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previous: Chapter 11 This webpage reproduces part of Giraud and the African Scene by G. Ward Price The Macmillan Company, 1944 The text is in the public domain. This text has been carefully proofread and I believe it to be free of errors. If you find a mistake though, please let me know!

 p270  Chapter XII

The Future?

The interaction of personalities to which I referred in the foreword of this book continues to exert its influence upon the future fate of France.

Since the formation of the Consultative Assembly in Algiers, General Giraud and General de Gaulle have been the respective rallying-points of the two main bodies of French political opinion represented there — the one Conservative and the other Radical (though these words must be interpreted according to their political use in English; their French equivalents have a more extreme significance).

The groups which they respectively represent are united in the purpose of restoring the freedom of their country. The difference between them arises mainly from the variance of their views as to the subsequent steps to be taken for the reconstitution of an independent French Government. The political opinion of which Giraud is the type aims at securing an element of continuity in this work of political reconstruction. The followers of De Gaulle seem rather to envisage the creation of a new France of their own design.

This divergence of policy resulted in a challenge to Giraud's political influence from the more radical elements of the new Consultative Assembly soon after it was formed.

A deputation of members belonging to the resistance movement in France waited upon him for the purpose of demanding that he should publicly denounce Marshal Pétain as a traitor and disavow all ties with the Vichy Government.

No practical motive could have inspired this démarche. Giraud's personal record since his arrival in Algiers established his independence both of the Vichy Government and of its chief. He had refused  p271 to obey Pétain's orders, and was in consequence denounced by the Marshal as "a soldier who has forfeited his honour."

Deeply as General Giraud must have felt this totally undeserved affront, he had continued to follow the course dictated by his patriotic instincts. Yet, when these militant deputies, still smarting with the resentment engendered by their experience of the Vichy regime, demanded that he should return Pétain's abuse in kind, he declined, on the ground that it was one of his principles not to insult other Frenchmen. To their second challenge he retorted that, having no ties with Vichy, there was nothing for him to disavow.

Punctilio of this kind did more honour to Giraud's sense of personal dignity than of political expediency. His refusal to make public repudiation of the Pétain Government gave his political critics the leverage they required to get him out of public office

By a resolution of the Committee of National Liberation, Giraud was excluded from the joint presidency of that body, which he had previously shared with De Gaulle.

The political elements in the Committee supporting General de Gaulle also further exploited this opportunity for the purpose of ejecting all Giraud's adherents from the Committee, with the sole exception of M. René Meyer. They were General Georges, who had been Chief of Staff to General Gamelin during the first part of the campaign in France, M. Couve de Murville, and Dr. Jules Abadie.

Giraud offered no opposition to this virtual elimination of his influence from the political body which now began to claim to be regarded as the Government of France. Together with De Gaulle, he signed the decrees that registered the Committee's decision in these matters.

It may, indeed, have been with relief that he accepted his own virtual exclusion from political affairs in Algiers, of which he had had twelve months' arduous and thankless experience.

The post to which he held with keen enthusiasm and which he retained was that of Commander-in‑Chief of the French forces in North Africa. It was to assume this position that he had originally  p272 come to Algiers. He continued to hold it until the very end of the year 1943, when he took the initiative of transferring his responsibilities as the actual future leader in the field of a French army of liberation to General de Lattre de Tassigny, an officer who had the advantage of being thirteen years younger than himself, but who had already attained to the rank of full general, which Giraud also holds.

In returning to the purely military activities in which he was so much more at home, General Giraud made certain stipulations, under threat of resignation from the Commandership-in‑Chief if they were not accepted. The strong sympathy which the personality of the General inspired in the majority of the officers serving under him gave force to his demands.

These were that he should have a free hand to direct the military effort of France in cooperation with the Allies; that no new French general should be appointed without his consent, and that no officer should be arraigned on a political charge except with his approval.

The differences of opinion that gradually manifested themselves between Giraud and his opponents in the Consultative Assembly are chiefly important because they foreshadow the divisions that are likely to develop in France after the liberation of that country from the enemy.

The Frenchmen who have left their native land for the purpose of carrying on the struggle, and those who are gallantly keeping up resistance within French territory, not unnaturally cherish bitter feelings for those of their fellow-countrymen who have accepted, whether actively or only passively, the German occupation of their country. They feel that everyone who has not proved his patriotism by actual deeds is under suspicion of having consorted with the enemy. They are already demanding the investigation of the record of every Frenchman who has been associated, however obscurely, with the public life or administration of that country.

This "witch-hunt," for the purpose of "smelling out" collaborationists, has already started in North Africa. At the end of November, 1943, two "Purge Committees" were sitting in Algiers and had  p273 five hundred cases before them on which they hoped to have pronounced judgment within two months' time.

The question of whether the political records of Frenchmen are to be condoned or condemned is one which will take on greater scope when the liberation of France has been accomplished. A similar spirit to that which inflamed the Jacobins against the aristocrats in the early stages of the French Revolution now animates the members of the resistance movement in France against those of their fellow-countrymen, who — even if passively and by compliance rather than voluntary cooperation — have acquiesced in the German occupation of France.

The fact is that times of war and revolution tend to bring to positions of power and leader­ship men whose force of character is greater than their powers of intellect or judgment. The merits of a cause are not always faithfully reflected in its supporters. Types like "Headsman" Jourdan, in Carlyle's French Revolution, recur in every period of public commotion. The political influence which they exercise is supported by a heavy fist and violent temper rather than by persuasion and intelligence.

The parallel between the Convention of 1793 in Paris and the National Committee of 1943 in Algiers is not a close one, for these bodies came into existence under very different circumstances. Yet in both organisations are manifest the same addiction to high-sounding phrase and lofty principle, the same indifference to matters of practical, utilitarian politics.

As in the days of Robespierre, the members of the Consultative Assembly are intensely preoccupied with the "purity" of each other's convictions. A loose phrase in a speech, a casual remark in private conversation are liable at any moment to be dragged out of the past for the purpose of supporting the charge of "collaborationism." The result of similar heresy-hunting in the France of one hundred and fifty years ago was that the leaders of the Revolution were reduced to denouncing each other when the supply of more notorious victims for their zeal became exhausted. This is a danger to which some of the "sea‑green incorruptibles" of Algiers may one day find themselves exposed.

 p274  The desire to impose exemplary punishment upon "collaborators" has been openly expressed by the De Gaullists in North Africa from the outset of the Allied campaign.

"We shall judge Giraud by the action he takes, or fails to take, immediately we have won back Tunis and Bizerta," they used to say. "What we want is the immediate establishment of 'revolutionary tribunals' which will at once proceed to punish anyone who has given aid to the enemy in any way whatever." These Frenchmen brushed aside the argument that such "drumhead courts-martial" on political charges held under conditions of popular excitement might open the door to malicious denunciations and private vendettas.

It would clearly be difficult for courts of this kind to decide whether State or municipal officials who had continued to discharge their functions during the enemy occupation were thereby deliberately helping the Germans, or whether their motive may not have been to keep the social order running as smoothly as possible. Some writers in the English Press almost equalled the ruthlessness of the Nazis themselves in their demand for a pogrom of all who could not prove their adherence to the strict De Gaullist doctrine. Left-Wing publicists who are filled with righteous indignation by any violence to their own friends, openly rejoiced in print over the assassination of Admiral Darlan, not because of any specific charge against him but solely on the ground of his "collaborationist" past.

For such self-righteous doctrinaires of other nations there can be no excuse. The desire to mete out punishment to those who have given aid to the enemy is natural, however, among Frenchmen who have risked their lives by resisting the Germans, whose sons or brothers have been caught and executed, and whose families, in many cases, still live under the peril of reprisals. But if the De Gaullist views predominating in Algiers were later on to be adopted by the national executive power, it would seem inevitable that the French nation will be divided into two mutually hostile sections. The more submissive and fatalistic section of the population may be threatened with general impeachment by the virile and aggressive minority who have risked everything for their country's salvation and won through to victory.

 p275  This division of the French nation into two groups — accusers and judges on one side, suspects on the other — might conceivably degenerate into something like civil war. The restoration of France to the position in Europe which is hers by historical right will require the combined and concentrated effort of the entire country. The atmosphere of feud and recrimination generated in Algiers thus threatens to delay national recovery.

It would contribute to German Schadenfreude — their characteristic delight in the misery of others — if the eviction of the Nazi forces from France were to be followed by internal disturbances like the Paris Commune of 1871 on a nation-wide scale. The systematic destruction carried out by the German armies on their retreat will not consist of material damage alone. It will be their aim to create the maximum amount of internal discord everywhere. Baffled in his attempt to establish German domination under the label of the "New European Order," Hitler will do his best to leave behind him an evil legacy of confusion, political as well as economic and material.

Much will depend upon the sequence of events which the process of French liberation follows. The Committee of National Liberation claims to be a National Government exercising French sovereignty. It has not yet been recognised as such by the Allied Powers. Nor does its position correspond to that of émigré Governments in previous wars. Between 1914 and 1918 the Belgian Government was established at Havre in France, and the Serbian Government first in Corfu and afterwards at Salonica.

Like France today, the territories of those Governments were under enemy occupation. There is a difference, however, between their situation and that of the French Committee of National Liberation in Algiers. The Germans themselves administered the territory of Belgium and Serbia, whereas in France a "collaborationist" Government came into existence and was recognised for more than two years by one of the principal Allied nations, the United States, which maintained an Ambassador at Vichy up to the time of the Anglo-American landing in North Africa.

Though the Committee of National Liberation claims to speak and  p276 act in the name of France, it is conceivable that before the end of the war with Germany some other national body may emerge from the majority of the French nation which remains at home, or that some transformation of the existing Vichy regime may challenge the right of a self-constituted authority formed by a minority of the nation to bind the rest.

The standing of the organisation in Algiers headed by General de Gaulle is not a representative one, for it has never been elected. It claims, however, to interpret the popular sentiment of France. This is doubtless true, though there have been variations in that sentiment during the course of the war.

In June, 1940, Pétain's assumption of supreme authority in the State was undoubtedly approved by a very large part of the nation. To them, with the victorious invader actually in their midst, he seemed to be taking the only possible course by which something might be saved from the catastrophe of defeat and despair.

Later on, as hope revived with the gradual recovery of British strength after the disaster of Dunkirk, and as Pétain proved incapable of preserving even the outward dignity of France from German violence, popular feeling began to swing over to De Gaulle. This tendency increased as the fortunes of the United Nations improved. By the beginning of 1944 Pétain's prestige was at the lowest possible ebb. Such hold as he still retained upon the respect of the French people was due in the main to the uncanny tenacity with which the eighty-seven-year‑old Marshal clung both to life and office.

It was his prestige of years and long service alone which prevented the Nazi Government from forcing Pétain out of office and substituting a new and more definitely quisling government formed of such bought-and‑paid‑for tools as Laval, Déat, and Doriot.

To do so would have still further antagonised the mass of the French people, infuriated already by the ruthless conscription of labour for Germany. Hitler was content to isolate the aged Marshal, in the hope that Nature would soon remove him from the scene.

Meanwhile, preparations were made to replace him by introducing a new figure into Franco-German relations — the former Nazi Minister to Denmark, Dr. Renthe-Fink.

 p277  Fink was formally presented to Pétain by Abetz, the German "Ambassador" to the Vichy Government, as a special envoy charged with the duty of negotiating the dispatch of French labour and supplies to Germany. There seems to be little doubt that he is, in fact, a German Gauleiter standing at Pétain's side ready to assume the mantle of authority as soon as it slips from the Marshal's worn‑out frame.

It is thus uncertain what sort of Government will be found in France when the Allied Armies of Liberation arrive there, nor is it yet ascertained exactly what kind of Government the French people as a whole will wish to set up in its place.

The old generation of internationally known French politicians has passed into the shadows. It is not among such prewar figures as Herriot, Tardieu, Reynaud or Daladier that the future leaders of France will be found. Even if they survive the war, they will be disqualified by age and by their ill‑omened association in the public mind with the regime that led France to disaster.

But, behind the curtain of German occupation which has masked French political life since mid‑1940, new personalities have been maturing, ready to assert themselves when the restraints to which they are now subject are removed.

It is possible that, as the war approaches its end, the position may be further complicated by an attempt to reestablish a constitutional French Government in France itself, as distinct from the self-appointed Government established in Algiers.

The last exercise of French constitutional authority was the meeting of the National Assembly, or joint session of both Houses of Parliament, which was convened in July, 1940, and conferred upon Marshal Pétain, by 569 votes to 80, the title of "Chief of the State." Of the thousand members of that National Assembly, more than eight hundred have remained in France.

The mandates of the members of the last Chamber of Deputies to be elected expired in 1942. Since the enemy occupation of France has made it impossible to hold new elections, it might be claimed that this body is entitled to prolong its existence until a new Parliament can be regularly elected. The British House of Commons  p278 has continued its functions beyond the statutory period merely on the ground that a General Election is difficult to organise in wartime.

The French Senate is in even stronger position for the assertion of its authority, since the mandates of two‑thirds of its members do not expire till 1945 and 1948. These Senators number three hundred as against only three members of their House who have seats in the Consultative Assembly at Algiers. There are about half-a‑dozen other Senators outside France, but the overwhelming majority of this body, in which, under the laws of the Third Republic, the constitutional authority in France predominantly resides, remains inside that country, with its powers juridically unabated, thorough at present suspended by foreign duress.

The Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber are still alive. They were dismissed from their posts in 1942, but they never resigned. On the contrary, they publicly protested against the attempt to deprive them of their powers. The former of the two, M. Jeanneney, who ranks as the second citizen of France after the President, is at liberty. The Germans have subjected M. Herriot, the President of the Chamber, to some kind of detention.

The initiative in summoning another National Assembly might be taken by the President of the Republic, M. Lebrun, whose term of office has not expired, and who has not resigned, though, like the Presidents of the two Houses of Parliament, he was pushed into the background by the substitution of Marshal Pétain for himself as Chief of the State. President Lebrun was imprisoned in Bavaria for a time, but was allowed to return to France in November, 1942, and occupy an allotted residence near Grenoble. His own home is in the Department of the Meuse. The possibility that, when the Germans are forced to evacuate France, the attempt may be made to reassert the authority of the nation by constitutional means cannot be left out of account.

If the President of the Republic, supported by the Presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies were to summon the two Houses of Parliament for the purpose of establishing a national government, the administration thus created would probably be recognised  p279 and obeyed by the hierarchy of the French Civil Service. France is a country where legal forms are much respected.

Such a reassertion of his powers by the old regime would undoubtedly be strongly opposed by the Committee of National Liberation, which has already entered an emphatic claim for recognition as sole French national authority.

This body is, in fact, already preparing to take over the internal administration of that country, and has formed for the purpose an organisation of local administrators, who are being trained to act under the authority of Algiers in the same way as AMGOT​a acts under the control of the Allied General Staff.

Will the great majority of French men and women who have endured the German occupation of their country be prepared to submit to an administration imposed upon them by a comparatively small number of their fellow-countrymen who escaped from the rigours of the enemy occupation?

It is perhaps tempting for the members of the Consultative Assembly and the Committee of National Liberation to see themselves in the role of deliverers of France, and, as such, entitled to dispose of her future, but the people who, in that country, have lived under harsh Nazi control may feel that they have as much right to be consulted about her political future as those who spent the war in the comparative comfort and safety of Algiers or London.

Moreover, the ardour displayed by the Committee of National Liberation may not help to popularise its authority with the people who have remained in France. Some of these might be apprehensive lest their attitude during the period of German occupation should be misinterpreted by such patriotic purists as the Algiers Committee.

It is probable that many Frenchmen besides Marshal Pétain have convinced themselves that their acceptance in 1940 of what appeared to be the prospect of an imminent and inevitable German victory was inspired by motives of national prudence. They would claim that in submitting to the German conquest of their country as an accomplished fact they were taking the best course to save something from the wreckage of its fortunes. To discredit this argument will be difficult, for there can be no doubt of its sincerity.​b In the  p280 case of Laval, De Brinon, Déat, Doriot, and all who went over to the Germans for obvious purposes of self-advancement, no defence is possible. Many others, however, now branded as collaborationists will plead that they were swept along by a current which they were powerless to resist, and that they acted, not from choice, but by compulsion.

It is evident, therefore, that the possibilities of political discussion among Frenchmen after the liberation of their native land will be considerable. These internal divisions are likely to play as great a part as the material and human losses entailed by the war in bringing about that delay in the recovery of France which was foretold by General Smuts. Since this restoration is in the interests not only of the Allies but of all Western Europe, the speedy reconciliation of all Frenchmen except proved traitors should be the aim of those who claim to control the internal affairs of that country.

Until the liberation of France has been accomplished, the able, ambitious, and arbitrary personality of General de Gaulle is likely to remain the strongest individual influence in French affairs. It may be that he will not prove as uncompromising as his own Left-Wing followers in Algiers about the necessity of holding a nation-wide hunt for collaborationists. At present his main preoccupation would seem to be to keep himself on the box‑seat of the curiously assorted team he has to drive as head of the Algiers Committee of National Liberation. The General has great confidence in his own political ability, and might well appeal to the people of France with a programme of reconciliation when the hour of their deliverance comes.

The Consultative Assembly is divided on the question of whether elections should be held as soon as French territory is greed. The Socialists realise that they have small prospects of securing a majority in an early General Election. Times of great political excitement such as those which will follow the war usually result in augmented polls for more extreme parties, whether of the Left or the Right.

Everyone is agreed that the final decision as to the future form of French Government must be taken by nation as a whole. It will not be possible to consult the people, however, until the prisoners of war and conscripted workers, numbering several millions,  p281 have been brought back from Germany. This will take a year or eighteen months. The question is what sort of interim Government will be set up in France meanwhile.

It may prove that the Allied General Staff will have some influence on this matter. Invidious as it would be for the other Allied Governments to choose between those Frenchmen who have stayed at home and the minority who have been fighting or working against Germany from outside the frontiers of France, the interests of the United Nations as a whole require that political disturbances in that country should be avoided.

If such a situation arose, and other French political leaders were competing among themselves for control, an opportunity might well arise for General Giraud again to play a useful part. He is recognised as standing outside and above politics, he is respected and admired by all Frenchmen of patriotic instincts; he has a strong sense of discipline and justice.

France may find herself in a desperately disorganised condition after the expulsion of the Germans. The Nazis will do much damage before they give up their greatest prize. The country may have to be rebuilt from a state almost of ruin. When a nation is confronted with such a task, the safest foundations for it are those of the traditions which the character of the race has gradually created. By training and instinct alike, Giraud is a traditionalist.

Few countries have had a more variegated history than France during the last century and a half. Monarchy, Convention, Directory, Consulate, Empire, Monarchy, Republic, Second Empire, and Third Republic have been the successive forms assumed by the authority of the State. Yet through all these changes and complexities, certain traits of the French national character have constantly reasserted themselves. Despite the violence of their political upheavals, the sober, cautious realism which is one of the abiding qualities of the French people found expression from time to time in leading personalities whose influence had a moderating effect.

After the defeat of France by Prussia in 1870, nearly seven years passed before the Third Republic was firmly established.

During most of that time a French soldier, Marshal MacMahon,  p282 was at the head of the nation. He had been elected to the Presidency by the Royalists. They hoped that he would prove to be no more than a locum tenens to prepare the way for the restoration of the Monarchy. MacMahon's own instincts inclined him that way, but, since it gradually became clear that the Republican Party was the strongest in the State, the Marshal's sense of constitutional duty led him to resign his office.

There can be no doubt that during those years of internal dissension that followed the Franco-Prussian war it was of advantage to France to have a Conservative statesman at the head of the Government machine.

In both character and career, certain resemblances can be detected between Marshal MacMahon and General Giraud. What France will need to bring her through the difficult times that must inevitably follow on the war is restorative rather than stimulating leader­ship.

It remains to be seen whether, after a lifetime of service to his country on the battlefield, Henri Giraud is destined to exercise his Conservative and traditionalist influence upon her fortunes at the outset of the trying phase of readjustment and reconstruction that lies ahead of her.

---

Thayer's Note:

a The Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories.

b My mother, who served in the Free French Army out of Algiers in 1943 and retired as a captain in Berlin in 1947, to the end of of her life said of Marshal Pétain (and of Pétain only) that he was a sad old man who was stuck between a rock and a hard place: what could he do? anything else and France and her people would have suffered worse. Right or wrong, it was a very common opinion in post-war France.

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