General Stand Watie's Confederate Indians • Chapter 11

Watie's men — whirling dust on the skyline — rode, continually raiding the Fort Scott-Fort Gibson road, killing Negro soldiers, burning mowing machines and Union hay stacks. General Watie's fame as the greatest of the Secesh Indian leaders became even more secure as his raiders scored with torch and bullet.

But Watie's most spectacular raid of all was still phantomlike on the coming fall winds — a strike against the Yankees which was to win Watie the official praise of the Confederate Congress; and Indicates a West Point graduate, Class of 1828: a link to his biographical entry in Cullum's Register.

Indicates a West Point graduate, Class of 1828: a link to his biographical entry in Cullum's Register.

Jefferson Davis was to speak with warmth to Elias Boudinot at Richmond concerning his uncle, the Cherokee cavalier.

Antedating this raid, though, was the Confederate victory at Massard Prairie, Arkansas. Early in July, General Cooper nimbly reconnoitered to within ten miles of Fort Smith and even audaciously p152 attacked General Thayer's outposts near the fort. Under orders from Cooper, Gano and Watie expeditiously moved against Major David Mefford's Sixth Kansas Cavalry units stationed about five miles outside Fort Smith. On the morning of the 27th, the spirited Indians and Texans charged in so rapidly that Mefford's horses were stampeded and his cavalry had to fight dismounted. After a fighting retreat of a mile, Mefford was unable to break the Confederate line which had cut across his rear and he and his men surrendered. Watie whirled his command back toward safety as already Thayer's reinforcements were on their way from Fort Smith. The captured Yankees — with no horses — marched double time for ten miles. The Confederates back across the Poteau River, deemed it safe to stop for the night.

General Cooper followed up the victory at Massard Prairie four days after, sending forward his whole army, Gano commanding his right wing and Watie his left, to within two miles of Fort Smith. But after an exchange of artillery fire and slight skirmishing, Cooper withdrew his army back into the Choctaw Nation.

In a summation of his operations around Fort Smith, General Cooper had this to say of Stand Watie:

"General Watie executed the order given him with his customary gallantry and promptness, sending Colonel Bell, with First Cherokee Regiment on the main and Colonel Adair on the road to the left known as the Line Road, both detachments charging with the impetuosity for which they and their men are noted. He not only routed the Federal pickets, but ran them up to the line of their entrenchments near Fort Smith, and returning, the men sat down to the plentiful dinner just prepared for the Federals at their camp.

". . . Having arrived at the camp lately occupied by the enemy, I found Brigadier-General Watie with his command in a position on the hill south of spring. General Gano soon arrived and Captain Humphreys, with his light battery, was advanced and opened fire on the enemy, then some 600 to 800 yards to the front.

"The enemy soon brought up a four-gun battery (Rabb's, I suppose) and commenced a furious cannonade upon our light howitzers . . . Captain Humphreys, being so unequally unmatched, p153 was ordered to withdraw, and in the act of doing so a shell exploded directly amid the battery horses, killing 3, wounding one, and cutting the leg off one of the men. Another shot swept off the head from the shoulders of one of Gano's men . . ."

Lack of the Confederacy to get adequate supplies, clothing, finances and ammunition to the Indian allies was beginning to create unrest among the ranks of the Indian troops, though in no way did it lessen their determination to support the Confederacy. The Indian soldiers did not realize that similar conditions were existing throughout much of Confederate-held territory. On August 8, General Watie wrote to General

Indicates a West Point graduate, Class of 1845: a link to his biographical entry in Cullum's Register.

Kirby-Smith, complaining about what he considered subordination of the Indian interests and — a month later — Kirby-Smith replied:

"I know your people have a cause for complaint. Their sufferings and the apparent ill-faith of our Government naturally produces some dissatisfaction. That your patriotic band of followers deserves the thanks of our Government I know . . . Tell them to remain true . . . we must stand and struggle on together till that justice and good Providence, who always supports the Right, crowns our efforts with success . . . and I can only assure you that I feel the importance of your country to our cause."

Not long after he wrote Kirby-Smith, Watie's men rode on a routine raid, as reported in a letter written by Lieutenant Lynch of Adair's Company, Second Cherokee Regiment, "Gnl. Watie in command of about 300 of his braves crossed Arkansas river a few days ago and they attacked a small encampment of negro infantry as they thought, but they were more of them than he expected and consequently flaxed our General. Watie took twelve prisoners (white), killed several negroes and got only 3 wounded."

At the Federal hay camps at Flat Rock near Fort Gibson four companies of colored infantry — scattered over three miles of prairie — were cutting and putting up hay. Captain E. A. Baker with detachments of two Second Kansas Cavalry companies was in command. Scouts from these detachments rode in fast the afternoon of September 16, bellowing the alarm that a large Confederate force was sighted on the old military road — this road p154 surveyed around 1824 ran from Fort Scott to Fort Gibson — advancing on the camp.

Indeed even then General Watie and General Richard M. Gano, the new commander of the district, stood on a high wall and with their field glasses, watched the big hay camp in operation. What a plum — especially the Corps d'Afrique as the Rebels called Negro troops — this was for the taking; something to whet their appetites for the main course these two Generals were planning to enjoy at the Yankee table!

With six pieces of artillery, the Confederates advanced on the camp — Lieutenant Colonel Welch and two Texas regiments on the right, General Watie and his Indians on the left, and General Gano commanding in the center.

Captain Baker, having fought vainly for half an hour, ordered all his men who had horses to break through the Confederate line at its weakest point; fifteen riders got through, but forty didn't!

The colored regiment, unmounted, was left to fight its way out on foot. Under Lieutenant Thomas B. Sutherland, First Kansas Colored Infantry, the Negro troops, fighting from behind natural obstacles, slowed down the Confederates for two hours. After that, the Rebels turned the engagement into a massacre. The veteran Confederate Indians, coming into close quarter fighting, shot down the blacks like rabbits. Some of the Negro soldiers ran out from tall weed patches and unburned hay stacks crying, "O! Good master, save and spare me!" But the Texans and Indians held no feeling of sympathy for Negroes in Union ranks and felt their cries for mercy sheer hypocrisy as only a few moments before the same Negroes had been trying to kill their "good masters."

After disposing of the Negro troops — about one in five were able to escape — the Confederates fired 3,000 tons of hay. Again Fort Gibson would smart under the sting of Stand Watie's whip.

The Confederate troops — with hardly a scratch from the warmup encounter — marched to Wolf Creek, approximately the location of Salina. With Watie in charge of the camp, General Gano and four hundred Texans moved north on the 18th, hid in the timber, and Gano sent word back to Watie to hurry forward and get in on the kill. For Gano had found the rich pickings p155 for which he and Watie quested; a million dollar wagon train!

The search came about when General Watie, learning that this train was rolling down the Fort Scott road headed for Fort Gibson, asked General Gano to join him on an ambitious and bold venture to bypass Fort Gibson and destroy or capture this mobile Yankee treasure. General Gano readily agreed that here was the prize of all prizes. The Confederate column set out with Texans, Choctaws, Chickasaws, John Jumper's Creeks and Seminoles and, of course, the Cherokees.

Spies abounded throughout the Indian Territory and the Federals were not long in learning that venturesome Watie was really on the warpath for high stakes. Word was rushed to the train — "run for safety to any place with a stockade!"

Major Henry Hopkins, Second Kansas Cavalry commanding the train, pulled it to a halt on the bluffs overlooking the military crossing at Cabin Creek. Quickly his soldiers and the wagon men piled hay bales into breastworks to reinforce the stockade. Major Hopkins worked with the assurance that Yankee men and guns were moving out from both Fort Gibson and Fort Smith to whip Watie and Gano for their arrogance in attempting to capture a million dollar train.

Without the expected reinforcements, Hopkins had about a thousand white and Indian troops to protect some four hundred wagons and about 1,800 mules and horses. Certainly, even if the support was tardy in arriving, Hopkins could hold off the attack. Hopkins was to get a quick testing. His scouts found Gano in a ravine three miles south of Cabin Creek.

The Confederate attack, like ghosts on the wind, flared out of the night at two o'clock in the morning. The advancing Confederates — Watie having arrived at midnight — could hear the noise of men drinking and shouting inside the stockade.

At three hundred yards, the Union defenders opened fire and the Confederates stopped as there was no need to lose precious men in the night firing. Captain Grayson — promoted since his participation in the "Williams" episode — walked boldly up and down his Creek line. He had no need for the "magic medicine" which some of the Indians had used earlier in the night for protection from Yankee bullets.

General Gano shifted his artillery so that it could cross fire p156 the stockade and the Confederate shells crashed through wagon and timber, creating havoc within the stockade.

From the Confederate lines, individual Indians, anxious for plunder and a chance to plunge a knife into the hated Yankee Indians, would dash out toward the stockade, screaming their traditional turkey gobble challenge at the Pins inside.

In the inferno of disintegrating wagons, Confederate shells and screaming Indians, Major Hopkins realized that he could wait no longer for succor from Fort Smith or Fort Gibson. He must abandon his position and save what he could of the train by retreating to Fort Scott. This thought must have come to Hopkins and Watie at the same time. As Hopkins prepared to carry out this maneuver, two of Stand Watie's regiments took possession of the Fort Scott road, cutting off retreat.

With daylight, the condition of the Yankee encampment grew steadily worse as artillerymen for the six Confederate guns could more accurately direct their fire. Mules panicked, dashed through the camp, some falling over the one hundred-fifty-foot bluff. Federal soldiers threw themselves prone on the ground to escape the fire.

Yet Major Hopkins held out. Somewhere out of the haze might come those six companies of Indians and two howitzers from Fort Gibson. Watie and Gano, deciding to wait no longer, drove in the Union right — which originally faced south — until it faced almost west. Then Gano's Texans raced to flank the new position.

Billows of smoke reached into the murky clouds and, with this as a cloak, Hopkins, abandoning hope, shouted for his men to leave the wagons and fight their way onto the Fort Gibson road. This they did as the Confederates were more eager to capture the train than to stop escaping Yankees.

The ragged Confederates — the uniforms captured at the "Williams" were not plentiful — snatched new clothing out of the canvas topped wagons, sought new shoes for their scarred, bare feet, and poured Yankee brandy down their throats. And a few Indians, getting out of control in their detestation for their Yankee Indian opponents, killed and mutilated wounded men before the Confederate officers could stop them.

The looting and excitement subsiding, Watie and Gano felt it expedient to leave as soon as possible as they did not want to p157 be attacked themselves by the tardy reinforcements. Half the wagon train stood fully loaded, but the mules — those which hadn't been killed or wounded — were hard to handle. Some would not take commands from new masters. Despite all the difficulties about one hundred and thirty wagons moved out of the camp toward Confederate Indian Territory. Gleefully, the raiders either put the torch to the remaining wagons or, pushing them over the bluffs, watched them shatter below. To put a spectacular end to the raid, 3,000 tons of hay went under the torch.

Nothing usable remained of the million dollar train except what was in Confederate hands. Watie and Gano with their Indians and Texans had given the damn yankees their worst disaster of the entire Indian Territory war. The Civilized Nations had scored their most impressive military triumph, one which resounded from Richmond to Texas and the Confederate Indians refugees down along the Red River and in Texas took new heart for the hopes of the Indian South.

As to the reinforcements for Hopkins, the six regiments and two guns from Fort Gibson headed for Cabin Creek passed the broken command of Hopkins coming in, but on another road, so that the two commands did not encounter each other.

The Confederates with clothing for 2,000 men and hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of supplies marched south and recrossed the Arkansas River about fifteen miles above Fort Gibson.

That night the victorious Confederates encountered Colonel J. M. Williams and his Negro troops with two Parrott guns on their way from Fort Smith to relieve the wagon train. Colonel Williams decided he'd recapture what the Confederates had won.

Watie's first effort to rush a report on the wagon train victory to Cooper failed when his messenger, sent from Bird Creek, September 21, failed to get through. But Cooper did receive word of the Confederate triumph elsewhere and on September 24 he wrote Captain T. M. Scott, Assistant Adjutant-General, from his headquarters in the field:

"I have the honor to report that the expedition from this command under Generals Watie and Gano, north of Arkansas River is on its return, having destroyed several Federal camps and a large quantity of hay between Gibson and Cabin Creek on p158 the Texas and Missouri road, and captured a train of between 100 and 200 wagons, with many prisoners. The above is from an old Uchee warrior, whom I know to be reliable who arrived yesterday at headquarters of First Creek Regiment, bringing arms, etc, he captured himself from a Federal officer. Generals Watie and Gano are returning slowly, the command being worn and tired . . . "

Later a message from Watie did come in and also one from Gano dated September 23 which said, "Our men behaved gallantly. The enemy had strong position at Cabin Creek and held it six hours. God has blessed us."

A later report from General Gano told of the efforts of the Yankees to retake the train:

"As we moved back with our train we met a reinforcement from Forts Smith and Gibson going up to protect the train, consisting of infantry, artillery and cavalry. We drove them back three miles and a half, held them in check all night, and created the impression that we had parked the train for the night by running an empty wagon train over a rocky place for two hours, while our train was being moved with all possible dispatch toward the Arkansas River. The day found us separating rapidly, we following our train while they were retreating to Fort Gibson. We expected to fight at Arkansas River, and hurried forward with all dispatch day and night. For three days and nights our boys were without sleep, except such as they could snatch in the saddle or at watering places. They dug down banks, cut out trees, rolled wagons and artillery up hills and banks by hand, kept cheerful and never wearied in the good cause, and came into camp rejoicing on the 28th instant.

"We were out fourteen days, marching over 400 miles, killed 97, wounded many, captured 111 prisoners, burned 6,000 tons of hay and all reapers and mowers — destroyed all together from the Federals $1,500,000 worth of property, bringing safely within our lines nearly one‑third of this amount (estimated in greenbacks.) Our total was 6 killed, 48 wounded — 3 mortally . . . General Watie was by my side at Cabin Creek, cool and brave as ever . . ."

General Maxey at Fort Towson, in General Orders No. 61 referred to the victories on the expedition "by the troops under the leadership of the gallant and chivalrous Gano and the noble p159 old hero Stand Watie" and also that Throughout the expedition I am rejoiced to say perfect harmony and good will prevailed between the white and Indian troops, all striving for the common good of our beloved country." He called his men, "soldiers of the holy cause."

In a communication with General Indicates a West Point graduate, Class of 1853: a link to his biographical entry in Cullum's Register.

Boggs, Chief of Staff, at Shreveport, Maxey commented on the cooperation between Stand Watie and General Gano, who had been a star officer with the famous raider, General John Morgan:

"I also would call your attention to the noble course of General Watie. General Gano had been recognized a brigadier-general and acted as such before the date of General Watie's commission. General W., however, governed by patriotism, a feeling of delicacy, and, as he considered, justice, raised no issue, but acted in perfect harmony and concert for the common good."

General E. Kirby-Smith termed the capture of the wagon train "one of the most brilliant raids of the war," adding, "The celerity of the movement, the dash of the attack and their entire success entitle the commands engaged to the thanks of the country."

Along with other reports of that time, which came through to Confederate headquarters at Fort Towson, was one proving the necessity of General Watie keeping an over-supply of liquor from his men. Captain J. N. Hildebrand, writing from Fishertown, to General Cooper, said:

". . . I have further learned that John or Johnson Thompson of General Watie's command, got drunk and went to sleep, and when he awoke, seeing a body of men and supposing they were Watie's men, went to them and finding they were Federals surrendered, was carried to Gibson and kept there until he was sober and then marched out and publicly shot."

The reaction of the Federal commanders to the Confederate triumph over the million dollar wagon train at Cabin Creek is reflected in these official communications. On September 20, Major General Indicates a West Point graduate, Class of 1831: a link to his biographical entry in Cullum's Register.

Indicates a West Point graduate, Class of 1831: a link to his biographical entry in Cullum's Register.

S. R. Curtis, at Fort Leavenworth, writing Major General Indicates a West Point graduate, Class of 1842: a link to his biographical entry in Cullum's Register.

Indicates a West Point graduate, Class of 1842: a link to his biographical entry in Cullum's Register.

Rosecrans, commanding the Department of Missouri, said, "The further advance of rebels toward our department is attested by the capture of train by 1,500 of Stand Watie's men . . ." On the same day Major General Indicates a West Point graduate, Class of 1842: a link to his biographical entry in Cullum's Register.

George Sykes, at Fort Scott, writing Major C. S. Charlot, stated "Colonel Blair reports that p160 the train . . . was captured by the enemy at Cabin Creek, said to be 3,000 strong . . ."

Ever increasing was the size of the Indian Rebel attackers. Colonel C. W. Blair at Fort Scott communicating with Major Charlot, said, "Lieutenant Colonel Wheeler, who was with the train when captured at Cabin Creek yesterday morning, has arrived in one of my outposts . . . the rebel force was Stand Watie's and Colonel Wheeler thinks it 4,000 strong . . ."

In some quarters, the Confederate Indian victory created consternation and semi-panic. Colonel T. Moonlight, Eleventh Kansas Cavalry, at Paola, sent this urgent message to Major General Sykes:

"I have just received the following from Colonel Jennison from Mound City:

'Report of the capture of train troop. Two large bodies of troops, are moving north — one for Fort Scott, the other on Springfield. The force marching on Fort Scott numbers 3,000, and are reported to be from 75 to 100 miles below Fort Scott. It is reported that Fort Gibson has surrendered.'

"I believe there is some truth in the above, and would suggest the calling out of the militia of the three border tiers of counties immediately to replace the troops now on the border, without will be required to meet the enemy."

At Mound City, Colonel C. R. Jennison, Commanding First Sub-District, informed Captain George S. Hampton, Assistant Adjutant-General, that with the victory over the train complete, Rebel forces were moving against Fort Scott and Springfield and "I will concentrate my forces at Fort Scott. I think I can hold that place. I will take the field in the morning in person . . . send as many troops to the southern portion of your district as can be spared. I will call out the citizens of this locality in the defense of their homes . . ."

Having taken the field, Jennison, two days later, from Fort Scott, wrote Hampton:

"From the loss of the supply train recently dispatched for the subsistence of the forces at Forts Smith and Gibson, the utmost difficulty is to be apprehended in procuring supplies, if indeed it can be accomplished. The presumption is that at this time the forces at the above points are reduced to scant rations, as they are reported to have had only sufficient to subsist them until the train should arrive. In this view of the case the evacuation p161 of the post at Gibson and Smith becomes a matter of most reasonable supposition, and that the forces will fall back in this direction can hardly be imagined with large bodies of the enemy intervening. The probability is, therefore, that the troops mentioned will be sent to Little Rock or some other point in General Indicates a West Point graduate, Class of 1843: a link to his biographical entry in Cullum's Register. Steele's command, thus leaving our whole southern and southeastern frontier entirely exposed . . . I have ordered the entire force of employees in the quartermaster and commissary departments at the post enrolled, armed and placed in charge of suitable and skilled officers. The citizen companies are being drilled, and every preparation is being made to resist . . ."

With his all-out efforts to repel attacks by the Rebels, Colonel Jennison even contemplated sending a column out against the supposedly advancing Watie. Higher headquarters quashed this move with the notation that Jennison had no suitable force for such a task. It must have been a somewhat chagrined Yankee Colonel who, in time, received the news that Stand Watie and his cavalry were safely back in their own territory.

But the exact location of Watie's activities was often a puzzle to his foes and, shortly, G. S. Smith, Adjutant Kansas State Militia, at Leavenworth City, advised Major General S. R. Curtis at the Headquarters Army of the Border at Wyandotte, "It is reported at Leavenworth City that a sergeant of U. S. Troops passed through Ottawa this A.M. with a dispatch for you, saying that Stand Watie, with 6,000 Indians, was within thirty miles of Humboldt and had burned the Osage Mission."

To which Curtis rather humorously replied, "This report about Stand Watie is undoubtedly a roorback. If true, it would have come to me by telegraph and not by a Sergeant."

The official Confederate report on the organization of the Army of the Trans-Mississippi Department, September 30, 1864, shows the makeup of the Indian Cavalry Division commanded by Brigadier General Douglas H. Cooper as broken into two brigades, the First Indian Brigade, commanded by General Watie and the Second Indian Brigade, commanded by Colonel Tandy Walker.

Comprising the First were: 1st Cherokee, Colonel Robert C. Parks; 2nd Cherokee, Colonel William P. Adair; Cherokee Battalion, Major Joseph A. Scales; 1st Creek, Colonel Daniel N. McIntosh; 2nd Creek, Colonel Chilly McIntosh; Creek Squadron, p162 Captain R. Kenard; 1st Osage Battalion, Major Broke Arm; 1st Seminole Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel John Jumper.

Colonel Walker's Brigade was made up of the 1st Cherokee Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Lemuel M. Reynolds; 1st Choctaw Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Jackson McCurtain; 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel James Riley; 2nd Choctaw, Colonel Simpson N. Folsom; and the Reserve Squadron, Captain George Washington.

In addition, there were the unattached white troops, the 20th Texas, under Major John R. Johnson and the 1st Battalion, Texas Sharpshooters, commanded by Major James Burnet.

The Indians' artillery support was the Seventh Mounted Artillery Battalion in charge of Captain W. Butler Krumbhaar, and made up of Dashiell's (Texas) battery, Captain George R. Dashiell; Krumbhaar's (Texas) battery, Lieutenant W. M. Stafford; and Howell's (Texas) battery, Captain Sylvanus Howell.

Traditional Southern chivalry to the womenfolk had its place in the Indian Territory warfare, even as it did in the Confederate States. The honeyed words of a pretty girl could always bring a smile to a Rebel soldier no matter how hard the battle of the previous day.

But masked by the curving lips, the full figure and the protestations of devotion for the Johnny Rebs, was sometimes an entirely different woman than the one the gray-clad men held a friend, a confidante and — often — lover.

Commenting on the espionage agents in the War between the States, Harnett T. Kane, author of Spies for the Blue and Gray, wrote:

The ladies were terrific. In this war they made their American debut in espionage, and never since have the nation's women taken such an active part as spies. No matter how raving a partisan a man might be, his wife or sister was probably still more impassioned . . . They connived endlessly, took great risks, and pushed through to success in ways impossible to simple males. They showed that the female is not only the deadlier of the sexes, but also the livelier.

"In the eighteen-sixties the double standard prevailed in spying as in other matters, and to the ladies' benefit. Neither side did a great deal about it, even when the identities of the p163 women agents were well established. As the war grew slowly more bitter, men operatives were hanged one by one. The women received threats, or perhaps a prison term, and then freedom to try again . . . After all, a lady was a lady . . . A gentleman could not bring himself to order her shot or swung from a gallows."

"I have had for some time the utmost difficulty in getting information from the enemy over the river. My spies have been taken or killed . . . I have opened some new leads . . . I have just had a spy of Cooper's in camp. She brought up news of Scott and Sebastian counties and was recommended as a suitable spy for Cooper. He employed her and sent her over, giving her a good deal of information as to his modus operandi in getting news from our camp. She was passed over fifteen miles from here, and came in with my dispatches in her bonnet slits . . . ."

From Neosho, Missouri, September 16, 1864, Major Milton Burch, Eighth Cavalry, Missouri State Militia, wrote General Sanborn, Commanding District of Missouri:

"I have the honor, according to yours of the 4th instant requesting a lady suitable to act in the secret service as spy, to send you Miss Mary Martin, a lady of undoubted loyalty, ingenious and daring. I have information of Stand Watie being down near Spavinaw. I am going to start a lady, together with the boy Winfield Scott, in that direction today. I will use all the vigilance possible and inform you of every move in that direction. P. S. The news of Stand Watie being near is only from a rebel source, and I do not put any confidence in it, but I will soon know the actsº and communicate with you."

Union reports on Mary Martin's ensuing activities indicated that she was held in high esteem as an agent. No name of the woman mentioned is given in an illuminating letter — which shows that it was not always brother against brother in the war — Brigadier General John B. Sanborn at Springfield, Missouri, wrote General Rosecrans, September 25, 1864:

". . . The [Union] woman scout has brothers in the rebel army and she always manages to get the confidence of their officers. She has spied a great deal for us from Neosho and always has been reliable and correct. She says she expressed great doubt to Colonel Speer about Price and his force coming to Missouri p164 and to satisfy her that what he said was true he exhibited these letters to show the army was north of Batesville."

Apparently the female Union spy had forwarded to Sanborn the Confederate letters to Colonel Speer.

". . . One of my secret agents has just returned from a trip down South. She reports having seen and taken prisoner by Major Piercy's [a leading Confederate bushwhacker] command . . . I have sent another agent down South, and if she can get through I think she will bring news of more importance . . . We hear nothing of Stand Watie at all; he may be down in the Choctaw Nation. If he is not there, I cannot tell where, but have all confidence in my agent that is gone down South bringing me news of his whereabouts."

One of the times a Union spy did locate Watie was told in a report made at Neosho by Major Burch to General Sanborn:

"I have the honor to inform you that I have the information there are some 800 to 1,200 rebels on Grand River, near Gilstrop's Ferry . . . This report came from a woman, who says she saw 60 of the rebels. She saw Stand Watie and talked with him, so she says. She says Stand Watie has 400 men . . . She also says they intend to attack the train that is now on its way from Fort Scott. She says that — they calculate to take my command in out of the wet, but they will have a hard time doing it. I can whip a thousand if attacked."

This account was made in May and actually tipped the Federals off about the plans of the Confederate Indians against the wagon train, the results of which were unsuccessful.

No less intent on spying were the Confederates and on January 15, 1864, General Maxey from Fort Towson wrote E. Kirby-Smith, "No man can be too cautious in the selection of men for secret service. I have a shrewd, intelligent Indian who spends his time in the cane brake between the Arkansas and Poteau, near Fort Smith and gets his information through his women, who have the run of the town."

But the end for the spy, be he Union or Confederate? One such a finish was recounted by Colonel M. La Rue Harrison at Fayetteville to General Sanborn:

"One of Adair's [Watie's Chief of Scouts] spies came in yesterday; was followed by Lieutenant Rowe. He had a good horse, p165 shotgun, 3 revolvers; left them all near town when he came in. He was killed near one of my pickets at 10 last night."

Wiley Britton, who after the war became the most widely known writer on the border conflict, was with Colonel Phillips' forces and in his book Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border, 1863, related the following spy incident:

"A spy was caught today (23d) near camp, dressed in a woman's suit. He is a young fellow with light hair, fair complexion, of a rather prepossessing appearance, and I should think not over sixteen years of age. When I saw him in the Provost-marshal's tent he seemed to be badly frightened, in fact almost out of his wits. Two or three officers were putting questions to him in regard to his visiting our camp in disguise, but his excitement had not sufficiently subsided to enable him to give rational answers. He seemed ready to confess anything asked of him. He showed that he was unaccustomed to be goaded with questions of a such a serious nature. From ancient times to the present day, it has been the practice of commanding generals of armies to hang spies immediately after being caught, so as to make it impossible for the enemy to gain any advantage from the information they have obtained. What disposition will be made of this young man, had not been determined. Colonel Phillips, as commanding officer of troops in the field, has authority to order him tried by a drum-head court martial, and, if found guilty, hung within the next twenty-four hours. It is possible that his youthful age may save him from the death penalty at present, and that he will be turned over to the Department commander, for such punishment as he may deem proper. He claims to have been sent here by General Cooper, who is now encamped near Webber's Falls, for the purpose of getting information in regard to our strength and intentions in the near future.

"It was by merest accident that he was detected. When several of our Indian soldiers first saw him near the limits of our camp, they thought he was a white woman, although there are now very few white women in this country. They also noticed his movements were peculiar and not like those of a woman, and when they came towards him, he started to run, but in the chase they soon convinced him that his only safety lay in absolute submission. His garments were probably an impediment in his flight, p166 but as our Indians are generally fleet of foot, they would have soon overtaken him anyway.

"If I were going as a spy into the enemy's camp, to dress in a woman's suit would be about the last method I should think of adopting, even if I had as marked feminine features as some young men, which I have not. And as to the time of making such an adventure, I should prefer the night to broad daylight, particularly if there was anyone in the enemy camp likely to know me."

Although Britton's book leaves one uninformed as to whether the fair-faced Rebel spy was executed, hanging of spies was carried out by both sides and Private Sam R. Watkins, C. S. A., Maury Grays, First Tennessee Regiment, in his book Co. Aytch, described such an execution:

"I heard that two spies were going to be hung on a certain day and I went to the hanging. The scaffold was erected, two coffins were placed on the platform, the ropes dangling from the cross beam above . . . I wanted to see a Yankee spy hung. I wouldn't mind that. I would like to see him agonize. A spy; O, yes, they had hung one of our regiment at Pulaski — Sam Davis. Yes, I would see the hangings. After a while I saw a guard approach, and saw two little boys in their midst, but didn't see the Yankees that I had been looking for. The two little boys were rushed upon the platform. I saw they were handcuffed. 'Are they the spies?' I was appalled; I was horrified; nay, more, I was sick at heart. One was about fourteen and the other about sixteen years old, I would judge. The ropes were promptly adjusted about their necks by the provost-marshal. The youngest one began to beg and cry and plead most piteously. It was horrid. The older one kicked him, and told him to stand up and show the Rebels how a Union man could die for his country. Be a man! The charges and specifications were then read. The props were knocked out and the two boys were dangling in the air. I turned off sick at heart."

So died the two youthful Yankee spies. But Sam Davis, one of the writer's regimental mates, had been hanged by the Yankees at Pulaski, it must be remembered. If they had been successful, doubtless teen-aged Confederate soldiers could have died because of the information they had gleaned.

And if the Rebel spy with the feminine features died at the p167 end of a taut rope in Indian Territory, doubtless there were Union men who turned away from the swaying body as "sick at heart" as was Sam Watkins.

From the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, at Richmond, on July 21, 1864, had come Special Orders No. 171 signed by Samuel W. Melton, Assistant Adjutant General, which stated:

". . . XXXV. The Indian Territory west of the Arkansas is hereby constituted a separate district of the Trans-Mississippi Department, to the command of which Brig. Gen. D. H. Cooper, Provisional Army, C. S., is assigned."

This command change met with opposition from Kirby-Smith and he ignored it. Finally on October 1, 1864, from the Shreveport headquarters of the Trans-Mississippi Department, he wrote General Indicates a West Point graduate, Class of 1815: a link to his biographical entry in Cullum's Register.

Indicates a West Point graduate, Class of 1815: a link to his biographical entry in Cullum's Register.

S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General at Richmond:

"I have the honor respectfully to request that Special Orders, No. 171 . . . be revoked. I believe that serious injury would result to the service were this order enforced. I have delayed its publication. Awaiting further instructions. General Maxey, commanding the district of the Indian country, has with skill, judgment and success administered his duties. I have satisfactory evidence for believing that he gives satisfaction to both the Indians and the white troops. His removal, besides being an injustice to him, would be a misfortune to the department. General Cooper has been assigned to the division of Indian troops serving under General Maxey in the Indian Territory. I would respectfully refer this department to Colonel Scott, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, for particulars regarding the administration of General Maxey's district."

The "Indorsement" to this letter by General S. Cooper merely stated, "Please inform General Smith, in answer to this letter, that Special Orders, No. 171, from this office, is deemed imperative and must be carried into effect."

It was a mighty long way from Richmond to the headquarters of the Trans-Mississippi and Kirby-Smith reckoned that it might be quite a spell before these orders "deemed imperative" were carried out by him.

p151 Chapter 11