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Chapter 24

This webpage reproduces a chapter of
Gallant John Barry

by
William Bell Clark

published by
The Macmillan Company
New York
1938

The text is in the public domain.

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and I believe it to be free of errors.
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Chapter 26

This site is not affiliated with the US Naval Academy.

 p365  XXV.

Senior Captain of the American Navy

A handful of Yankee seamen had been captives in Algiers since 1785. Congress, in 1792, had appropriated $25,000 to ransom them, but a vociferous minority had fought tenaciously and success­fully against a naval program to insure the swarming American merchant ships protection against piratical aggressions of the Barbary powers.

"Eleven unfortunate men, now in slavery in Algiers, is the pretext for fitting out a fleet to go to war with them." Thus scoffed Senator Maclay, of Pennsylvania, early in 1791, when national resentment first stirred against the corsairs. "It is urged that we should expend half a million dollars rather than redeem these unhappy men," he continued, putting cost above his country's honor.⁠a As long as Portugal, warring with Algiers, bottled the Barbary pirates within the Mediterranean, Maclay and his Republican colleagues saw no reason a for naval expenditures, particularly when they suspicioned an administration desire "to have a fleet and army." So Congress coasted along, letting "the other fellow" do the job, and inaugurating that besetting evil of unpreparedness, which countless experiences have not yet taught the United States to avoid.⁠b

Supine complacency ended, on December 16, 1793, when Washington notified Congress that Portugal had negotiated a year's truce with Algiers, and that Barbary pirates were again in the Atlantic. England, hostile to America's expanding mercantile marine, had negotiated the truce. To turn the barbarians loose upon defenceless American ships was one way to restore the bulk of the world's cargo-carrying to Great Britain. In the House of Representatives, objectors' voices were stilled as a committee was appointed "to report the naval force adequate  p366 to the protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine corsairs, together with an estimate of the expense, and the ways and means for defraying the same." The birth of the American navy dates from that day.

* * *

To John Barry, at Strawberry Hill, came Thomas Fitzsimons, of the congressional committee. Who could offer better advice on the subject of naval protection than Barry? Through the Christmas holidays of 1793 and the early weeks of January, 1794, the Captain was engaged in constant conferences with committee members. He and Joshua Humphreys, the shipbuilder, were chief sources for the information which found its way into recommendations and estimates drafted by the committee. Fitzsimons presented the report on January 20. It surmised the Algerian naval strength as light vessels and galleys carrying a total of 282 cannon, and contained a specific antidote in the way of an adequate beginning for a navy. Costs of armament, estimates of annual expense, and methods for defraying everything by certain additional duties were submitted at the same time.

Not without a terrific battle was the "peace at any price" faction defeated. The formal resolution, "That a naval force, to consist of four ships of forty-four guns, and two ships of twenty-four guns, each, be provided for the protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine corsairs," was passed by a narrow margin of two votes. The further resolve, appointing a committee to bring in a bill conformable to the above, had as tight a squeak. National honor was still in a precarious position.

Before the committee reported, the rumor that "Congress have Determin'd on Building a Number of Ships of War," spread up and down the continent. Officers of the Continental navy heard of it, and letters began to pour into Philadelphia with proffers of service from these veterans of the Revolution. A number wrote personally to Barry to urge his influence in their behalf — among them two whose epistles must have given the Captain amusement.

"I as your old Friend," read a letter from John B. Hopkins, "Come forward & ask your Influence, in procuring me the Command,"  p367 of one of the new ships. This was the captain, whose conduct in the frigate Warren, in 1778, had so disgusted Barry.⁠c Now Hopkins, who had been dismissed from the Continental navy, was persuaded he could secure a commission, if old officers were given preference, and if the Captain would use exertion "in my favour, with the President, and your Friends in Congress."

Alike in tenor was a letter from Samuel Nicholson — the same Nicholson whom Barry almost ordered before a court-martial in December, 1781.⁠d Writing from Boston, the estimable Samuel asked the Captain, "after establishing yourself on such command as may be pleasing to you, to help an old friend and brother officer."

In the hands of Washington and Secretary of War Knox, into whose department fell all naval matters, were more than a hundred applications for commissions. Once the resolution to create a navy had passed, the pressure for preferment of those with power­ful friends became intense. Barry was close in the councils of Washington and Knox. His advice was sought upon all applicants, and he noted with delight that "the President from the first was determined to come as near to Justice as was in his power." For himself, the Captain withheld any offer of service until he was sure the navy actually would get beyond the resolution stage. When, early in March, Congress received formal notification that the Algerines had taken thirteen American vessels with crews totalling 119 men, Barry sensed that opposition to the proposed naval bill was weakening. On March 19, he addressed Washington, but not with a mere request for a captain's commission. He was aiming higher.

"Finding that Government have partly determined to fit out Some Ships of War for the protection of our Trade against the Algeriens," he wrote, "I beg leave to offer my self for the Comd of the Squadron conceiving my self competent thereto assuring your Excellency that should I be honored with your approbation my utmost Abilities and the most unremitting attention shall be exerted for the good of my Country, and also to approve my self Worthy of the high honor shown by your Excellency."

Before March ended, Congress, over-riding a noisy but less threatening opposition, authorized the construction and equipment  p368 of four frigates of forty-four guns, and two, of thirty‑six guns, each, instead of the two of twenty-four guns previously proposed. To propitiate the minority, a dangerous rider was affixed to the bill. Construction of the frigates should cease if peace was concluded with the Barbary powers.

Within two weeks, Joshua Humphreys was propounding his famous theory to Henry Knox — less ships than the navies of Europe, but each carrying as many guns on one deck as a European frigate carried on two, and each spreading so much canvas that she could sail fast enough either to fight or to show her heels. "Prepare the models for the frames of the frigates proposed by you," Knox directed the noted shipbuilder, on April 12. While Humphreys and his draftsman, Josiah Fox, toiled day and night to execute this commission, John Barry awaited the President's decision. It came on June 5, and was received at Strawberry Hill the next day. Knox wrote the letter.

"The President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate has appointed you to be a Captain of one of the ships to be provided in pursuance of the act to provide a naval armament.

"It is to be understood that the relative rank of the Captains is to be in the following order."

There, heading the list, was the name, "John Barry." Then came Samuel Nicholson — New England influence had been at work for that gentleman. Third was Silas Talbot, another Easterner. After that, in order, were Joshua Barney, Richard Dale and Truxtun. Five of the six had been Continental naval officers, and Truxtun had been noted as a fighting letter-of‑marque captain.

"You will please to inform me as soon as convenient whether you accept or decline the appointment," Knox's letter concluded.

The answer went from Strawberry Hill within the hour:

"The honor done me in appointing me a Commander in the Navy of the United States is gratefully Acknowledged and Accepted by — Sir Your, most Obedient, Humbl. Serv't John Barry."

Senior captain of the navy! It was an appointment, which, along with the others, as Barry naïvely expressed it, "has given General Satisfaction here." Congratulations rolled in  p369 from all sides. Strawberry Hill was the Mecca for those who wished to felicitate the Captain, or seek his help. Even the bards of Philadelphia sang, with verses, such as the following, to the "Son of Neptune":

Worth in whatever sphere, should have a nitch

Altho' 'tis seldom gain'd but by the rich,

The fault is owing to misguided pride,

That judge's merit blind fortune's guide.

When Britain held the bold tyrannic rod,

And cry'd "Ye slaves obey our sov'reign nod,"

The patriot sons of virtue took the flame,

And fill'd the lists with hardy deeds of fame;

Amongst the first, the boldest and the best,

Brave Barry stands intrepidly confest.

From Boston, Samuel Nicholson joined in the praise. The Captain's appointment "to the Command of our Navy," wrote Sam, pleased all "a few excepted only who wished themselves or friends in it." Nicholson was eager for details — Where will the ships be built? Who will build them? What would the new uniforms be like? When will other officers be appointed? Finally — typical of a Nicholson — could he get his sons, aged twelve and eleven years, appointed midshipmen?

Barry sought to answer the inquiries, his old troubles with the effusive Sam laid aside in view of the latter's appointment. He told of Joshua Barney's refusal — because ranked under Talbot — and disclosed other pertinent matters.

"The Ships are to be built in different States," he wrote. "Capt Dales one in Norfolk Truxtun Baltimore Barry Phila Talbut New York Nicholson Boston and Portsmouth N H the Capt not appointed."

While uniforms had not been fixed, he believed they would be blue and buff, and urged Nicholson to advise him at once if he had objections. Also, he thought Captain Sam's elder son could be enrolled as a midshipman and the younger one entered as an acting midshipman. While both were of tender years, Barry felt, "there ought to be some exceptions in favor of the Son or Sons of Capts."

To the matter of uniforms and the proposal for his boys, Samuel Nicholson returned prompt and hearty agreement.

 p370  "I think Blue & Buff will be very handsome," he enthused, "Much before the old Blue & red . . . pray informe me when you put on your Uniforms. As to our young Officers I hope you will have the Establishment such, as to allow those Ships that have 8 Midshipmen, to take two boys each, Gentms Sons, & to be brought up for the Navy . . . you are on the Spot, and I dare say will take care to have proper Exceptions made, and that young men may be Introduced into the Service as Midshipman.

In this surmise, wherein Nicholson was purely selfish, he touched upon what would be Barry's greatest service to the new navy — development of able officers from young men enrolled as junior officers and midshipmen under his command. Of that, more later.

* * *

In "anxious solicitude that this second commencement of a navy for the United States should be worthy of their national character," Henry Knox was insistent upon deliberate and "the most mature advice." Barry and Humphreys were in constant attendance upon the Secretary of War. Theirs to supply that "most mature advice," and supply it they did. Thus, these two men, who literally had created the first Continental fleet in 1775, were now the creators of the new navy. While Humphreys perfected his models and plans, the Captain studied and developed "Dimensions of the Masts and Yards of a Ship of 145 feet Keel 43 Beam 14 feet Hold." His findings went to Knox, on June 7, with the comment that, although alterations might be necessary, "it Will do for a Sail-maker to find out how much Canvas it will take."

Humphreys's models and plans were produced shortly thereafter, and were approved with little delay. They called for vessels that "should combine such qualities of strength, durability, swiftness of sailing, and force, as to render them equal, if not superior, to any frigates belonging to any of the European powers." The six frigates were to be built of live oak and red cedar "in all parts where they can be used to advantage." Humphreys estimated the durability of live oak as "five times that of common white oak."

 p371  The armament was to consist of 24‑pounders, 12‑pounders, and brass howitzers. The forty-four gun frigates, to be built at Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Norfolk, were to carry thirty 24‑pounders on the gun deck; the thirty‑six gun frigates, at Portsmouth and Baltimore, twenty-eight cannon of the same calibre on the gun deck. Before June ended, Humphreys was appointed constructor "of a 44‑gun ship to be built in the port of Philadelphia." She was to measure 1,576 tons, with a length of 175 feet, and a beam of forty-four feet.

Thereafter, the Secretary of War set up the construction program personnel. All contracts for the principal materials were to be made under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, with Tench Coxe, Commissioner of the Revenue, in immediate charge. Labor and inferior materials were to be supplied through naval agents, the firm of Gurney & Smith being named for Philadelphia. The captains appointed to the various frigates were to superintend their construction and equipment, and Samuel Hodgdon, who had been commissioner of military stores in the closing days of the Revolution, was appointed to a similar post in the War Department to maintain accurate check upon materials used.

Such arrangements took time. Barry was not informed officially of his superintendency until August 7, his instructions calling for "constant attendance," and a weekly report to Knox upon the number of men employed and the progress made "in the execution either of the hull or equipment." Small wonder, with such duties, that he had to decline Senator Pierce Butler's invitation to accompany him to the seashore. Writing to the wealthy South Carolinian, on September 7, Barry explained that business "would make it very inconvenient for me to leave home more than twenty-four hours, as I must be in Philadelphia at least every Other day."

Within a month, however, he was off for a much longer absence, but this was on government business. The live oak for the flooring and rising timbers of the frigates had to come from Georgia, and the Treasury Department was none too sure contracts for cutting and shipping were being carried out expeditiously. Instructions from Tench Coxe, placed in Barry's hands on October 8, ordered him to take passage in the brig  p372 Schuylkill, under public charter, for Frederica, Georgia. There were numerous persons to be consulted in both Georgia and South Carolina, but, in view of contingencies that might arise "in places remote from the seat of Government," the Captain was given permission to proceed as he saw fit.

"I shall content myself," wrote Coxe, "with requesting that you will use all possible exertion to effect your departure from hence, to the cutting and transportation of the timber for your own and every other Frigate, to the order and industry of all persons whatever employed in procuring the wood, and to the preservation of the valuable property, which is the object of the voyage, in whatever situation it may be."

Senator Butler heard of the proposed journey, and insisted that, in South Carolina, Barry make use of his plantation "as Your own." It was not much of a place, he apologized, but "If you put in here in a year or two with Your Frigate you will find things better." Several days later, the Captain sailed in the Schuylkill, the public property on the brig being also "recommended to your particular care."

Fortunate for the government that Barry was sent to Georgia, for the timber cutting operations were in even worse state than the Treasury Department had suspected. After a passage of seven days, the Schuylkill dropped anchor off the northern end of St. Simon island, and the Captain went ashore at Gashayes Bluff. He found John T. Morgan, superintendent of the operation, "with his two Boys Sick and not a man with him nor a stick of wood cut." Nor were the "utensils for Cutting timber parts of the Moulds" arrived. Absence of men, tools and provisions was chargeable to John Habersham, of Savannah, who had the timber contract. A revenue cutter arrived October 15 from Savannah with some equipment and stores, and Barry dispatched Morgan to hire hands from neighboring plantations. The superintendent drummed up sixteen negroes, and the Captain put them to work opening a road between the saw mill and the timber land.

"What are the terms with the owner of this land?" Barry asked Morgan casually, as the negroes set to work.

Mr. Habersham told me I might cut what timber I wanted off the owner's land upon terms as good as he could get anywhere else in the state," was the reply.

 p373  "That's a poor contract," the Captain remarked. "It's too vague. Why, you actually haven't anything definite at all."

"That's true," Morgan admitted. "All I know is that Mr. Habersham has a contract for 50,000 feet here, and, I believe, no time limit for the hauling of it."

Barry made a note to call on Habersham, and subsequent events hurried his departure for that call. Eighty‑one expert sawyers, who had been hired in Connecticut, arrived on the island, on October 22, in a sloop which had taken them on board at Savannah. In the sloop came orders from Habersham to Morgan to return half of the men within twenty days to Savannah, where another 50,000 feet were being cut. The superintendent protested to Barry that unless he could hold the crew together, he could not get the timber cut that fall. He promised to load all he cut on the Schuylkill and dispatch her for Philadelphia.

Having seen the sawyers housed under lean‑tos of their own making, and actually at work in the timber lands, the Captain took passage in the sloop, on October 24, for the seventy mile run up the coast to Savannah. His first step there was to call upon Habersham.

"May I inquire the reason why only 100,000 feet of timber have been contracted for?" he asked.

Habersham gave an insolent reply. "We can have as much timber as we want," he said in a who‑are-you‑to-question‑me manner.

The years had given Barry power to hold his temper. He held it now.

"I did not think that a proper answer," he reported later, "but as I had no order to call him to acct I thought it best to leave that to the gentleman that employed him."

Neither had Habersham taken steps to hire vessels to transport timber to the various ports where the frigates were to be built. Barry's efforts to supply the omission were, at first, futile. He found "not a Vessel in the place fit for the business." In his dilemma, he consulted James Jackson. That fiery Georgia Republican promised cooperation and extended it before the necessity of returning to Congress hastened him off by sea, on October 28, with only time for a note of farewell to Barry. For five more days, the Captain was detained in Savannah.  p374 When he departed, he felt the live oak situation to be well in hand, and so he reported to Tench Coxe when he disembarked at Philadelphia, on November 10.⁠e

In his absence, preliminary work on the frigate had progressed. The keel was cut and sawed, but not yet arrived at Humphreys's shipyard in Southwark. Sawyers were also busy cutting plank as well as sturdy pine for the masts. The shipbuilder told him of a dispute with Knox. Truxtun, from Baltimore, had been insisting that all beams be of oak and had so convinced the Secretary of War. Barry and Humphreys had long believed they should be of Southern pine. A compromise had been reached. Five of the frigates would have beams of oak, but an exception would be made in Philadelphia, due to, as Humphreys told Barry, "the confidence he [Knox] expressed he had in me & your wish to have pine beams."

To avoid criticism of alleged delay in construction, Knox called Truxtun from Baltimore and Dale for Norfolk, in December, and asked them and Barry to lay before him, in a joint letter, their frank opinion of the progress made. Behind his request lay a desire to stop political efforts to have northern white oak used in timbering the frigates. The three captains complied with a long, able document, certifying "that the arrangements to commence the building of frigates has been judiciously made, and every pains taken to procure the most durable wood in the world (the live oak of Georgia)."

They analyzed the live oak's sturdiness, being well satisfied that, accidents excepted, the frames of the frigates "will be perfectly sound half a century hence." Prophetic, indeed, the statement. They showed where, even using common oak, no greater progress could have been made, as no timber large enough for the purpose had been cut prior to the summer, and to cut it during warm weather, with sap in the trees, would have meant building the vessels with green wood. "They would have proved rotten, and totally unfit for the public service in less than five years from the laying of their keels," was their verdict.

A patriotic peroration closed the document. Would they could embark at once, "and obey the commands of our country, in going in pursuit of a barbarous enemy, who now holds in chains and slavery so many of our unfortunate fellow citizens;  p375 the relieving and restoring of which to the bosom of their families and friends, are, with that of having an opportunity to chastise their cruel oppressors, objects of our greatest ambition, and which we anticipate with all the ardor of officers, of seamen, and of citizens."

Glorious motives, indeed, but Barry would have had difficulties embarking in his frigate just then, no matter how laudable the purpose. On December 23, the progress report showed the keel laid on the blocks with stern and stem posts erected. That was about all, save piles of live oak, unloaded from the brig Schuylkill. The frigate was not even a skeleton.

Nevertheless, the Captain swelled with pride, when, as 1794 ended, Washington came down to Southwark for an inspection. Accompanying him were Henry Knox, on the eve of retiring as Secretary of War, and young George Custis, the President's adopted son. Humphreys and Barry guided the nation's chief executive through the yard and along the keel. They explained the intricacies of frigate-building to him. He drank it in, marveled at the size of the ship that was to be, and, on his way back to his coach, complimented them.

"I am most gratified with all I have seen and heard," he said in his most gracious manner, "and, gentlemen, this is my first visit to an American navy yard."

* * *

How far in the future lay the completion of the frigate is evidenced by an application John Barry received, in February, 1795, from Richard Dale. Could he procure a suitable person to superintend the building of the ship at Norfolk, Dale would like permission to make a China cruise. The Captain forwarded the request to Timothy Pickering the new Secretary of War, urging it be granted, and extolling Dale as "most certainly a brave and deserving officer."

Not only was Dale released for a voyage to Canton, but Barry, on March 21, gave him 800 Spanish milled dollars to be laid out in "one Thousand pieces of the best short Nankeens, six pieces of the best Long Nakeensº for my own use one box of ten or twelve pound of the best Hyson Sheelong Tea."

Scarcely had Dale cleared, when John Rossiter sailed up the Delaware, bringing home Michael Hayes, a supplicating letter  p376 from Barry's sister, Margaret Howlin, and a request for aid from a new Irish relation. Rossiter had touched at Wexford the previous summer, and sister Margaret had unburdened herself. She had not heard from her "dear brother" for a year and a half. Similar was the tenor of her letter, which protested she could not "account for anything that might have given you displeasure formerly and never shall forget my prayers and love to you as a sister." She was still looking for a promised "token of your affection."

While at Wexford, Rossiter also had encountered Austin (Mrs. James) Doyle, who "lived in a Cabbin in Chapel lane," and who promptly dispatched by him an appeal for aid to Barry as "my Aunts Son." She explained the relation­ship: "I am Daughter to Your Aunt Margret Kelly . . . You and I are of the same Age." Austin Doyle wanted relief, and was emboldened to request it because "of your goodness and humanity to others."

Whether Barry sent the "token" or the relief is not clear. Both might well have been overlooked amid the excitement of Strawberry Hill, for great preparations were under way for a big wedding. Betsy Keen and Patrick Hayes — a merchant captain now, if you please — were to be married on April 9. Springtime was in the evening air, when, with countless guests from Philadelphia, Barry's nephew and Sarah's first cousin became man and wife. Romance, indeed, at Strawberry Hill, as the nuptial knot was tied by the same clergy­man who had officiated at Christ's Church almost eighteen years before when tall John Barry had wed lithesome Sarah Austin — the Reverend, now Bishop, William White.

No doubt, Michael Hayes was his brother's best man. We know that Michael was present, but departed in May, sailing again with Rossiter, China-bound. Barry, as usual, ordered goods from Canton. Acknowledging the order, as the Rising Sun dropped down the Delaware, Rossiter added, "make my Humble respects to Mrs Barry and Mrs Hayes, & Inform them that Michl is Well."

The excitement of the Strawberry Hill nuptials had been too much for John Barry. Dr. Rush was summoned, on April 20, and, again next day, to the bedside of a very sick man. His prescriptions relieved the asthmatic cough, but the cure was  p377 slow, and another call was necessary on May 4. Thereafter, Barry regained his strength slowly. It was mid‑summer before he could resume his daily visits to the Southwark shipyard, driving down in a chair, behind a horse, the maintenance of which was a charge against government during the whole period the frigate was being built.

Progress on the hull had been nothing to boast about. The live oak, barring the first shipment on the Schuylkill, had been slow in arriving. Timothy Pickering had been snarling over delays, and he seems to have taxed Barry with failure to supply proper information on masting. Apparently, the detailed table the Captain had given Knox, in June, 1794, had been mislaid. At any rate, Barry supplied the dimensions anew, adding:

"I have examined a great many plans for masting ships of war and others, and do not find one that will answer our Frigates. They differ in their construction from any that I ever heard of, and, of course, must differ in masts and yards . . . The yards may appear long but I am of opinion that the longer the ship the longer the yard should be and I am sure I am not alone in that opinion."

Then Sarah was taken ill, and, through October, November and December, the Captain found his hands full with a sick wife at Strawberry Hill, and a querulous Secretary of War in Philadelphia. Fortunately, Sarah recovered by the end of December, and Pickering moved up to Secretary of State at the same time, being succeeded in the War Department by genial, though incompetent, James McHenry. One of Pickering's closing acts in 1795, was to present Barry's progress report, of December 12, to Congress.

The frigate at Southwark had the keel laid, the pieces scarfed and bolted to each other, the stern frame finished and ready for raising, the other frames bolted and in shape to be put in the ship. Two‑thirds of the live oak for the frame had arrived, and had been worked agreeable to the moulds. Two‑thirds of the plank for outside and ceiling was also on hand, and one‑third for wales. All beams for the orlop deck and most of the upper deck beams had been procured. Masts, bowsprit, yards and other spars had been cut, and some had reached the yard. The copper for sheathing was in the public store as well as all  p378 canvas necessary for one suit of sails. Hemp for the cables was spinning. Anchors were purchased. Rigging blocks were being manufactured. Bunting for colors was on hand. Innumerable smaller articles for hull, rigging and equipping the ship were stored in readiness for use.

Altogether, a more promising situation than might have been expected. Then the blow fell!

* * *

A treaty had been signed with Morocco and peace had been concluded with Algiers! So Washington informed the Senate, on December 21, 1795. Automatically, under the clause in the navy bill — that sop to the minority — work on the six frigates was suspended. Republicans chortled gleefully, as the American navy seemed doomed to extinction. Fortunately, there was still a Federalist majority.

For once, working at top speed, Secretary of War McHenry laid before Congress, on January 20, 1796, a statement from the naval constructors, that all six vessels could be completed within the year. The report went to the House Committee on Naval Affairs, which, nine days later, recommended that one forty-four gun frigate and one thirty‑six be completed, and that the President dispose of perishable materials and store the balance for future use, "whenever Congress may deem it advisable to direct the finishing of the other four frigates." The recommendation hung fire as the winter sped along. On March 15, Washington asked Congress whether the building of all six frigates should continue suspended. A Senate committee, two days later, urged the completion of two of the forty-fours, and one thirty‑six. Still no action. Arguments on the floor of Senate and House. Bitter disputes, with the future of the navy entangled in other controversial subjects. Finally, on April 20, came a decision. The President should complete the frigates at Philadelphia, Boston and Baltimore.

The navy was saved, but at a cost of half the ships, and four months of precious lost time.

Washington named the three frigates hard upon the heels of the decision. He selected the first three suggestions on a list submitted sometime before, acting promptly now, so the distinguished wood-carver, William Rush, of Philadelphia, could  p379 start his artistic creation of figureheads. Barry's forty-four, at Philadelphia, was called the United States, and Nicholson's at Boston, the Constitution. Truxtun's thirty‑six, at Baltimore, was designated the Constellation.

John Barry went to work with restored vigor. A trail of lists, estimates and letters traces his varied activities through the remaining months of 1796. In mid‑May he was at Cecil Furnace, Maryland, with Truxtun, examining guns cast by Samuel Hughes, an ironmaster whose contract with government aroused the Captain's ire — a contract providing no date for delivery, no forfeit for delay, no proofing of the cannon before delivery. He and Truxtun protested to McHenry, who, being from Maryland, and a politician, took no action save to authorize Truxtun to prove each piece before accepting it.

From cannon, Barry turned to canvas, experimenting with several types, and reporting to McHenry, on May 26, that so‑called Boston canvas was, when wet, "ahard harsh dirty black," and not "fit for Sails for our Frigates."

In June and July, he was busily working out cordage requirements and an invoice of slops. Tench Francis, purveyor for the War Department, called him away from these tasks temporarily, to join Truxtun and Dale in rushing out an indent of everything needed to outfit all three frigates. They submitted it, on July 11, and next day, the Captain supplemented the list with a comment that it "was done in Such a hurry that it is very probably we have omitted many things that ought not to have been done if we had been allowed time."

An estimate of the expense in fitting out the United States with 305 officers and men and fifty-four marines, for one month, came next, on September 19. It totalled $7,285, including a month's bounty to petty officers and men, and the cost of operating a recruiting rendezvous. It was "as near as I can possibly make [it]," Barry explained to McHenry, "and I hope it may meet your approbation."

The Captain closed 1796 with "aStatement of the different Articles for Equiping the Said frigate." Rigging, cables, anchors, iron ballast, blocks, water casks, boats, lanthorns and tin work were ready, but "Guns, Gun carriages, Masts, Yards, pumpes Sailes and many other articles much behind hand."

A House committee was inquiring into the state of naval  p380 equipment, goaded by the anti-Federalist press, whose columns bristled with such statements as "The public would be glad to learn for what reason Captains were appointed and entered into pay for the command of these vessels before they were built." McHenry, on January 11, 1797, gave the committee an optimistic picture of progress on Barry's frigate, whose hull was planked inside and out, and whose principal decks were laid and calked. The Secretary of War was confident "she may be launched by the beginning of April, provided the winter does not prove severe." He satisfied the committee, whose report, on January 25, repeated his prognostication, and added that the frigate could be made ready for sea in two months after her launching!

With his usual indifference to the howling anti-administration press, George Washington, choosing his birthday, February 22, 1797, for the act, issued Commission No. 1 in the American navy to John Barry. It exists today . . .

"I George Washington, President of the United States, reposing special trust and confidence in your patriotism, valor, fidelity, and abilities . . . appoint you Captain in the Navy of the United States, and Commander of the Frigate called the United States; to take rank from the fourth day of June, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four."

A print, designed and drawn on stone by an artist named Hoffy, shows the President presenting this commission to Barry. Through the window the frigate can be seen riding at anchor. Beside the Captain stands a youth in his 'teens in a midshipman's uniform; a youth whom we are informed is Barry's nephew, Patrick Hayes.

Anachronisms in this print are amusing. The United States was not then launched! No midshipman was appointed in the navy until 1798! Patrick Hayes was twenty‑six years old, and the proud father of a son born to him and Betsy Keen Hayes, on July 8, 1796! When art and history mingle, alas for history!

Issuance of Barry's commission was one of the last official acts of Washington. Eight strenuous, tiring years were ending. Formal farewells were daily occurrences at the Executive Mansion — the Robert Morris home on Eighth street below Walnut. There went Barry, later in February, along with Charles Biddle and Colonel William Jackson — one time passenger on the  p381 Alliance — carrying an address from the Society of Cincinnati to their beloved chief. There again, on February 25, the Captain joined "All the Military and Naval Officers," who dined with the President.

John Adams succeeded to the executive chair, on March 4 and, five days later, the great Washington set off for Mount Vernon. Behind him he left an injunction to Congress upon the maintenance of peace, which has proved sound since the day it was uttered: "To secure respect for a neutral flag, requires a naval force, organized, and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression."


Thayer's Notes:

a As it turned out, appeasement — in the form of the treaty of 1795 — cost the United States more than twice that much: $992,000 as a lump sum payment to Algiers (something like a hundred million in today's money), and yearly tribute after that; the details are given in H. J. Ford, Washington and His Colleagues, pp112 f.

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b Our author is writing three years before Pearl Harbor.

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c p162.

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d p279.

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e For a succinct and less roundabout assessment of Barry's work on the live oak situation, see E. S. Ferguson, Truxtun of the Constellation, p115.


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