong the war into the winter in a place of their own choosing. Having formed this plan, they order ships p87to be sought for along the whole course of the Ebro and to be brought to Octogesa. This town was situated on the Ebro, and was thirty miles from the camp. They order a bridge to be made at this part of the river by coupling ships together and bring two legions over the Sicoris. A camp is entrenched with a rampart twelve feet high.

62 When this was ascertained by means of scouts, Caesar, continuing day and night his task of diverting the stream by the utmost efforts of his soldiery, had so far advanced operations that the horsemen were able to cross the river, and ventured to do so, though the feat was laborious and difficult; while the foot-soldiers had only their shoulders and the upper part of their bodies above the surface, and were impeded in crossing both by the depth of the water and also by the rapidity of the current. Nevertheless about one and the same time the bridge over the Ebro was announced to be nearly finished and a ford was being found in the Sicoris.

63 Now, however, the enemy thought it the more necessary that their march should be hastened. So, leaving two auxiliary cohorts to garrison Ilerda, they cross the Sicoris in full force and join camp with the two legions which they had led across on a previous day. The only course left for Caesar was to annoy and harass the enemy's line of march with his cavalry; for his own bridge involved a wide circuit, so that the enemy could reach the Ebro by a much shorter route. He sends horsemen who cross the river and, although Petreius and Afranius had moved camp about the third watch, suddenly show themselves in the rear of the column and begin to delay them and impede their march by pouring a great number of men around their flanks.

p89 64 At early dawn it was observed from the higher ground adjacent to Caesar's camp that the enemy's rear was being hard pressed by the attack of our cavalry, and that sometimes the end of the column was being held up and even being cut off from the rest, while at other times their colours were pushed forward and our men were driven back by a charge of the cohorts in a body, and then again wheeled round and pursued the foe. And now throughout the camp the men gathered in groups, indignantly complaining that the enemy were being let slip from their hands, and that the war was being needlessly protracted to an undue length. They went to the centurions and military tribunes, and besought them to assure Caesar that he was not to shrink from exposing them to labour or peril. "We are ready," they said; "we can and we dare cross the river by the way the cavalry passed over." Caesar, urged by their zeal and their clamour, though he feared to expose his army to such a strength of current, nevertheless decides that he must attempt the experiment. So he orders the weaker men, whose spirit or strength seemed unequal to the effort, to be set aside from all the centuries. These he leaves with one legion to guard the camp. The rest of the legions he leads out lightly equipped, and after placing a great number of pack-horses in the river above and below leads across his force. A few of these men were carried away by the strength of the current, but were caught and supported by the horsemen; not one, however, was lost. When his army had been led across without loss, he draws up his forces and proceeds to lead his battle in three lines. And there was such zeal in the soldiery that though a circuit of six miles was added to their route and a long delay was interposed at the ford, p91they overtook by the ninth hour of the day those who had gone out at the third watch.

65 And when Afranius with Petreius beheld these troops whom he caught sight of from a distance he was dismayed by an event so startling, and halting on higher ground drew up his line. Caesar re-forms his army on the plains that he may not expose it to battle exhausted with fatigue. When they again attempt to advance he follows and checks them. The foe of necessity pitch their camp earlier than they had intended, for the hills were close by and difficult and narrow routes awaited them only five miles off. These hills they were eager to penetrate in order to escape Caesar's cavalry and by placing outposts in the defiles to stop the march of his army, and themselves to conduct their forces across the Ebro without danger and alarm. This they should have attempted and carried out by every possible means, but worn out by a whole day's fighting and the toil of their march, they postponed the business till the next day. Caesar also pitches camp on the nearest hill.

66 About midnight, when some men who had gone some distance from their camp to fetch water were seized by his horsemen, Caesar is informed by them that the officers of the enemy are silently leading their forces out of camp. Having learnt this, he bids the signal be given and the usual military order for striking camp to be proclaimed. The foe, having caught the sound of the proclamation, fearing lest, impeded and over-burdened, they should be compelled to engage by night, or lest they should be held up by Caesar's cavalry in the defiles, stop their march and keep their forces in camp. Next day Petreius sets forth secretly with a few horsemen to explore the district. The same thing p93is done from Caesar's camp. L. Decidius Saxa is sent with a few men to reconnoitre the character of the place. Each brings back the same message to his people: that nearest them there lie five miles of level route, then follows rugged and hilly ground, that there is no difficulty in the enemy being stopped by whosoever first occupies these defiles.

67 Petreius and Afranius hold a discussion in council, the question before them being the time of starting. Many thought that they should march by night, urging that they could reach the defiles before it was noticed. Others took the fact that the cry had been raised the previous night in Caesar's camp as a proof that secret departure was impossible. They pointed out that Caesar's horsemen poured around at night and beset every place and every path; that night battles should be avoided because the soldiers in the terror of civil strife are wont to consider their fears rather than their obligations. But daylight, they urged, in itself brings a sense of shame when all are looking on, and the presence of military tribunes and centurions also contributes much, and that it was by such considerations that troops are wont to be restrained and kept in allegiance. On every ground, therefore, they must break through by day: though some loss should be sustained, yet the place they are after can be captured without impairing the army as a whole. This opinion prevails in the council and they determine to set out next day at early dawn.

68 Caesar after reconnoitring the district leads all his forces out of camp when the sky grows light and, making a wide circuit, conducts his army by no clearly marked route. For the roads that led to the Ebro and to Octogesa were blocked by the interposition of the enemy's camp. He himself had to cross p95very large and difficult valleys, steep rocks in many places impeded their march, so that arms were of necessity passed from hand to hand, and the men accomplished a great part of their way unarmed and helped up one by another. But no one shirked this toil, because they thought it would prove the end of all their labours, if only they should be able to cut off the foe from the Ebro and prevent him from foraging.

69 And first of all the Afranian soldiers joyfully ran out of their camp to see the spectacle and pursued our men with insulting cries, saying that they were fleeing under the stress of lack of necessary food, and were on their way back to Ilerda. For the direction of their march was different from that proposed, and they seemed to be going in the contrary direction. The Afranian officers extolled their own policy in having kept themselves in camp, and their opinion was greatly strengthened by the fact that they saw the foe started on their way without any baggage train, so that they were confident that they could not hold out much longer against privation. But when they saw the column gradually wheeling to the right and observed the vanguard already outflanking the line of their own camp, no one was so slow, so impatient of labour, as not to feel that they must at once leave the camp and go to meet the foe. The cry "To arms!" is raised, and the whole force, a few cohorts only being left on guard, goes forth and hurries on a straight course to the Ebro.

70 The whole contest turned on speed — which of the two would first seize the defiles and the hills — but the difficulties of the roads delayed Caesar's army, while Caesar's pursuing cavalry hindered the forces of Afranius. Matters, however, had of necessity come p97to such a pass with the Afranians that, if they should first reach the hills that they aimed at, they would themselves escape peril, while they would be unable to save the baggage of the whole army and the cohorts left in the camp; for when these were cut off by Caesar's army it was by no means possible for assistance to be conveyed to them. Caesar completed the distance first, and finding a plain after crossing the great rocks, he draws up his line therein opposite the enemy. Afranius, seeing the foe in front of him, while his rear was being harassed by the cavalry, finding a hill near, halted on it. From this spot he dispatches four light-armed cohorts to a mountain which was the loftiest of all in sight. He orders them to hurry at full speed and occupy it, with the intention of himself hastening thither with all his forces, and by a change of route arriving at Octogesa by the ridge. When the light-armed men were making for this by an oblique route, Caesar's horsemen, perceiving it, charged the cohorts; nor could they, with their small shields, hold out for ever so short a time against the cavalry attack, but are all surrounded by them and slain in the sight of both armies.

71 There was now opportunity for a successful action. Nor, indeed, did it escape Caesar that an army demoralized by such a loss received under their eyes could not hold out, especially as they were surrounded on every side by cavalry, since the engagement was taking place in level and open country; and such action was demanded of him from every quarter. Legates, centurions, and tribunes hurried to him begging him not to hesitate to join battle; they pointed out that the spirits of the whole force were as keen as possible; on the p99other hand, the Afranians had in many ways shown signs of fear, by the fact that they had not succoured their own men, that they were not going down from the hill, that they were scarcely holding their ground against the cavalry charges, and that, crowded together, with their colours congregated in one spot, they were keeping neither to their ranks nor to their standards. If it was the inequality of site that he feared, yet an opportunity of fighting in some place or other would be afforded him, because Afranius was certainly bound to come down from his position, and could not continue to hold it without water.

72 Caesar had entertained the hope that, having cut off his adversaries from their food supply, he would be able to finish the business without exposing his men to fighting or bloodshed. Why should he lose any of his men even in a successful battle? Why should he suffer soldiers who had served him so well to be wounded? Why, in a word, should he make trial of fortune? Especially as it was as much the duty of a commander to win by policy as by the sword. He was moved, moreover, by compassion for his fellow-citizens whose slaughter he saw to be inevitable. He preferred to gain his object without loss or harm to them. This policy of his did not commend itself to the majority; in fact, the soldiers said openly among themselves that, since such an opportunity of victory was being let slip, they would not fight even when Caesar wished them to. He adheres to his intention, and moves a little way from his position so as to diminish the alarm of the foe. Petreius and Afranius return to their camp when the chance is offered them. Caesar, after distributing outposts on the hills, shutting off every route to the p101Ebro, entrenches himself as near as possible to the enemy's camp.

73 On the next day the enemy's officers, dismayed at having lost all prospect of supplies and of reaching the Ebro, took counsel on their other measures. There was one route in case they wished to return to Ilerda, another if they made for Tarraco. While deliberating thereon, word is brought them that their water-carriers are being harassed by our cavalry. Having ascertained this, they distribute numerous outposts of horsemen and auxiliary cohorts, and between them place cohorts of the legions, and set about making a line of rampart from the camp to the water, so that they might be able to get water within their defences, both without alarm and without outposts. Petreius and Afranius share this task between them, and themselves proceed to some distance for the purpose of carrying out the work.

74 At their departure the soldiers, getting a free opportunity for conversation, come out everywhere, and each one inquires after any acquaintance or fellow-townsman that he had in Caesar's camp and summons him forth. First they all express gratitude to the others collectively for having spared them the day before, when they were in a state of panic: "To your kindness," they said, "we owe our life." Then they inquire about the good faith of the general, whether they would be justified in committing themselves to him, and express regret that they did not do so at first, and that they engaged in a conflict with friends and kinsmen. Stirred by such speeches, the men demand a solemn promise from the general for the life of Petreius and Afranius, fearing lest they should seem to have conceived some crime in their hearts or to have betrayed their party. p103If these conditions are assured they guarantee to transfer their colours at once and send centurions of the first rank to Caesar as deputies to treat of peace. Meanwhile some bring their friends into the camp to entertain them, others are led off by their acquaintances, so that the two camps seemed already fused into one, and many military tribunes and centurions come to Caesar and commend themselves to him. The same thing is done by the Spanish chieftains whom the enemy had called out and were keeping with them in camp as hostages. These sought for their own acquaintances and guest-friends by whom they might severally have an opportunity of being commended to the notice of Caesar. The youthful son of Afranius also pleaded with Caesar through the envoy Sulpicius for his own and his father's safety. The whole place was full of rejoicing and congratulation, on the one side of those who were deemed to have avoided such perils, on the other of those who were seen to have wrought such achievements without bloodshed; and Caesar in the general estimation reaped a great advantage from his traditional leniency, and his policy met with the approval of all.

75 When these events were announced Afranius abandons the work that he had begun and returns to camp, apparently resolved to bear with a quiet and equal mind whatever chance should befall. But Petreius does not fail himself. He arms his retinue; with this and his official staff of light-armed men and with a few barbarian horsemen, his own retainers, whom he had been wont to maintain to guard his person, he makes a sudden onset on the rampart, interrupts the soldiers' colloquies, drives our men from the camp, and slays all he catches. The rest gather together and, terrified p105by the sudden peril, wrap their left hands in their cloaks, draw their swords, and thus defend themselves from the light infantry and horsemen, trusting in the proximity of their camp, and retire to it, defended by the cohorts which are on guard at the gates.

76 When this action was over Petreius goes the round of the maniples and calls on his men, beseeching them with tears not to hand over himself or their commander Pompeius to the foe for punishment. A crowd quickly gathers at the general's headquarters. He demands that all should swear not to desert or betray the army and its officers, nor to take measures for their own safety apart from the rest. He first takes this oath himself, and also compels Afranius to take the same. Next come the military tribunes and centurions; the rank and file come forward and take the oath century by century. They issue orders that any soldier of Caesar who is in the company of one of their men should be brought forward by him. When produced they kill him publicly at the headquarters. But many of them are concealed by those who had entertained them, and are let go at night through the ramparts. Thus the intimidation employed by the generals, cruelty in punishment, and the obligation of their fresh oath removed all prospect of present surrender, changed the inclination of the soldiery, and brought matters back to the old condition of hostility.

77 Caesar gives orders that the men of the other side who had come into his camp at the time of the colloquy should be sought for with the utmost diligence and sent back. But out of their number several military tribunes and centurions remained with him of their own accord. These he afterwards p107held in high honour; centurions he restored to their former ranks, Roman knights to the post of tribune.2

78 The Afranians were in straits with their foraging and were getting water with difficulty. The legionaries had some store of corn because they had been ordered to bring a twenty-two days' supply from Ilerda; the light-armed and auxiliaries had none, since their opportunities for providing it were scanty and their bodies were not trained to carry burdens. And so a great number of them fled to Caesar every day. Such were the straits of the enemy's situation. But of the two plans set before them the simpler seemed to be to return to Ilerda, because they had left a little corn there. They were confident that they would there evolve their plans for the future. Tarraco was a long way off, and they understood that in so long a journey their fortune might meet with various mischances. This plan having approved itself, they depart from the camp. Caesar, after sending forward his cavalry to annoy and hinder their rear, himself follows with the legions. No moment passed without their rearguard having to fight with the horsemen.

79 Their method of fighting was as follows: lightly equipped cohorts closed in their rearguard and several of these kept halting in the level districts; if a hill had to be climbed, the nature of the ground in itself averted peril, since from the higher ground those who had gone in front protected their comrades who were ascending; whenever a valley or a slope lay before them and those who had gone on in front could not bring aid to those who were delayed, while p109the horsemen from higher ground kept hurling missiles against them from behind, then indeed the position was most critical. The only course left for them was, whenever they approached such places, to order a halt of the legions and to repel the cavalry by a vigorous charge, and when they had dislodged it, starting forward immediately at a run, to descend in a body into the valleys, and so, after crossing them, again to halt on the higher ground. For they were so far from being aided by their cavalry, of whom they had a considerable number, that they actually received them for protection, demoralized as they were by the previous battles, into the centre of their column, and none of them could stray from the route without being caught by Caesar's horse.

80 Fighting in this way, men advance slowly and tentatively, frequently halting to support their comrades, and so it happened on this occasion. For after proceeding four miles and being seriously harassed by the cavalry, they occupy a lofty hill and there entrench a camp with one front only facing the foe, and do not unload their baggage animals. When they observed Caesar's camp pitched, his tents set up, and the horsemen dispersed on foraging duty, they suddenly sally forth about the sixth hour of the same day and, hoping that the pursuit would be delayed by the departure of our cavalry, begin their march. On observing this, Caesar, having rested his legions, follows them up and leaves a few cohorts to guard the baggage. He orders the foragers to follow on at the tenth hour and the horsemen to be recalled. The cavalry quickly returns to its daily employment during the march. Keen fighting goes on in the rear of the foe so that they are almost put to flight, and many men from the ranks, also several centurions, p111are slain. Meanwhile Caesar's main force was pressing on and threatening them in mass.

81 Then, indeed, having no opportunities of searching for a suitable place for their camp nor of advancing, they are obliged to halt and pitch their camp far from water and in a place unfavourable by nature. But, for the same reasons that are set forth above, Caesar no longer harasses them with hostilities, and on that day he did not allow tents to be set up, in order that his men might all be more ready to pursue, in case they should break out either by night or by day. Observing the faulty position of their camp, the enemy push forward outworks throughout the night and exchange one camp for another. They engage in the same task next day from early dawn, and spend the whole day over it. But the more they advanced with their work and pushed forward their camp, the further they were from water, and remedies were provided for their present ill only by incurring fresh ills. On the approach of night no one goes out of camp for watering; on the following day, leaving a guard in the camp, they lead out all their forces for water, but no one is sent out for fodder. Caesar preferred that they should be harassed by such sufferings and submit to a compulsory surrender rather than fight a pitched battle. Nevertheless he attempts to fence them in with a rampart and ditch, so as to hinder as far as possible sudden sallies on their part, to which he thought they would necessarily have recourse. And so forced by want of fodder, and to lighten their equipment for marching, they order all their baggage animals to be killed.

82 In these operations and plans two days are consumed; on the third day a great part of Caesar's work had already reached completion. The enemy, p113in order to hinder the rest of the defences, giving the signal about the ninth hour, lead out the legions and draw up their line close to the camp. Caesar recalls his legions from their work, orders all the cavalry to assemble, and draws up his line; for to appear to have shunned a battle against the general sentiment of the troops, and his credit in the eyes of the world, involved serious detriment to his cause. But, for the same reasons that have been already made known, he was led to object to a pitched battle, and all the more because by reason of the narrow intervening space, even if the enemy were driven to flight, a victory could not greatly promote his final success. For the two camps were distant from one another not more than two thousand paces. The two lines occupied two-thirds of this space; the remaining third was empty, left free for the onset and charge of the troops. If battle were joined, the propinquity of the camps afforded the conquered a speedy retreat in their flight. For this reason he had made up his mind to resist them if they advanced their colours, but not to be the first to attack.

83 The Afranian line was a double one of five legions. The third line of reserves was occupied by the auxiliary cohorts. Caesar's line was threefold, but the first line was held by four cohorts from each of the five legions, next to these came three reserve cohorts, and again three more, each from its respective legion; the bowmen and slingers were enclosed in the centre of the force, while cavalry protected the flanks. The battle array being thus drawn out, each commander seemed to have gained his purpose, Caesar not to engage in battle unless compelled, Afranius to hinder Caesar's works. However, the situation is prolonged and the battle array is maintained p115till sunset; then each side withdraws to camp. On the next day Caesar prepares to complete the defence works he had started; the enemy make trial of the ford of the River Sicoris to see if they could cross. Observing this, Caesar throws his light-armed Germans and part of his cavalry across the river and places frequent outposts along the banks.

84 At last blockaded in every way, their baggage animals now kept without fodder for four days, through their want of water, firewood, and forage, they beg for a conference, and that too, if possible, in a place out of reach of the soldiers. When this stipulation was refused by Caesar, but permission was granted provided they chose to confer in public, the son of Afranius is offered to Caesar as a hostage. They come to a place which Caesar chose. In the hearing of each army Afranius speaks. "You must not be angry with us or our men because we have chosen to keep faith with our commander Gn. Pompeius. But we have already done enough for duty and we have suffered punishment enough by enduring the want of every necessary; now indeed, hemmed in almost like wild beasts, we are kept from water, kept from moving, and cannot bear the pain in our bodies or the shame in our minds. And so we confess ourselves beaten: we pray and beseech, if any room for compassion is left, that you should not think it necessary to proceed to the extreme of punishment." Such are the sentiments he expresses in the most humble and submissive language.

85 To this Caesar replies: "No one in the whole army could have played this part, whether of querulous lament or of self-commiseration, less suitably than you. All the rest have done their duty: I, p117who was unwilling to fight even when conditions were favourable, time and place suitable, that there might be absolutely nothing to prejudice the chances of peace; my army, which preserved and protected those whom it held in its power, even when it had been injured and its soldiers slain; lastly, the men of your army who voluntarily pleaded for reconciliation, a matter wherein they thought it right to have regard to the life of all their comrades. Thus the part played by all ranks has been based on compassion, but the leaders themselves have shrunk from peace; they have observed the rights neither of conference nor of truce, and with utmost cruelty have slain men who through want of experience were deceived by a pretended colloquy. So that has happened to them which is usually wont to happen to men of overmuch obstinacy and arrogance — namely, to recur to that which they have a little while before despised and to make that the chief object of their desire. Nor do I now make demands whereby my resources may be increased by reason of your humiliation or some fortunate conjuncture of events, but I wish the armies which you have now maintained against me for so many years to be disbanded. For no other reason but this were six legions sent into Spain and a seventh levied there, or so many large fleets equipped or leaders of military experience sent to the front. None of these provisions were made for the pacifying of the Spanish provinces, none for the advantage of the province, which from the long continuance of peace required no assistance. All these measures have been for long in course of preparation against me; against me imperial powers of a novel kind are set up, such as that one and the same person should preside p119over city affairs outside the gates3 and should hold in absence two of the most warlike provinces for so many years; against me are the rights of magistrates subverted, so that they are not sent into the provinces as always hitherto after the praetorship and consulship, but as approved and elected by a small clique; against me even the plea of age is of no avail to prevent men approved4 in former wars being called out to control armies; in my case alone the rule is not observed which has always been allowed to all commanders, that when they have conducted affairs successfully they should return home, either with some distinction or at any rate without ignominy, and disband their army. Yet I have borne all these wrongs patiently and will bear them, nor is it my present object to retain for myself an army taken from you, which, however, it would not be difficult for me to do, but to prevent you from having one that you can use against me. So then, as has been said, let us quit our provinces and disband ur army; if that is so arranged I will injure no one. This is my one and final condition of peace."

86 Now it was very acceptable and pleasant to the troops, as could be known merely by the indications they gave, that men who had expected some merited penalty should win the boon of discharge without asking for it. For when a discussion was introduced about the place and time of the arrangement, the whole body of men began to signify by voice and hand from the rampart where they stood that they p121should be discharged at once, and that the undertaking could not be assured if it were put off to another time, whatever pledges might be given in the interval. When the point had been briefly discussed in either sense, the final result was that those who had a domicile or holding in Spain should be discharged at once, the rest at the River Varus. Pledges are given by Caesar that no wrong should be done to them, and that no one should be compelled to take the oath of allegiance against his will.

87 Caesar promises to provide them with corn from that time while on their way to the River Varus. He also adds that whatever any one of them has lost in war, when such property is in the hands of his own soldiers, should be restored to the losers; after making a fair valuation, he pays the men a sum of money for these effects. Hereafter whatever disputes the soldiers had amongst themselves, of their own accord they came to Caesar for final decision. When the legions on the verge of mutiny were demanding their pay from Petreius and Afranius, who said that the time for it had not yet come, a request was made that Caesar should investigate the point, and each was satisfied with his decision. About a third of the army having been discharged within two days, Caesar ordered his own two legions, to march first, the rest to follow close, so as to encamp at no great distance apart, and set the legate, Q. Fufius Calenus, in charge of this duty. In accordance with this instruction they marched from Spain to the River Varus, and there the rest of the army was disbanded.


The Loeb Editor's Notes:

1 Calagurris had been deprived of its independence and made tributary to the people of Osca.

[decorative delimiter]

2 The tribuni militum were equites Romani. Caesar means that he restored the military tribunes to the rank that they had previously held in Pompeius' army.

[decorative delimiter]

3 Early in 49 Pompeius was outside Rome, endeavouring to control affairs within the city, which, as proconsul and armed with the imperium, he was not allowed to enter.

[decorative delimiter]

4 Veteran officers might reasonably claim exemption from further service. The text of this sentence is, however, uncertain.


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