Giraud and the African Scene • Chapter 6

One of the mysterious parts in the preparations for the Allied landing in North Africa was played by General Weygand, that dapper little man with the trim figure, red, puckish face, and alert, birdlike eyes who was Marshal Foch's Chief of Staff when he was Commander-in‑Chief of the Allied armies in the closing months of the last war.

Weygand is a man of mystery, apart from his activities in North Africa. He was brought up as a Belgian, and only took French nationality when he entered the Military College of St. Cyr. He is believed to be the posthumous son of the Emperor Maximilian of Mexico, a former Austrian archduke who was captured and shot by the Mexican rebel, Juarez, in 1867. Such birth would make him a nephew of the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. The Archduke Maximilian married Princess Charlotte, daughter of King Leopold of the Belgians. She returned to her native country the year before her husband's execution, to try to persuade the Emperor Napoleon III of France to come to his assistance against the rebels. Despair at the failure of her mission drove her out of her mind, and she lived another sixty years without recovering her reason.

In the French Army the story circulates that General Maxime Weygand was her child, born in Belgium shortly after her return to Europe.

Weygand, they say, did not know the secret of his Royal origin until he had grown up. As a young cavalry lieutenant he was acting as A. D. C. to a French general, who was a marquis. He fell in love with his chief's daughter. Taking the father into his confidence, he said, "I cannot hope that you will be prepared to accept me as a p109 son-in‑law, because I do not know to what kind of family I belong. All that I can tell you is that I was brought up by a Belgian count as a sort of adopted son."

The marquis went to see the Belgian count, and on his return said to young Weygand, "I have been bound to secrecy, but I can tell you that your birth is at least equal to my own" — with the result that the marriage took place.

There can be little doubt that when Weygand came over as Marshal Pétain's Delegate-General to North Africa, he already had to mind the possibility of organising a renewal of French resistance on that territory. It was not long before Mr. Robert Murphy, the American Consul-General, got into confidential communication with him.

He found that Weygand took a realist military view of the situation. He regarded it as foolish to start any local movement of defiance to Germany without the certainty that it would be at once supported by strong Allied forces. As the United States was not yet in the war, and Great Britain was clearly too heavily engaged in the Middle East to undertake such an expedition single-handed, Weygand maintained a non‑committal attitude, though from the first moment of his presence in North Africa he had been organizing the French troops there with a view to ultimate action for the liberation of France. Had any military steps been taken openly, or had he himself declared his secret inclinations, there was every likelihood that the Germans would have themselves occupied French North Africa as a precautionary measure.

When, therefore, Mr. Murphy enquired as to whether he would undertake the leadership of French resistance to the Germans if he were sent material for the equipment of his troops, together, possibly, with some American divisions as a reinforcement, he returned a cryptic reply.

"I can say nothing about this proposal," he said, "but if the Americans decide to send me some war material, or to carry out the operation they suggest, I hope they will inform me."

Weygand's attitude seems to have been that it was wise for North Africa to remain passive so long as the Germans did not break the p110 conditions of the armistice which they had imposed on France. He was, however, an opponent of collaboration outside those limits, and whenever he visited Vichy he used to protest to Admiral Darlan against the facilities which the Admiral was allowing to the Germans in the way of using the ports of Bizerta and Tunis for sending munitions to Rommel in Libya.

These protests raised doubts in the mind of Laval and his German patrons as to Weygand's reliability. Such misgivings were increased by the high praise which was being given to him at that time in the American Press.

In November, 1941, Weygand was accordingly ordered to quit his post as Delegate-General and return to France.

The French patriots in North Africa urged him to defy the authority of the Vichy Government by refusing to obey this order.

Weygand's answer to them was: "I am a disciplined soldier and must comply." It is likely, however, that he would have taken the bolder course if there had been any prospect of early help from overseas for the Liberation Movement.

In the winter of 1941 there seemed a great risk that the Germans might themselves occupy North Africa. Some of the leaders of the Liberation Movement in Algiers began accordingly to press the American Government to give larger scope to its proposed intervention. General Jousse, with Lemaigre-Dubreuil and others, drafted a report setting forth the requirements in transport and weapons of the French North African army in order that it should be able to put into the field six motorised and two infantry divisions. They estimated that it would be essential for the United States to supply anti‑tank and anti-aircraft artillery, together with 300 fighter planes.

No reply was received to these representations, and a similar fate met another memorandum drafted by Colonel van Heck and his organising committee early in 1942, which urged the Government of the United States to act immediately if the Germans showed any signs of being about to occupy French North Africa.

What was wanted was to find a French leader for a joint Franco-American enterprise, one who would combine an inspiring p111 personality and well-known name with the technical abilities required for command in the field.

They could still think of no one but Weygand, who was now living in retirement at Cannes. The general was accordingly again sounded by American agents, but it was clear that advancing years and lack of initiative disqualified him for so hazardous an undertaking.

Meanwhile the situation in the Mediterranean was turning in favour of the Axis. Heavy losses in defence of Crete had obliged the British Navy to withdraw most of its strength from that sea, and the British Army had fallen back into Egypt. In French North Africa the chief administrative posts were being filled by collaborationists. The conditions for Allied intervention there seemed to be growing less favourable. Moreover, the approval expressed in the United States of the British landing in Madagascar at the beginning of May, 1942, nearly led to a rupture of diplomatic relations between Vichy and Washington. If this had happened, Mr. Robert Murphy and his staff of consuls who were doing such valuable under-cover work in North Africa would have had to be withdrawn.

All these circumstances combined to spread a feeling of depression among the Frenchmen in North Africa who had been looking to America for help, and they addressed another letter to Mr. Murphy, pointing out that they had repeatedly asked without success for American aid. They recalled that they had been negotiating with him for sixteen months without any concrete results, and that they had thereby incurred the risk of severe reprisals on the part of their own Government and the Germans if their activities were discovered. They now fixed May 20, 1942, as a time-limit, after which they could not hold out any more hope of Franco-American collaboration in North Africa unless the American Government was prepared meanwhile to make some definite proposals.

At the very moment when matters had reached this critical stage the news of General Giraud's escape from Koenigstein and arrival in France aroused new hope in the hearts of French patriots everywhere.

p112 To Americans and French alike it seemed that here was an ideal figure for that post of leader which they had so far been unable to fill.

Lemaigre-Dubreuil, whose business interests enabled him to travel about freely, flew from Algiers to France and saw General Giraud near Lyons on May 19th.

To his delight he found the General full of plans for taking the offensive against the German invader.

He did not regard immediate action as possible. It would be necessary to wait until the Germans began to show signs of weakness, and then attack them with a well-prepared series of synchronised operations. These he proposed to plan for the spring of 1943.

When the time came, he counted upon using against Germany the small metropolitan army of 100,000 men left to the French Government by the armistice, as also upon a general rising in the occupied zone of France, where the stores of German war material would be seized.

French North Africa, according to Giraud's plan, was to serve only as a supply base, its troops being brought over to metropolitan France.

An indispensable feature of this scheme was however the landing of a substantial American Expeditionary Force in Southern France.

Giraud strongly urged that this landing should take place in Southern France rather than in North Africa, since this would:

Lemaigre-Dubreuil was able to surprise the General, however, by telling him how much preparatory work had already been done in North Africa. He insisted that it was there that the work of liberation p113 must begin, and he ultimately persuaded Giraud to modify his own plan to the extent of approving an American landing in North Africa, though he still maintained that this should be combined with one in France.

Finding that an organization already existed in North Africa, Giraud agreed to go over there when the time came to take charge of the military operations which would follow on the arrival of American troops. In the meantime he appointed General Mast to act as his military representative.

Lemaigre-Dubreuil returned to Algiers greatly encouraged by his visit to Giraud. The Liberation Movement had found its military leader.

In this same month of May, Colonel Otto Solberg arrived in Morocco. He was a former American military attaché in Lisbon and had been sent by the United States Government to renew contact with the French patriots in North Africa, bringing them the formal assurance that the United States definitely intended to carry out the operation which Murphy had discussed with General Jousse.

After consultations in Algiers between Solberg, Murphy and Lemaigre-Dubreuil, a memorandum was drafted, setting forth the material which would be required for the equipment of the French forces, and dealing with such economic and financial questions as the extension of the Lend-Lease Act to North Africa, rates of exchange and so forth.

Colonel Solberg took the memorandum back to Washington, but, as no further communication was received from the American Government, Mr. Murphy also went there in July to explain the situation, while a new envoy, Colonel Eddy, military attaché in Tangier,a arrived in Algiers on July 30th. From him the French patriots got the impression that only at this late stage were the Americans seriously beginning to study the French proposals and demands.

In August, 1942, Lemaigre-Dubreuil again visited Giraud near Lyons. By this time the General was being secretly approached by other Frenchmen who were anxious to resume the struggle against Germany, and were turning to him as a potential leader.

Murphy returned from Washington in September with the news p114 that the American landing-force would be on a far larger scale than any of his French friends in Algiers had dared to hope. The figures he mentioned were 500,000 men, 2,000 aircraft, and 100 warships.

Now that the French patriots were definitely assured of the arrival of the Expeditionary Force, their activity became feverish.

The organisers of the Liberation Movement in Algiers were eager to do everything in their power to help the Allied cause, but, as patriotic Frenchmen, they desired also to be assured that the interests of their own country would be safeguarded.

M. Tarbet de St. Hardouin, the former diplomat, was entrusted with the drafting of a document to ensure that the attitude of the American State Department towards France was clearly understood on both sides.

Mr. Robert Murphy, on behalf of the American Government, in accepting its terms agreed that it was the intention of the United States to restore the full sovereignty of France over all the territories in her possession before the war, both in Europe and overseas, as soon as possible.

It was further put on record that the United States would deal with France as with an ally. On the economic side, the operation of the Lend-Lease Act was to be extended to French North Africa.

Directly the conference with General Indicates a West Point graduate and gives his Class.

Mark Clark at Cherchell in October was over, Lemaigre-Dubreuil had arranged to fly to Lyons for the purpose of persuading Giraud to leave his home there for the South of France, and also to induce him to abandon his idea of a landing in France as an accompaniment of the invasion of North Africa.

Owing to the twenty-four hours' delay in General Clark's arrival at Cherchell, Lemaigre-Dubreuil had to leave Algiers before the conference had actually taken place. It was with great anxiety that he scanned the newspapers on arriving at Marseilles. He half expected to see big headlines in them announcing the news that the whole conclave of negotiators had been discovered and arrested.

Dubreuil saw Giraud on October 24th at Lyons, and again the following day at his sister's house in the country near by.

p115 The discussions he had with him were difficult. Giraud is not the kind of man to be easily dissuaded from a course of action upon which he has once decided. For six months now he had been living in the unoccupied zone of France, constantly turning over in his mind schemes for evicting the German invaders from the northern half of French territory.

Officers of the French Army had assured him that, if he put himself at the head of a movement for the expulsion of the German invaders, the whole of unoccupied France would rise in his support, and that he could also expect cooperation from the inhabitants of the occupied area, in whose midst the German reserves of war material and lines of communication lay.

He hoped that a French revolt of this kind would be backed by an American landing, and had fixed upon the spring of 1943 as the most suitable time for this surprise operation.

All such plans he was now asked to abandon, and to concentrate his efforts on cooperating with an American landing on the other side of the Mediterranean.

Giraud cannot be blamed if, in his mind, the immediate importance of liberating France counted for more than the strategic designs of the Allies in North Africa.

When he heard, however, that the Americans were going to send half-a‑million men to Morocco and Algiers, he decided, after a night's reflection, that he would give up his scheme of a rising in France supported by an Allied landing there, and would go over to Africa. Since the American Government had entered no objection to his claim to be the Allied Commander-in‑Chief, he fully expected that he would have command over French and American forces alike.

He nevertheless still clung to the idea that a diversion might be made in France by the troops of the reduced army which the armistice had allowed the French Government to retain. He visualised the establishment by them of a bridgehead in the south of France, where the Allies could land after making good their hold on North Africa.

He accordingly summoned a number of army officers, with p116 whom he had been in secret communication, to meet him at Marseilles for the purpose of discussing this plan. It was never actually executed, except for the action of General de Lattre de Tassigny, commanding the military district of Montpellier.

This officer had been on Giraud's staff at Metz, and when he heard that the general had landed in North Africa, he attempted to carry out the scheme which he knew had been at the back of the mind of his former chief by opposing the advance of the German troops into unoccupied France, and by seizing a bridgehead at Sète, on the coast south of Montpellier. In the absence of support, General de Lattre's gesture failed, and he was sentenced to ten years in prison at Riom, where the famous state trial took place. In September, 1942, he managed to escape.

Lemaigre-Dubreuil got back to Algiers from his mission to Giraud on October 31st. Hardly had he returned when General Mast was informed by Mr. Robert Murphy that the American landing would take place, not at the end of November as had been expected, but on the night of November 7th‑8th.

The information plunged the French patriots in Algiers into consternation. They had worked out a schedule for seizing strategic points, surrounding the houses of senior officers who had not given secret promises of support to the Liberation Movement, and providing guides to meet the Allied troops as they came ashore. They had already been in doubt as to whether they could complete these preparations within the month on which they had counted. They knew it was impossible to do so inside a week.

Their position was an awkward one. If they refused to cooperate with the Allied forces now already approaching by sea, they would virtually be helping the Germans. On the other hand, they could not hope at such short notice to induce the French forces in North Africa to submit without resistance to the occupation of their territory. Troops of any country, if they are any good at all, may be expected to fight against an army of another nationality suddenly descending on their shores.

The French patriots in Algiers felt that if they themselves continued to work in with the American scheme, this opposition from p117 the garrison of French North Africa, which they were powerless to prevent in the time available, might expose them to the charge of having double-crossed the Allies.

In their perplexity, M. Lemaigre-Dubreuil and General Mast appealed to Mr. Robert Murphy to urge the American Government to postpone the operation. "Too late," was the reply. "The transports are already on the way."

The two Frenchmen accordingly drew up a formal letter in which they disclaimed, on behalf of the leaders of the Liberation Movement in North Africa, any responsibility for the possible consequences of what they described as a premature landing, likely to be more injurious than beneficial to the interests which they and the Americans had in common.

The most they could do, they said, was to give their help locally in Algiers. It would be impossible for them, in the space of six days, to inform their partisans in Tunisia and Morocco of the imminence of the opportunity for which they had been preparing. Except in the immediate neighbourhood of Algiers, therefore, the Allied Expeditionary Force would have to take its own measures for establishing relations with the local population.

For the Anglo-American General Staff it was a question of balancing one risk against another. By giving our friends on the spot time to circulate the news that the landing was about to take place, peaceful conditions might have been secured for it; on the other hand, there was a risk of this information leaking through to the Axis Powers, which would make it easier for them to oppose the Allied enterprise.

Mr. Murphy acknowledged the representations made to him by his French associates in Algiers. He agreed that, since the Allied plans could not be changed, the alteration of the arrangements originally communicated to them would liberate them from the major part of the responsibilities they had assumed.

This sudden speeding‑up of the American landing in North Africa also affected General Giraud's expectation to be put in command of the operations.

The misunderstanding which arose between Giraud and the p118 American Government as to part which he was to play was due to the fact that Mr. Murphy had not been able to take him fully into his confidence. Murphy was an intermediary rather than a negotiator. He was under definite restrictions as to how much of the American Government's plans he could impart to those Frenchmen whose cooperation it was hoped to obtain.

Right up to the time when Giraud left France on November 5th, he was under the impression that he was to be Commander-in‑Chief, and that the campaign would be conducted on the lines which he had laid down in his communications with Algiers. He had even gone so far as to fix the date of the landing of part of the American Expeditionary Force in southern France for the month of January, and had chosen Sète as the place to carry it out. Nevertheless he took the news of the unexpected acceleration of the American Government's plan with calm. After the first surprise, he was eager to get under way.

"Diable ! Diable ! Quand partons‑nous ?" was his only remark. There was no hesitation. Giraud was ready. In view of the fact, however, that the impending action in North Africa was developing along lines different from those which he himself had laid down, he decided that he must visit Gibraltar before going to Algiers, so as to have a personal consultation with the American Commander, General

Eisenhower, who was about to set up his headquarters there.

At this time Giraud was staying in hiding at a private house in Marseilles together with his son, Bernard, Lieutenant Viret of the French Navy, and Commandant Beaufre, the member of the Liberation Movement who had been arrested and condemned to a term of imprisonment on a charge of clandestine correspondence, but had since been released.

The French police had lost sight of Giraud's movements since he had slipped out of his house near Lyons a week before. When they enquired there why the General was not taking his daily walk, they were told he was suffering from a chill.

In Marseilles, Giraud was in touch with Gibraltar by means of a secret radio-transmitter. There are many such hidden wireless sets p119 in France, by which French patriots keep in touch with the Allied Governments.

Giraud was thus able to send a message to Gibraltar that he wanted to come there. He received the reply that a submarine would be sent to wait for him and his party on three successive nights at a point on the coast.

Two automobiles were obtained. This was not easy, as cars had practically disappeared from the streets of Marseilles.

By this means, the party set off at night. Lieutenant Viret, who is now Giraud's A. D. C., was driving. He had not gone far out of Marseilles when his dim headlights revealed, stretched across the road in front, a cordon of police. They had heard the automobiles coming, and were evidently preparing to examine the papers of their passengers. Viret did not hesitate. He stepped on the gas and drove straight for the centre of the line. The policemen jumped back into the darkness only just in time to escape being knocked down. They were so startled that the cars had disappeared down the road before they had time to draw their revolvers.

A night's lodging had been arranged for the General in the house of a sympathiser near the village off which the submarine was to appear.

It had been raining heavily, and the car made conspicuous tracks in the mud up to the door. So seldom were automobiles seen in that part of France that the fugitives feared that these marks might start police enquiries.

They went straight down to the beach and made flashlight signals in code to seaward which remained without reply. As dawn drew near and the sky began to get light, the reason for this disappointing result became plain. Between them and the open sea was an island, so that their signals would have been masked from the waiting submarine.b

There was also the disturbing thought that someone might have noticed the mysterious gleams coming from the beach and reported them to the police, which made it dangerous for General Giraud to stay much longer.

p120 The owner of one of the automobiles accordingly drove back to Marseilles that morning, November 4th, to send another message to Gibraltar explaining the urgent need for taking the General off.

It was 11 P.M. when he got back, bringing with him a message: "Submarine will be waiting from 10 P.M. tonight."

The party again hurried down to the beach, where they arrived about midnight. They had arranged with a fisherman to come round from the nearest little harbour with a motor boat to take them off. To their chagrin they found that a strong wind had sprung up, and the fisherman sent a message that it was too rough to start.

For an hour or so the party stayed on the shore, occasionally flashing the word "Wait" out to sea on their torches.

At last Beaufre told Viret that he must go to the harbour and get the boat at all costs, even if he had to sail it himself.

The fisherman's wife, who was not in the secret of her husband's plans, became suspicious of such comings and goings in the middle of the night, and set up a fit of screaming hysterics which seemed likely to rouse all the neighbours. Fortunately, at this critical moment, Giraud's baraka began to work again. The wind suddenly turned, and the sea quickly became almost calm.

This enabled Viret and the fisherman at last to bring the boat round to where the party was waiting, and take them out to sea. They had only got •about half a mile when the black shape of the submarine loomed up on the water, and, after an exchange of recognition-signals, the fugitives were taken on board.

A swell was still running, and as General Giraud stepped out the heaving motor boat he slipped and fell into the water up to his knees. The sloping hull of the submarine prevented him from going under altogether, and a British sailor, seizing him by the collar, hauled him onto the deck.

Giraud had been very particular to have dealings only with the Americans. He did not want to expose himself to the risk of misunderstandings by getting into touch with the British as well. He had carried this precaution so far as to stipulate that the submarine which took him off from France should belong to the American Navy. No American submarine was, however, available at the moment, p121 so a British submarine was sent, but Captain Jerauld Wright, U. S. N., was put in temporary charge of her, with Lieutenant L. A. Jewell, R. N., her real commander, in nominal subordination to him. It was the same submarine as had taken General Clark to Cherchell.c

In view of the urgency of establishing contact between Giraud and Eisenhower, it had been arranged to sent down a flying-boat to meet the vessel on the open sea. The submarine commander was to signal his position by wireless, but, to the consternation of everyone on board, the transmitting‑set broke down, so that Gibraltar could not be informed of the exact spot to which the seaplane should be sent.

The submarine had accordingly to take the risk of surfacing by day and keeping a look‑out for any plane that might be seen approaching. If this had proved to be an enemy aircraft, the only course to take would have been a crash-dive.

The only means of getting the General and his party on board the aircraft was to ferry them over in a rubber dinghy.

The submarine had brought from Gibraltar two young commando men specially chosen for their strength and skill in handling these craft.

"I shall never forget," says Commandant Beaufre, "what an oddly dignified figure the General presented as he was being taken across to the seaplane. He was very calm, though the little circular boat was first tossed on the crest of a wave, then hidden from sight in its trough. He was dressed in a raincoat and soft felt hat, and sat bolt upright, with his walking-cane between his knees."

The General himself continues the story. "When we got to the seaplane," he says, "there seemed no means of getting on board, for we were thrown up and down so much that the entrance to its hull was alternately within touching distance and •ten feet away. However, a burly young Canadian leaned out of the machine and shouted 'Stretch out your arms and I'll catch you by the wrists.' He seized p122 me as I rose on top of a wave and by main strength swung me on board."

Here may be related the sequel of this adventurous voyage, which concerns Madame Beaufre, the wife of the French major who had accompanied General Giraud. She is a Titian-haired Englishwoman, the daughter of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Brodrick Hartwell.

Madame Beaufre stayed behind in Marseilles when her husband left. She was in greater danger than her husband had been, for the French police had got onto Giraud's track. They raided the office where the wireless set was installed by which the communications had been exchanged with Gibraltar.

Madame Beaufre and others of Giraud's confederates left Marseilles by motor car on the night of this police raid, being themselves chased, but getting away in the darkness. Their last message on the wireless set before it was seized had been to ask for a submarine to come and fetch them. They rowed out to sea to the appointed rendezvous, knowing that if they did not find it, and had to return to shore, they would at once be arrested.

The password had never reached the fugitives, so Madame Beaufre called back: "We don't know it, but will this do?

"That's good enough," came the answering hail, and a few minutes later this quick-witted English-born girl and her friends were on board and under way for safety.

That submarine commander is now known in his service as "The Scarlet Pimpernel."d

Meanwhile Giraud had arrived at Gibraltar. There, he came face to face with perhaps the most difficult problem that had yet arisen p123 in his life of constant adventure and high responsibility. He was confronted by the fact that the scheme which he had drafted, and which he believed to have been accepted by the Government of the United States, had in fact been rejected. There was to be no invasion of France, and he was not to be Commander-in‑Chief.

That was the situation he found when he was conducted into the great gallery under the Rock of Gibraltar known as the "Tunnel," which is the bomb- and shell-proof refuge where the wartime offices of the General Staff had been established. Here General Eisenhower, who had flown from London on November 5th, was awaiting Giraud's arrival on the afternoon of November 7th.

The French general was hardly in the best condition to carry on intricate negotiations. For the past week he had been living the life of a fugitive. He had had very little sleep: a bath or change of clothes had been impossible.

With General Eisenhower was General Mark Clark, and the proposition which they put to Giraud was that he should renounce the whole plan of campaign which he had so carefully thought out during the six months that had passed since his return to France.

One has to remember that in length of service and military experience Giraud was considerably senior to either of the two American generals whom he now met for the first time. If he threw in his lot with them, and the new scheme which they put before him, he would be committed to a military enterprise on whose organisation and resources he had no means of forming a judgment.

It is to Giraud's credit that he never showed any signs of wavering once he had taken his decision to cooperate early on the morning of November 8th, at the very moment when British and American troops were landing on the shores of Morocco and Algeria.

Just before this, a new complication had arisen in Algiers. At the last moment, on the very eve of the arrival of the arrival of the American Expeditionary Force, Admiral Darlan, Commander-in‑Chief of all French forces, naval, military, and air, under Marshal Pétain and Premier Laval, had arrived there. His coming was apparently due to no political motive, for his son was lying very ill with cerebral meningitis in the house of a friend of the family. Darlan had already p124 visited him in hospital on his way back through Algiers from an inspection of the North African colonies in October.

Young Darlan then seemed out of danger, but on November 4th, Admiral Fenard, his host, cabled the father that his son had become much worse, so Darlan flew over on the morning of November 5th, taking with him his Chief of Staff, Admiral Battet.

But there was no time for the French patriots in Algiers to consider what effect upon now imminent developments would be exercised by the unexpected presence of the third man in France. During these last days of feverish preparation, caution had to be thrown to the winds in the effort to complete arrangements for which they had relied on having at least a month.

4. To set up a unified French command, well disposed towards the Allies, with whom the latter could treat.

When the head of the vast Allied transport-flotilla, numbering many hundreds of ships, came on November 5th within sight of the Strait of Gibraltar, its presence on the high seas, which had hitherto amazingly remained an apparent secret, could no longer be concealed. The German agents in the Spanish port of Algeciras opposite Gibraltar at once flashed the news to Berlin, but fortunately the Axis Governments believed that its destination was Malta.

They might well do so. By this time, that gallant little island was in an almost desperate plight through shortage of food supplies. It was even thought possible that the Maltese might be starved into surrender early in 1943.

As a result of the enemy's mistake as to the invasion-flotilla's destination, his submarines were concentrated in two places. One of these was on either side of the Strait of Gibraltar, and the other the Sicilian Narrows, which are the passage between the island of Sicily p125 and the tip of Tunis,º forming the last gateway before Malta. The intervening part of the Mediterranean, along whose shores lay the ports of Oran and Algiers, where the Allies intended to land, were left comparatively unwatched by the U‑boats.

Then suddenly, on the morning of November 7th, a certain phrase in French was pronounced on all the Allied radio broadcasts reaching North Africa. It was repeated again and again throughout the day at regular intervals, for this was the code-warning which had been agreed upon as a signal to the French leaders of the Liberation Movement that the landing was to take place at the time already communicated to them.

At Algiers the position was that some 3,000 members of the Chantiers de la Jeunesse were standing by, ready at an hour's notice to gather at 26, rue Michelet, the new headquarters of the movement, for the purpose of carrying out any orders that they might receive, although none of them had any inkling as to their character.

At 5 P.M. on the afternoon of Saturday, November 7th, the call which the members of this French Youth organization had been awaiting was sent out. They responded to it loyally. From their barracks at Robertsau the main body marched down to the centre of Algiers to report for service. Three hundred more — Groupement 103 — came in by motor truck from Blida, •forty miles away. They were unarmed, and were still under the impression that the sudden summons was only for a night exercise.

The young men were marched out of town, and posted in small groups at various points along the coast where the character of the beach made it likely that landings would be. Not until midnight — two hours before disembarkation was expected to begin — were they told that they were to serve as guides to Allied landing-parties.

Meanwhile, the people of Algiers, even those in high official positions, were spending the evening hours of this fateful Saturday in complete ignorance that their city was about to leap into front-page prominence all over the world.

It was speech‑day at the University. Most of the high civil and p126 military functionaries were attending the ceremony in the Salle Pierre Bordes to see the students get their diplomas, and to listen to the orations customary on such occasions.

During the afternoon and early evening of November 7th, the leaders of the pro‑Allied party in Algiers had completed their final arrangements, arming themselves with such weapons as they possessed, and taking leave of their wives and children. They had no means of knowing what would be the scope or issue of this adventure on which they had staked not only their fortunes but their lives. If the landing failed, their end would be certain and swift. For all they knew, they might, in the next twenty-four hours, find themselves facing a firing-party, while their closest relatives and friends would be hurried off by the Gestapo to concentration camps in Germany on suspicion of being their accomplices. The fact that the enterprise actually succeeded, so that its helpers are now in positions of authority instead of in their graves, should not diminish the credit due to these men for the risks they ran.

While most of the population of Algiers was fast asleep that night, the drone of low‑flying aeroplanes began to resound through the darkness. They were American P.38's — twin-bodied Lightning fighters — acting as escorts for the long, low, flat-bottomed landing-craft stealthily approaching the coast.

Besides these, troop-carrying planes passed on their way to occupy the aerodromes of Maison Blanche and Blida, •twelve and forty miles from Algiers respectively.

It was two o'clock in the morning of Sunday, November 8th, when the first Allied troops set foot on the beaches on either side of Algiers. As soon as the alarm was given, the coastal batteries began to fire on the landing-craft approaching out of the darkness, and revealed by the searchlights of the forts, switched on to sweep the bay.

The fire from the battery at Cape Matifou was concentrated on the approaches to the harbour, and prevented the larger craft, carrying tanks and guns, from reaching the quays until a good deal later that day.

It is impossible to give a circumstantial account of the way in p127 which these scattered landings were carried out, and to record the movements of each individual party. An idea of the general character of the operations may be gained from the personal experience of one of the leading French organisers of assistance for the Allies, Captain Lindsay Watson, who, with a detachment of young men belonging to the Chantiers de la Jeunesse, was waiting for them near Sidi Ferruch, a headland •about twelve miles to the north of Algiers.

"We had asked," he said, "that the troops taking part in the first landing should all be Americans. There was a good feeling among the population and troops in North Africa towards the Americans.

"But the British had sent out a number of commando troops, specially trained for operations of the kind likely to follow upon the landing. So that their skill should be available when it was needed, some of these were included in the first parties to come ashore at Sidi Ferruch. All the men had blackened faces.

"With a French captain, I walked down to meet them as they splashed ashore, and shouted in English that we were friends and were there to help them. One of the first officers to set foot on the beach demanded to know my identity. Directly he spoke I recognised him for an Englishman.

I told him that general Mast and the officers of his staff working with us were a little further along the road, and that I would go and fetch them in my car. As my French companion and I drove back in the dark, another party of about two hundred black-faced figures, all Americans this time, suddenly sprang up out of the ditches on both sides of the road, made a rush at the automobile, and dragged us out of it.

"A dozen bayonets were pressed against my chest and back, so I put up my hands, calling out, 'Don't shoot!' Where is your officer?'

"One came hurrying up out of the darkness. We had been given a pass-word, which was intended to serve in just such a predicament as this. I whispered it to him. The word was 'Whiskey.'

p128 "He snatched off my beret, and looked inside. I did not know that it had also been arranged that we French collaborators should have, inside our headdress, a white star.

"If it had not been that I spoke English very well, I think they might have made an end of us at once. As it was, I stood there arguing for about a quarter of an hour. The men had searched my car, and found an American officer's carbine in it. They asked me where I had got that from. I said it was a present given me by General Clark when he had come ashore at Cherchell. As they had evidently never heard of General Clark coming to North Africa, they just jeered at me.

"In vain I begged the officer to send me on to Sidi Ferruch, where I could be identified by other Frenchmen working with the Allies.

"It soon appeared that these troops had not the slightest idea where they were. They demanded that I should tell them, threatening that they would shoot me if they found I had given them false information.

" 'It is vital that you should occupy Algiers before daylight. I'll lead you there if you will let me.'

"Eventually he agreed to this, and they took the two of us along, with tommy-guns pressed into our sides. They confiscated my carbine and the pistol of my French companion.

"On the way out from Algiers, I had noticed a party of French soldiers by the side of the road, and, not having been in touch with General Mast, who was in command of such troops as were cooperating on our side, I did not know whether these would prove to be friendly or hostile.

"I realised that we should soon be reaching the spot where I had seen this detachment, and I told the American officer the position. He ordered me to walk on with raised hands ahead of his men. "If anyone opens fire on us, we shall shoot you,' he said grimly.

"It was with considerable anxiety, therefore, that I went towards p129 the French troops, who were still where I had seen them, and called out 'Is there an officer with you?'

"It was a sergeant-major who came forward. I told him who I was and what I was doing, and asked what his men were waiting there for.

"To my relief, he answered, 'We are here under General Mallet's orders, warning for the Allies. We have some motor vehicles to derive a party of them to Blida airfield.'

"I hurried back with this information to my captors, who were waiting, with tommy-guns and automatic pistols at the ready, fifty or sixty yards behind me.

"The landing-party then moved up, and there was a good deal of demonstrative handshaking in the dark. The American soldiers were thirsty, and asked, by signs and in broken French, where they could get something to drink. The French gave them some of the wine they had in their flasks, and the doughboys presented them with cigarettes in exchange." This incident reassured Captain Watson's captors.

"The American officer allowed me to go back along the road to where my car had been, giving me one of his men as an escort. It had disappeared when I got there, so I had to walk the whole way on foot. By the time I reached Sidi Ferruch it was 3:30 A.M., and the landing was in full swing at many of the beaches along the coast.

"General Mast ordered me to go into Algiers to find out what the situation was there. He gave me one of his cars, and, taking my American soldier to vouch for me, I set off back by the road which winds along the top of the cliffs.

"Progress was slow, for it was now thronged with Allied troops advancing on the city. They had made contact with the members of the Chantiers de la Jeunesse who had been posted on the beaches as guides, and the people in the small townships along the road had turned out of their beds to cheer them, offering them drinks of wine as they passed. So far, all was going well, but the main job of occupying Algiers itself still lay ahead.

"It took me until 6:30 A.M. to reach the outskirts. Day was breaking, p130 and I said to the American officers in command of the leading detachment, 'The first place you should make for is the Admiralty building in the harbour. If you get there quickly enough, there will probably be no opposition.'

"They fell in with my suggestion and piled half-a‑dozen men with tommy-guns into the back of my car; then we drove on towards the port.

"As I reached the gateway into the Admiralty dockyard, I saw a post of French soldiers on the pavement in front of it, with two machine‑guns mounted. I jumped up in the front seat of the car to let them see my uniform as Commissaire of the Chantiers de la Jeunesse. This reassured them, and they let us pass, apparently not noticing that the men in the back were American soldiers. Driving into the dockyard, I pointed to the Admiralty building and said, 'There's the Admiralty. Go in and occupy it!'

"They sprang out of the car willingly enough, but just then a French naval chaplain rushed up, shouting 'Keep away! There are sailors in there. They'll open fire if you go any nearer. You'll only be killed, and probably a lot of civilians as well.'

"So I drove on into the town, bidding my companions take off their American helmets, and hide their guns.

"Till then, they had been delighted at the idea of being the first Americans into Algiers, but things were not looking too good. The difficulty was to know what to do with them, for they were now •two or three miles ahead of the nearest American troops to the city.

"The streets were empty of automobiles. There were many posts of Zouaves, armed with machine‑guns, but, seeing my uniform of the Chantiers de la Jeunesse, they did not stop the car. I made for our headquarters, at 26, Rue Michelet, for I knew that two of the American Consuls had arranged to be there, to await the result of the landing.

"The pavement outside was crowded with people, and some French troops were trying to move them on. Amid the confusion I told the American soldiers to jump out and run into the house. They did so, carrying their tommy‑guns under one arm and helmets p131 under the other. We rushed up to the second floor, and I beat on the door, shouting my name. Mr. Cole, one of the U. S. Consuls, opened it, startled and delighted to see the first American uniforms in Algiers.

"I left the men there, and went out to see what was happening. I knew that arrangements had been made in advance to arrest Admiral Darlan and General Juin. The police were on our side, for we had secured the collaboration of M. Moscatelli, their Commissioner. He has since become the Prefect of Algiers."

By this time, a proclamation by General Giraud was being broadcast. It had been sent over from Marseilles, and Tarbet de St. Hardouin read it in the General's name:

"For two years you have scrupulously observed the terms of the Armistice, despite repeated enemy violations," it said. "Today, Germany and Italy want to occupy North Africa. The United States have foreseen this and offer us loyal and disinterested help. . . . This is our chance of resurrection. We must not miss it. I have resolved to stay with you. I ask your confidence; you have mine. We have but one desire — France; one aim — victory. Remember that the Army of Africa holds the fate of France in its hands."

"I found detachments of troops in defensive positions all round the outskirts of Algiers," his story goes on. "Many of their officers were known to me, and I got out of my car to shake hands with them. It was plain that they did not know whether to fight or not. Meanwhile, the American troops were halted outside the city, and Admiral Darlan was already negotiating an armistice with Mr. Murphy and Major-General Indicates a West Point graduate and gives his Class.

Ryder.

"The events of the morning had thrown the members of the Axis Disarmament Commission in Algiers into a panic. They had been awakened by the fire of an American destroyer directed against the naval dockyard.

"Immediately they realised that an Allied landing was in progress, the German and Italian officers sprang into their automobiles, not even waiting to pack their clothes or carry off their secret papers. p132 They aimed at getting out into the open country, but every road proved to be blocked by American troops, until they were reduced to driving despairingly round the city itself.

"They finally barricaded themselves in the Hotel d'Angleterre, which had been their office building, while their residential quarters were in the Hotel Aletti opposite. In the Hotel d'Angleterre they at first announced their intention to hold out and defend themselves to the last, but when the Allied landing-force marched in that evening, the hotel was surrounded with strong American pickets, and after a blockade of two days, they surrendered unconditionally.

"A few of the leading members of these Axis organisations, including the chiefs of the Gestapo, nevertheless did manage to escape in civilian clothes, and were never discovered. They were presumably able to buy the help of Arabs in making a cross-country journey to the enemy-occupied part of Tunisia, •600 miles away."

The attitude of the troops of the Algiers garrison was in the main friendly to the Allies. All the regiments stood to arms throughout the day, but few of them fired a shot.

The gunners in the forts opened fire, though their aim seemed to be deliberately bad. Some light French naval craft put boldly out of the harbour and engaged the destroyers escorting the approaching invasion-flotilla. Several of these French vessels were sunk. The British destroyer H. M. S. Broke went down after ramming the boom that closed the entrance to the port.

A battalion of Senegalese opposed the landing of American troops in the harbour, but only because they were confused as to what was going on and there was no senior officer to give them orders. Such elements in the army as wanted to resist found themselves outnumbered by their comrades who were well disposed to the Allied landing.

The forenoon of Sunday, November 8th, accordingly found Algiers in an extraordinary position, half‑way between peace and war. Many civilians, and even some soldiers who had received no orders from their officers, were going to church in the usual way with their families.

p133 At 11:30 A.M. the terrace outside the Hotel Aletti was as full as usual of people drinking their apéritifs and excitedly discussing the morning's events, though few of them had any clear idea of what was going on. An anti-aircraft battery on the hill behind the town was firing. At about noon, three seaplanes appeared and dropped half-a‑dozen bombs on the Northern Mole. The harbour at Algiers is overlooked by a high promenade, built on lofty arches. This thoroughfare was crowded ten‑deep with spectators, watching the bombing and cheering the Allied aircraft.

The Governor-General of Algeria, M. Yves Châtel, was in Vichy, and his chief subordinate, M. Ettori, the Secretary-General, vanished for the first two days, only reappearing on the Tuesday.

During this period, while the American and British troops remained on the outskirts of the city, the responsibility of preventing any anti-Allied activities in Algiers itself remained with the members of the Liberation Movement, who had an extremely anxious time, for the only effective weapon of which they disposed was bluff.

By putting up a show of authority, the patriots managed to keep in check those detachments of the garrison which might have caused trouble. One of their number lost his life. He was an officer, Captain Pilafort of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, who had been to school in Edinburgh.

I had met him ten years earlier in southern Morocco, leading a company of native "partisans." My attention had been drawn to him by the fact that he was the only officer whom I had seen in the bright scarlet tunic of his distinguished cavalry regiment, completed by the Cross of the Legion of Honour. When I asked him why he wore that uniform in a campaign where all his brother-officers were dressed in khaki, his answer was, "My men can always see where I am in this red coat — and, what is more, they think they are following the most important commander in the whole French Army."

This same Captain Pilafort set himself to organise a traffic-block in the square before the Post Office, which is the centre of Algiers, for the purpose of obstructing any movement of troops that anti-Allied officers might be trying to bring about. In the course of this p134 endeavour he got into an angry dispute with one such officer, who drew his revolver and shot him dead.

The confused conditions prevailing were well instanced by what happened to Commandant de Clermont-Tonnerre, whom General Giraud sent, directly he arrived from Gibraltar, to bring the Prefect of Algiers, M. Temple, to see him. For the purposes of this official visit, the Prefect put on his gold-laced uniform, which turned out to be a wise precaution. On their way to General Giraud, both he and the Commandant were arrested by the Secretary-General, M. Ettori, who had suddenly become active and descended upon them at the head of two companies of Senegalese.

He had already arrested the Chief of the Security Police and proceeded to lock up all his three prisoners in the cellars of the offices of the Algerian Government-General. Despite his cocked hat and gilt oak leaves, the Prefect had to spend the night on a bare concrete floor.

At six o'clock next morning, however, the Senegalese guard was changed, and the Prefect took advantage of his impressive costume to bluff the new sentries into unlocking the gates and letting him and his fellow captives out. They then seized the first car they could find, and drove straight to General Giraud.

At Blida, the airfield •forty miles south of Algiers, there had been a slight skirmish between French troops and the American infantry rushed up there from the coast in lorries provided by the French patriots.

No resistance was met with at the other big aerodrome of Maison Blanche, twelve miles outside Algiers, and the American Air Force was quickly installed on both fields. There was some shooting amid the pine forests at El Biar, the villa-suburb on the hill behind Algiers, but in general the American troops came ashore unopposed at beaches on either side of the city, and then converged upon it. These were the same tactics by which Marshal Bugeaud took Algiers when the French first landed there in 1830.

At Oran and Casablanca in Morocco, French opposition was more serious. Two ex‑American coastguard cutters, which had been transferred to the British Navy, broke through the boom at Oran p135 and managed, although on fire, to land the detachments of troops they carried before being sunk in the inner harbour. British battleships silenced the shore-batteries, and British and American planes bombed the Tafraoui and La Sénia aerodromes which were afterwards occupied by American troops under Major-General Lloyd R. Fredendall, though the French infantry held out at La Sénia until American tanks and armoured cars had been landed and brought up against them.

On the Moroccan coast. Major-General Indicates a West Point graduate and gives his Class.

G. S. Patton, in command of the United States forces, had the hardest job of any. At Casablanca, a French battleship, Jean Bart, and a cruiser, with several destroyers, opened fire from the harbour as the transport vessels approached.

The American warships escorting the convoy drove back an attempt on the part of the French destroyers to break out of the port. Their fire, together with the bombs of the American naval aircraft, finally sank the Jean Bart at her moorings.

At Port Lyautey, fighting went on for three days, from November 8‑11, over the rolling green hills round a picturesque fort built in the seventeenth century, called the Kasbah de Mehdija, on a height overlooking the broad Atlantic beach. Eight American officers and eighty enlisted men were killed there, while the French lost two hundred and fifty. This was the most sustained action of resistance.e More Americans were drowned when lighters overturned in the rough sea during the landing.

As a typical instance of the confusion that existed in the minds of the garrison at Algiers may be cited what happened when the 5th Chasseus d'Afrique stationed at Maison Carrée, a suburb of the city, heard that Admiral Darlan had ordered the "cease fire" at 5:15 on the afternoon of Sunday, November 8th. This was an armoured car regiment, with one mounted squadron.

The captain commanding the mounted squadron declared that Admiral Darlan had been forced to capitulate, and that he would take to the open country with his men and continue to resist. He ordered his trumpeter to sound the "Fall in," and the two hundred and fifty horsemen paraded in fighting order.

p136 Their captain then addressed them with the words, "Admiral Darlan is a prisoner, but we shall continue to fight for our honour. Mount!"

Upon this, the subaltern coming one of the troops of the squadron ordered his men to return to stables and unsaddle. The warrant officer commanding the second troop imitated his example. Abusing them as traitors, the captain called for volunteers to follow him. Only ten men and one officer complied.

After some difficulty in eluding the American forces converging on Algiers from all directions, this small party reached Médéa, which was the station of another cavalry regiment, the 1st Spahis. There its leader reported to their colonel, who rang up the officer commanding the 5th Chasseurs d'Afrique to ask what he should do with this truant die‑hard captain. The prompt answer from Algiers was "Arrest him and send him back here."

The conduct of the 5th Chasseurs d'Afrique was typical of that of most of the French troops in North Africa. This regiment afterwards lost 30 per cent of its strength killed in fighting on the Allied side in Tunisia. Their dashing attacks upon the formidable heights of Djebel Mansour and Zaghouan in the final phase of the campaign helped to bring about the capture of 25,000 German prisoners, including a divisional general.

Sniping went on in the outskirts of Algiers for some days after the occupation of the city. This was probably the work of members of the pro‑German Doriot organisation, the Parti Populaire Français. The majority of the civilian inhabitants, both French and Arab, displayed a friendly feeling towards the Allies from the first, despite the fact that their arrival brought upon these hitherto sheltered populations of the North African ports the danger and disturbance of Axis air raids.

Another consequence of the sudden conversion of Algiers into the principal base of the Anglo-American Expeditionary Force was a shortage of certain kinds of food. This was not due to lack of supplies, for Algeria produces foodstuffs, both cereal and animal, in large quantities. It was the consequence of the lack of gasolene for civilian transport. A few miles outside Algiers meat was plentiful, p137 whereas in that city and other towns it was severely rationed, and the inhabitants were obliged to live largely on the produce of the market-gardens in the suburbs.

To some extent this food shortage was counteracted by the supplies of milk and other nourishment for children which the Allied Governments shipped to North Africa, and there can be no doubt that there was considerable leakage of military rations to the civilian population. Every Algerian household which was lucky enough to have British or American officers or enlisted men billeted upon it could be sure of a substantial supplement to its own food stocks.

The incursion of many thousands of Allied soldiers, all of them with money to spend, had the effect of sending local prices rocketing. This particularly applied to what might be called military consumer goods, such as wrist watches, fountain pens, safety razor blades, and similar articles, which quickly vanished from the market. Everything of a souvenir or gift character, like women's handbags, advanced to Fifth Avenue prices.

On the other hand, the arrival of the Allies provided a large number of the local population with good jobs, and will undoubtedly in the end prove to have been a boon. Roads were everywhere improved; fresh railroad tracks were laid; bridges were built; water pipelines were constructed. These benefits will remain when the campaign is over.

Thayer's Notes:

a Col. William Alfred Eddy was a Marine; he was the Naval rather than the Military Attaché in Tangier.

b The place where General Giraud eventually met the submarine was the beach of La Fossette, a little more than a kilometer east by road from the beautiful little fishing port of Le Lavandou, which marks the western end of the French Riviera; the island was one of the two Islands of Lérins. The submarine was HMS Seraph. A commemorative marker has been set up at the beach.

c The submarine was HMS Seraph, as stated in my note above; the craft and its commander, Lt. [Norman] Limbury Auchinleck Jewell, played a key rôle in another equally important and even more extraordinary and more successful cloak-and‑dagger naval mission; they are mentioned nearly forty times in the book that chronicles it, The Man Who Never Was (in chapters 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11).

d The submarine in this mission, HMS Sibyl, when it flies the Jolly Roger, an unofficial flag traditionally flown by British and American naval vessels returning from a successful mission, to this day now apparently adds to it a small red flower — a Scarlet Pimpernel.

e The official U. S. Army account of the Battle of Port Lyautey can be found in Chapter VIII of United States Army in World War II Mediterranean Theater of Operations — Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative In the West; it is of course exhaustive and authoritative.

p108 Chapter VI How Giraud and the Allies Came to Africa

Thayer's Notes:

p108 Chapter VI

How Giraud and the Allies
Came to Africa