p59  V.

Outfitter of the Fleet

The Black Prince, cables bent to the anchors on the gunwale, decks and between decks swabbed, and all movable gear neatly stowed, lay, with sails furled, a half league off Henlopen awaiting a pilot-boat. None had been visible when they sighted the cape at noon that day, October 4, 1775. None appeared subsequently. To John Barry, restlessly pa­cing the poop-deck, it seemed extraordinary — unheard of in all his years of sailing in and out of the Delaware. Fully familiar with the shoals in the mouth of the bay, he would have proceeded, pilot or no pilot, had he been commanding a smaller vessel. With the Black Prince he hesitated. Her draft, even in ballast, was deep. Another deterrent was a suspicion that something was amiss. His decision was to investigate before taking risks. He recalled the threats he had read in London against all American seaport towns. The passage home had been long. Much could have transpired in the interim. While he could not conceive of British naval operations against Philadelphia, it was best to learn what the absence of pilot-boats portended. For this purpose, the mate had been sent ashore in the long-boat. Now the boat was returning, and the explanation came when one of the Delaware pilots climbed aboard from it.

"Sorry to ha' put you to the trouble, Cap'n," this worthy greeted him. " 'Tis the Committee o' Safety's to blame. They made us lay up the pilot-boats two weeks ago, an' nary a one o' us dare come out unless a merchantman sends in a boat."

"Nothing wrong in Philadelphia, I take it?" Barry asked.

"Nothin' 'cept they've got an idea the British are comin' to visit 'em, an' they're fixin' on a warm reception. Takin' no chances is the committee. Why, if ther'd o' been a King's ship  p60 lyin' off here right now, I couldn't o' come aboard you. Afraid a man‑o'‑war might snatch me to pilot 'em up the bay."

There are no King's ships around that I can see," Barry replied, "so let's underway before night overtakes me in the road."

"You needn't worry about that, Cap'n, seein' as how I'll be wi' you right up to the city," the pilot chuckled. "I ain't told you all o' it yet. There ain't a buoy in the bay, nor in the river, neither. The Port Wardens had 'em all took up. An' the Committee o' Safety's sunk a lot o' obstructions in the river off Billingsport and higher up off Gloucester. Shevvydefrees, they calls 'em — spiked logs stickin' up just below the surface. Nice things fer the Black Prince to run afoul o', eh? An' even if you got through, they'd probably drop an 18‑pound shot into you from one o' the row‑galleys or the fort they're buildin' on Liberty Island; that's the new name for Mud Island."

The garrulous pilot had Barry's close attention by now. Conditions had changed, indeed, since he had sailed almost five months before for London.

"An' that's why you don't part wi' me till I get you safe anchored at Bob Morris's wharf," the pilot continued. "It'll cost your owners somethin' extra, too. The Wardens are fixin' a new pilotage charge to take care o' my extra time. You ain't the first at 'll ha' to pay it, though. Cap'n Read, in the Aurora, went up yesterday, an' I reckon his pilot's collectin' the new fee by now."

Such was John Barry's re‑introduction to a Philadelphia he scarcely recognized as the Black Prince ascended the river. True, enough, numerous shallops were engaged in sinking chevaux-de‑frise off Billingsport and Gloucester. Fresh earthworks were rising on Liberty Island. He did not see the row‑galleys until he was opposite the city, but there they were outfitting at several piers — lubberly, flat-bottomed gondolas with a gun mounted on each flight deck. The Black Prince eased gently against Willing, Morris & Co.'s wharf. The pilot went off with his certified record of services rendered to collect his bill and whatever extra pilotage allowance the Port Wardens had set, and the two passengers departed.

When Barry stepped ashore it was with a full appreciation that the old order was no more. From Robert Morris, when he  p61 reported the arrival of the Black Prince, came facts emphasizing the magnitude of the change. The Continental Congress had adopted the army in New England as its own, and had appointed George Washington to command it. The British were closely beleaguered in Boston. A military campaign was on foot into Canada, and many of the provinces, like Pennsylvania, had equipped small coast defense fleets, including galleys and other lightly-armed craft. Needless to say where John Barry's allegiance went that day. A new rebel had reached home.

Philadelphia editors tackled him for his foreign news. He obliged with the collection of newspapers he had brought from London. Out of these journals and others, which Thomas Read had supplied, several columns of choice information were culled. The Pennsylvania Journal, first of the Philadelphia weeklies off the press after the arrival of the Black Prince and Aurora, announced, on October 11: "Since our last arrived here the Captains Reed [Read] and Barry, from London, by whom we have the following advices."

Space permits but brief scanning of these "advices." . . . Orders are sent to Portsmouth and Plymouth to outfit vessels of war. . . . Five regiments are not destined for Boston but for South Carolina. . . . The Americans seem to outnumber us in generals . . . 25,000 reinforcements are going to America . . . a twenty-eight gun frigate is dispatched to accommodate Lord Dunmore, the Virginia governor . . . eight men-of‑war of forty to fifty guns each are ordered to the American station . . . the commercial colonies are to be disarmed . . . forfeited estates are to go to loyal Americans . . . orders are issued to take all vessels in American waters within a certain distance of closed posts. Finally, detailed at some length, was "a plan for redu­cing the rebellious Colony of New England — and for the support of a legal Constitutional Government in America."

Such was the public news; some of it accurate, some fanci­ful. Private letters from London, however, were delivered by both shipmasters to members of the Continental Congress. Several of these, dated about August 11 and which could only have come by the Black Prince, disclosed that two government vessels, unarmed brigs, were enroute to Canada, ladened with powder and arms.

Neither John Barry nor Thomas Read ever realized that  p62 their intelligence, secret and point-blank, was instrumental in committing Congress to a policy of offensive sea operations against the enemy. And, in the development of this Continental navy, both men were, for a time, sadly neglected.

* * *

To understand the evolution of the first American, or Continental navy, it must be borne in mind that two proposals, each aiming at the same objective, proceeded simultaneously on parallel courses through the sessions of the Continental Congress. Despite their similarity of purpose, they were never weighed jointly. Viewed in retrospect, the reason for separate consideration is apparent. One was regarded as a permanent measure; the other, as an expedient.

First to be introduced, on October 3, 1775, several days before Barry and Read arrived, was a resolution adopted by the Rhode Island Assembly, and presented by its delegates. It urged the building, at Continental expense, of "a fleet of sufficient force for the protection of these colonies, and for employing them in such manner and places as will most effectually annoy our enemies, and contribute to the common defence of these colonies." This was the permanent measure. Its progress through Congress for more than two months was a series of postponements. Those steering it were wise tacticians. In the first debate, on October 7, they heard it denounced as "the maddest idea in the world," and realized the majority of delegates was not yet ripe for anything so all embra­cing. So they kept it in reserve, postponing action from time to time, until, through the measure of expediency, the dubious ones could be committed eventually to the broader plan.

On October 5 had come the confidential news of the two powder brigs bound to Canada. Under consideration at that time were many matters referred to Congress by General Washington, among others a suggestion that armed vessels operating off the New England coast might intercept provision and munition ships bound to Boston, and thus provide the Continental army with much-needed clothing, accoutrements and powder. The private letters from London and the suggestions from his Excellency, the Commander-in‑Chief, were referred to a committee of three, which reported later in the day. It recommended  p63 that Washington apply to Massachusetts for two armed vessels belonging to that province; that he be empowered to employ other armed vessels as well; that efforts be made to capture the two powder brigs and all ministerial vessels carrying supplies to Boston; that Rhode Island and Connecticut be asked to dispatch the largest of their naval armament on the same mission; that the captors be entitled to one‑half of the value of the prizes taken, and that all "ships and vessels of war" so employed "be on the continental risque and pay."

Led by Edward Rutledge, of South Carolina, and, no doubt, sensing the tactics of the "navy men," the opposition leaped to the attack. It was a wild, visionary, mad project. It was an infant taking a mad bull by the horns. It would ruin the character and corrupt the morals of American seamen, making them selfish, piratical, mercenary and bent wholly on plunder. Loud and vehement were the denunciations. One delegate who favored the project rather suspected that several of the opponents had been "primed" beforehand by some of Philadelphia's conservative merchants and statesmen. In answer to these "formidable arguments and terrible rhetoric," the proponents pointed out the advantages of distressing the enemy, supplying the army, and making a small beginning in a naval way rather than launching out on a major scale.

Adopted in toto, but by a slim majority, the measure of expediency was launched, and proceeded to take more concrete form next day. The special committee by then had supplemental resolutions to submit, recommending that Congress fit out two lightly armed vessels at Philadelphia to be dispatched into New England waters in search of British transports and supply ships, and that it might be well to equip several larger ships also.

"I don't think the resolution goes far enough," was the way Samuel Chase, of Maryland, opened the debate. "Lord Dunmore has been many months committing hostilities against Virginia, and has extended his piracies to Maryland. I wish he had been seized by the Colony months ago. Is it practicable now? Is there a power in the Congress to raise and pay a naval force?"

Hatred of Virginia's governor stirred others into words. The original resolution was forgotten in an angry dispute as to whether the seizure of Dunmore would wreck any chances of  p64 reconciliation with Great Britain. Nothing came of the argument save the consumption of so much time that the report of the special committee had to be laid on the table "for the perusal of the members."

One week later it came up again for consideration. After a less heated debate, a portion of the report was adopted and the balance deferred over the week‑end. That part approved provided for two armed vessels, one of ten carriage guns and eighty-five men, and the other not specified as to men or metal, to cruise for three months. The commanders were to be ordered to sail to the eastward to intercept "such transports as may be laden with warlike stores and other supplies for our enemies," or "such other purposes as the Congress shall direct." Congress balloted on a committee of three to prepare an estimate and to contract with proper persons to fit out the two vessels. Choice fell upon Silas Deane, of Connecticut; John Langdon, of New Hampshire, and Christopher Gadsden, of South Carolina. Each of the trio was a stalwart exponent of developing American sea power. They were back, on October 17, with a rough estimate, which was read, debated and recommitted. Congress wanted an actual cost figure, not an approximation.

Figures, rather than fancies, took time to accumulate. Almost two weeks elapsed before Messrs. Deane, Langdon and Gadsden again reported. It was October 30. They submitted the estimate and several new recommendations; that the second vessel authorized on October 13 carry fourteen guns, and that two additional vessels be fitted out, of thirty‑six and twenty guns respectively, "to be employed in such manner for the protection and defence of the united Colonies, as the Congress shall hereafter direct."

"Ridiculous!" snorted George Ross, of Pennsylvania, arising in protest. "We can't get seamen to man four vessels. We could not get seamen to man our boats, our galleys."

Virginia's delegates, all proponents of the plan, answered him, and the resolutions were adopted, with a further provision that the committee — henceforth to be known as the Naval Committee — be increased to seven. Stephen Hopkins, of Rhode Island; Joseph Hewes, of North Carolina; John Adams, of Massachusetts, and Richard Henry Lee, of Virginia, were selected as the four additional members.

 p65  The expediency measure had matured to a point where the aim of the Rhode Island resolution had been largely realized.

Congress, on November 2, authorized the Naval Committee to expend one‑hundred-thousand dollars in outfitting the four vessels, and empowered it to secure officers and men for each on the promise of fifty percent prize shares. To the reminiscences of John Adams, we are indebted for a picture of the committee at work. It procured a room in a public house, and began meeting every evening "to dispatch this business with all possible celerity." The most pleasant part of his labors in Congress were performed on the Naval Committee, Adams wrote in his autobiography.

Who can doubt it, when we read how old Governor Hopkins, a hale and hearty septuagenarian, sipped Jamaica spirits diluted with water, and reacted to its stimulus with "wit, sense, knowledge and good humor." Pope, Thomson and Milton shared honors with Greek, Roman and early history in shaping the plans for the Continental fleet. The committee, composed of "very temperate" gentlemen, enjoyed a vicarious inebriacy through the "flow of the soul" of the genial Rhode Islander.

The first action of this mellifluous committee was to purchase the Black Prince from Robert Morris and the other owners. The second was to select three well-experienced men to convert her and vessels subsequently acquired to purposes of war. Each of the three was well qualified for his respective post. For the structural work — the strengthening of beams, opening of gunports, reinforcement of timbers and bulwarks — the choice fell upon young Joshua Humphreys, master-builder in the shipyard of John Wharton. For the re‑rigging and outfitting, they turned to the man who knew most about the Black Prince and her sailing qualities, the man who had commanded her ever since she had been afloat; namely, John Barry. For the accumulation of gunners' stores, provisions and slops and the handling of all petty accounts, the appointee was Nathaniel Falconer, the master of the Mary and Elizabeth, who had returned from London a few weeks before Barry.

"I was employed by the Congress to fitt for Sea the first fleet that sailed from Phila.," is the laconic and only reference Barry ever made to the important task assigned him.

 p66  Fortunately, the evidence of his activity is provided from another source — the Charge Book of James Wharton, Philadelphia ship-chandler, who, as early as November 4, began to supply him with an endless procession of necessaries: "7 Scrapers 6 White Wash brushes 6 Empty Tarr barrels," on that day; "6 Birch Brooms," on Monday, November 6; "1 Barrell Tar," on Tuesday, and "18 Empty Tarr Barrells," on Wednesday. From these items, it would seem Barry's initial activity was one of having the ship thoroughly cleaned.

Through the entries in this ledger, it is apparent the Black Prince was acquired by the Naval Committee on Saturday, November 4 and on Wednesday, November 8, was re‑christened the Alfred. John Adams tells us this name was selected "in honor of the founder of the greatest navy that ever existed," — a rather plain admission that the committee did not underestimate the enemy.

The carpentry work on the Alfred began on Monday, November 13, with a gang of a half-dozen skilled artisans employed continuously thereafter, and Joshua Humphreys in constant attendance. There exists today the record of the time — 617 hours divided among thirty-four joiners, sawyers, calkers and laborers — and the formidable catalogue of materials used. More than 3,000 feet of planking, varying •from two to six inches in thickness; •fifty-four pounds of oakum and eight barrels of tar for calking, and many other items are included in the long compendium, which varies from a "Sweep for the Tiller" to "Sundry Augurs."

While Humphreys's workers were, among other pursuits, pie­cing the keel, increasing stanchions in the waist and piercing new gunports, Barry's crew of riggers were involved in a seemingly hopeless chaos of spun yarn, rope of various circumferences, whipping twine, lampblack, hog's lard and paint oil. The ship-chandlery book literally writhes with skeins of marline, coils of bolt rope and ratlings and fathoms of cable, interspersed with ten- and eight-penny nails, lamp oil and tallow.

From the existing records it is evident, that, between the purchase of the Black Prince and the acquisition of the other vessels authorized several weeks elapsed. At first the Naval Committee sought suitable craft in other ports. As early as November  p67 5, John Adams wrote to Massachusetts to inquire "what ships, brigantines, schooners, &c. are to be found in any port of the province, to be sold or hired out, which will be suitable for armed vessels." Deane was dispatched to New York and Connecticut in quest of "two Vessels that are properly capable of carrying sixteen six pounders each," or, "a ship suitable for carrying 20 nine pounders," and returned, November 26, "with the mortification of effecting nothing."

Meanwhile, those steering the Rhode Island resolution through Congress by November 16, considered that it had a prospect of passage.

"Our instruction for an American fleet has been long upon the table," wrote Samuel Ward, of Rhode Island, that day. "When it was first presented, it was looked upon as perfectly chimerical; but gentlemen now consider it in a very different light. I have great hopes of carrying it."

Ward and other backers of the measure brought it up for consideration as planned, sensed at once that opposition was still strong and again had it deferred. Humorously enough, the same delegates, who so seriously objected to a permanent move toward sea‑power, one week later were gravely debating a "set of rules for the government of the American Navy," which the Naval Committee submitted to Congress for approval on November 23. It took five days before these rules, read paragraph by paragraph, were agreed to, and November ended with an order to have them printed.

By then the Naval Committee had secured the other three vessels authorized, and had bestowed fitting names upon them — the Columbus, Cabot and Andrew Doria. All were purchased in the port of Philadelphia, and passed through the hands of Humphreys, Barry and Falconer. Early in December, upon Congressional authorization, a fifth vessel was taken into the service, the sloop Katy, which had arrived from Rhode Island with recruits for the fleet. She was re‑named the Providence. As she was fully rigged and already armed for war, neither Humphreys nor Barry had much to do with her.

* * *

 p68  While John Barry was devoting his time to the strenuous task of outfitting the four vessels of war, he may or may not have considered the possibility of commanding one of them. Had Robert Morris been a member of the Naval Committee, his selection would have been probable. Had the committee made any serious effort to canvass the qualifications of a number of the Philadelphia shipmasters, Barry's name would have stood high on the list. But the committee did not proceed in any such fashion. In considering what the committee did certain factors must be remembered:

First: The New England provinces at that time were the dynamic leaders in the battle for "the liberties of America."

Second: While the Rhode Island resolution was still on the table, that colony was credited with originating the idea of an American navy.

Third: The Naval Committee had a New England majority.

Fourth: Its chairman was Stephen Hopkins, of Rhode Island.

Fifth: Influence was an even more important factor in securing appointment than it is today.

Such being the situation, it is not hard to understand why Esek Hopkins, a brother of Stephen, should be commodore of the little fleet; why Abraham Whipple, also of Rhode Island, and who had served with Esek Hopkins on a privateer during the old French war, should command the Columbus; why John Burroughs Hopkins, son of the commodore, should be captain of the Cabot; why John Hazard, another Rhode Islander, should command the Providence, and why Dudley Saltonstall, brother-in‑law of Silas Deane, of Connecticut, should be senior captain of the fleet and commander of the Alfred. The only "outsider," who broke this charmed New England circle, was Nicholas Biddle, of Philadelphia, assigned to the Andrew Doria. Biddle had a brother in Congress, two first cousins in the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety, and, furthermore, had served several years as a midshipman in the British navy.

It is easy and, at times, has been quite popular, to criticize these appointments. They are vulnerable, it is true, from the viewpoints of favoritism and nepotism. Some of the captains, also, proved disappointing performers. At the time of their selection,  p69 however, the Naval Committee could only know of their abilities as shipmasters. All of them qualified in this respect. Only the commodore and Whipple, with their short privateering experience, and Biddle with his stretch in the British navy, could boast of any knowledge of vessels of war. At the time these appointments were made no criticisms were voiced. It was accepted, it would appear, that New England should dominate the fleet.

There was long a tradition that John Barry was the first captain appointed to the first ship-of‑war purchased by the Continental Congress. We have traced the evolution of the American navy to this point to show what Barry's part actually was, and to eradicate any further belief in this persistent and pernicious myth. Barry himself never contributed to its growth. He is on record, though succinctly, as to what he did, and through his life he was a stickler for the truth.

We can assume that the business of fitting out the four vessels brought him into intimate touch with all the officers of the fleet. Undoubtedly his acquaintance­ship with many of them antedated their arrival in Philadelphia that fall. Others he met for the first time, particularly the younger men, such as John Paul Jones, senior lieutenant of the Alfred, and Scotch protégé of Joseph Hewes, of North Carolina; Elisha Hinman, of Connecticut, first lieutenant of the Cabot, and Hoysted Hacker, first lieutenant of the Columbus. During the time the five vessels lay outfitting at Willing, Morris & Co.'s and James Cuthbert's piers, he had plenty of opportunity to study and appraise all the officers, from the commodore down to the lowliest midshipman.

Of greater interest to him than observing the Continental naval officers, and, perhaps, envying them a bit, was the fact that, on December 14, Robert Morris had been named as Pennsylvania's member of a new Marine Committee of thirteen. The Rhode Island resolution had, at last, found its way to a vote and a majority that had passed it on December 11. A committee had been appointed at once to devise ways and means of furnishing an adequate naval armament. Its report, on December 13, called for the building of thirteen frigates, and the appointment of a permanent Marine Committee. With the selection  p70 of Morris, the proposed naval expansion should provide Barry the opportunity he desired to stride the quarter-deck in command of a Continental ship-of‑war.

But in December, 1775, the thirteen frigates were yet on paper. It would be many months before any of them would be afloat. Hence, his interests still lay with Hopkins's fleet, and his activity in the outfitting continued until the year closed. By then, barring a deficit in powder and men, the five vessels were ready for sea. Barry's duties probably terminated officially on January 4, 1776, the day when four of them dropped down the Delaware to Liberty Island. Long before the squadron sailed from Cape Henlopen, on February 18 — ice in the river and bay contributing to the delay of well nigh a month and a half — he was embarked upon other duties.

* * *

To strengthen the defences of the Delaware, the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety, early in November, 1775, had determined upon a ship-of‑war as a proper flagship for its fleet of thirteen row‑galleys. In the preliminary period, the sub‑committee appointed to contract for the desired ship had been undecided between building and buying. Shipbuilders to whom it applied would not guarantee delivery until an indefinite date in the following spring. Attempts to purchase a vessel disclosed that the Naval Committee had already cornered the market by acquiring any which might have proven suitable.

Sometime late in December a contract was awarded Simon Shurlock, a Southwark shipbuilder, to construct the vessel at a cost not to exceed nine thousand pounds. When Shurlock showed indications of procrastination, the sub‑committee found its members too involved in the multitudinous duties of the Committee of Safety to give individual attention to prodding the shipbuilder. The alternative was to appoint someone who could devote his entire time to directing the project.

On the sub‑committee were three of John Barry's close friends; men who had employed him in the past and had every confidence in his ability. One of these was Robert Morris, a member both of Congress and the Committee of Safety. Another was George Clymer, of Meredith and Clymer, and the third was John Nixon, one of the former joint owners of the  p71 Black Prince. They turned to Barry early in January. He accepted promptly. Again, his own account of what he did is a meagre sentence.

"As soon as they [the Continental fleet] were outfitted," he stated, "I was employed by the Committee of Safety to superintend the Building a State Ship."

Under his direction the ship took form. We get glimpses of him again through James Wharton, the ship-chandler, who, on January 31, delivered to the "Province Ship Capt Barry Dr 12lb Tallow 1 Wooden Bowl." There was another delivery, on February 22, of "6lb Tallow," items indicating that construction was so well along that the ways were being greased for the launching.

Around March 1, the province ship took the water, and, on March 6, Thomas Read was appointed to command her. Read had been employed previously by the Naval Committee to prove cannon, but, like Barry, had been ignored when commissions were distributed. It looked now as if he had stepped out ahead of his fellow shipmaster. The new ship, soon to be called the Montgomery, in honor of that brigadier general whose death before Quebec had recently shocked the continent was staunchly built and completely outfitted, with fourteen 18‑pounders, supplemented by sixteen cohorns and eight swivels — a really formidable fighting craft for her size.

His superintendency at an end, John Barry had some idle hours on his hands. He utilized them to examine into the progress being made upon the four frigates on the ways at Philadelphia — Pennsylvania's quota of the thirteen the Marine Committee had been authorized to build. They were in various stages of construction, the two in Kensington having little more than their keels laid. Should he be fortunate enough to get command of one of them, the time seemed a long way off.

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