Having been relieved of the command of the Indian Territory, at my own request, I think it proper to report a brief summary of the military operations in that Territory during the past year . . .

"Early in the month of January, of the past year, in conformity with orders received from Lieutenant General Holmes, commanding Trans-Mississippi Department, I reported to Major-General Hindman for duty in the Indian Territory, and, in accordance with instructions from the latter, proceeded without delay to Fort Smith, and, on or about January 8, 1863, assumed the command to which I had been assigned. I will premise by saying that I was fully and truthfully advised by Major-General Hindman of the exhausted condition of the enemy, as well as the undisciplined, ill-equipped, and demoralized state of the few troops whom I was called to command. On my arrival at Fort Smith the appearance of everything was of the most gloomy description. The continuous occupation of the country by a large Confederate force from the beginning of the war had utterly exhausted its resources, and the retreat of General Hindman from that section immediately preceding my arrival had left the people desponding, hopeless, and, with a few honorable exceptions, thoroughly demoralized; insomuch that my anxiety and watchfulness was more taxed by the operation of traitors, deserters, and Union men known in common as "jayhawkers"  p119 (who were in the majority), than by the movements of the enemy in my front.

"The only force I found at Fort Smith was about 100 men, under Colonel (J. C.) Monroe, of the First Arkansas Cavalry, who had been sent temporarily to that point by General Hindman, and the remnant of Lane's (Texas) Partisan Rangers, under Lieutenant-Colonel (R. P.) Crump, numbering about 150 men, this being the entire number present for duty in a regiment originally consisting of fourteen full companies. This regiment had not a change of clothing nor an average of a blanket to the man. About 1,500 inmates, in a wretched condition, were officially reported in the numerous hospitals in the place. The quartermaster and commissary departments throughout the Territory were found in the utmost confusion. The officers serving in those departments, as a general rule, had derived their appointments from General Hindman or General Pike, were without legal commissions, and, in many cases, had executed no bonds. To have displaced these would have stopped all operations; therefore, having others to replace them, I was compelled to continue them on duty. Many of these staff officers were incompetent and negligent. Orders were issued and re-issued demanding that their returns should be forwarded to headquarters without attaining the object sought. From Majors (Israel G.) Vore and (N. B.) Breedlove, quartermaster and commissary of subsistence, respectively, of Cooper's brigade, of some 6,000 men, on paper, returns were repeatedly called off, but never received. I may here also mention that I was unable to procure a single paper (nor did I ever receive one) in the way of a record, either in reference to previous military operations or the Indian superintendency.

"The few stores left by General Hindman on his retreat had been stolen and scattered to all parts of the country. In the quartermaster's department there was neither transportation nor forage. The best efforts of the officer in charge of the commissary department were only productive of a very limited supply of poor beef and corn meal. Of the latter, there was but a few days' supply on hand, and, to obtain the necessary supply for the subsistence of the troops mentioned, and the hospitals, it became imperatively necessary to reopen the navigation of the Arkansas River.

 p120  "I ascertained, on inquiry, that a considerable supply of flour, for the use of the Indian Department, had been purchased in Northern Texas by an agent sent by General Hindman for that purpose, but the deficiency in transportation and the condition of the roads forbade the hope of an adequate supply of breadstuffs from that quarter. The Arkansas River was, therefore, the only avenue for a supply left open to me, and this of corn. The territory on the northern side of the stream for a considerable distance was virtually in the possession of the enemy, whilst jayhawkers in considerable numbers were boldly depredating on both sides of the river between Little Rock and Fort Smith. Under these circumstances, I besought the lieutenant-general commanding to so dispose a sufficient force of cavalry along the north side of the river as to afford protection to such boats as might be employed in the transportation of corn. After no little delay and embarrassment, a sufficient supply of corn was thus obtained, not, however, until I was forced, through absolute want of subsistence, to send to Red River Speight's brigade, with a battery attached. The scarcity of forage and subsistence, together with the destitute condition of the command, involved the necessity, also, of ordering the remnant of Lane's regiment to a point at which there was a probability of subsistence, recruiting, re-equipping, &c. Bass' (Texas) regiment, of Speight's brigade, was numbering some 200 men, was kept at Fort Smith for police duty, &c. This regiment, as was the case with most of the other regiments composing Speight's brigade, was found to be greatly demoralized, and in very short time for being put on duty exhibited an effective strength of less than 100 men, this depletion arising, in the main, from desertion.

"The necessity of sending Speight's infantry brigade to the Red River, though deeply regretted at the time, was, nevertheless, imperative. Could I have retained that brigade at Fort Smith, I should have been enabled, in all probability, to have inaugurated the spring campaign from the line of the Arkansas River, and thus, perhaps, have materially changed the fortunes of war in that section of the country. All of these many difficulties and embarrassments will be seen by reference to my official correspondence, to which I would most respect­fully refer.

"Prior to my arrival at Fort Smith, General Hindman had directed Brigadier-General Cooper, in command of the Indian  p121 Brigade, to adopt a universal system of furloughs. Very many of the Indian troops availed themselves of this privilege. There, however, remained quite a number who refused to accept furloughs, and whose subsistence, &c., added greatly to the then existing difficulties. Brigadier-General Cooper's official reports represented the troops under his command as being almost destitute of clothing; miserably equipped in all respects; poorly armed (many being without arms), and that it was impossible to subsist them on the line of the Arkansas River; hence I was under the necessity, also, of ordering this force to the southward. The alternative was thus presented to me either to proceed with the troops that had been ordered southward, and abandon the line of the Upper Arkansas, or remain in person at Fort Smith, and attempt, with the small force in garrison at that point, to hold possession of the place, and, to some extent, the line indicated until such time as I should have it in my power to subsist such troops as were then in the country or as might be sent from other points. I determined, believing, as I did, that Fort Smith was the true strategic key to the Indian Territory, to adopt the latter course, trusting to the inclemency of the season and the waters of the Arkansas to shield me from an attack. During the winter the enemy made frequent raids, penetrating as far southward as the Arkansas, doing little other mischief than annoying and interrupting the river transportation. I became satisfied, however, that he had no design of attempting the permanent occupation of any point south of the Arkansas so long as our forces held possession of, and controlled, the navigation of the Lower Arkansas. Thus impressed, I ordered the main body of the troops in the Territory to encamp as near Red River as was convenient, in order, first, that they might be more readily subsisted, recruited, and equipped; and, second, that the available transportation might be used in accumulating supplies in the depots near the line of the Arkansas. I thus hoped to accumulate an ample supply of bread-stuffs for the commencement of the spring campaign at the earliest day, the artillery and cavalry horses being meanwhile recruited on Red River, where an abundance of forage had been placed under my direction, by Maj. A. S. Cabell, chief quartermaster.

"In order to distract the attention of the enemy from an insight into these plans and operations, I resolved to have the  p122 enemy, then at Fayetteville, Ark., 55 miles northwest from Fort Smith, annoyed as much as possible, and to this end I gave every encouragement in my power to the formation of partisan companies. Colonel Monroe's First Arkansas Cavalry, about 400 strong, having been sent to my aid, I caused as frequent scouts to be made as it was possible for man and horse to endure. The greater portion of this cavalry was constantly employed watching over and defeating the operations of the numerous bands of jayhawkers who were committing daily deeds of violence and bloodshed.

"The full force of the enemy in Northwestern Arkansas and the Cherokee country during the winter and early spring did not exceed 3,000, inclusive of Pin Indians. Of the latter, some 1,200 or 1,500 were in the service of the Federal Government. To subsist this force and obtain forage, the enemy was under the necessity of scattering it over a large extent of country. In Northwestern Arkansas he was unable to mount a force exceeding 500 men. These facts were repeatedly urged upon the lieutenant-general commanding, and a movement in the rear of this force urgently pressed. I became satisfied that if the enemy was permitted to remain in quiet and uninterrupted possession of the north side of the Arkansas River during the winter and spring, he would, in the exercise of his customary energy, throw forward in the direction of Fort Gibson such quantity of supplies as would suffice to attempt a flank movement on Fort Smith in that direction. General Marmaduke's cavalry force was then occupying the country in the vicinity of Batesville. A brigade of cavalry, under Colonel (C. A.) Carroll, occupied the country in the vicinity of Roseville. From Batesville to Fayetteville was but a short distance, and from Roseville to the same point the distance was not exceeding four or five days' march. Had Marmaduke's cavalry been thrown rapidly in the rear of the enemy at Fayetteville while Carroll marched upon the front, it is quite sure that the result would have been either his capture in detail or his entire abandonment of Northwestern Arkansas and the Indian country. I mean no disrespect to the lieutenant-general then commanding, in making these statements, yet justice to myself and the subsequent verification of the correctness of the views then entertained and repeatedly urged, demand that I should record them. Had the movement indicated been made  p123 (its success­ful issue, in my judgment, being beyond the peradventure of a doubt), I should have been enabled to have had in store, in depots on or near the Arkansas River, an ample supply of breadstuffs, while the country south of that stream abounded in beef cattle of the best quality. In short, I could have assumed the offensive from the line of the Arkansas River with a force fully rested and recruited, both as regards men and horses, considerably earlier in the spring than the enemy could have begun his movements from either Missouri or Kansas. The moral effect of such a condition of affairs upon the people of Arkansas and the Indian Territory and Northern Texas, and its influence upon operations then contemplated and subsequently consummated in the direction of Little Rock, remains, of course, only a subject of conjecture.

"During the winter months I had caused workshops for the repair, &c., of arms and wagons (of which quite a number were fitted up from the debris found scattered above the garrison), as well as put in operation such other branches of industry necessary to the supply of the army as the resources of the country afforded.

"Repeated re­quisitions for the supply of arms and ammunition remaining unfilled, I assumed the responsibility of sending an officer of my staff to Texas, with a view of making an endeavor to obtaining the necessary supply of ammunition and arms, if possible, from that quarter. A greater portion of the ammunition obtained by this officer had to be transported from San Antonio to Bonham, Tex., in ox wagons. The delay incident to this means of transportation was of very material prejudice, especially so, as it was found impossible to procure a supply from any other quarter. I also procured some 500 stand of arms from this source, these being the only arms brought into the Territory during the period of my command, other than a few repaired arms.

"I repeatedly urged upon General Cooper and the officer in command of Speight's brigade the necessity of straining every energy to the preparation of their commands for an advance movement at the earliest practicable period; and, in accordance with my orders, the march northward was begun by the entire force near Red River left under my command as soon as the condition of the roads, &c., would permit. Speight's brigade, together with West's battery (this being the only reliable battery  p124 then under my control), was ordered to Louisiana, after being some days on the march northward.

"Notwithstanding this sudden and important depletion of my effective strength, I determined to make every effort to hold the line of the Arkansas, and, if possible, by means of a superior numerical force of cavalry operating upon the enemy's rear, compel him to abandon his hold on the north bank of that stream at Fort Gibson, a point which he had strongly fortified and garrisoned with from 2,500 to 3,500 troops.

"General Cooper, in conformity with my orders, moved forward with his brigade, consisting of two regiments of Texas cavalry (De Morse's and Martin's), with the bulk of the Indian troops, and a battery of three mountain howitzers and one small prairie rifle gun, to the vicinity of Fort Gibson. Fully apprised of the difficulties experienced by the enemy in regard to his supplies (he being under the necessity of transporting them in wagons for a distance of several hundred miles), and being regularly and correctly advised of the departure of his trains from Fort Scott and other depots to the northward, I made such dispositions as I flattered myself would effectually cut off supplies and re-enforcements. Cabell's brigade, which had been placed under my command a short time before, was moved forward to Fayetteville, with the design of operating upon the rear and lines of communication from that quarter, whilst General Cooper was instructed to avoid a general action, and operate with his available cavalry from the west. Attempts to effect this object were accordingly made. With the conduct and results of these expeditions I was wholly unsatisfied. The failure of the first expedition, under Colonel McIntosh, sent by General Cooper, was attributable, in my judgment, to the command of the expedition devolving upon an Indian officer, deficient in energy and capacity, and who did not enjoy the confidence of the white troops under his command.

"A second expedition, under Col. Stand Watie, was sent to the west of Grand River and in rear of Fort Gibson, with the view of attacking a large train of the enemy and a number of re-enforcements, known to be en route for Gibson." [Steele then recounts the action at Cabin Creek.]

". . . In a few days (July 22) Cooper's and Cabell's brigades were concentrated about 25 miles in rear of the battleground  p125 [Honey Springs] and by the 25th were placed in position at Prairie Springs, 15 miles from Fort Gibson, where I determined to await the arrival of a brigade from Texas, under command of Col. S. P. Bankhead, which I had been notified was ordered to report to me, and which was expected before the 10th of August. Upon the arrival of that brigade, it was my intention to take a position near enough to Fort Gibson to effectually prevent any further supplies or re-enforcements from going in. In a few days the desertions from Cabell's Arkansas brigade became alarming, without any apparent cause. They left by tens and hundreds (as many as 200 leaving in one night, several officers going with them). The weather at this time was good, and provisions (flour and beef) abundant; but another serious difficulty presented itself. The powder which had been received from Texas was found to be worthless when exposed to the slightest moisture, a night's heavy dew converting it into a paste. Under these circumstances, I determined to withdraw farther from the enemy, who might in a night's march attack us at any time, knowing, as he undoubtedly did, the condition of affairs with us, from several deserters who went to his lines. The whole force was accordingly withdrawn to the south side of the Canadian River, and Fort Smith being threatened by a force from Springfield, Mo., Cabell's brigade was posted within supporting distance of that place. My force being nearly all cavalry, and dependent entirely upon grass to subsist the animals, was necessarily much scattered; consequently, when a few days later the enemy was reported advancing in force, a move to the rear was made to a point where all could concentrate. The Creeks failed entirely to come to the point designated, and most of the Cherokees and several companies of Choctaws being absent, I found myself with not over 1,500 men, many of whom were unarmed (nearly all with indifferent arms), opposed to a force of 2,000 cavalry and about 3,000 infantry, the latter transported in 300 two-horse wagons. Instead, therefore, of risking an engagement, nothing was attempted but to keep the enemy in check until our supplies were moved to the rear. In this we were success­ful, nothing having been left to fall into the enemy's hands. He gratified his malice, however, by burning the little town of Perryville. From Perryville the enemy turned toward Fort Smith with a portion of his forces, where General Cabell contested his advance in an engagement  p126 of several hours' duration, most of his men behaving badly. A few hundred repulsed the attacking force, and then retired in the direction of Waldron.

"Whilst retiring before the enemy, near Perryville, I again received notice that Bankhead's brigade was ordered to report to me. It was hurried forward in the direction of Fort Smith, to the support of General Cabell, who had been instructed to retire, in case of necessity, on the road this brigade advanced upon. It was expected that if General Cabell had been obliged to evacuate, this re-enforcement would have enabled him to regain his lost ground. General Cooper's brigade, composed of a few whites and several different tribes of Indians, could not be moved. General Cabell's movements, by the way of Waldron, prevented his junction with the re-enforcements at a time when the enemy, feeling secure, had scattered his forces and offered an easy conquest. General Cabell reported that he had received orders from Major-General Price, which orders were never sent me, and thus his brigade was in some way disconnected with my command. Acting Brigadier-General Bankhead remained several weeks near Fort Smith, cutting off small parties of the enemy. General Cooper, with his brigade, was, as soon as possible, advanced upon the line we had retired upon.

"At this time I left General Cooper in command, for the purpose of having an interview with the commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department. On my return, I found that all the troops had been concentrated near North Fork Town, on the Canadian, and immediately after my arrival, and without consulting my wishes, General Cooper moved the whole slowly in the direction of Fort Smith, halting about 35 miles from that place, where I overtook him. The statements in regard to the enemy's force and position, sent to me during the few days previous of the my arrival at his camp, had varied so much from day to day that I was in great uncertainty as to the best course to pursue. The troops had moved down with the expectation of a battle. I determined to attempt a surprise, upon learning that, owing to the annoyance given by the Choctaws, the enemy had no pickets on one road leading through the Arkansas Bottom, and gave orders accordingly, when General Cooper represented me that he could not bring up his brigade of Indians to take the part assigned to them. I then thought of making the attack  p127 from another direction, where a prairie, with several roads leading from it to the enemy's position would obviate the objection urged. To this plan General Cooper demurred, on the ground that the ponies of his Indians, having been without forage for several days could not make the march in time. The distance was estimated at about 35 miles, to be traveled between 12 m. and daylight the next morning. Wishing to remove every objection, I moved my camp farther around to the south of Fort Smith, and to within 20 miles of that place, where I arrived on the 31st of October, having been delayed by a storm of rain and snow, and in cutting out a road through the Poteau Bottom. During this storm the various commanders of the regiments of Texas troops, composing the Second Brigade, came in a body to inform me of the suffering condition of their men from the want of proper clothing, and of their inability to keep the men together much longer under such circumstances. My force on the 31st of October, as I derived from inspectors' reports, was: Seminoles, 106; Chickasaws, 208; Creeks, 305; Choctaws, 1,024; Choctaw militia, 200, and whites, 999. Of the Indians, all but one regiment were armed with any kind of guns that could be obtained. Some were entirely without arms. The whole force was cavalry and artillery. General Gano arrived the next day with his escort and a portion of Howell's battery, making my whole force nearly 3,000, about two‑thirds of which was composed of at-least three different nations, speaking different languages, and under no kind of discipline. The enemy's scouts had discovered us; consequently all hope of a surprise was at an end. General McNeil had arrived at Fort Smith with re-enforcements. I believe that to have made an attack would only have ended in disaster. Under these circumstances, I withdrew the white troops, and directed General Cooper to keep up, with his Indian brigade, a desultory warfare, to prevent the enemy from foraging or moving about at will. The Texas brigade, Brigadier-General Gano commanding, was withdrawn, and found its clothing at Boggy Depot, from which point it was moved at once eastward near the Arkansas State line. At the time of withdrawing the Texas brigade, the whole command was out of flour or other breadstuffs; 4 small wagon loads only arrived just as we were retiring.

"One of the most fruitful sources of embarrassment experienced in the command of the Indian country, and one which,  p128 instead of being repressed, constantly increased, was that of feeding the indigent Indians. The policy of feeding such Indians as had been driven from their homes, and whose country was in the occupation of the enemy, had been inaugurated prior to my arrival. The total failure of the crops throughout the entire Indian Territory had increased the number dependent upon the commissariat to many thousands. It became necessary to give these people bread or have them throw themselves upon the charity of the enemy, who lost no opportunity to gain ground by holding out liberal inducements of pardon, and of supplies of clothing and food. To resist the moral effect of these inducements held out by the enemy, I was compelled to yield with as much show of cheerfulness as possible to the very heavy demands that were made upon me, and, to meet these demands, large draughts were constantly being made upon stores accumulated for military purposes.

"An experience of twelve months in the command of the Indian country has convinced me that, with a few exceptions, the Indians are wholly unreliable as troops of the line. The officers, as a general rule, are ignorant, void of moral tone of character, and indisposed to enforce discipline among their men. Their allegiance to the Government seems to be regarded more in the light of a voluntary contribution on their part, susceptible of being withheld at their option, than the performance of an obligatory duty. In order to acquire the reputation derived from success, in the administration of the affairs of the Territory (according to the somewhat doubtful standard, success) it is necessary to pander to the opinions and sentiments of Indianized white men, and through such to coax and demagoguize with the Indians, rather than attempt the enforcement of discipline among the troops and system in the various departments. The ignorance of the main body of the Indians naturally subjects them to the influence for good or evil of a class of whites and educated half-breeds, who, living among them and having a knowledge of their language, feelings, prejudices, &c., find no difficulty in molding the masses to their generally interested views. I became satisfied that with those exercising the chief influence among the Indians, there was a settled design to subordinate white officers and white troops to Indian officers and Indian troops.

"In suggesting these views, I would take occasion to state that there are serving in the Indian country a few striking exceptions. Among these I may mention Col. Stand Watie, whom I found to be a gallant and daring officer, but, as was the case in all other instances among the Indian troops, without the slightest discipline in his regiment. For some time prior to making the movement in the direction of Fort Smith, already referred to, I had discerned a growing disinclination on the part of the Indian troops to serve under my command. The ingenuity of my defamers had been taxed to the utmost in giving circulation to the most reckless falsehoods. I was charged with a determination to take the white troops out of their country and abandon them to their fate; that I only awaited a favorable opportunity to go over to the enemy in person; that I was Northern-born, and had no true feeling of sympathy with the South. With another class of troops such calumnies could have been success­fully met, and my influence as a commander not, perhaps, have  p130 been thereby materially impaired; but among the Indian troops, with the influence mentioned operating against me, the consequence will be patent. An improper and unjust construction was given to almost every step I deemed it necessary to take for the good of the service; in short, nothing seemed to have been left undone by designing men and knaves to excite the most violent prejudice and distrust on the part of the Indians. The dark side of my picture, painted in their own colors, was kept constantly present to their view. Explanations of my official conduct were never attempted to be made by those whose implied duty it was to give me their aid and comfort. The Indian command was also led to believe that I was illegally exercising the command of the Territory over Brigadier-General Cooper, who was represented as my superior in rank, and that he, being an Indian officer I was thereby trampling upon the rights, privileges, and wishes of the Indian troops.

"Concluding from these reasons, and many more of a similar character . . . I respect­fully asked of the lieutenant-general commanding to be relieved of duty in the Indian country . . ."