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p275 56 Aetolia, Acarnania, and the Amphilochi having been recovered through Cassius Longinus and Calvisius Sabinus, as we have shown, Caesar thought that he ought to make an attempt on Achaea and advance a little further. And so he sent Q. Calenus thither, associating with him Sabinus and Cassius with some cohorts. On their arrival becoming known, Rutilius Lupus, who, on commission from Pompeius, was in charge of Achaea, determined to block approach to the Isthmus so as to prevent Fufius from entering Achaea. Calenus recovered Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus with the goodwill of the communities themselves, and took some towns by storm. The rest of the communities he endeavoured to win over to friendship with Caesar by sending round embassies. Such were mainly the occupations in which Fufius was engaged.
57 While this was going on in Achaea and at Dyrrachium and when it was known that Scipio had come into Macedonia, Caesar, mindful of his long-established custom, sends to him their common friend A. Clodius, who had been originally brought to his notice by an introduction from Scipio and whom he had been in the habit of regarding as one of his intimates. To him he gives a letter and instructions to carry to Scipio of which this was the purport: that, having made every effort on behalf of peace, he thought that the fact that nothing had been done was the fault of those whom he had wished to be the prime movers in the matter because they feared to carry his p277 instructions to Pompeius at an inopportune time. Scipio was a man of such authority that he could not only express with freedom what his judgment approved, but could also to a large extent compel and control one who was going astray; moreover he commanded an army in his own name, so that in addition to authority he also possessed strength to coerce. If he should do this everyone would put down to his sole credit the tranquillity of Italy, the peace of the provinces, the safety of the empire. Clodius carries these instructions to him, and though on the first few days he apparently met with a ready hearing, on subsequent days he is not admitted to a conference, Scipio having been censured by Favonius, as we found out afterwards when the war was over; and so he returned to Caesar without having effected anything.
58 To keep the Pompeian cavalry more easily in check at Dyrrachium and to prevent them from foraging, Caesar fortified with large works the two approaches, which, as we have shown, were narrow, and planted forts at these spots. When Pompeius found out that no advantage was gained by the cavalry, after a few days' interval he fetches them back again by sea to his own quarters within the entrenchments. There was a great scarcity of provisions, so much so that they fed their horses on leaves stripped from the trees and on the soft powdered roots of reeds, for they had used up the crops that had been sown within the entrenchments. They were gradually forced to bring up fodder from Corcyra and Acarnania, with a long sea passage intervening, and as the supply of this was deficient, to supplement it with barley and by these devices to keep their horses alive. But when not only the barley and other fodder and the herbs that had been everywhere cut down began to p279 fail, but even the foliage from the trees, the horses being rendered useless by emaciation, Pompeius thought that he ought to attempt something in the way of a sortie.
59 There were with Caesar, among his horsemen, two Allobrogian brothers, Raucillus and Egus, sons of Adbucillus, who had held the chieftainship in the state for many years, men of singular valour, whose very able and valiant co-operation Caesar had enjoyed in all his Gallic wars. He had bestowed on them for these reasons offices of great dignity in their own homes, had arranged that they should be chosen on the senate out of due course, had assigned to them lands in Gaul taken from the enemy and large prizes of money, and had raised them from poverty to wealth. These men, on account of their worth, were not only held in honour by Caesar, but were also regarded with affection in the army; but, relying on Caesar's friendship and puffed up with stupid and barbarous arrogance, they began to despise their countrymen and fraudulently to appropriate the pay of the cavalry and to divert the whole of the plunder to their own homes. Deeply stirred by this conduct, the men approached Caesar in a body and openly complained of their wrong-doings, and added to their other complaints that they were in the habit of sending in a false return of the number of the cavalry in order that they might appropriate their pay.
60 Caesar, thinking that this was not the time for punishment and overlooking much in consideration of their valour, postponed the whole matter, but privately he took the offenders to task for having made profit out of the cavalry and urged them to expect everything from his friendship, and to judge from his past good offices what they had still to hope p281 for. The occurrence, however, brought on them great obloquy and contempt in the sight of all, and they understood that this was so not merely from the reproaches of others but also from the judgment of their intimates and from their own conscience. Influenced by this sense of shame and thinking, perhaps, that they were being reserved for punishment on a future occasion rather than let off free, they determined to quit us and hazard a new fortune and make trial of new friendships. And having conferred with a few of their clients, to whom they ventured to submit such an enterprise, they first attempted to kill G. Volusenus, the prefect of horse, as was ascertained afterwards when the war was over, that they might be seen to have deserted to Pompeius with some service to show. But when this seemed rather difficult and no opportunity of carrying it out was afforded, they borrowed as large sums as possible, just as if it was their intention to satisfy their comrades and restore their defalcations, and having bought up a number of horses, they crossed over to Pompeius with those whom they had made the participators of their plans.
61 And as they were born in a respectable position and were bountifully supplied, and had come with a great retinue and many animals, and were regarded as brave men and had been held in honour by Caesar, and as the occurrence was novel and out of the ordinary course, he conducted them round all his garrisons for purposes of display. For before that time no one, either of foot or horse, had changed sides from Caesar to Pompeius, though men were deserting almost every day from Pompeius to Caesar, and the troops levied in Epirus and Aetolia and from all the regions which were in Caesar's occupation p283 were going over as a rule in mass. But these men having an acquaintance with everything, whether there was any lack of completeness in the lines of investment, or whether anything was thought lacking by men of considerable experience in warfare, and after observation of the times of occurrences and the distance between localities, and the varying watchfulness at the outposts, according to the diversities of natural temperament or zeal on the part of the several officers in charge of affairs — all these things they reported to Pompeius.
62 Having ascertained these facts and having already planned a sortie, as we have shown, he orders his men to make protective coverings of osier for their helmets and to collect material for earthworks. When these were provided he embarks by night a large number of light-armed men and archers with all the material on board row-boats and merchant-vessels, and about midnight he leads sixty cohorts drawn from his largest camp and outposts to that part of the entrenchments which extended to the sea and was the furthest removed from Caesar's largest camp. To the same place he sends his ships, which, as we explained, had on board the material and the light-armed troops, and the warships which he had at Dyrrachium, and issues orders stating what he wishes each man to do. At these entrenchments Caesar had his quaestor Lentulus Marcellinus posted with the Ninth Legion, and as he was in unsatisfactory health, he had sent up Fulvius Postumus to assist him.
63 There was in that place a ditch •fifteen feet wide and a rampart •ten feet high facing the enemy, and the earthwork of this rampart was also ten feet in breadth. And at an interval of •six hundred feet p285 from this there was a second stockade facing in the other direction with a rampart of rather lower elevation. For on the preceding days Caesar, fearing lest our men should be hemmed in by the fleet, had constructed a double stockade in this spot, so that in case of an attack on both sides it might be possible to hold out. But the magnitude of the works and the continuous toil of every day, since he had taken in entrenchments of •seventeen miles circuit, did not allow opportunity of completion. And so he had not yet completed the cross stockade facing the sea to join these two lines. This fact was known to Pompeius, who had been informed of it by the Allobrogian deserters, and it had caused our men great inconvenience. For two cohorts of the Ninth Legion being on sentry duty by the sea, the Pompeians suddenly approached at early dawn; at the same time soldiers conveyed round on shipboard began to hurl javelins at the outer stockade,1 the ditches were being filled up with earth, the Pompeian legionaries, having brought up ladders, were terrifying the defenders of the inner line with engines of every kind and missiles, and a great multitude of archers were being thrown around them on every side. But the osier coverings placed on their helmets protected them to a great extent from the blows of stones, which were the only weapon our men had. And so when our men were being hard pressed in every way and with difficulty holding their ground, the defect, mentioned above, of the line of entrenchment became observable and between the two stockades, where the work was not yet finished, the Pompeians, disembarking, took our men in the p287 rear on both sides and, dislodging them from each line, compelled them to take to flight.
64 On the announcement of this sudden attack Marcellinus sends up some cohorts from the camp to the support of our suffering troops. And these, seeing them fleeing, could not strengthen them by their coming and themselves failed to sustain the onset of the enemy. And so every additional reinforcement that was sent up was demoralized by the fright of the fugitives and increased the terror and the peril; for retreat was hindered by the multitude of men. An eagle-bearer who had been seriously wounded in this battle and whose strength was now failing, seeing our horsemen, exclaimed: "This eagle in my life I defended with great care for many years, and now, dying, I restore it to Caesar with the same loyalty. Do not, I beseech, suffer a military disgrace to take place, which has never happened before in Caesar's army, and convey it to him in safety." By this chance the eagle was preserved, though all the centurions of the first cohort were slain except the senior centurion of the second maniple.
65 Already the Pompeians, after great slaughter of our men, were approaching the camp of Marcellinus, causing no slight terror in the rest of the cohorts, when M. Antonius, who held the nearest position among the outposts, after receiving the news was seen coming down with twelve cohorts from the higher ground. His arrival checked the Pompeians and encouraged our men, so that they recovered themselves from their extreme fear. And not long after Caesar, signalling by smoke from one redoubt to another, according to his previous custom, brought down some cohorts from the garrisons and came to p289 the same place. And having learnt of the loss sustained, on observing that Pompeius had gone out of his lines and was entrenching a camp near the sea so as to be able to get fodder freely and to have none the less a way of approach for his ships, he changed his tactics, since he had failed to gain his purpose and ordered his men to entrench a camp close to Pompeius.
66 When this entrenchment was finished it was noticed by Caesar's scouts that certain cohorts, enough to seem equivalent to a legion, were behind the wood2 and were being led to the old camp. The position of the camp was this: on the preceding days Caesar's Ninth Legion, after it had confronted the Pompeian forces and was investing them (as we have shown) with earthworks, encamped in that spot. This camp bordered on a wood and was not more than •three hundred paces from the sea. Afterwards changing his plans for certain reasons, Caesar transferred his camp a little beyond that spot, and after a few days' interval Pompeius had occupied the same camp, and as he was likely to have several legions in that place he had abandoned the inner rampart and had added a larger entrenchment. So the smaller camp included in a larger one took the place of a redoubt and citadel. Also from the left corner of his camp he had drawn a line of entrenchments to the river, •about four hundred paces long, in order that his men might get water with more freedom from risk. But he, too, changing his plan for certain reasons which it is not necessary to mention, had quitted that place. So for many days the camp had remained empty; as for the earthworks, they were all intact.
p291 67 The scouts reported to Caesar that the standards of the legion had been borne thither. They assured him that the same thing had been seen from some of the higher redoubts. This place3 was •about five hundred paces from the new camp4 of Pompeius. Caesar, hoping to be able to crush this legion and anxious to repair the loss of that day, left two cohorts at the work to give an appearance of fortifying. Himself taking a divergent route in the utmost secrecy, he led out in double line towards Pompeius' legion and the smaller camp5 the remaining cohorts, numbering thirty-three, among which was the Ninth Legion, which had suffered the loss of many centurions and a diminution of the rank and file. Nor did his original idea fail him. For he arrived before Pompeius could be aware of it, and though the defences of the camp were large yet by attacking quickly with the left wing, where he himself was, he drove the Pompeians from the rampart. Beams studded with spikes barred the gates. Here there was fighting for a while, our men attempting to break in, the others defending their camp, Titus Pulio, by whose aid we have said that the army of G. Antonius was betrayed, leading the fighting with the utmost bravery at that spot. Nevertheless our men won by their endurance, and cutting down the beams burst first into the larger camp, then also into the fort which was included within the larger camp, whither the legion when routed had retired for shelter. There they slew a few men who continued the struggle.
p293 68 But fortune, which has great influence in affairs generally and especially in war, produces by a slight disturbance of balance important changes in human affairs; and so it happened then. The cohorts of Caesar's right wing in their ignorance of the locality followed up the entrenchment which, as we have explained above, extended from the camp to the river, looking for the gate, and supposing that these lines were a part of the camp. And when they observed that they only served to connect the camp with the river they threw down the defences, no one opposing them, and crossed over, and our whole cavalry followed the cohorts.
69 Meanwhile, a fairly long interval of time had elapsed, and the news having reached Pompeius, he withdrew five legions from their work and led them to the relief of his men; and at the same time his cavalry approached our horsemen, and his serried ranks came into the view of our men who had occupied the camp. At once everything was changed. The Pompeian legion, encouraged by the hope of speedy succour, attempted resistance by the decuman gate, and taking the aggressive began to attack our men. Caesar's cavalry, fearing for its retreat, as it was mounting by a narrow track over the earthworks, began to flee. The right wing, cut off from the left, observing the panic among the cavalry, to avoid being overwhelmed within the defences began to withdraw by the part of the rampart which it had levelled; and many of these men, fearing that they might get involved in the cramped space, flung themselves from the •ten-foot rampart into the fosses, and when the first were crushed the rest tried to attain safety and a way of escape over their bodies. On the left wing the soldiers, seeing p295 from the rampart the approach of Pompeius and the flight of their own men, fearing that they might be cut off in the narrow space, as they had the enemy both inside and outside the camp, took counsel for themselves, retreating by the way by which they had come; and every place was full of disorder, panic, and flight, so much so that when Caesar grasped the standards of the fugitives and bade them halt, some without slackening speed fled at full gallop, others in their fear even let go their colours, nor did a single one of them halt.
70 The only relief that came to mitigate these great disasters, preventing the destruction of the whole army, was the fact that Pompeius, fearing, I suppose, an ambuscade, since these events had happened contrary to his expectation, for a little while before he had seen his men fleeing from the camp, did not venture for a long time to approach the lines, and his horsemen were hindered in their pursuit by the narrowness of the passages, especially as they were occupied by Caesar's troops. So have small events often turned the scale of fortune for good or evil. For the lines which were drawn from the camp to the river interrupted the victory of Caesar, which when once Pompeius' camp had been stormed was all but assured, and the same circumstance by checking the speed of the pursuers brought safety to our men.
71 In these two battles in one day Caesar lost nine hundred and sixty men and some well-known Roman knights — Tuticanus the Gaul, son of a senator, G. Fleginas of Placentia, A. Granius of Puteoli, M. Sacrativir of Capua — and thirty-two military tribunes and centurions; but the majority of these were overwhelmed at the ditches and lines of investment and river-banks in the panic and flight of p297 their comrades and perished without any wound; and thirty-two military standards were lost. In this battle Pompeius received the appellation of Imperator. To this title he adhered and afterwards allowed himself to be saluted as such but he was never wont to use the ascription in his dispatches, nor did he display the insignia of the laurel on his fasces. But Labienus, having induced Pompeius to order the captives to be handed over to him, brought them all out, apparently for the sake of display, to increase his own credit as a traitor, and, styling them "comrades" and asking them with much insolence of language whether veterans were in the habit of running away, killed them in the sight of all.
72 By these successes the Pompeians gained so much confidence and spirit that instead of forming a plan of campaign they regarded themselves as having already conquered. They did not reflect that the cause of their success had been the small number of our troops, the unfavourable conditions of the site and the narrow space, when they had forestalled us in the occupation of the camp; the twofold panic, within and without the fortifications; the severance of the army into two parts, one being unable to bear aid to the other. They did not consider further that they had not fought in a sharp encounter or in a pitched battle, and that our men had brought a greater loss upon themselves by their numbers and the confined space than they had suffered from the enemy. Finally, they did not recollect the common chances of warfare, how often trifling causes, originating in a false suspicion, a sudden alarm, or a religious scruple, have entailed great disasters, whensoever a mistake has been made in an army through the incapacity of a general or the fault of a p299 tribune; but just as if their victory were due to their valour and no change of fortune could occur, by reports and dispatches they proceeded to celebrate throughout the world the victory of that day.
73 Caesar, driven from his former plans, came to the conclusion that he must alter his whole method of campaign. And so simultaneously withdrawing all his garrisons, abandoning the siege, and gathering all his army together, he delivered an harangue before his troops and exhorted them not to take to heart what had happened nor to be terrified by these events and set one reverse, and that a slight one, against many successful battles. They should be grateful to fortune that they had captured Italy without a disaster of some kind; that they had pacified the two Spains, the home of most warlike races, with generals of the utmost skill and experience; that they had brought under their own control the neighbouring cornº-supplying provinces; finally, they should remember with what good fortune they had all been transported in safety through the midst of the enemy's fleets when not only the harbours but even the shores were crowded with their foes. If everything did not fall out favourably, they must assist fortune by their own energy. The loss that had been sustained should be attributed to the fault of anyone rather than himself. He had given them a favourable situation for fighting, he had gained possession of the enemy's camp, he had expelled and overcome them in fight. But whether it was their own nervousness or some blunder, or even a chance of fortune that had interrupted a victory already won and within their hands, they must all exert themselves to repair by their valour the damage they had sustained. If this were done, the p301 result would be that the loss would be turned to advantage, as had happened at Gergovia, and those who had previously feared to fight would voluntarily offer themselves for battle.
74 After delivering this harangue he publicly disgraced and degraded some standard-bearers. The army, as a whole, was seized with such remorse as a result of the disaster, and such eagerness to repair the discredit, that no one waited for the commands of tribune or centurion, and each man imposed even heavier tasks on himself by way of penalty, and all were alike inflamed by an eager desire for fighting, while some even of higher rank, moved by reflection, thought that they ought to remain on the spot and entrust the issue to a pitched battle. On the other hand, Caesar had not sufficient confidence in his panic-stricken troops and thought that an interval should be allowed to restore their spirits; and if he abandoned his lines he was in great fear for his corn supply.
75 And so, with only such delay as attention to the sick and wounded required, he quietly sent on all his baggage-train from the camp at nightfall to Apollonia and forbade it to stop for rest till the journey was finished, and one legion was sent to protect it. Having arranged these matters, he kept back two legions in camp and led out the rest at the fourth watch by several gates and sent them on by the same route; and after a short interval he ordered the signal to be given in order that the military custom might be observed and that his departure might be known as late as possible; and at once marching out and following the rearguard, he quickly departed out of sight of the camp. Nor, on the other hand, did Pompeius, when he learnt of his design, allow any delay in pursuit, but with the same object in p303 view, hoping to overtake the foe in the confusion and alarm of a difficult march, led his army from the camp and sent forward his horse to delay the rearguard, but was unable to overtake them, because Caesar, being in light marching order, had gone far ahead. But when they reached the River Genusus, with its difficult banks, the cavalry following up engaged and hindered the rearguard. Caesar opposed his own horsemen to them, mixing with them four hundred light-armed front-rank men, who gained such success that, engaging in a cavalry skirmish, they repelled them all, slaying many, and withdrew unhurt to the main body.
76 Having completed his full march for that day, and having taken his army across the River Genusus, Caesar established himself in his old camp over against Asparagium and kept all his men within the rampart of the camp, and ordered his cavalry, which had been sent out under the pretence of foraging, to return to camp at once by the decuman gate. In the same way Pompeius, having finished his day's march, sat down in his old camp at Asparagium. Of his soldiers, who were free from work owing to the fortifications being intact, some were going to a distance for the purpose of getting wood and fodder; others, who had left behind a great part of their baggage-train and accoutrements, when they suddenly formed the design of setting out, being induced by the propinquity of their last camp to fetch them back, had deposited their arms in their quarters and were leaving the ramparts. As they were thus hindered from pursuing, Caesar, having foreseen that this would happen, gave the signal for departure, and about noon led out his army, and doing a double march this p305 day he advanced •about eight miles from this place. This Pompeius was unable to do owing to the dispersal of his men.
77 On the next day Caesar, having in the same way sent on his baggage-train at nightfall himself marched out at the fourth watch, so that if any necessity for fighting should be laid on him he might meet the sudden emergency with a lightly equipped force. He did the same thing on the following days. By which means it resulted that, notwithstanding the very deep streams and the extremely difficult routes, he sustained no damage. For Pompeius, after the delay caused on the first day and the toil undertaken to no purpose on the subsequent days, pressing forward as he did by forced marches in his eagerness to overtake the troops in front of him, ended his pursuit on the fourth day and concluded that he must adopt a different plan.
78 It was necessary for Caesar to go to Apollonia for the purpose of depositing his wounded, paying his army, encouraging his allies, and leaving garrisons for the towns. But to these measures he assigned only so much time as the hurry of his movements allowed. Fearing for Domitius, lest he should be taken unawares by the arrival of Pompeius, Caesar hastened to him with all speed and urgent endeavour. Now he was evolving his general plan of campaign with various contingencies in view: if Pompeius should hurry to the same place he would compel him, when drawn away from the sea and separated from the stores that he had gathered at Dyrrachium, to fight with him under equal conditions of warfare; if he should cross into Italy he would join his army with that of Domitius and set out through Illyricum to succour Italy; if Pompeius p307 should attempt to besiege Apollonia and Oricum and to exclude him from the whole coast, he would blockade Scipio, and so compel Pompeius of necessity to take aid to his own people. And so Caesar sent on messengers and wrote to Gn. Domitius explaining what he wanted done; and leaving a garrison of four cohorts at Apollonia, one at Lissus, and three at Oricum, and depositing at various places those who were suffering from wounds, he began his march through Epirus and Athamania. Pompeius also, forming a conjecture as to Caesar's plans, thought it his duty to hasten to Scipio, so that if Caesar was marching thither he should go to the aid of Scipio, but if Caesar did not choose to leave the coast and the district of Oricum, waiting for his legions and cavalry from Italy, he should himself attack Domitius In full force.
79 For these reasons each of them aimed at celerity of movement, both to succour his own allies, and not to miss the opportunity that any moment might afford of crushing his adversaries. But Apollonia had turned Caesar aside from the direct route, and Pompeius was marching in light equipment through Candavia into Macedonia. Another unforeseen difficulty also arose in the fact that Domitius, whose camp had been pitched over against that of Scipio for several days, had moved away from him for foraging purposes and had marched to Heraclia, which lies close under Candavia, so that fortune itself seemed to expose him to the attack of Pompeius. Of this, however, Caesar was till then ignorant. At the same time, letters having been sent by Pompeius through all the provinces and communities after the battle at Dyrrachium, couched in a more exaggerated and inflated style than the facts warranted, a report had spread abroad that Caesar had p309 been beaten and was in flight with the loss of nearly all his forces. This rumour had made the routes full of danger and was drawing off some of the communities from their friendship with him. In consequence of this it happened that persons sent by various routes from Caesar to Domitius and from Domitius to Caesar could by no means finish their journey. But the Allobroges, friends of Raucillus and Egus, who, as we have explained, had deserted to Pompeius, having seen on the route some scouts of Domitius, either by reason of their old intimacy because they had waged war together in Gaul, or in the elation of vainglory, set before them everything that had happened, and told them of the departure of Caesar and the arrival of Pompeius. Domitius, who was scarcely four hours ahead, receiving this information from them, escaped his peril thanks to the foe, and met Caesar on his way to Aeginium, a town which lies over against Thessaly.
80 With his army thus united Caesar arrived at Gomphi, the first town in Thessaly as one comes from Epirus: a few months before, the people had voluntarily sent envoys to Caesar bidding him use all their resources, and had asked him for a garrison of troops. But the rumour which we have mentioned above about the battle at Dyrrachium, which it had considerably exaggerated, had already outstripped him. And so Androsthenes, governor of Thessaly, preferring to share the victory of Pompeius rather than be associated with Caesar in adversity, compels the whole multitude of slaves and freedmen to come from the fields to the town, shuts the gates, and sends messengers to Scipio and Pompeius asking them to come to his aid, saying that he has confidence in the defences of the town if succour is p311 brought quickly, but that he cannot hold out against a long siege. Scipio, having learnt of the departure of the armies from Dyrrachium, had brought his legions to Larisa. Pompeius was not yet near Thessaly. Caesar, having made an entrenched camp, ordered ladders and mantlets for a hasty siege to be made and hurdles to be got ready. When these measures had been taken he exhorted his troops and explained to them how useful it would be for the purpose of alleviating the general scarcity to get possession of a well-filled and opulent town, and at the same time to strike terror into the remaining communities by the example of this town, and that this should be done quickly before reinforcements could come together. And so, experiencing the utmost zeal on the part of his troops, he began to besiege the town, which had very high walls, on the very day of his arrival after the ninth hour, and took it by storm before sunset, and gave it over to his men for plunder. He then immediately moved his camp away from the town and came to Metropolis so quickly as to outstrip all news and rumour of the storming of the town.
81 The Metropolitans, at first following the same policy, influenced by the same rumours as the others, closed their gates and manned their walls with armed men; but afterwards learning from captives, whom Caesar had directed to be produced before the walls, of the fall of the town of Gomphi, they opened their gates. The inhabitants were most carefully preserved from harm, and when their fortune was compared with the fate of the men of Gomphi there was no state of Thessaly, with the exception of the Larisaeans, who were held in check by the large armies of Scipio, that did not obey Caesar and p313 submit to his authority. Finding a suitable place in the country district where the crops were now nearly ripe, he determined there to await the arrival of Pompeius and to transfer thither all his military operations.
1 The southern line: the interior munitio mentioned just after is the northern line.
2 A wood near the coast and between the River Lesnikia and Caesar's lines.
3 Referring back to eo in the first line of this chapter, indicating the enlarged camp, described in ch. 66, near the River Lesnikia.
4 The camp entrenched by Pompeius on the spot where he had broken through Caesar's lines, as described in ch. 65.
5 The old interior portion of the enlarged camp near the Lesnikia. In ch. 66 this smaller portion is said to have served as a castellum, and it is so styled at the end of the present chapter.
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