Short URL for this page:
bit.ly/COTTSI4


[Much of my site will be useless to you if you've got the images turned off!]
mail:
Bill Thayer

[Link to a series of help pages]
Help
[Link to the next level up]
Up
[Link to my homepage]
Home
previous:

[Link to previous section]
Chapter 3

This webpage reproduces a chapter of
The Southern Indians

by
R. S. Cotterill

University of Oklahoma Press
Norman, Oklahoma, 1954

The text is in the public domain.

This page has been carefully proofread
and I believe it to be free of errors.
If you find a mistake though,
please let me know!

next:

[Link to next section]
Chapter 5

 p57  IV
Alexander McGillivray

From the American Revolution the Southern Indians emerged with their territory theoretically undiminished since the enforced Cherokee cessions of 1777; the encroachments on Cherokee land after the treaty of Long Island had been the acts of individuals eliciting from the North Carolina government as little of approval as of opposition. But with the return of peace the expropriation of Indian land became an official North Carolina policy directed at both Cherokees and Chickasaws. In May, 1783, North Carolina, by legislative act, confiscated the entire Indian domain within her limits except the land in the angle of the French Broad and Tennessee, which the Cherokees were permitted to retain. For the Chickasaws no reservation at all was provided, whether because North Carolina knew the tribe lived outside the state or was unaware that it claimed land within. The expropriated lands were opened to entry, and in the summer and fall of 1783, the two bewildered and exasperated tribes saw their domain overrun by a host of white men locating claims.1

The example of grand larceny set by North Carolina was one  p58 that Georgia could wholly approve but was unable to follow; since the Indians within her borders were too strong to be dispossessed by legislation, the state could only essay piecemeal spoliations by treaty. A beginning was made with the Cherokees, from whom Georgia demanded a land cession in compensation for Chickamauga ravages in 1782. This venerable stratagem of exacting from the peaceful Cherokees a payment of debts due from the hostile Chickamaugas was countered by the Cherokees with a cession of lands belonging to the Creeks. The land between the Tugalo and the Apalachee rivers was ceded on May 31, 1783, at Augusta, by a delegation of Overhill Cherokees led by the Terrapin, son of the deceased Oconostota.2 The beguiled Georgians, forced to the conclusion that a Creek cession of the same land was a prerequisite to peaceful possession, invited that tribe to meet them at Augusta, November 1, 1783. This invitation the tribe as a whole ignored but the civil chiefs of Cusseta and Tallassie — the Fat King and the Tame King — who had defiantly remained friendly to the Americans during the Revolution and were now smarting under their recent demotion by McGillivray, attended the conference and made the cession which Georgia desired. On their return home, the two chiefs justified themselves to their outraged neighbors by alleging that they had been forced by the Georgians to make the cession in spite of their protest that their act could not bind the tribe.3

The third American inroad on Indian lands in 1783 was initiated at Long Island on July 9, 1783, when Joseph Martin, now Cherokee agent of North Carolina (since the spring of 1783) as  p59 well as of Virginia, and John Donelson, acting for a group of North Carolina speculators, bought for a promised $5,000 in merchandise from a group of Indians, whom they called Chickamaugas, the Muscle Shoals region north of the Tennessee River. Only the high reputation for integrity which Martin deservedly enjoyed prevents the suspicion that he here employed the hoary frontier legerdemain of buying from one set of Indians the property belonging to another. For it is by no means clear that the Indians with whom he dealt were really Chickamaugas, since the Indian spokesman in the Virginia treaty immediately preceding the land deal was the Raven. Moreover, the prospect of free rations and presents, which ordinarily made an Indian treaty delegation approximate in numbers the tribal population, attracted to Long Island on this occasion only twenty-two Indians, of whom six were women. Whether or not the twenty-two were Chickamaugas they certainly did not represent the Five Lower Towns, the inhabitants of which were the Indians nearer the Muscle Shoals region. Moreover, any settlement there would certainly be opposed by the Chickasaws, who claimed part of the region, and by the Creeks, who claimed it all.4

Against the rapacity of North Carolina, the sly nibbling of Georgia, and the infiltration of the speculators, the Southern Indians reacted in various ways. The Chickasaws made treaties with Virginia and Spain; the Choctaws made overtures to Georgia and a treaty with Spain; the Creeks allied themselves to Spain; the Chickamaugas went on fighting. The Chickasaws had addressed their overtures in 1782 to Virginia partly because they considered and the United States to be synonymous. These overtures finally bore fruit in the summer of 1783, when an agent sent by Joseph Martin reached the Chickasaw towns and arranged for a conference to be held at French Lick in November. In this conference on November 5 and 6 with Martin and Donelson, the Red King (Mingo Homa) and Piomingo asserted the Chickasaw owner­ship  p60 of the territory west of a line running along the Cumberland-Tennessee divide from the Ohio to Duck Creek and thence up Duck Creek to its source. Undoubtedly their emphasis on this matter was a notification to all and sundry that they meant to oppose the Carolina confiscation act of the preceding May.5

Since it became evident to the Chickasaws that while Virginia could grant peace it could not supply trade, they were forced in their desire for the latter commodity to have recourse to Spain. On this question of friendship, public opinion among the Chickasaws was divided, with Piomingo and the Colberts leading an American faction, while Mingo Homa (the "king") with the younger men favored the Spaniards. But on the necessity for trade there could be no difference of opinion, and the delegation that went to Mobile to treat with the Spaniards (at their invitation) in June, 1784, seems to have been representative of the nation. The resulting treaty, made on June 22 and 23, confirmed peace and bound the Spaniards to provide an adequate trade. In return, the Chickasaws promised to prohibit traders other than those with Spanish licenses, to report all strangers in their country to the Spanish authorities, and to maintain peaceful relations with all Indian nations except the Kickapoos, with whom the Chickasaws were nourishing an ancient feud.6

The Chickasaws had turned to the Spaniards only after applying to the Americans, but the Choctaws dealt with them both at the same time. In June, 1783, Franchimastabe, the head chief, with the approval of the Choctaw council started a delegation to Savannah to solicit peace and trade from the Georgians. On July 17 the Governor of Georgia answered their request by proffering friendship and promising trade provided the Choctaws should induce the Creeks to permit the Georgia traders to go through their territory,7 While this delegation was on its way to Savannah, the  p61 hungry Choctaws at home went in mass formation to Mobile to confer with the Spaniards. The resulting treaty on June 14 was practically the same as that made a few days later between Spaniards and Chickasaws except for the omission of the Kickapoo clause.8

The position of Alexander McGillivray at the close of the Revolution was eminent and unenviable. He was head chief and principal warrior of the Creek confederacy, thus uniting in himself the power of peace and war, but he was "deserted by the British, without pay, without money, without friends, and without property, saving a few negroes, and he and his nation threatened with destruction by the Georgians, unless they agreed to cede them the better part of their country." To this catalog of woes it may be added that the collapse of the British deprived the Creeks of the trade on which their power and perhaps even their existence depended. Future trade could be secured only from the Spaniards, whose ability and disposition to supply it McGillivray distrusted, or from the Georgians, against whom he felt a bitter and unabating resentment because of their confiscation of his father's estate. While pondering this dilemma, McGillivray put his house in order against his two recent foes and now unfriendly neighbors by a governmental reform which subordinated the town civil chiefs to the war chiefs. This measure, which had the effect of pla­cing the nation on a permanent war footing, was bitterly opposed by some of the civil chiefs, notably by Opothle Mico (the Tame King), of Tallassie, and Neah Mico (the Fat King), of Cusseta, both of whom had clashed repeatedly with McGillivray because of their pro-Americanism during the Revolution. Tribal custom made it impossible for McGillivray to punish the chiefs themselves, but he had the satisfaction of executing several of their white followers.9

 p62  From the difficulties that were besetting him, McGillivray found relief through the counsel of his father's old friend and neighbor, William Panton, head of the firm of Panton, Leslie and Company. Panton advised him to make an alliance with the Spaniards by which the latter would guarantee the Creek lands against Georgia in return for a monopoly of Creek trade to be supplied through Panton, Leslie and Company, of which McGillivray should become a partner, and to be controlled by McGillivray as Spanish commissary.10 Accepting this sage, although not disinterested, advice, McGillivray wrote to O'Neill, the Spanish commander at Pensacola, soliciting protection and trade for the Creeks, and for himself an appointment as commissary.11 The result of his overtures was a Creek-Spanish treaty at Pensacola, June 1, 1784, by which Spain guaranteed the Creek territory within her limits and pledged a permanent trade in return for a Creek promise to refrain from dealing with Americans and to honor only Spanish passports. After the signing of the treaty, McGillivray was appointed commissary.12

The territorial guarantee contained elements of imperfection, since a considerable portion of the Creek lands (including the Augusta cession) lay east of the Flint and therefore beyond the limits of the Spanish claims. For the firm of Panton, Leslie and Company, in which he had a silent, although unconcealed, partner­ship,  p63  McGillivray was able to secure from the Spaniards neither entrance into Pensacola for the Creek trade nor a share of the Choctaw-Chickasaw trade, but only permission to continue its store established near St. Marks in the last year of the war.13 Accepting the half-loaf then possible of attainment in these two respects, McGillivray after the treaty set himself to the twin tasks of inducing (by a unceasing epistolary bombardment) the Spaniards to grant Panton entrance into Pensacola and persuading the Choctaws and Chickasaws to place themselves under Spanish protection. In both endeavors he used all his prestige as chief of the Creeks and as "principal in the late general confederacy of the Indian Nations in favor of the English." In the former objective his success was immediate; in the latter, delayed. Having done what he could to put the Creeks on a war footing, to secure Spanish protection, and to promote intertribal co‑operation, McGillivray was in a position to undertake the recovery of the Augusta cession. But the Governor of Georgia, apparently impressed by these measures, heeded the official Creek repudiation of the cession and in November, 1784, notified McGillivray that the Georgians would not attempt to settle the disputed lands. This assurance McGillivray professed to, and perhaps did, accept, and so, for the time being, the Creeks kept the peace.

The Cherokees escaped the effects of the confiscation act not by virtue of their own opposition, but by the confusion of the spoilers. For when North Carolina in the spring of 1784, by the cession of her western land, threw on the United States the burden of protecting her satiated land speculators, rival speculators initiated the state of Franklin with such enthusiasm that even a repeal of the cession failed to impress them. The ensuing "war" between North Carolina and Franklin made white settlement of the confiscated land so impossible that both Cherokees and Chickasaws remained undispossessed. Dragging Canoe and the Chickamaugas remained relatively quiet through 1784, partly because their British ammunition was exhausted and partly because the Muscle Shoals speculation had not yet reached the stage of attempted  p64 settlement. The speculators, after buying the land from Indians who did not own it, solicited a grant of it from a state whose title was in dispute. Selecting Georgia over South Carolina as their prospective benefactor, they presented through William Blount, in February, 1784, a petition, to which the legislature of that state responded inadequately, not by a grant, but by the appointment of commissioners to organize a district of the Tennessee and to survey the region for sale. Since three of the commissioners were members of the speculating group and the other four complaisant, the disappointed but persevering speculators still hoped by individual warrants to engross the land which Georgia had refused to grant. In July, 1784, four of the commissioners (including the three speculators) met and justified the trust placed in them by appointing members of the land company colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, Indian agent, and surveyor. To further the settling of the Carolina-manned Georgia District of the Tennessee the commissioners decreed the opening of a land office at Muscle Shoals in March, 1785. But the interest of the Franklin people, the only prospective settlers, in the land venture was so overshadowed by the attraction of their "war" against North Carolina that the opening failed to materialize.14

To the United States in congress assembled, the menace to peace inherent in the discontent of the Southern Indians was evident at the very close of the Revolution. But since its "sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians" was limited to those Indians who "not members of any of the States," it could not constitutionally intervene in the South, where all the Indians were indubitably state members.15 Until the North Carolina cession of 1784, Congress  p65 could only view with alarm a situation it was powerless to improve. While Congress hesitated, North Carolina rescinded its cession, the state of Franklin was organized, the Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws placed themselves under the protection of Spain, and Georgia appointed commissioners to set up a government in the Muscle Shoals country. Perhaps assisted in making up its mind by the impact of these events, Congress on March 15, 1785, decided to appoint commissioners to treat with the Southern Indians.16

With none of the Southern Indians could the United States constitutionally treat except with a portion of the Cherokees, and even with them only on the doubtful theory that the North Carolina repeal of cession was invalid. Yet all four tribes received invitations to meet the commissioners, the Creeks at Galphinton in Georgia, October 24, and the others later at Hopewell in South Carolina. McGillivray's acceptance of the invitation to the Creeks was inspired partly by a hope of having the Augusta cession repudiated and partly by his regard for Pickens, from whom he had received a personal appeal supplementing the formal invitation to the "Kings, Headmen and Warriors of the Creeks." Since the conclusion of the Spanish treaty he had had the satisfaction of seeing the Spaniards forced by their own necessities to admit Panton, Leslie and Company into Pensacola (1785) and of holding (in July) a conference with the other Southern tribes as a further step in reforging an Indian confederacy. It is possible that his plan of using the United States to curb Georgia might have succeeded, since the commissioners, as their later actions revealed, were sincerely intent on checking encroachment on Indian land. But deciding, probably because of the strenuous objections of O'Neill, to absent himself from the Galphinton meeting, he sent  p66 as his deputies two chiefs each from the Upper and Lower Creeks under definite instructions to have the Augusta cession nullified and the boundary fixed as it was in 1773. With these deputies the commissioners refused to treat, allegedly because they were too few, actually perhaps, because the commissioners were intimidated by the Georgia agents, who had come to Galphinton determined to prevent any treaty between the United States and the Creek Indian "members" of Georgia. After the departure of the timid, or at least prudent, commissioners, the Georgia officials made a treaty of their own, not with the accredited Creek representative, but with the Tame King and the Fat King, who had put in their appearance presumably as a mark of defiance to McGillivray. The two chiefs not only reaffirmed the Augusta cession, but made an additional cession of the territory east of the Oconee and of a line from the many of the Oconee to the headwaters of the St. Mary's.17

After the futile experiments at Galphinton, the disgruntled commissioners went on to Hopewell, on the Keowee, where 918 Cherokees including thirty-six chiefs from nearly as many towns, set siege to their inadequate commissary. This representative attendance from all the nation, except the Five Lower Towns, was attracted not solely, perhaps, by the culinary prospects but also by the hope of securing from the United States a redress of their grievances against North Carolina and Franklin. The latter community, appropriating the practices as well as the territory of North Carolina, had forced a faction of the Overhills into a treaty on Dumplin Creek in June, whereby the Indians surrendered that part of their reserved land which lay between the French Broad and the Little Tennessee divide. To the browbeaten Cherokees, the commissioners' opening announcement that no land cession was desired came as a surprise; but when they were called on to state their boundaries, they had recovered sufficiently to reassert  p67 their claim to Transylvania colony. This claim they philosophically withdrew when the commissioners produced Henderson's deed signed by Oconostota and Attakullaculla. The boundary as finally agreed upon followed the southern boundary of Transylvania (so the commissioners thought), the treaty line of 1777 (with minor variations), and the Augusta line of 1783. To Old Tassel's plea for the removal of the trespassers on their land, the commissioners replied, in the classical formula for nonaction, that they would lay the matter before Congress. The treaty was signed on November 28, 1785, by thirty-six chiefs, including Old Tassel, of Toquo, the head chief, and Hanging Maw, of Echota, the chief warrior.18

The tardiness of the Choctaws in arriving at Hopewell nearly a month after the Cherokees made the treaty was likely because the Creeks, as a mark of displeasure or as a matter of routine, had stolen all the Choctaw horses as the latter passed through the Creek country, with the result that they had to finish their journey on foot. From the biographical details available, it is impossible to determine whether or not the Colonel Wood who led them in was the "intelligent, honest man" whom the commissioners had sent to the Choctaws with an invitation to treat. At any rate, he had been named by Georgia as one of her commissioners to set up Bourbon county in the Natchez country and, since the failure of that fantastic enterprise, had been living furtively among the Choctaws, styling himself Georgia Indian agent and seducing them into ceding him vast tracts of their land.19 His ability to secure  p68 a Choctaw delegation to Hopewell was due to Choctaw discontent with trade conditions. The firm of Mathers and Strothers, to which the Spaniards had given a monopoly of Choctaw and Chickasaw commerce, had been unable to furnish an adequate supply of goods, and, because of a glut of Indian products on the market, had been compelled to lower their prices on peltry. To the Indians, innocent of any knowledge of economic laws, the explanation of their lowered income lay simply in Spanish perfidy, which they now proceeded to counter by returning to the Americans. Under the Spanish regime, the Choctaws had continued their ancient organization of three divisions, which the Spaniards called the Big District, Little District, and the Six Towns. Franchimastabe was head chief, and it was he who sent the Choctaw delegation to Hopewell, selecting men marked by their former loyalty to the British.

When the Choctaws arrived at Hopewell on December 26, their Mississippi clothing, at best inadequate for a Carolina winter, was so shredded and torn from their long overland journey that their wardrobes had to be replenished before the negotiations could proceed. The treaty signed January 3, 1786, contained a guarantee of Choctaw territory as it was on the last day of British rule, an acknowledgment by the Choctaws of American sovereignty, and a recognition of American control of their trade. The Choctaws ceded to the United States two six-square-mile tracts for trading posts, the location of which was to be determined later. In gratitude, perhaps, to Wood for leading them to new clothes and two weeks of free meals, the Choctaws asked that he be appointed their superintendent; the commissioners tempered their refusal of the request, which was beyond their authority to grant, by appointing John Pitchlynn as official interpreter for the tribe. This completed the farcical treaty, which was signed by thirty-one Choctaws (so they later explained to the accusing Spaniards) only after they had been so saturated with liquor by the Americans as to be insensible.20

 p69  The ethical scruples that had prevented the commissioners from treating with the four Creeks at Galphinton did not now embarrass them in dealing with the three Chickasaws who arrived as the Choctaw meeting was ending. The three delegates were Lotapaia, Piomingo, the war chief, and Mingotuska, in the garbled spelling of whose name can be detected the Choctaw "king," Taski Etoka. Taski Etoka, whom the Americans commonly called the "Hare-lip King," was the nephew and successor of Mingo Homa, who had died in 1784, while Lotapaia was apparently acting in the place of James Colbert, who had been killed by a fall from his horse in January, 1784. Between the Chickasaw king and the war chief there existed considerable enmity, reflecting the division of the tribe into Spanish and American factions, but they had been forced into temporary accord by the necessity of seeking from the Americans a trade promised but still unprovided by the Spanish from Mobile. In the treaty, signed January 10, the Chickasaws granted to the United States the same trade monopoly they had given the preceding year to Spain, and with hopes long unrealized ceded to the United States a tract of land five miles in diameter at the lower end of Muscle Shoals for a trading post. Before they could leave, both Chickasaws and Choctaws were robbed thoroughly and impartially by the Cherokees.21

The three dubious treaties negotiated at Hopewell were duly reported to Congress, which on April 17, 1786, received them in calm disregard of protests by North Carolina and Georgia. Whatever ambition Congress may have had of increasing its authority or of improving Indian relations was quickly nullified by the conduct of Franklin and Georgia. Because some Cherokees, apparently in naive reliance on the Hopewell treaty, had killed several  p70 trespassers on their land, John Sevier, the president of Franklin, sent an expedition in August, 1786, against the easily accessible Overhills and forced them in the treaty of Coyatee to surrender all their remaining land north of the Little Tennessee.22 At the very time that the commissioners at Hopewell were ostensibly restoring the Muscle Shoals region to the Indians, Valentine Sevier was leading a group of ninety people down the Tennessee to settle in the Bend. Only a prudent retreat before the onslaught of Dragging Canoe saved them from annihilation at the hands of McGillivray.23

On April 2, 1786, the Creek council declared war on Georgia, which had resumed, or continued, the occupation of the territory "ceded" at Augusta and Galphinton. The activities of the war parties, which McGillivray at once unleashed, were apparently unhampered by his counsel to remove the intruders and destroy their property, but to refrain from killing the unresisting. War parties sent against Muscle Shoals had to limit themselves to a survey of the ruins, Dragging Canoe having made other action unnecessary. A third set of Creek warriors joined with the Chickamaugas against the Cumberland settlements in an onslaught so furious that it carried far into Kentucky.24 Arms and ammunition for these raids were furnished the Creeks from St. Marks and Pensacola. Dragging Canoe received part of his supplies through John McDonald, who after the Revolution had remained among the Chickamaugas as a trader to Charleston and Pensacola. Most of the Chickamauga supplies, however, were brought in by  p71 French traders from Detroit over the ancient Wabash-Tennessee route. There were about one hundred of these traders resorting to Muscle Shoals, of whom thirty were settled there under a guard of Shawnee and Delaware Indians. The enterprising French traders not only supplied the Chickamaugas, but also visited the Cherokee and Chickasaw towns and went far enough into Creek territory to excite the apprehensions of Panton's factors.25 It was doubtless with a view of safeguarding these supplies that the Chickamaugas built the new town of Coldwater.

The immediate effect of McGillivray's vigorous attack was an overture for peace from the Cumberland settlements and the appointment by the Georgia legislature of Daniel McMurphy as "their agent to reside in the Creek nation to preserve peace with their Friends the Creek Indians." The arrival of McMurphy (dubbed Yellow Hair by the Creeks) coincided, by design or good fortune, with the absence of McGillivray in New Orleans. His optimistic, or impudent, demands that all traders should have a Georgia license and all travelers a Georgia passport received the support of the still disgruntled Tame King and Fat King, but the other chiefs refused any dealing with him until McGillivray returned. Prior to this event, McMurphy, with commendable prudence, returned to Georgia but, before leaving, wrote a letter to O'Neill at Pensacola, asserting that the Creeks were within the state of Georgia and protesting against the action of Spain in supplying them with arms.26 The Creek council, called by McGillivray on his return, after listening to the talks of McMurphy, in absentia, as relayed through Tame King and Fat King, instructed  p72 McGillivray (doubtless at his suggestion) to warn the Georgians again to retire east of the Ogeechee.27

This warning Georgia answered, apparently before receiving it, with an invitation to the Creeks to meet state commissioners on Shoulderbone Creek on October 15, blandly observing that if the Creeks had any complaints about encroachments, they ought to let the Georgians know what they were. In a tart reply a month later, McGillivray, after reminding the commissioners that the Creeks had spent a considerable portion of their time for the last few years sending unanswered complaints to Georgia, declined any meeting until assured that the 1773 boundary was restored. At the same time he defied Georgia, McGillivray granted the Cumberland people a truce till the following April (1787), being induced thereto by the clamors of Tame King and Fat King, by the need of the Creek people to resume their hunting, and by the information gathered by his reliable intelligence service that the Georgians were negotiating with Franklin for a joint expedition against the Creeks, with whom they were discussing peace.28

Undeterred by the attitude of McGillivray, the Georgians continued their diplomatic efforts to promote a conference that might bear fruit commensurate with those won at Augusta and Galphinton. They were so far success­ful that when the time came for the Shoulderbone meeting, November 3, 1786, the Tame King and the Fat King with their followers put in their appearance and confirmed the two treaties they had previously made. Their reward for this limited complaisance and eminent past exertions on behalf of Georgia was their detention by the Georgians as hostages for the good conduct of the Creeks, one element of the said good conduct, so it was rumored, being the assassination of McGillivray or, as an equivalent, his delivery to the Georgians. The seizure of the two chiefs was perhaps the one act of the Georgians that McGillivray could wholly approve, since it relieved  p73 him of his two thorns in the flesh and at the same time gave him an opportunity to execrate the Georgian conduct. The net result of the Shoulderbone species of diplomacy was the solidification of the Creeks, for the Tame King "for once in his life time behaved like a Man," frightened the Georgians into releasing him, and came home with his resentment unassuaged by the presents given him. The followers of the unreleased Fat King also now aligned themselves with McGillivray, and even the Seminoles joined in the war. The Georgians, suspecting that their boldness had boomeranged, sent McMurphy and "Young Galphin" to the Creeks, the division of labor between them being that the latter should ask for peace while the former promoted the assassination of McGillivray. McGillivray chased McMurphy out of the country and granted Galphin a truce for the duration of the hunting season.29

In the meantime, since the negotiation of the Hopewell treaties seemed to have provoked the Southern states to a no more violent attitude than contempt, the Congress of the United States had apparently felt encouraged to push further the assertion of its authority. On April 3, 1787, just as he was on the point of resuming war after the nominal truce, McGillivray received a letter from Dr. James White stating that White had been appointed United States superintendent of Southern Indians and was on his way to the Creek country to establish peace.30 Any hope McGillivray  p74 may have had from this mission disappeared when he found that White had arrived in the Creek country convinced that the Augusta and Galphinton cessions had been fairly negotiated, a conviction gained neither from study nor from intuition but from the propaganda which he had been subjected as he passed through Georgia. This view, however, when expressed to the council aroused such an extreme denunciation from the chiefs that the superintendent returned to Georgia convinced that the Georgia claims were invalid. His mission promoted peace by securing the release of the Creek hostages held by Georgia and a consequent extension of the truce till August.31

While McGillivray was fencing with Georgia and the Overhill Cherokees were trying to satisfy Franklin's insatiable appetite for land, the Chickamaugas, disdaining both appeasement and diplomacy, had been bludgeoning away on the Cumberland settlements. In May, 1787, the unilateral delights of this operation were interrupted when the Cumberland people sent an unexpected expedition under James Robertson against Coldwater, which presented the double attraction of accessibility and quiet. Among those killed in the ensuing engagement were several Creek Indians, who, in all probability, were present not merely as innocent bystanders.32 The truce being thus broken, McGillivray at once unleashed several hundred of his straining warriors against the Cumberlands and sent a small party into the Chickasaw country, where, he had been informed, the Americans were building a fort. The latter, finding some Americans at work, killed a number of them, including Davenport, who had gone out as one of Georgia's commissioners in 1785 to organize Bourbon County and since the failure of that fantastic enterprise had been lingering among the Chickasaws as Georgia's commissary.33

 p75  Both factions of the Chickasaws had tolerated Davenport because they had hoped through him to secure some modicum of the commerce that both Spain and the United States had promised and neither had supplied. In a joint action springing from a common destitution, Taski Etoka and Franchimastabe in December, 1786, had sent Miró a formal complaint about trade conditions, threatening that if Spain did not provide the supplies promised at Mobile, the two tribes would turn to the Americans.34 Since no visible commercial improvement followed in the wake of their indignation, they had carried out their threat in March, 1787, by sending a joint delegation to Congress to request the immediate establishment at Muscle Shoals of the trading post for which the Chickasaws at Hopewell had donated the site. From this excursion they secured nothing except the usual presents and the customary extensive collection of promises.35 Some Americans, apparently on individual initiative unassociated with official encouragement, had established a trading post at Chickasaw Bluffs, but only a thin trickle of goods from it reached the Chickasaws and Choctaws.36 On March 19, 1787, the Choctaws and Chickasaws, having seen their delegation safely off to the Americans, held a conference with the Spanish commissary, Pedro Yuzón, at Yazoo, where they aired their economic grievances and proposed certain reforms.37 Having received these proposals, chiefly for cheaper  p76 goods and more of them, Miró finally recognized the elementary truth that the Indians could receive supplies only from some one who could furnish them and began negotiations with Panton to supplant Mather and Strother and take over the trade. He sent Juan de Villebeuvre to the Indians to herald the coming dispensation and to counteract American influences. Villebeuvre met the Indians at Yazoo the last of October, heard their excuses for their previous dealing with the Americans, and received, probably with considerable skepticism, their pledges of future good conduct.38

When, in the summer of 1787, McGillivray began planning to intensify the war against the Georgians to an even greater degree than had been normal during the truce, he could justly congratulate himself on the smiling state of his fortunes. His warriors had inflicted so much punishment on the Cumberlands that even Governor Caswell had been moved to intercession; in May at Little Tallassie he had presided over a council with visiting delegations of Iroquois, Hurons, and Shawnees and had seen an agreement made to restore their Revolutionary confederation against the Americans; he had outwitted White, killed Davenport, and, with the unwitting aid of Choctaws and Chickasaws, forced the Spaniards to admit Panton into Mobile. The only element of discontent was the pro-Americanism of Piomingo and his followers among the Chickasaws, and he proposed that the Spaniards should bring them into alignment by withholding supplies from them, although the operation might have to be deferred until there were some supplies to withhold.39

But McGillivray's consciousness of well-being was considerably diluted when he heard in the fall of 1787 that he was to be deprived of Spanish support, both moral and material. This change of attitude on the part of Miró reflected his fear that McGillivray, by his aggressive tactics, might become involved in a general war with the United States and (what was more deplorable) also involve  p77 Spain.40 His first act was to reduce the quantity of arms (according to McGillivray the quantity was not reducible) and to notify him that they were to be used only in defensive warfare. Since defensive warfare was the only kind that McGillivray considered he had been waging, he among other things demanded that Miró tell him exactly what his intentions were. Miró then advised him to make terms with the Georgians even if he had to confirm the cessions of Augusta and Galphinton. This unpalatable advice was made even more distasteful by Miró's insistence that in any event the monopoly of Creek trade should be reserved to Spain. From this dilemma of fighting without support or accepting an ignominious peace, McGillivray was extricated by the intervention of the United States Congress, William Augustus Bowles, and the captain general of Cuba.

In a body as deliberative as the United States Congress, the further consideration given to the Creek situation on August 3, 1787, must be considered as practically an immediate reaction to the failure of the White mission four months before. After briefly pondering the issue until October 26, it voted to send a four-man delegation to the South to make new treaties with the Creeks and Cherokees, one commissioner each to be selected by the Carolinas and Georgia to act with the superintendent. White, in order, presumably, to devote full time to conspiracy, closed his brief and discouraging diplomatic career by resigning in January, 1788, and Congress on February 29 appointed Richard Winn of North Carolina as his successor for a term of six months. The instructions given the commissioners to negotiate treaties of peace and friendship, to arrange boundaries, and to eschew land cessions did not carry any implication that they were to consider the treaties of Augusta and Galphinton invalid.

The invitation from the United States to a peace conference not only relieved McGillivray from fear of a general war, but  p78 also aroused his suspicion that it had originated in Georgia's adversity. Therefore he qualified his acceptance by demanding, as prerequisite to a conference, the removal of the Georgians from the disputed territory. Nor would he accept as a substitute for a removal, which the agitated commissioners alleged their inability to force, their promise to request Georgia to make no further encroachment. While negotiations were in this interesting stage where neither party was able to advance and neither wished to withdraw, the Creeks received a visitor in the person of William Augustus Bowles.41

The arrival of Bowles among the Lower Creeks in June, 1788, was so timely that it is difficult to consider it not prearranged. Whether he came by invitation or on his own initiative, he brought the welcome news that he had landed a supply of arms and ammunition on the east coast of Florida and that McGillivray had only to send a pack train for it. To McGillivray the beneficence of this manna in no way depended either on its origin or on the manner of its transmission, and he blandly accepted Bowles' explanation that it had been sent by an English charitable society in sympathy with Creek distress. With this supply in hand, and a larger one promised for November, he became even more independent in his attitude to Spain and even more adamant toward the commissioners. On August 20, 1788, he sent Miró his "determined resignation" from the Spanish service, being moved thereto by the credence which the Spanish officials were giving to the wild rumors that McGillivray, Bowles, and Panton were conspiring to attack Pensacola, take over the Floridas, and set up an Indian government under British protection. But the sensible Governor checked the gathering storms by writing McGillivray that the captain general had directed him (Miró) "to sattisfie you and your nation," adding slyly that it would doubtless no longer be necessary for McGillivray to resort to extraordinary agencies for supplies. Since Miró, by breaking up Bowles' second expedition, had made it impossible for any immediate supplies to reach  p79 the Creeks by this "extraordinary" agency, McGillivray accepted the tendered Spanish olive branch, and agreed, on Panton's urgent advice, to have no further dealings with Bowles.42 So, his deadlock with other American commissioners already temporarily resolved by their postponement of the conference till the following May, McGillivray, again secure on flanks and rear, could now bestow on the Georgians the attention that they, in his view, deserved.

Since the Chickamaugas were unrecognized as a separate tribe and the Cherokee government was officially at peace, North Carolina could justify its refusal to appoint a peace commissioner on the technical grounds that the state and the Cherokees were not at war.43 This fortunate state of affairs, however, came to an end in June, 1788, when a force of Franklinites on one of their expeditions foully murdered Old Tassel, who had come out on their own invitation to confer with them. The immediate result of this act was that the inhabitants of Echota and five other towns of the Overhills deserted their towns and moved east of the mountains, hoping to derive from distance a safety that meekness had been unable to bring.44 The tribal council elected Little Turkey as head chief, thus ending the schism that had existed since 1777. From Oostanaula on June 20 and June 30, the chiefs sent talks to Pickens declaring for peace, but condemning in bitter language  p80 the murder of Old Tassel and the killing of other peaceful Indians by the Franklin people.45 Martin went among them and remained for a month, trying to quiet them, preventing the wholesale removal they had apparently contemplated, but failing, and perhaps not desiring, to allay their resentment against Sevier and Franklin.

The war which Governor Johnston had been unable to detect became evident to Winn when the Cherokees in August inflicted a stinging defeat on Martin at Lookout Mountain, and on August 29 he appealed to Martin and the Governor to make peace.46 Since this appeal was fruitless and was followed by another raid by Sevier on the Valley and Middle towns in September, on the twelfth of October he sent a talk to the chiefs themselves, which they answered from Oostanaula November 10, recounting the injustices they had received but avowing their desire for peace.47 The signatures of Little Turkey, Hanging Maw, and Dragging Canoe attested a Cherokee unity that might be directed either to peace or continued war. In November, the Governor finally acted by issuing a proclamation against warring on the Cherokees, by appointing John Steele as North Carolina commissioner to act with Winn, and by sending Alexander Drumgoole to invite the Cherokees to a peace conference and to go on to the Creek country with a letter to McGillivray soliciting his co‑operation.48 On March 10, Little Turkey, Hanging Maw, and Dragging Canoe accepted the invitation to a peace conference, which they asked to be held at Hopewell; they also agreed to a truce until the conference should be held. But while Drumgoole was at Oostanaula, a delegation of Cherokees was meeting with Winn, Martin, and the three state commissioners on the Keowee, agreeing to a truce and a conference to be held on the French Broad the third Monday in May.49

 p81  When in May, 17889, McGillivray received from the American commissioners an invitation to meet them in the postponed conference on June 30, he might have refused, with good grace, on the technical ground that their commissions given under the Confederation were not valid in a Georgia that had now joined the "more perfect union." His acceptance, as he carefully explained to Miró, was because the failure of the Spaniards to deliver their promised war supplies left him no alternative to negotiating for peace. The Cherokees had no such legal grounds for avoiding a meeting, for whatever validity the American commissions had possessed for a treaty in 1788 they still possessed in 1789, since North Carolina had not joined the new union, and was therefore, presumably, still a member (with Rhode Island) of the old. The Cherokees, indeed, failed to appear on the French Broad at the appointed time, but they were absent because they had agreed to a conference not on the French Broad but at Hopewell.50 Steele went to the Cherokee country in June and secured a confirmation of the truce.

The disappointment of the commissioners over Cherokee misfeasance was augmented by the failure of the Creek conference to  p82 materialize. McGillivray, with forebodings too publicly expressed to be altogether sincere, actually set out for the conference, but on passing through the Lower Creeks, he was persuaded by the chiefs to wait until their war parties, then in the field, returned. He was the more easily persuaded since he had just received fresh promises of support from Miró, and had been informed through his intelligence service that the American commissioners had instructions to support the land claims of Georgia. Instead of proceeding, McGillivray requested a further postponement, and to this the commissioners perforce agreeing, a conference was set for Rock Landing on the Oconee, September 15.

It seems likely that the only attractiveness of this meeting to McGillivray lay in the prospects it offered him of regaining his confiscated estate amounting to some $150,000. The hints he had received to this effect were all the more welcome since, after resigning as Spanish commissary, he had no financial resources except such sums as he received from Panton.51 Taking with him some nine hundred Creeks as a precaution against any Georgian reversion to kidnapping or assassination, McGillivray went to Rock Landing, where he learned that the old commissioners had been replaced by new ones who had not yet arrived — and as a matter of fact did not all arrive until September 30. The three commissioners — Benjamin Lincoln, Cyrus Griffin, and David Humphrys — had been instructed to investigate the treaties of Augusta, Galphinton, and Shoulderbone and to base the terms of their treaty on their conclusions: whether the treaties had been fair or fraudulent, the commissioners were to demand the land in dispute, but in the latter case they were to pay for it. It is charitable to suppose that their action in treating first and investigating later was due to their late arrival. McGillivray was given a draft in a treaty which recognized the validity of the treaty, the suzerainty of the United States over the Creek Nation, and the exclusive right of the United States to Creek trade. The indignant Creek leader summarily rejected the proposed treaty, and, gathering  p83 his empty-handed Indians around him, set out for home without the formality of a farewell.52

The satisfaction with which McGillivray regarded his conduct at Rock Landing markedly diminished when Miró warned him that it might well result in war, since the commissioners would be certain to represent his action as an insult to the United States. In such a war McGillivray knew that the United States would have the active assistance of Piomingo's faction of the Chickasaws, whose pro-Americanism had been strengthened by a Creek killing of Piomingo's brother and nephew at the beginning of June.53 It must have seemed to in McGillivray that the first step toward such an alliance was being taken when in December, 1789, the United States sent down the Ohio and up the Tennessee a small military force under Major John Doughty to visit the Chickasaws.54 The Creeks were vulnerable now on their northern flank because of North Carolina's action in joining the new union (November, 1789) and subsequently ceding (December, 1789) its western lands to the United States. An added source of worry was the sale by Georgia in December, 1789, of vast quantities of land in the present states of Mississippi and Alabama to three land companies. If these companies succeeded in planting their intended colonies at Muscle Shoals and on the Yazoo, the Creeks would then face  p85 enemies on three sides, having behind them only the inconstant support of Spain.55  (p84) 


[A map of part of what is now the southeastern section of the United States, from eastern Tennessee in the upper right corner to New Orleans in the lower left. It shows about a dozen rivers, mostly gathered in basins draining south in the Gulf of Mexico: the Pearl, the Chickasawhay/Pascagoula, the Tombigbee/Alabama and their main upstream tributaries, the Escambia/Connecuh, and the Apalachicola/Flint, also in the north, the mostly eastward-flowing Tennessee River. From north to south, these five tribes are prominently indicated: Cherokees, Chickasaws, Upper Creeks, Lower Creeks, and Choctaws. The native American towns shown in the interior are Little Tallassie, Tuckabatches, Coweta, Oussitche, Kinnards, and Perrymans; other towns are shown on the Gulf coast: from west to east, New Orleans, Mobile, Tensa, and Pensacola.]

Locations of the major Southern
Indian Tribes about 1790

[A larger, fully readable version opens here (1 MB).]

To McGillivray, then, the arrival of Colonel Marinus Willett in April, 1790, must have seemed as providential as the appearance of Bowles in 1788. Washington, undeceived by the biased reports of the commissioners and uninfluenced by his associates demanding war, had sent Willett as his personal envoy to invite McGillivray to New York (then the capital) to discuss peace terms. McGillivray's acceptance (after consulting his council) was not due to any reliance on Washington's professed yearning for "justice and humanity," but to his knowledge that the Doughty expedition had failed and that the United States was fa­cing an Indian war in the Northwest. The adversity of the United States was the Creek opportunity.56 After writing his decision to Panton and Miró so late that he could not receive their protests, he set out overland for New York, accompanied by Willett and twenty-six chiefs.57 His journey to New York was a triumphal tour, his reception, when he arrived July 21, was that of a visiting emperor, and his stay in the city was one continual ovation. None of this dulled McGillivray's innate caution nor deflected him from his purpose. He refused to make any trade concessions or any acknowledgment of United States suzerainty except over those  p86 Creeks living within the limits of the United States. He recovered that part of the Galphinton cession lying south of the Altamaha and conceded the remainder of the land in dispute in return for an annuity of $1,500 to be paid by the United States to the Creek Nation; he did this because he knew the Creek title to the land ceded at Augusta had been doubtful, and that it was impossible to dispossess Georgians of land they had already settled.

In addition to the fourteen articles of the treaty, there were six others which the Americans called "secret" and McGillivray called "separate"; they might perhaps, most properly be designated as "contingent" since they depended on the course of future developments for their validity. The first of these provided that the Creeks might have a free post for supplies through the United States in case their present supply system should be dislocated by war, and that after two years the United States might send $6,000 worth of supplies annually if it could arrange to do so. There can be little doubt that McGillivray considered this latter provision as merely a polite way of declining trade relations with the United States, since certainly the latter would never be able to "arrange" any trade without McGillivray's express approval. The free post provision had reference to the threat of war between Spain and Great Britain over the Nootka Sound affair. McGillivray learned of this only when he reached New York and the articles represented his improvisation to meet the apparent danger. Another article provided that McGillivray should have the rank of honorary brigadier general at a salary of $1,200 a year upon taking the required oath.58 It is evident that this "salary" was, as McGillivray explained to Miró, merely an annuity to McGillivray in compensation for his confiscated estate, which Georgia could not be forced to restore. McGillivray, of course, realized that the payment, in whatever guise, was actually attempted bribery (as was a $100 annuity to the chiefs of Okfuskee, Tuckabatchie, Tallassie, Cusseta, Coweta, and Miccosukee) but his philosophy  p87  permitted him, as in his dealings with Bowles, to accept supplies from any source that was available.59

From the standpoint of peace, certain verbal agreements made by McGillivray and Knox at New York were as important as the treaty provisions, whether absolute or contingent. Knox agreed to prevent any settlement by the Yazoo companies and to exert pressure on Georgia to revoke the grants. Washington's proclamation against them followed in August. McGillivray promised to influence Little Turkey to make peace and perhaps promised to prevent his Creek warriors from helping the Northern Indians against the Harmar expedition then under way. The logic of events, if nothing else, was forcing this change of policy on McGillivray for the creation of the Territory South of the River Ohio in May, 1790, cut the connection between Northern and Southern Indians and brought the Cherokees (and also the Chickasaws) into direct contact with federal authority. The first step in asserting this authority took the form of an "Act for Regulating Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes," which was approved by Washington the day after McGillivray arrived in New York. The act, to run for two years, provided that the Indian trade should be limited to traders licensed by the superintendent or other Presidential appointee.60

Although McGillivray upon his return from New York revealed to Miró both the open and secret articles of the treaty, he did not completely convince the Spaniards of his candor. When in April, 1791, he was presented with an annuity of $2,000, the gift was perhaps more an evidence of Spanish apprehension than of Spanish confidence. McGillivray, however, accepted it with his usual indifference to the origin of benefits conferred. His financial condition improved still further the following month  p88 when John Heth arrived in Little Tallassie with $2,900 in gold representing the amount due the Creeks for the first year of the treaty.61 The sense of well-being induced by the monetary accessions was reflected, perhaps, in his genial hospitality to John Pope when he came through the Creek country in June.62 It was reflected also in his polite manner of evading the repeated invitations to member­ship in the South Carolina Yazoo Company.63 The attempt of the Tennessee Company to make a settlement at Muscle Shoals in January, 1791, aroused his wrath, but before he could move against it, the Chickamaugas by prompt action had deftly removed the source of irritation.64

In the performance of this public service, the Chickamaugas found themselves acting in unwonted harmony with the United States, for, since the settlement had been denounced by Washington, Governor Blount (of the Territory South of the River Ohio) had notified the Indians to deal with it as they saw fit. One is tempted to believe that the restraint shown by the Chickamaugas in merely driving off the settlers instead of killing them was due less to any amelioration of Indian character than to a possible sympathy for any group defying the United States. For the Chickamaugas had been consistent in disregarding the truce to which they had consented, and had continued their raids with unabated enthusiasm. But when Governor Blount invited the Cherokees to meet him in Knoxville in July, 1791, for the long-delayed treaty of occurrence, the chiefs of the Lower Towns attended and took the leading part in the negotiations. The Chickamaugas were probably too well-conditioned to American diplomacy to feel any  p89 surprise when Blount introduced his peace program by demanding, in complete violation of his instructions, a cession of the Muscle Shoals region. Their automatic rejection of this demand was delivered with such emphasis that the Governor found it necessary to shift his ambitions and ask for the land between the Holston and French Broad. Since this Overhill territory was, in reality, already lost, and would serve for a battleground quite as well ceded as unceded, the Indians finally agreed to sell after protesting the price and declaring their intention of sending a delegation to the President to ask for more. They also conceded free use of the Tennessee and gave permission for a road through Cherokee territory from eastern Tennessee to the Cumberland settlements.65

On the same day that some of the Chickamauga chiefs were making peace on the Holston, others were meeting on the Miami with Northern Indians planning war. Their agreement to make peace was taken probably on the advice of McGillivray, whom Knox had consulted on the matter at New York; their participation in the Miami war council was a result of a close accord with the Shawnees existing since 1777. In confirmation of this friendship a group of Chickamaugas had gone north at the close of the Revolution to live on the Scioto, while a number of Shawnee families had moved south to live at Running Water.66 Using the liaison services of these groups, Dragging Canoe had maintained contact with the British Indian officials at Detroit, while the British Indian agent, Alexander McKee, had a representative among the Chickamaugas in the person of George Welbank, through  p90 whom he sent letters and supplies to Dragging Canoe.67 As a result of these influences a considerable number of Chickamaugas participated in the defeat of St. Clair and were so inflamed by their success that they abandoned whatever pretense they had previously made of observing the Holston agreement.68

The restlessness of the Southern Indians engendered by the war in the Northwest furnished the setting, and perhaps the occasion, for the reappearance of Bowles among the Creeks. Although it is impossible to speak with precision of his aims and purposes, it is certain that he desired to prevent the execution of the New York treaty. His evident collusion with Welbank indicates a prearranged co-operation with the Northern Indians and with the British agents in Canada. His designs required the overthrow of McGillivray and, probably, the elimination of Panton, Leslie and Company, which, although it saw eye to eye with Bowles on the treaty, would certainly oppose any attempt against McGillivray. If Bowles could have secured the support of Panton, it is not likely that he would have been deterred by any consideration for the firm of Miller and Bonamy (Nassau), which had outfitted him.

Late in September, 1791, Bowles, anchoring his ship (in which he had come from New Providence) at the mouth of the Ochlocknee, went on overland to Oussitchie (Osochi) on the Flint, where his father-in‑law, Perryman, was chief. Here, by distributing presents and promises, he gained the support of the villagers, who listened with apparent approval to his denunciation of the treaty and presently proclaimed him "General and Director of the Affairs of the Nation." The turmoil caused by his few but noisy followers forced McGillivray to postpone the running of the treaty line and to send Heth away with his mission uncompleted. Unable on account of Indian custom to seize Bowles while protected by his father-in‑law, McGillivray put a price on his head  p91 and, confident that Bowles' support would not survive the exhaustion of his supplies, set off unperturbed on a prearranged visit to New Orleans. As a matter of fact, the supplies of the "General and Director" soon came to an end, and his seizure of Panton's store near St. Marks, whether in hostility or as an emergency measure, only postponed the day of reckoning. On February 26 the director, at the end of his resources, accepting an invitation from the Spanish governor, boarded a Spanish ship for New Orleans. The new Spanish governor, the Baron de Carondelet, opposing the New York treaty, was apparently hoping to use Bowles to supplant McGillivray, whom Carondelet distrusted and whose authority he was seeking to destroy.69

The withdrawal, or abduction, of Bowles did not end or even ease the tensions among the Southern Indians. Throughout the year 1792 they were continually pulled and hauled by the sundry outside agencies into antagonistic courses. One of these external pressure groups was the Northwest Indians, who, elated by their victory over St. Clair, were urging a general alliance of Southern Indians for the purpose of completing a work so auspiciously begun. The most avid missionaries in this movement were the mingled Shawnee, Creek, and Chickamauga warriors who had drifted back to Running Water after the campaign ended. Welbank, now living among the Lower Creeks as the political heir of Bowles, advocated the alliance, and Dragging Canoe devoted to it the final energies of his failing life. Since there could be no alliance unapproved by McGillivray, Dragging Canoe went to Little Tallassie to see his old ally, and McGillivray, whether in evasion or in assistance, advised him to visit the Chickasaws. It would be difficult to say whether the rivalry of Piomingo and Taski Etoka was the result of their different attitudes toward Spain and the United States or whether their different attitudes reflected their rivalry. At any rate, the tribe was so evenly divided  p92 that the only common action it could take was the negative one of preserving the status quo. Apparently, however, Dragging Canoe converted Taski Etoka to his view, with the result that from this time on the latter became the leading advocate of Indian confederation in the South. Shortly after his return from the Chickasaws, Dragging Canoe died at Lookout Mountain Town, March 1, 1792, as a result, it is said, of a too vigorous celebration of certain success­ful Chickamauga depredations near Nashville.70 As his successor, the Chickamaugas elected John Watts, the nephew of Old Tassel.

Directly opposed to the policies of Dragging Canoe and Taski Etoka were the efforts of the Americans to enlist the Southern Indians in a projected campaign against the Northern tribes. Their insistence that they were doing this, not because they needed help, but because otherwise the restless Indians would enlist with their Northern brethren, reveals a commendable knowledge of Indian psychology and an impossible plan for dealing with it. In January, 1790, President Washington took the first step (as yet unauthorized by law) in this course by appointing temporary agents to reside among the Indians, thus resuming the practice that had lapsed with the ending of Martin's agency. Leonard Shaw became agent to the Cherokees, James Seagrove to the Creeks, and (in March) James Robertson to the Chickasaws and Choctaws.71 Each of these was instructed to recruit the Indians of his agency for service in Wayne's army: six hundred Indians were to be secured, and they were to be armed and supplied by the United States, to be led by General Pickens, and to rendezvous at Fort Washington (Cincinnati) in June. As a supplement to the evangelical campaign by the agents, Blount was authorized to hold a  p93 conference with the Chickasaws and Choctaws at Nashville in July.72

The mutually antagonistic plans of the Northern Indians and the United States were checkmated by the activities of Carondelet, who opposed all Indian collaborations with the United States and distrusted an Indian confederation dominated, in all probability, by the British. With the immediate purpose of undoing the treaty of New York, he sent a trusted agent, Pedro Olivier, in February, 1792, to live among the Creeks as commissary while he dallied with the idea of supporting Bowles against McGillivray. But it soon became evident that Olivier could do nothing to lesson the authority of McGillivray over the Creeks or to prevent him from carrying out the treaty as he seemed determined to do. Nor was Carondelet able to supplant McGillivray with Bowles unless he were prepared also to discard Panton, whose loyalty to McGillivray was beyond question. The one course open to Carondelet was to continue Miró's policy of supporting McGillivray while attempting by Panton's influence to lure him away from his present course. Accordingly, in the spring of 1792, Carondelet sent Panton to Little Tallassie. Panton arrived April 30 just as McGillivray was preparing to set out for Rock Landing to help mark the treaty line fixed by the Treaty of New York. What passed between the two men is not known, but whatever it was, it caused McGillivray to abandon his trip to Rock Landing and to go instead to New Orleans to see Carondelet.73

After his conversation with McGillivray, Panton went on to the Chickamaugas. He arrived while the chiefs were away conferring with Blount at Coyatee, receiving the annuity due under the treaty of Holston, and blandly denying any knowledge of the forty murders and two hundred cases of horse stealing which had  p94 occurred on the territorial frontier since the treaty.74 Staying at the home of John McDonald, the former commissary, Panton summoned Watts from the conference, delivered to him O'Neill's invitation to come to Pensacola for a free supply of ammunition, and added that if he needed anything more, he could get it from Panton at cost. To these fair prospects Watts promptly surrendered and set out at once with Panton, several Chickamaugas, and the largest pack train the tribe was able to improvise. Arriving at Little Tallassie about the first of June, Watts and Panton had a conference with McGillivray, after which McGillivray set out for New Orleans while Panton, Watts, and the others went on to Pensacola.75

What McGillivray did at New Orleans he did not do because he was forced by Carondelet, but because he had been persuaded by Panton, whom Seagrove, in one of his infrequent moments of insight, had declared to have more influence with McGillivray than any man living. In the resulting brief treaty of July 6, 1792, the Spaniards guaranteed all the lands "belonging to and actually possessed by the Creek nation" in 1784 and promised to furnish the Creeks ample and sufficient supplies not only to defend their country but also to regain their "encroached lands." In return, McGillivray guaranteed the territory of Spain in Louisiana and West Florida. In addition to these obligations the treaty recommended that the Creeks give (at a time unspecified) to all white people living within the Creek limits of 1773 a demand that they withdraw in two months; there was no commitment by McGillivray to remove them by force. The treaty was to be in effect only until his Most Gracious Majesty's pleasure was known, and McGillivray probably had no difficulty in foreseeing what the reaction of His Majesty would be to a treaty which bound Spain rigidly but left the Creeks free. In return, apparently, for his complaisance in signing a treaty so favorable to himself, McGillivray received an increase of his pension to $3,500 a year.76

 p95  Hardly had McGillivray returned home when he received a letter from Carondelet asking him to influence the Chickasaws and Choctaws against attending a conference with the Americans in Nashville. As a matter of fact, the Creeks, even before Carondelet wrote, had already exercised their "influence," perhaps at the suggestion of Taski Etoka, who had visited the Creek country while McGillivray was absent. In the Choctaw conference called on June 23 to hear the American talks, certain Creek warriors appeared, and by pretending drunkenness broke up the meeting. They then finished their work by driving the Americans out of the country and issuing to the conniving Choctaws a warning against going to Nashville.77 As a result of their efforts only 110 Choctaws attended the conference, which, as McGillivray tolerantly commented, was a small number considering the ingrained Indian yearning for the food and presents at these meetings. The Chickasaw delegation was much larger, comprising the entire Piomingo faction of the tribe with an addition of the usual number attracted by entertainment. Taski Etoka boycotted the meeting, but some of his followers were present as spies: Tinebi (Chananby), his nephew and heir apparent, and Ugula Yacabe (Wolf's Friend), second warrior of the nation, a rival of Piomingo's devoted to Spanish interests, and others. The Piomingo faction had its ardor for the Americans considerably cooled by the time it reached Nashville, for at a council on Duck Creek, Captain George convinced them that the Americans were trying to involve them in the northwestern war in order to kill off all the Indians and take their land. Happily, Blount's announcement that Wayne's campaign had been postponed left the Chickasaws free to proclaim their martial ardor without the inconvenience of displaying it. Ugula Yacabe protested so vigorously against any Muscle Shoals trading post that Blount promised to abandon the plan. It is uncertain whether the precision with which Piomingo outlined the Chickasaw boundaries was meant as a hint to the Americans or to the Cherokees.78

 p96  The twenty-three Cherokees in attendance at the Nashville conference were there primarily as spies for their nation, always uneasy at any conjunction of its unpredictable neighbors. Upon their return they stirred the nation by reporting that James Robertson was threatening to destroy the Five Towns in retaliation for the continued outrages emanating from that source. While the Five Towns were making preparations to deal with this coming invasion, John Watts arrived opportunely at his home at Willstown (near Fort Payne, Alabama) and summoned the chiefs of the nation to that place in September to hear his report.

When the chiefs gathered at Willstown, they found that Watts had brought back a letter from O'Neill pledging Spanish support for the Cherokees in defending their homes; as an earnest of which support the Spaniards had given Watts ammunition requiring seven pack horses to carry and accoutrement for two hundred horsemen. Not all of Watts' three months' trip had been spent at Pensacola; on his return he spent some time among the Creeks, a large delegation of whom had accompanied him home. It was Watts' suggestion that since they had plentiful supplies, they might well now begin their defensive warfare, to which the promise of Spanish support was limited, by an anticipatory attack on the Holston country. To this measure the upper Cherokees, being most exposed to a Holston reprisal, raised the objection that the failure of their corn crop had left them destitute of food. The result of the deliberations at Willstown was that the Lower Cherokees declared for war, in which it was understood the Upper Cherokees would have no official participation.

In a meeting at Lookout Mountain Town a few days later, the Lower Cherokees after planning their campaign against the Holston country, became so drunk in the subsequent celebration that they were unable to go on the campaign they had planned. This was perhaps just as well, for Blount, warned by Agent Shaw, Interpreter Carey, and others, had mobilized the militia.79 Learning  p97 this, Watts put Blount off his guard by conciliatory letters, secretly changed his plans to an attack on the Cumberlands, and on September 30, 1792, made a sudden (and un­success­ful) attack on Buchanan's Station, near Nashville. The war thus begun continued with flourishing fortunes until February 6, 1793, when Watts and Blount arranged a three-weeks' truce until the meeting of the Cherokee council.

In October, 1792, in order to assure themselves of continued Spanish support, the Lower Cherokees had sent to New Orleans a six-man delegation including Bloody Fellow and Bold Hunter. After the Cherokees arrived in New Orleans (in December), Taski Etoka and Franchimastabe appeared, the former bringing proposals from the Shawnees for a general confederation and the latter accompanied by several hundred half-famished fellow-citizens. The relations of Spain with the Choctaws and Chickasaws had been peaceful since Panton had taken over the their monopoly. There had been stirrings of discontent among the apprehensive Choctaws when Spain established a fort in the triangular cession of 1777, but the matter had been amiably settled by a formal treaty May 14, 1790, by which the Choctaws and Chickasaws agreed that the Spanish rightfully had title to the land in question as heirs of the British.80 At the New Orleans conference, Taski Etoka, who was making himself the spiritual heir of Dragging Canoe, suggested to Carondelet that Spain make a defensive alliance with the Southern Indians, and Bloody Fellow asked that the Spaniards build forts on the Tombigbee and at Muscle Shoals so as to insure their line of communication with the Cherokees.81 It was suggested by the gratified but cautious Carondelet that the Indians should lay these proposals before their tribal councils and return to New Orleans in the spring of 1793 for final action  p98 on them. Since the Piomingo faction had not been represented at the New Orleans meeting, Bloody Fellow and two of his companions went home through the Chickasaw country with the purpose of persuading them to unite with the other Southern Indians. Before the Chickasaw council on February 13, 1793, the Cherokee ambassadors presented their arguments reinforced by talks sent to Piomingo and Ugula Yacabe by Carondelet and by McGillivray to the nation. But Piomingo was not to be placated; the Chickasaw council, dominated by him, not only rejected the plan for a confederation but even declared war on the Creeks.82

It is unlikely that McGillivray had expected his advice (sent at the solicitation of Carondelet) to be accepted by the Chickasaws or was sorry to have it rejected He had little faith now in a general alliance, however great his zeal had been five years before. He wanted only to preserve the status quo as long as possible; having made two incomparable treaties, he could preserve his integrity only by failing to execute either. After his treaty with Carondelet, he never began war against the Americans, nor did he ever give them notice to withdraw within their limits of 1773. The treaty placed him under no obligation to do either, and he resisted Carondelet's timid urgings by pleading the lack of arms. He gave up his "salary," much to the consternation of Knox; he refused all Seagrove's importunities for marking the boundary, asserting that the Creek council had rejected the proposed bounds (which was quite true) and that the ill will resulting from mutual depredations made it unsafe for any surveying party to take the field (which was also quite true).83 This course left the Georgians in possession of the ceded land quite as effectively as if the boundary  p99 had been marked. But McGillivray knew he could not remain indefinitely resting on his oars, and so, as he confided to Panton, he was "approaching to a despondency." In addition to his mental worries, his health seems to have been shattered by the fatigues, and perhaps the dissipations, incident to the New York trip. The "cursed gout" kept him chained to his fireside with his legs paralyzed from the knees down. Thus sore beset in mind and body he continued to rule the Creeks, satisfy Carondelet, and placate the United States until finally in December, 1792, he summoned his weary fleet and spirit for a visit to Panton in Pensacola. There, at eleven o'clock on the night of February 17, in the house of his friend and his father's friend, he died.

"Poor fellow," said the sorrowing Panton, "he has left us at an untoward time."84


The Author's Notes:

1 It is only fair in judging this act of May 17, 1783, to note that it was the expressed intention of North Carolina to follow this confiscation with treaties in which provision would be made for compensating the Indians for the land taken. Such treaties were not held, partly because North Carolina could not secure the necessary supplies and partly because of the rise of Franklin. For the overrunning of Chickasaw lands after the passing of the act see Samuel C. Williams' Beginnings of West Tennessee in the Land of the Chickasaws, 1541‑1841, 40‑46.

[decorative delimiter]

2 Milling, op. cit., 322‑23. Oconostota had died in 1781 after an abortive attempt to resign in favor of his son Tuckasee, but the Cherokee council elected Old Tassel (Corn Tassel or Tassel) as head chief (Calendar of Virginia State Papers, III, 234; ibid., IV, 176, 341).

[decorative delimiter]

3 The Georgia account of this treaty is given in Indian Affairs I, 13; the Creek version is set forth in letters by McGillivray in May, 1786, to Miró and O'Neill in J. W. Caughey's McGillivray of the Creeks, 105‑107. It can not be said with any degree of positiveness whether the right to alienate land lay in the tribe as a whole or in that portion which had occupied it. In a later treaty the tribal chieftain pleaded inability to cede because the portion of the tribe owning the land was absent. In view of the previous and future conduct of the Fat King and the Tame King, one must conclude that coercion was unnecessary to secure their signatures at Augusta.

[decorative delimiter]

4 No record of the proceedings at this purchase seems to be extant. The only record of the Virginia-Chickamauga treaty (which Martin negotiated, in his public capacity, immediately before making the purchase in his private capacity) is in Draper MSS, IXX,º 55. This is an invoice of the presents given at the treaty; they went to four chiefs, twelve young men, and six women.

[decorative delimiter]

5 For this treaty and its preliminaries see R. S. Cotterill's "The Virginia-Chickasaw Treaty of 1783," The Journal of Southern History, Vol. VIII, 483‑96.

[decorative delimiter]

6 The proceedings of this conference and the text of the treaty have been consulted in the Mississippi Provincial Archives, Spanish Dominion, II, 162‑70 (hereafter cited as Miss. Prov. Ar., Spanish Dominion). The treaty was signed by the Chickasaw king (Mingo Homa or his successor), Piomingo, and about ten other chiefs. For the Kickapoo war see Papers of the Continental Congress, III, 56.

[decorative delimiter]

7 Archives of Georgia, Creek Indian Letters, 1705‑1793, pt. I, 56, 58, 59‑60. The Choctaw delegation to Georgia was led by Mingohoopa, second chief of the Choctaws. It is probable that at this meeting the Georgians laid the foundations for their later Bourbon County venture.

[decorative delimiter]

8 The text of this treaty, with the names of the signers, has been published in Manuel Serrano y Sanz, España y Los Indios Cherokis y Choctas en la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XVIII, 82‑85.

[decorative delimiter]

9 McGillivray's reforms are briefly alluded to in Caleb Swan, "Position and State of Manners and Arts in the Creek or Muscogee Nation in 1791" in Henry R. Schoolcraft's Historical and Statistical Information Regarding the History, Condition and the Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States, V, 251‑83.

[decorative delimiter]

10 Panton's responsibility for McGillivray's decision to deal with the Spaniards is evident in Panton's letter to Lachlan McGillivray, April 10, 1794 (Caughey, McGillivray, 362‑63). The Florida Historical Society possesses an unrivaled collection of material on Panton, Leslie and Company, of which students of the period have up to now made little use.

[decorative delimiter]

11 This letter, written January 1, 1784, from Little Tallassie, is given in Caughey, McGillivray, 64. This book is the chief printed source on McGillivray, and the account of McGillivray's activities here given is drawn from it unless other reference is cited. R. C. Downes, in "Creek-American Relations, 1782‑1790," Georgia Historical Quarterly, Vol. XXI, 142‑184, deals fully with this period.

[decorative delimiter]

12 The salient provisions of this treaty are given in Caughey, McGillivray, 75‑76. The full text is in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, 278‑79. McGillivray negotiated this treaty for the Upper Creeks, Lower Creeks, and Seminoles. The Spaniards made a treaty later at Mobile with the Alabamas, at the same time as with the Choctaws.

[decorative delimiter]

13 The Spaniards entrusted the Chickasaw-Choctaw trade to the firm of Mather and Strother, in which McGillivray accepted a one-sixth share.

[decorative delimiter]

14 A. P. Whitaker, "The Muscle Shoals Speculation, 1783‑1789, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. XIII, 365‑86; Oliver D. Street, "Houston County in the Great Bend of the Tennessee," Alabama Historical Quarterly, Vol. VI, 50‑59.

[decorative delimiter]

15 According to the decision of the United States Supreme Court, Harcourt v. Gaillard, 12 Wheaton 716, the United States in 1783 contained no land other than that belonging to the individual states. The relative power of the states and United States over Indian affairs under the Articles of Confederation is discussed ex parte in a report of the Committee on Southern Indians, Continental Congress Papers, II, 311.

[decorative delimiter]

16 In October, 1783, Congress appointed a committee to consider Indian affairs in the South, and this committee on April 19, 1784, recommended that conferences be held with the Southern tribes to fix boundaries without regard to state treaties and private purchases. On January 17, 1785, Congress appointed a committee to draw up an ordinance on Indian trade. The commissioners appointed in March were Benjamin Hawkins of North Carolina, Lachlan McIntosh of Georgia, Governor Pickens of South Carolina, Joseph Martin, and W. Perry. Acting on instructions from Congress, Hawkins, Pickens, and Martin held a preliminary meeting in Charleston to perfect their arrangements.

[decorative delimiter]

17 McGillivray's account of the Galphinton meeting is in Caughey, McGillivray, 107. The Georgia treaty at Galphinton is given in Indian Affairs, I, 17. The treaty was signed November 12, 1785, by seventeen Creeks (Colonial Records of Georgia, XXXIX, 506‑509). Navarro's decree admitting McGillivray to Pensacola was dated September 16, 1785 (D. C. Corbitt, ed. and trans., "Papers Relating to the Georgia-Florida Frontier, 1784‑1800," Georgia Historical Quarterly, Vol. XXI, 77).

[decorative delimiter]

18 For the Dumplin Creek treaty see S. C. Williams, The Lost State of Franklin, 77‑78. The proceedings at the Hopewell meetings are given in Indian Affairs, I, 40‑52; the text of the three treaties made at Hopewell are in Charles J. Kappler's Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, II, 8‑16. For all Indian land cessions and treaty lines the maps in Charles C. Royce's Indian Land Cessions in the United States, B. A. E. Eighteenth Annual Report, pt. 2, are indispensable. By the Cherokee treaty there was a small land cession in North Carolina. In the description of the Cherokee northern boundary the treaty text contained an ambiguity of which the Americans later took full advantage. For a discussion of this point see Charles C. Royce, in The Cherokee Nation of Indians, B. A. E. Fifth Annual Report, 153‑54.

[decorative delimiter]

19 For Bourbon County see E. C. Burnett, ed., "Documents Relating to Bourbon County," American Historical Review, Vol. XV, 66. The Choctaws always denied that they had made any cession to Wood (Miss. Prov. Ar., Spanish Dominion, IV, 437).

[decorative delimiter]

20 Trade conditions among the Choctaws and Chickasaws at this time are discussed in Serrano y Sanz, op. cit., 31ff. The Choctaw version of the Hopewell proceedings is given in a letter by McGillivray to Miró, May 1, 1786, in D. C. and Roberta Corbitt, eds., "Papers from the Spanish Archives Relating to Tennessee and the Old Southwest, 1783‑1800," East Tennessee Historical Society Publications, Vol. X, 131, and in a letter by Miró to Gálvez, June 28, 1786, Miss. Prov. Ar., Spanish Dominion, II, 739‑40. For Franchimastabe's responsibility for the Choctaw delegation to Hopewell see Serrano y Sanz, op. cit. 36, and Burnett, "Documents Relating to Bourbon County," loc. cit., 337, Long, Davenport, and Christman to Elbert, September 13, 1785. John Pitchlynn, born in 1756, had lived among the Choctaws since 1775.

[decorative delimiter]

21 For the Chickasaw conference and treaty see n. 12 above. McGillivray in his letter of May 1, 1786, to Miró (n. 20 above) says that the Chickasaws were bribed to cede the trading-post site.

[decorative delimiter]

22 Ramsey, op. cit., 344‑45; Brown, op. cit., 254‑55.

[decorative delimiter]

23 Ramsey, op. cit., 377‑79; Brown, op. cit., 251; Street, "Houston County," loc. cit. These men had accompanied the commissioners of the District of the Tennessee as a guard to Long Island Town, where they had opened a land office and issued land warrants.

[decorative delimiter]

24 It was probably at the hands of one of these raiding parties that John Donelson met his death April 11, 1786. Donelson in the spring of 1781 had moved from French Lick to Daviess Station in Lincoln County, Kentucky. In 1785 he moved his family again to French Lick, while he was at Muscle Shoals in connection with his land speculation. In the fall of that year he went to Virginia and in the spring of 1786 was returning to French Lick through Kentucky with two companions, Tilly and Leach, when he was killed near the Big Barren River. He was buried there (Draper MS Notes XXXII, 309‑13; Calendar of Virginia State Papers, IV, 120).

[decorative delimiter]

25 For John McDonald as a trader see P. M. Hamer, "The British in Canada and the Southern Indians," East Tennessee Historical Society Publications, Vol. II, 107‑34 and A. P. Whitaker, "Spain and the Cherokee Indians, 1783‑1795," North Carolina Historical Review, Vol. IV, 83‑98, 252‑69. For the French at Muscle Shoals, see Cherokee Indians, Talks and Treaties, I, 4, Martin to Telfair, October 16, 1786, and I, 128, Davenport to Sevier, July 28, 1786, Papers of the Continental Congress, II, 185, Martin to Thompson, January 5, 1787. Corbitt, "Papers from the Spanish Archives," loc. cit., Vol. XI, 65, Kelley to Panton, January 23, 1787. It was Martin's opinion that the French traders had more supplies at Muscle Shoals than all the Southern Indians could buy in three years.

[decorative delimiter]

26 Although the Spaniards affected to disdain this letter, it caused them considerable worry since it revealed that their aid to the Creeks had not remained secret, as they had tried to keep it.

[decorative delimiter]

27 The activities of McMurphy are described in Caughey, McGillivray, 118‑24 and 127‑28. See also McMurphy's report in Cherokee Indians, Talks and Treaties, I, 129.

[decorative delimiter]

28 The Cumberland envoys to McGillivray were Ewing and Samuel Hogg (Indian Office Records, Retired Classified Files, Ewing to Coffee, December 30, 1815).

[decorative delimiter]

29 McGillivray's comments on the Shoulderbone proceedings are given in Caughey, McGillivray, 139‑41. There is a copy of the Shoulderbone treaty in the Colonial Records of Georgia, edited by Allen D. Candler, XXIX, 524; the treaty was signed by fifty-nine Creeks, chiefly from Tallassie, Broken Arrow, Cusseta, and Coweta.

[decorative delimiter]

30 Dr. James White was connected with the Blount group of speculators, and it was probably through their influence that he was chosen a delegate to Congress in December, 1785. He had no knowledge of Indian affairs, and at the time he was chosen superintendent had already begun negotiations with Gardoqui, looking, ostensibly, toward the union of the western country with Spain. His career as a conspirator is described in T. B. Abernethy, Western Lands and the American Revolution, and in A. P. Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier, 1783‑1795. He is often confused with the Colonel James White who founded Knoxville.

The United States Congress on August 7, 1786, had established two Indian districts, one of which included all the tribes south of the Ohio. A superintendent was to have charge of each district, and provision was made for the licensing of traders. On October 6, Dr. James White had been appointed superintendent of the southern district and four days later instructed to visit the Southern tribes and report.

[decorative delimiter]

31 White's report on his Creek mission is in Indian Affairs, I, 21; McGillivray's comments in Caughey, McGillivray, 148‑51. According to the report, McGillivray offered to cede the Oconee land provided the United States would set up a buffer state there. In none of his correspondence does McGillivray allude to any such offer.

[decorative delimiter]

32 Clark, op. cit., XX, 730, Robertson to Caswell, July 2, 1787.

[decorative delimiter]

33 The killing of Davenport is described in Corbitt, "Papers from the Spanish Archives," loc. cit., Vol. XI, 84, 87, and 88, Ben James to Mather and Strother and to John Joyce, July 23, 1787, McGillivray to Miró, July 25, 1787. From these it is to be gathered that the Creek party was from Coosada and numbered twelve men and a boy. They found Davenport at the home of William Kemp on Wolf Creek, killed both Davenport and Kemp, as well as two of Kemp's boat crew, wounded six other men, and carried off a white boy. After this they plundered the store, carrying off seventy rifles and twelve blankets. There were fourteen Americans present. One Creek was killed.

[decorative delimiter]

34 Serrano y Sanz, op. cit., 31, note 2.

[decorative delimiter]

35 Williams, Lost State, 141; Corbitt, "Papers from Spanish Archives," loc. cit., Vol. XIV, 101, Fraser to Miró, April 15, 1788; Miss. Prov. Ar., Spanish Dominion, III, 223‑55. The delegation was headed by Toboka of the Choctaws and included Cabosa, Mingotaska, John Woods, "Chamby" (Tinebe), and Indies, They brought back presents to Piomingo, Franchimastabe, and other chiefs.

[decorative delimiter]

36 Corbitt, "Papers from the Spanish Archives," in loc. cit., Vol. XII, 103, O'Neill to Miró, September 8, 1787.

[decorative delimiter]

37 Serrano y Sanz, op. cit., 31‑34.

[decorative delimiter]

38 Ibid., 37‑40.

[decorative delimiter]

39 Corbitt, "Papers from the Spanish Archives," in loc. cit., Vol. XI, 82, McGillivray to Miró, June 20, 1787. McGillivray said that the conference had met to restore the union of 1777 and 1779, and that the delegations would return in November to co-ordinate their warfare with that of McGillivray and Dragging Canoe.

[decorative delimiter]

40 The Spanish officials were disturbed, too, by McGillivray's growing power (which they thought would render him less dependent on Spain) and by his plans for a confederation of Northern and Southern Indians, which they feared would be dominated by the British in Canada. A very revealing letter in this latter respect is that by Zéspedes (Spanish governor of East Florida) to Valdés, March 24,178, in Corbitt, "Papers from the Spanish Archives," loc. cit., Vol. XIV, 86.

[decorative delimiter]

41 North Carolina did not appoint a commissioner; South Carolina and Georgia appointed Pickens and Matthews. Their letter of March 29, 1788 to McGillivray and his reply are in Caughey, McGillivray, 174, 180.

[decorative delimiter]

42 Bowles, like Panton, still awaits a biographer. For his 1788 venture see Caughey, McGillivray, 185‑226; Corbitt, "Papers from the Spanish Archives," loc. cit., Vol. XV, 95‑101; and Lawrence Kinnaird, "International Rivalry in the Creek Country," Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. X, 67. Any account of Bowles not based on the Spanish Archives is of little value. D. C. Corbitt and John Tate Lanning's "A Letter of Marque issued by William Augustus Bowles as Director-General of the State of Muscogee," The Journal of Southern History, Vol. XI, 246‑61 is an excellent summary of his career.

McGillivray never withdrew his resignation and never again drew a salary from Spain.

[decorative delimiter]

43 Indian Affairs, I, 26, Governor Johnston to the governor of South Carolina, March 19, 1788.

[decorative delimiter]

44 Papers of Continental Congress, III, 425, Talk of the Prince of Notaly, June 5, 1788, ibid., 438, Justices of Abbeville to people on Nolichucky, French Broad, and Holston, September 9, 1788.

[decorative delimiter]

45 Ibid., III, 429, 435, Talks given at Oostanaula, June 20 and 30, 1788.

[decorative delimiter]

46 Indian Affairs, I, 45, Winn to Knox, October 13, 1788.

[decorative delimiter]

47 Ibid., I, 45. Cherokees to Winn, November 20, 1788. On November 1, the chiefs had sent a similar talk to Martin.

[decorative delimiter]

48 For the Drumgoole mission see Clark, op. cit., XXVI, 507, 508, 529 and 542. Drumgoole arrived at Oostanaula, January 18, met the Cherokees at Coosawatee, February 6, 1789, and then went on to the Creek country. McGillivray had gone to Pensacola two days before, but Dan McGillivray took the Governor's letter and promised an answer when the chiefs returned from hunting about May 1.

[decorative delimiter]

49 Ibid., XXI, 522 and 527, Martin to Johnston, February 2, 1789, and Steele to Johnston, February 19, 1789; Indian Affairs, I, 31, Winn to Knox, March 1, 1789.

[decorative delimiter]

50 Draper MSS, Tennessee Papers, 2XX30, Martin to Henry, July 2, 1789. Martin was present on the French Broad as United States agent for the Cherokees and Chickasaws, to which position he had been appointed by Congress on August 20, 1788. In consequence of White's appointment as superintendent, Virginia had closed down her Indian agency on January 31, 1787. McGillivray asserted (Caughey, McGillivray, 245) that the Cherokees boycotted French Broad on his advice. The Cherokee officials had attended the Lower Creek council in April and asked his protection (Caughey, McGillivray, 230). The Cherokees' obstinacy in preferring Hopewell to the French Broad was on account of their fear of Sevier, who in March, 1789, had again raided the Overhill towns. On August 22 a trader named Bellew appeared in New York and presented to President Washington a document purporting to be a memorial adopted at Echota, May 19, by the chiefs of twenty-one Overhill and Valley towns, asking that the intruders on their land be removed and offering to cede to the United States land in the angle of the French Broad and Holston. Suspecting fraud, Washington sent a reply that the United States could do nothing about the matter while North Carolina remained out of the Union (Indian Affairs, I, 56‑57). There is no doubt that the memorial was a forgery (Draper MSS, Tennessee Papers, 2XX30, Martin to Henry, July 2, 1789).

[decorative delimiter]

51 Caughey, McGillivray, 245, McGillivray to Panton, August 10, 1789. In this letter McGillivray said that the commissioners had "for some time past been endeavoring to stop my mouth and hands with my family estate . . . ."

[decorative delimiter]

52 There are numbers of discrepancies between McGillivray's account of the conference (Caughey, McGillivray, 251‑54) and that given by the commissioners (Indian Affairs, I, 65‑69). The day before he started to the conference McGillivray had heard from Miró that the king of Spain had confirmed the treaty of 1784. This "made me stout in my heart and strong in my mouth" at the meeting (Caughey, McGillivray, 254‑55, McGillivray to Leslie, October 12, 1789).

[decorative delimiter]

53 Caughey, McGillivray, 239, McGillivray to Miró, June 24, 1789; Ayer Collection, No. 722, Piomingo's talk to Martin, September 20, 1789; Indian Affairs, I, 77. The Chickasaws had been killed while on their way to the conference on the French Broad. In the fall Piomingo went to New York to see the President, stopped off on Long Island to give Martin a talk for Governor Johnston, and on his way home met the commissioners at Richmond, who sent talks by him to Choctaws and Chickasaws.

[decorative delimiter]

54 Colton Storm, ed., "Up the Tennessee in 1790: The Report of Major John Doughty to the Secretary of War," The East Tennessee Historical Society Publications, Vol. XVII, 119‑32. Doughty's small force was attacked by Creeks and Chickamaugas on the Tennessee near Bear Creek and driven back down the river, finally taking refuge with the Spaniards at New Madrid. He reported to Knox that it would be impossible to maintain a trading post at Muscle Shoals. The expedition was sent as a result of Piomingo's plea for trade.

[decorative delimiter]

55 C. H. Haskins, "The Yazoo Land Companies," Papers of the American Historical Association, Vol. V, 395‑437 is the standard treatment of the subject, but was written from insufficient sources and is misleading in numerous respects. See also J. C. Parish, "The Intrigues of Dr. James O'Fallon," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. XVII, 230‑63.

[decorative delimiter]

56 William Willett, in A Narrative of the Military Actions of Colonel Marinus Willett, 96‑113, describes the visit of Willett to the Creeks. He brought McGillivray a letter from Benjamin Hawkins (then senator from North Carolina) referring to the unfavorable report by the Rock Landing commissioners and urging him to come to New York. Apparently the plan for a New York conference originated with Hawkins. McGillivray in a letter to Panton, May 8 (Caughey, McGillivray, 259) outlines Willett's arguments and his own reasons for accepting them.

[decorative delimiter]

57 McGillivray rode horseback the greater part of the journey, the chiefs and warriors were in wagons, and Willett in a sulky. They traveled by way of Stone Mountain, Seneca, Guilford Court House, Richmond, Fredericksburg, Washington, and Philadelphia. Governor Zéspedes of St. Augustine sent Carolus Howard to New York to counsel with McGillivray, which he succeeded in doing despite the vigilance of the Americans. The British officials in Canada sent two agents to New York ostensibly to learn from McGillivray more about Bowles, who was then in Canada appealing to the authorities.

[decorative delimiter]

58 In a letter to Miró, February 26, 1791 (Caughey, McGillivray, 290) McGillivray explicitly said that when he found that the required oath was one of allegiance to the United States he refused to take it. But in the Knox Papers, XXVI, folio 145 (Massachusetts Historical Society) is his signed oath of allegiance witnessed by Justice John Blair of the United States Supreme Court.


[zzz.]
 (p35) 

McGillivray's oath of allegiance before Justice John Blair

[A larger, fully readable version opens here (1.5 MB).]

[decorative delimiter]

59 The so‑called secret articles are given in Hunter Miller, Treaties and other International Acts of the United States of North America, I, 344. There is no record that any of the secret articles were ever ratified by the Senate except the trade provision, concerning which the Senate was consulted in advance. The open treaty is given in Kappler, op. cit., II, 25‑28. The treaty was signed by McGillivray and twenty-four chiefs on August 7, 1790.

[decorative delimiter]

60 Annals of Congress, 1 Cong., 2 sess., II, 2241. This act, repeatedly extended and modified, remained the basic regulation for private traders as long as there were any private traders to be regulated.

[decorative delimiter]

61 The account of the United States with the Creeks from August 7, 1790, to August 7, 1791, is given in Indian Affairs, I, 127. The total payment to the Creeks was $3,700, comprising $1,500 annuity, $1,200 for McGillivray's salary, $600 for the six chiefs, and $400 for two interpreters. Of this amount $600 had been advanced to McGillivray in New York and $200 to Cornell for interpreting.

[decorative delimiter]

62 Pope's observations on the Creeks were incorporated in his well-known Tour through the Southern States and Western Territories of North America, 46‑52.

[decorative delimiter]

63 For the invitation given McGillivray to join the company see the letter of Alexander Moultrie to McGillivray, February 19, 1790, in Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. XVI, 391‑92. McGillivray's rejection of this and other overtures is indicated in Caughey, McGillivray, 280‑81.

[decorative delimiter]

64 Brown, op. cit., 318‑19; Ramsey, op. cit., 560.

[decorative delimiter]

65 Indian Affairs, I, 203‑206. Blount's instructions for this treaty have been lost; it seems probable that he had been instructed to secure the land on the Holston, which the forged memorial of 1789 had represented the Cherokees as willing to cede. In December, 1791, a delegation of four Cherokees (led by Bloody Fellow) with two interpreters went to Philadelphia to solicit an increase in the annuity fixed by the treaty at $1,000. They arrived December 28, and as a result of conferences with Knox secured an increase to $1,500. The Cherokees argued that they had never received any payment for the land taken at Hopewell.

[decorative delimiter]

66 Carter, op. cit., II, 193; Royce, "The Cherokee Nation," loc. cit., 165; Indian Affairs, I, 264; Papers of Continental Congress, II, 531. There were about seventy of the Chickamaugas settled in Ohio on Paint Creek, from which location they made continual raids against northern Kentucky. The Shawnees at Running Water numbered about one hundred.

[decorative delimiter]

67 The best account of Welbank's activities is Hamer's "The British in Canada," loc. cit., 117ff.

[decorative delimiter]

68 Piomingo led a small force of Chickasaws to assist St. Clair. Affronted by St. Clair's apparent neglect, the Chickasaws left the day before the defeat, alleging that they had news of an invasion of the Chickasaw country by the Creeks (W. H. Smith, ed., St. Clair Papers, II, 250, 254, 256, 302; Indian Affairs, I, 266‑91; A. W. Putnam, History of Middle Tennessee, 363).

[decorative delimiter]

69 In addition to the references on Bowles given in n. 42 above see Lawrence Kinnaird, "The Significance of William Augustus Bowles' Seizure of Panton's Apalachee Store in 1793," Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. IX, 156‑91; Corbitt, ed., "Papers Relating to the Georgia-Florida Frontier," loc. cit., Vol. XXII, 186‑89; Caughey, McGillivray, 305‑306, 307‑309. An account of Bowles' "capture" is in Miss. Prov. Ar., Spanish Dominion, III, 765ff.

[decorative delimiter]

70 The date of Dragging Canoe's death is given by Brown, op. cit., without citation of authority. A letter from Welbank to McKee January 16, 1793 (Hamer, "British in Canada," loc. cit.), refers to Dragging Canoe as having recently died.

[decorative delimiter]

71 The appointment of agents was suggested by the Cherokee delegation in Philadelphia asking for an increase in annuity. Shaw accompanied the delegation back to the Cherokee country, bringing with him talks for the Chickasaws and Choctaws, which were forwarded to them by Blount when he invited them to the Nashville conference. Robertson's appointment was a compensation for damages received from Chickamaugas and Creeks.

[decorative delimiter]

72 The government's desire to enlist the Southern Indians is evident in its instructions to Shaw and Seagrove at the time of their appointment and in the correspondence of Knox with Blount, Seagrove, and McGillivray, during February, March, and April (Indian Affairs, I, 253‑66, and in I. O. R., Old Records Division, Adjutant General Division, War Department (MSS)).

[decorative delimiter]

73 McGillivray's letter to White, May 6, 1792 (Caughey, McGillivray, 321) makes it clear that it was Panton's influence which induced him to abandon his trip to Oconee and to go to New Orleans instead. Panton's unexpected visit would have missed McGillivray had the latter not been detained by high waters.

[decorative delimiter]

74 Blount's report of the Coyatee conference is in Indian Affairs, I, 267‑69.

[decorative delimiter]

75 Details of Panton's visit with the Chickamaugas are given in the statements of James Leonard and Richard Finnelson, ibid., 191‑95, 288‑89. It is evident from McGillivray's letters to White (n. 73 above) that Leonard was mistaken in saying that McGillivray accompanied Panton to the Chickamaugas.

[decorative delimiter]

76 The text of this treaty is given in Caughey, McGillivray, 329‑30.

[decorative delimiter]

77 Ibid., 332‑33, McGillivray to Carondelet, July 22, 1792; Indian Affairs, I, 278.

[decorative delimiter]

78 Indian Affairs, I, 284‑88. During the conference Piomingo referred to Chenanbe (Tinebe) as king of the Chickasaws. As a matter of fact Taski Etoka was still king, but McGillivray describes him as wandering in exile among the Choctaws (Caughey, McGillivray, 346‑49, McGillivray to Panton, November 28, 1792).

[decorative delimiter]

79 The Cherokees ascribed their war preparations to Robertson's threat (Indian Affairs, I, 280) and there is no good reason for thinking they were dissembling. The proceedings at Willstown were reported to Blount by the traders Finnelson and Deraque and by James Carey (ibid. I, 289‑91, 328). At this meeting Shaw, because it became known he was warning Blount, was threatened with death by the Creek delegation and was sent under guard of friendly Upper Cherokees to Seneca.

[decorative delimiter]

80 American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, 280.

[decorative delimiter]

81 A full account of this meeting is to be found in Miss. Prov. Ar., Spanish Dominion, IV, 611ff. See also Caughey, McGillivray, 343‑44, Carondelet to McGillivray, November 11, 1792.

[decorative delimiter]

82 Indian Affairs, I, 441.

[decorative delimiter]

83 McGillivray himself never had a meeting with Seagrove, who for fear of assassination, refrained from visiting the Creek country. In May, 1792, while waiting for Panton to return from the Chickamaugas, McGillivray sent some of the Creek chiefs to meet Seagrove at Rock Landing and in November permitted some of the Lower Creeks to visit him for the sake of receiving supplies which the United States was donating because of Creek famine conditions caused by a prolonged drouth (Downes, "Creek-American Relations," loc. cit., 350‑73; Indian Affairs, I, 314, Seagrove to McGillivray, October 8, 1792). The United States contributed some $10,000 worth of supplies for famine relief. These the Creeks received with gratitude but without commitments about ending their raids or running the line.

[decorative delimiter]

84 Caughey, McGillivray, 354, Panton to Carondelet, February 20, 1793.


[Valid HTML 4.01.]

Page updated: 29 Jan 26

Accessibility