p159  VII

The Next Step

There have been volumes written on the cause and prevention of war. It were futile for me to attempt even to draw an outline of so vast a field. However, it may not be amiss to state briefly the psychical effects I have received from my study and observation over a period of many years.

To me it appears that all causes of war may be defined, in the final analysis by two words: (1) Intolerance and (2) Competition. These two words indicate that the cause of war may be either spiritual or material.

Intolerance of rivalry; of freedom; of religion; of resentment against a growing and prosperous neighbor — these have caused wars in the past. Due to education, to rapid communication and transportation and to the more tolerant spirit thereby engendered, it is quite probable that war springing from intolerance will soon be a thing of the past. This optimism, I believe, is justified by the history of international affairs during the past decade.

 p160  More and more does one sense a Will for Peace by the peoples of the civilized nations. And in the nations where the people rule, war based on intolerance has become practically extinct. However, just here one must remember that today many nations are ruled by dictators. Hungary, Poland, Italy and Spain certainly are governed by autocratic power vested in one individual. Though a dictator upon his own volition may not declare war in any country, yet he may so act as to commit his country to a policy that inferentially will result in war. A country once in a war, it follows, as night the day, that the people of the country will fight to the bitter end. Such is the power of patriotism.

Competition, or the material cause of war, has always existed. It abides in the present and probably will endure in the future.

Competition for foreign markets, for raw materials, for natural resources, for expansion due to over-population, for the world's carrying trade, for colonial empires and competition in other lesser things — all these abide with us today and surely are to engender friction and differences among the nations. Unless differences among nations are settled diplomatically or by arbitration or in some World Court of Justice, then the settlement is made by the arbitrament of arms. To prevent this last is that which is occupying the minds of all thoughtful and Christian-minded men now in the time of peace.

There is, I think, one kind of competition that  p161 is more provocative of grave international differences than any other — the irrational and insensate competition in armaments; a competition that is based on fear.

It was a statesmanlike conception that made the late President Harding call a conference in 1922, at Washington, in an attempt to limit armaments. The results of that conference are very well known. There were treaties signed limiting the naval power of the several nations. One is familiar with the terms of these treaties, so there is no need now to discuss them.

Over a year ago, President Coolidge invited the great naval powers to a conference at Geneva on the further limitations of naval armaments. Only Great Britain and Japan accepted. However, as these are the greatest naval powers, there was a tripartite convention held in Geneva that lasted from June 20 to August 5, 1927. This conference was a failure. For that reason I shall go into it rather in detail and indicate my opinion as to the causes of the failure. I do this for even a stronger reason, believing as I do, that further limitations of armaments is one of the most practical "next steps" that may be taken in seeking a formula whereby war may be avoided — not that limitation, per se, may end war, for were limitation carried to an extreme, nations could still wage war on the sea with their merchant marines, on land with ploughshares beaten into weapons, in the air with  p162 commercial aircraft, the products of industrial chemical factories, in fact, with all the available resources of their respective nations.

My belief in limitation as a deterrent of war is this: that there can be no sudden fatal attack upon one nation by another when armaments are limited. That thereby there will be no initial grave wounds made in a nation's pride, that would obviate or hinder negotiation. It would give time, before an irrevocable conflict was started, for the exercise of sober judgment and reason.

In the memorandum accompanying the President's message to Congress on February 10, 1927, was the following significant statement:

It is well to keep in mind this pronouncement.

The object of the Conference clearly then was to limit naval armaments further than was done by the Washington treaties. Since the latter placed a limit on the number of battle­ships and aircraft carriers, the Geneva Conference could have continued limitation so as to apply to cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

In accepting the invitation to the Conference  p163 both the Japanese and British Governments made statements presaging difficulty in reaching an agreement.

In the Japanese acceptance, we read:

In the British reply was the statement:

To understand fully the proceedings of the Conference, it must be kept in mind that all three delegations largely were composed of naval officers. Naval opinion dominated the Conference.

In opening the Conference the Chairman of the Conference, Hon. Hugh Gibson, an American delegate, read a message from the President in which was stated:

He further outlined the policy of America as concerns naval armament. Following are extracts from that statement:

The American suggestions are based on the following considerations:

The British statement by Rt. Hon. W. C. Bridgeman, First Lord of the Admiralty, contains among other things the following:

On the part of Japan, Viscount Saito made statements from which the following are extracts:

The Japanese delegation submitted a practical plan of limitation which may be omitted.

It will be noted from the foregoing proposals, that the United States and Japan wanted a real limitation of auxiliary naval craft. That is to say, as regards numbers or tonnage. On the other hand, the British proposals were all in the direction of limiting the size of ships and reducing the calibre of the guns. It is important to note this. For the effort of the British, although admitting parity, was to have a treaty such as to reduce the offensive power of the other Navies.

The British view appeared to be that the discussion was on disarmament. As a matter of fact, it was only to limit armaments.

The British proposed eleven changes in present conditions, resulting from the Washington Conference.

Consider these seriatim: the first proposal was to extend the life of existing capital ships from 20 to 26 years. Having now a superiority, the  p175 British were willing to ensure this for six years longer. The second proposal was fair and would result in a saving to the naval powers. Proposals 3, 4, 5 and 6, all provided for reducing size or armament of vessels.

Proposal 8 is probably the one that caused the most discussion at the Conference.

This requires comment in some detail.

One result of the Washington Conference was to limit cruisers to 10,000 tons and to carry guns not larger than the 8‑inch calibre. Then the British — always having an eye on control of the seas — began building these large cruisers. Not so the United States. America hoped for further limitation and in accordance with the spirit of the Washington Conference. So the Geneva Conference was called and was a failure from the fact that though ostensibly agreeable to parity, the British wished to limit to a small number the Washington cruisers, with a limitation as to size and guns of all other cruisers.

At Geneva the British attempted to restrict the large radius of action, heavily armed cruiser and force the United States to build types it did not need.

After weeks of discussion came an impasse. Finally the British delegation went to London for further instructions and returned with a final proposal, made on July 28, 1927, as follows:

Note the small number of Washington cruisers.

Proposals 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 are not of serious import.

From a consideration of these proposals it is seen that the British were aiming at two targets.

(1) To keep Washington cruisers limited to twelve,

and

(2) To raise the ratio of auxiliary vessels between  p177 the British Empire and the United States on the one hand and Japan on the other to 5:3.26, instead of the ratio of Washington Conference of 5:3. Why? To obtain the agreement of Japan?

What would have been the result had the American delegation agreed to this proposal?

The United States has now about 90,000 tons of submarines; 270,000 tons of destroyers; 66,000 tons of Richmond type cruisers. Add to this, 80,000 tons of Washington cruisers and the total is 506,000 tons; leaving only about 84,000 tons available to build cruisers, destroyer leaders or what not. And the British would still dominate the seas. On the other hand, if the Washington cruisers were not limited, the United States could build as many as the security of the nation demands. The crux of the situation is that the Washington cruiser can break any British blockade. Washington cruisers are of more value to the United States than any other type of cruiser.

From the foregoing, I summarize that the failure of the Conference was due most probably to the following:

1. The Conference was dominated by naval thought and tradition. Psychologically, the military mind is not one of compromise — as it should be for things military.

2. The British proposals were not for a real limitation, unless such limitation continued their present superiority on the seas.

 p178  3. The attempt of the British to force the United States to agree to build such ships and so to arm them as to make them of little value to the United States. Small cruisers are of importance to Britain by reason of British bases over the world.

4. The attempt by the British to prevent the United States from building the types of ships needed for the security of the nation.

5. And last, but most important, the absence at the Conference of the manifestation of a generous spirit or desire for a limitation of armaments — a spirit that was to have been expected after the results of the Washington Conference.

Though a disappointment, the tripartite conference at Geneva was not without value. The causes for that failure may be overcome in the future and such radical limitations made as to be a "next step" in reducing the possibility of war.

We naval officers know that there may come "a time to kill," "a time of war and a time of peace." For that reason we urge such a navy, as compared to other naval powers, that will mean security to the nation. Disarmament cannot take place until mankind fears God and keeps his commandments. That is the millennium.

For the present every gesture seeking a solution for this, the world's greatest problem, serves a useful purpose in directing thoughtful minds  p179 to the necessity of a continuous search for a formula that may banish from the face of the earth the greatest of all pestilences — War!

The End

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