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II.14‑21

This webpage reproduces a section of
Institutio Oratoria

by
Quintilian

published in Vol. I
of the Loeb Classical Library edition, 1920

The text is in the public domain.

This page has been carefully proofread
and I believe it to be free of errors.
If you find a mistake though,
please let me know!


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III.6

(Vol. I) Quintilian
Institutio Oratoria

p371 Book III

Chapters 1‑5

1 1 In the second book the subject of inquiry was the nature and the end of rhetoric, and I proved to the best of my ability that it was an art, that it was useful, that it was a virtue and that its material was all and every subject that might come up for treatment. I shall now discuss its origin, its component parts, and the method to be adopted in handling and forming our conception of each. For most authors of text-books have stopped short of this, indeed Apollodorus confines himself solely to forensic oratory. 2 I know that those who asked me to write this work were specially interested in that portion on which I am now entering, and which, owing to the necessity of examining a great diversity of opinions, at once forms by far the most difficult section of this work, and also, I fear, may be the least attractive to my readers, since it necessitates a dry exposition of rules. 3 In other portions of this work I have attempted to introduce a certain amount of ornateness, not, I may say, to advertise my style (if I had wished to do that, I could have chosen a more fertile theme), but in order that I might thus do something to lure our young men to make themselves acquainted with those principles which I regarded as necessary to the study of rhetoric: for I hoped that by giving them something which was not unpleasant to read I might induce a greater readiness to learn those rules which I feared p373might, by the dryness and aridity which must necessarily characterise their exposition, revolt their minds and offend their ears which are nowadays grown somewhat over-sensitive. 4 Lucretius has the same object in mind when he states that he has set forth his philosophical system in verse; for you will remember the well-known simile which he uses:—1

"And as physicians when they seek to give

A draught of bitter wormwood to a child,

First smearing along the edge that rims the cup

The liquid sweets of honey, golden-hued,"

and the rest. 5 But I fear that this book will have too little honey and too much wormwood, and that though the student may find it a healthy draught, it will be far from agreeable. I am also haunted by the further fear that it will be all the less attractive from the fact that most of the precepts which it contains are not original, but derived from others, and because it is likely to rouse the opposition of certain persons who do not share my views. For there are a large number of writers, who though they are all moving toward the same goal, have constructed different roads to it and each drawn their followers into their own. 6 The latter, however, approve of the path on which they have been launched whatever its nature, and it is difficult to change the convictions implanted in boyhood, for the excellent reason that everybody prefers to have learned rather than to be in the process of learning. 7 But, as will appear in the course of this book, there is an infinite diversity of opinions among writers on this subject, since some have added their own discoveries to those portions of the art which were still shapeless and unformed, p375and subsequently have altered even what was perfectly sound in order to establish a claim to originality.

8 The first writer after those recorded by the poets who is said to have taken any steps in the direction of rhetoric is Empedocles. But the earliest writers of text-books are the Sicilians, Corax and Tisias, who were followed by another from the same island, namely Gorgias of Leontini, whom tradition asserts to have been the pupil of Empedocles. 9 He, thanks to his length of days, for he lived to a hundred and nine, flourished as the contemporary of many rhetoricians, was consequently the rival of those whom I have just mentioned, and lived on to survive Socrates. 10 In the same period flourished Thrasymachus of Chalcedon,a Prodicus of Ceos, Protagoras of Abdera, for whose instructions, which he afterwards published in a text-book, Euathlus is said to have paid 10,000 denarii,2 Hippias of Elis and Alcidama of Elae whom Plato3 calls Palamedes. 11 There was Antiphon also, who was the first to write speeches and who also wrote a text-book and is said to have spoken most eloquently in his own defence;b Polycrates, who, as I have already said, wrote a speech against Socrates, and Theodorus of Byzantium, who was one of those called "word-artificers" by Plato.4 12 Of these Protagoras and Gorgias are said to have been the first to treat commonplaces, Prodicus, Hippias, Protagoras and Thrasymachus the first to handle emotional themes. Cicero in the Brutus5 says that nothing in the ornate rhetorical style was ever committed to writing before Pericles, and that certain of his speeches are still extant. For my part I have been unable to discover anything in p377the least worthy of his great reputation for eloquence,6 and am consequently the less surprised that there should be some who hold that he never committed anything to writing, and that the writings circulating under his name are the works of others. 13 These rhetoricians had many successors, but the most famous of Gorgias' pupils was Isocrates, although our authorities are not agreed as to who was his teacher: I however accept the statement of Aristotle on the subject. 14 From this point the roads begin to part. The pupils of Isocrates were eminent in every branch of study, and when he was already advanced in years (and he lived to the age of ninety-eight), Aristotle began to teach the art of rhetoric in his afternoon lectures,7 in which he frequently quoted the well-known line from the Philoctetes8 in the form

"Isocrates still speaks. 'Twere shame should I

Sit silent."

Both Aristotle and Isocrates left text-books on rhetoric, but that by Aristotle is the larger and contains more books. Theodectes, whose work I mentioned above, also lived about the same period; 15 while Theophrastus, the pupil of Aristotle, produced some careful work on rhetoric. After him we may note that the philosophers, more especially the leaders of the Stoic and Peripatetic schools, surpassed even the rhetoricians in the zeal which they devoted to the subject. 16 Hermagoras next carved out a path of his own, which numbers have followed: of his rivals Athenaeus seems to have approached him most p379nearly. Later still much work was done by Apollonius Molon, Areus, Caecilius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. 17 But the rhetoricians who attracted the most enthusiastic following were Apollodorus of Pergamus, who was the instructor of Augustus Caesar at Apollonia, and Theodorus of Gadara, who preferred to be called Theodorus of Rhodes: it is said that Tiberius Caesar during his retirement in that island was a constant attendant at his lectures. 18 These rhetoricians taught different systems, and two schools have arisen known as the Apollodoreans and the Theodoreans, these names being modelled on the fashion of nomenclature in vogue with certain schools of philosophy. The doctrines of Apollodorus are best learned from his pupils, among whom Caius Valgius was the best interpreter of his master's views in Latin, Atticus in Greek. The only text-book by Apollodorus himself seems to be that addressed to Matius, as his letter to Domitius does not acknowledge the other works attributed to him. The writings of Theodorus were more numerous, and there are some still living who have seen his pupil Hermagoras.9

19 The first Roman to handle the subject was, to the best of my belief, Marcus Cato, the famous censor, while after him Marcus Antonius began a treatise on rhetoric: I say "began," because only this one work of his survives, and that is incomplete. He was followed by others of less note, whose names I will not omit to mention, should occasion demand. 20 But it was Cicero who shed the greatest light not only on the practice but on the theory of oratory; for he stands alone among Romans as combining the gift of actual eloquence with that of teaching the art. With him for p381predecessor it would be more modest to be silent, but for the fact that he himself describes his Rhetorica10 as a youthful indiscretion, while in his later works on oratory he deliberately omitted the discussion of certain minor points, on which instruction is generally desired. 21 Cornificius wrote a good deal, Stertinius something, and the elder Gallio a little on the same subject. But Gallio's predecessors, Celsus and Laenas, and in our own day Verginius, Pliny and Tutilius, have treated rhetoric with greater accuracy. Even to‑day we have some distinguished writers on oratory who, if they had dealt with the subject or comprehensively, would have saved me the trouble of writing this book. But I will spare the names of the living. The time will come when they will reap their meed of praise for their merits will endure to after generations, while the calumnies of envy will perish utterly.

22 Still, although so many writers have preceded me, I shall not shrink from expressing my own opinion on certain points. I am not a superstitious adherent of any school, and as this book will contain a collection of the opinions of many different authors, it was desirable to leave it to my readers to select what they will. I shall be content if they praise me for my industry, wherever there is no scope for originality.

2 1 The question as to the origin of rhetoric need not keep us long. For who can doubt that mankind received the gift of speech from nature at its birth (for we can hardly go further back than that), while the usefulness of speech brought improvement and study, and finally method and exercise gave perfection? 2 I cannot understand why some hold that the elaboration of speech originated in the fact that p383those who were in peril owing to some accusation being made against them, set themselves to speak with studied care for the purpose of their own defence. This, however, though a more honourable origin, cannot possibly be the earlier, for accusation necessarily precedes defence. You might as well assert that the sword was invented for the purpose of self-defence and not for aggression. 3 It was, then, nature that created speech, and observation that originated the art of speaking. Just as men discovered the art of medicine by observing that some things were healthy and some the reverse, so they observed that some things were useful and some useless in speaking, and noted them for imitation or avoidance, while they added certain other precepts according as their nature suggested. These observations were confirmed by experience and each man proceeded to teach what he knew. 4 Cicero,11 it is true, attributes the origin of oratory to the founders of cities and the makers of laws, who must needs have possessed the gift of eloquence. But why he thinks this the actual origin, I cannot understand, since there still exist certain nomad peoples without cities or laws, and yet members of these peoples perform the duties of ambassadors, accuse and defend, and regard one man as a better speaker than another.

3 1 The art of oratory, as taught by most authorities, and those the best, consists of five parts:— invention, arrangement, expression, memory, and delivery or action (the two latter terms being used synonymously). But all speech expressive of purpose involves also a subject and words. 2 If such expression is brief p385and contained within the limits of one sentence, it may demand nothing more, but longer speeches require much more. For not only what we say and how we say it is of importance, but also the circumstances under which we say it. It is here that the need of arrangement comes in. But it will be impossible to say everything demanded by the subject, putting each thing in its proper place, without the aid of memory. 3 It is for this reason that memory forms the fourth department. But a delivery, which is rendered unbecoming either by voice or gesture, spoils everything and almost entirely destroys the effect of what is said. Delivery therefore must be assigned the fifth place.

4 Those (and Albutius is among them), who maintain that there are only three departments on the ground that memory and delivery (for which I shall give instructions in their proper place)12 are given us by nature not by art, may be disregarded, although Thrasymachus held the same views as regards delivery. 5 Some have added a sixth department, subjoining judgment to invention, on the ground that it is necessary first to invent and then to exercise our judgment. For my own part I do not believe that invention can exist apart from judgment, since we do not say that a speaker has invented inconsistent, two-edged or foolish arguments, but merely that he has failed to avoid them. 6 It is true that Cicero in his Rhetorica13 includes judgment under invention; but in my opinion judgment is so inextricably mingled with the first three departments of rhetoric (for without judgment neither expression nor arrangement are possible), that I think that even delivery owes much to it. 7 I say this with all the greater confidence because Cicero in p387his Partitiones oratoriae14 arrives at the same five-fold division of which I have just spoken. For after an initial division of oratory into invention and expression, he assigns matter and arrangement to invention, words and delivery to expression, and makes memory a fifth department common to them all and acting as their guardian. Again in the Orator15 he states that eloquence consists of five things, and in view of the fact that this is a later work we may accept this as his more settled opinion. 8 Others, who seem to me to have been no less desirous than those mentioned above to introduce some novelty, have added order, although they had already mentioned arrangement, as though arrangement was anything else than the marshalling of arguments in the best possible order. Dion taught that oratory consisted only of invention and arrangement, but added that each of these departments was twofold in nature, being concerned with words and things, so that expression comes under invention, and delivery under arrangement, while memory must be added as a fifth department. The followers of Theodorus divide invention into two parts, the one concerned with matter and the other with expression, and then add the three remaining departments. 9 Hermagoras places judgment, division, order and everything relating to expression under the heading of economy, a Greek word meaning the management of domestic affairs which is applied metaphorically to oratory and has no Latin equivalent.

10 A further question arises at this point, since some make memory follow invention in the list of departments, while others make it follow arrangement. Personally I prefer to place it fourth. For we ought not merely to retain in our minds the fruits of our p389invention, in order that we may be able to arrange them, or to remember our arrangement in order that we may express it, but we must also commit to memory the words which we propose to use, since memory embraces everything that goes to the composition of a speech.

11 There are also not a few who have held that these are not parts of rhetoric, but rather duties to be observed by the orator. For it is his business to invent, arrange, express, etcetera. If, however, we accept this view, we leave nothing to art. 12 For although the orator's task is to speak well, rhetoric is the science of speaking well. Or if we adopt another view, the task of the artist is to persuade, while the power of persuasion resides in the art. Consequently, while it is the duty of the orator to invent and arrange, invention and arrangement may be regarded as belonging to rhetoric. 13 At this point there has been much disagreement, as to whether these are parts or duties of rhetoric, or, as Athenaeus believes, elements of rhetoric, which the Greeks call στοιχεῖα. But they cannot correctly be called elements. For in that case we should have to regard them merely as first-principles, like the moisture, fire, matter or atoms of which the universe is said to be composed. Nor is it correct to call them duties, since they are not performed by others, but perform something themselves. We must therefore conclude that they are parts. 14 For since rhetoric is composed of them, it follows that, since a whole consists of parts, these must be parts of the whole which they compose. Those who have called them duties seem to me to have been further influenced by the fact that they wished to reserve the name of parts for another p391division of rhetoric: for they asserted that the parts of rhetoric were, panegyric, deliberative and forensic oratory. But if these are parts, they are parts rather of the material than of the art. 15 For each of them contains the whole of rhetoric, since each of them requires invention, arrangement, expression, memory and delivery. Consequently some writers have thought it better to say that there are three kinds of oratory; those whom Cicero16 has followed seem to me to have taken the wisest course in terming them kinds of causes.

4 1 There is, however, a dispute as to whether there are three kinds or more. But it is quite certain that all the most eminent authorities among ancient writers, following Aristotle who merely substituted the term public for deliberative, have been content with the threefold division. 2 Still a feeble attempt has been made by certain Greeks and by Cicero in his de Oratore,17 to prove that there are not merely more than three, but that the number of kinds is almost past calculation: and this view has almost been thrust down our throats by the greatest authority18 of our own times. 3 Indeed if we place the task of praise and denunciation in the third division, on what kind of oratory are we to consider ourselves to be employed, when we complain, console, pacify, excite, terrify, encourage, instruct, explain obscurities, narrate, plead for mercy, thank, congratulate, reproach, abuse, describe, command, retract, express our desires and opinions, to mention no other of the many possibilities? 4 As an adherent of the older view I must ask for indulgence and must enquire what was the reason that led earlier writers to restrict a subject p393of such variety to such narrow bounds. Those who think such authorities in error hold that they were influenced by the fact that these three subjects practically exhausted the range of ancient oratory. 5 For it was customary to write panegyrics and denunciations and to deliver funeral orations, while the greater part of their activities was devoted to the law-courts and deliberative assemblies; as a result, they say, the old writers of text-books only included those kinds of oratory which were most in vogue. 6 The defenders of antiquity point out that there are three kinds of audience: one which comes simply for the sake of getting pleasure, a second which meets to receive advice, a third to give judgment on causes. In the course of a thorough enquiry into the question it has occurred to me that the tasks of oratory must either be concerned with the law-courts or with themes lying outside the law-courts. 7 The nature of the questions into which enquiry is made in the courts is obvious. As regards those matters which do not come before a judge, they must necessarily be concerned either with the past or the future. We praise or denounce past actions, we deliberate about the future. 8 Again everything on which we have to speak must be either certain or doubtful. We praise or blame what is certain, as our inclination leads us: on the other hand where doubt exists, in some cases we are free to form our own views, and it is here that deliberation comes in, while in others, we leave the problem to the decision of others, and it is on these that litigation takes place.

9 Anaximenes regarded forensic and public oratory as genera but held that there were seven species:— exhortation, dissuasion, praise, denunciation, accusation, p395defence, inquiry, or as he called it ἐξεταστικόν. The first two, however, clearly belong to deliberative, the next to demonstrative, the three last to forensic oratory. 10 I say nothing of Protagoras, who held that oratory was to be divided only into the following heads: question and answer, command and entreaty, or as he calls it εὐχωλή. Plato in his Sophist19 in addition to public and forensic oratory introduces a third kind which he styles προσομιλητική, which I will permit myself to translate by "conversational." This is distinct from forensic oratory and is adapted for private discussions, and we may regard it as identical with dialectic. 11 Isocrates20 held that praise and blame find a place in every kind of oratory.

12 The safest and most rational course seems to be to follow the authority of the majority. There is, then, as I have said, one kind concerned with praise and blame, which, however, derives its name from the better of its two functions and is called laudatory; others however call it demonstrative. Both names are believed to be derived from the Greek in which the corresponding terms are encomiastic, and epideictic. 13 The term epideictic seems to me however to imply display rather than demonstration, and to have a very different meaning from encomiastic. For although it includes laudatory oratory, it does not confine itself thereto. 14 Will any one deny the title of epideictic to panegyric? But yet panegyrics are advisory in form and frequently discuss the interests of Greece. We may therefore conclude that, while there are three kinds of oratory, all three devote themselves in part to the matter at hand, and in part to display. But it may be that Romans are not p397borrowing from Greek when they apply the term demonstrative, but are merely led to do so because praise and blame demonstrate the nature of the object with which they are concerned. 15 The second kind is deliberative, the third forensic oratory. All other species fall under these three genera: you will not find one in which we have not to praise or blame, to advise or dissuade, to drive home or refute a charge, while conciliation, narration, proof, exaggeration, extenuation, and the moulding of the minds of the audience by exciting or allaying their passions, are common to all three kinds of oratory. 16 I cannot even agree with those who hold that laudatory subjects are concerned with the question of what is honourable, deliberative with the question of what is expedient, and forensic with the question of what is just: the division thus made is easy and neat rather than true: for all three kinds rely on the mutual assistance of the other. For we deal with justice and expediency in panegyric and with honour in deliberations, while you will rarely find a forensic case, in part of which at any rate something of those questions just mentioned is not to be found.

5 1 Every speech however consists at once of that which is expressed and that which expresses, that is to say of matter and words. Skill in speaking is perfected by nature, art and practice, to which some add a fourth department, namely imitation, which I however prefer to include under art. 2 There are also three aims which the orator must always have in view; he must instruct, move and charm his hearers. This is a clearer division than that made by those who divide the task of oratory into that which relates to things and that which concerns the emotions, p399since both of these will not always be present in the subjects which we shall have to treat. For some themes are far from calling for any appeal to the emotions, which, although room cannot always be found for them, produce a most powerful effect wherever they do succeed in forcing their way. 3 The best authorities hold that there are some things in oratory which require proof and others which do not, a view with which I agree. Some on the other hand, as for instance Celsus, think that the orator will not speak on any subject unless there is some question involved in it; but the majority of writers on rhetoric are against him, as is also the threefold division of oratory, unless indeed to praise what is allowed to be honourable and to denounce what is admittedly disgraceful are no part of an orator's duty.

4 It is, however, universally agreed that all questions must be concerned either with something that is written or something that is not. Those concerned with what is written are questions of law, those which concern what is not written are questions of fact. Hermagoras calls the latter rational questions, the former legal questions, for so we may translate λογικόν and νομικόν. 5 Those who hold that every question concerns either things or words, mean much the same.

It is also agreed that questions are either definite or indefinite. Indefinite questions are those which may be maintained or impugned without reference to persons, time or place and the like. The Greeks call them theses, Cicero21 propositions, others general questions relating to civil life, others again questions suited for philosophical discussion, while Athenaeus calls them parts of a cause. 6 Cicero22 distinguishes two kinds, the one concerned with knowledge, the other with action. Thus "Is the world governed by providence?" p401is a question of knowledge, while "Should we enter politics?" is a question of action. The first involves three questions, whether a thing is, what it is, and of what nature: for all these things may be unknown: the second involves two, how to obtain power and how to use it. 7 Definite questions involve facts, persons, time and the like. The Greeks call them hypotheses, while we call them causes. In these the whole question turns on persons and facts. 8 An indefinite question is always the more comprehensive, since it is from the indefinite question that the definite is derived. I will illustrate what I mean by an example. The question "Should a man marry?" is indefinite; the question "Should Cato marry?" is definite, and consequently may be regarded as a subject for a deliberative theme. But even those which have no connexion with particular persons are generally given a specific reference. For instance the question "Ought we to take a share in the government of our country?" is abstract, whereas "Ought we to take part in the government of our country under the sway of a tyrant?" has a specific reference. 9 But in this latter case we may say that a person is tacitly implied. For the mention of a tyrant doubles the question, and there is an implicit admission of time and quality; but all the same you would scarcely be justified in calling it a cause or definite question. Those questions which I have styled indefinite are also called general: if this is correct, we shall have to call definite questions special questions. But in every special question the general question is implicit, since the genus is logically prior to the species. 10 And perhaps even in actual causes wherever the notion of quality comes into question, there is a certain intrusion of p403the abstract. "Milo killed Clodius: he was justified in killing one who lay in wait for him." Does this raise the general question as to whether we have the right to kill a man who lies in wait for us? What again of conjectures? May not they be of a general character, as for instance, "What was the motive for the crime? hatred? covetousness?" or "Are we justified in believing confessions made under torture?" or "Which should carry greater weight, evidence or argument?" As for definitions, everything that they contain is undoubtedly of a general nature. 11 There are some who hold that even those questions which have reference to persons and particular cases may at times be called theses, provided only they are put slightly differently: for instance, if Orestes be accused, we shall have a cause: whereas if it is put as question, namely "Was Orestes rightly acquitted?" it will be a thesis. To the same class as this last belongs the question "was Cato right in transferring Marcia to Hortensius?" These persons distinguish a thesis from a cause as follows: a thesis is theoretical in character, while a cause has relation to actual facts, since in the former case we argue merely with a view to abstract truth, while in the latter we have to deal with some particular act.

12 Some, however, think that general questions are useless to an orator, since no profit is to be derived from proving that we ought to marry or to take part in politics, if we are prevented from so doing by age or ill health. But not all general questions liable to this kind of objection. For instance questions such as "Is virtue an end in itself?" or "Is the world governed by providence?" cannot be countered in this way. 13 Further in questions p405which have reference to a particular person, although it is not sufficient merely to handle the general question, we cannot arrive at any conclusion on the special point until we have first discussed the general question. For how is Cato to deliberate "whether he personally is to marry," unless the general question "whether marriage is desirable" is first settled? And how is he to deliberate "whether he should marry Marcia," only it is proved that it is the duty of Cato to marry? 14 There are, however, certain books attributed to Hermagoras which support this erroneous opinion, though whether the attribution is spurious or whether they were written by another Hermagoras is an open question. For they cannot possibly be by the famous Hermagoras, who wrote so much that was admirable on the art of rhetoric, since, as is clear from the first book of the Rhetorica of Cicero,23 he divided the material of rhetoric into theses and causes. Cicero objects to this division, contends that theses have nothing to do with an orator, and refers all this class of questions to the philosophers. 15 But Cicero has relieved me of any feeling of shame that I might have in controverting his opinion, since he has not only expressed his disapproval of his Rhetorica, but in the Orator,24 the de Oratore and the Topica25 instructs us to abstract such discussions from particular persons and occasions, "because we can speak more fully on general than on special themes, and because what is proved of the whole must also be proved of the part." 16 In all general questions, however, the essential basis is the same as in a cause or definite question. It is further pointed out that there are some questions which p407concern "things in themselves," while others have a particular reference; an example of the former will be the question "Should a man marry?" of the latter "Should an old man marry?"; or again the question whether a man is brave will illustrate the first, while the question whether he is braver than another will exemplify the second.

17 Apollodorus defines a cause in the following terms (I quote the translation of his pupil Valgius):— "A cause is a matter which in all its parts bears on the question at issue," or again "a cause is a matter of which the question in dispute is the object." He then defines a matter in the following terms:— "A matter is a combination of persons, circumstances of place and time, motives, means, incidents, acts, instruments, speeches, the letter and the spirit of the law." 18 Let us then understand a cause in the sense of the Greek hypothesis or subject, and a matter in the sense of the Greek peristasis or collection of circumstances. But some, however, have defined a cause in the same way that Apollodorus defines a matter. Isocrates26 on the other hand defines a cause as some definite question concerned with some point of civil affairs, or a dispute in which definite persons are involved; while Cicero27 uses the following words:— "A cause may be known by its being concerned with certain definite persons, circumstances of time and place, actions, and business, and will relate either to all or at any rate to most of these."


The Translator's Notes:

1 iv.11. See also i.936.

2 About £312.

3 Phaedr. 261D.

4 Phaedr. 266E.

5 vii.27.

6 cp. XII.ii.22, x.49, where Quintilian asserts that all the writings of Pericles have been lost.

7 Aristotle gave his esoteric lectures in the morning, reserving the afternoon for those of more general interest: see Aul. Gell. XX.V.

8 Probably the Philoctetes of Euripides. The original line was αἰσχρὸν σιωπᾶν, βαρβάρους δ᾽ ἐᾶν λέγειν, which Aristotle travestied by substituting Ἰσοκράτην for βαρβάρους.

9 The younger Hermagoras, a rhetorician of the Augustan age.

10 sc. the de Inventione.

11 de Inv. i.2.

12 Book II chaps. ii and iii.

13 No such statement is found in the de Inventione.

14 i.3.

15 14‑17.

16 de Or. I.XXXI.141; Top. xxiv.91.

17 de Or. ii.10 sq.

18 Unknown. Perhaps the elder Pliny.

19 222C.

20 Fr. 3 S.

21 Top. xxi.79.

22 Top. 81; Part. Or. xviii.62.

23 de Inv. i.6.

24 Orator xiv.45.

25 de Or. III.30; Top. 21.

26 Fr. 13 Sheehan.

27 Top. xxi.80.


Thayer's Notes:

a The life and works of Thrasymachus are detailed in Dobson's Greek Orators, chapter III.

b The life and works of Antiphon are very thoroughly treated in Dobson's Greek Orators, chapter II.

Page updated: 4 Oct 12