Dreaming dreams as to air navigation is easy. We have all indulged in this delightful pastime, but the production and development of these entirely new craft, using a new medium, the air, requiring new materials, the training in a new art, the education of new designers, the training of new types of mechanics, etc., could not be done and was not done instantaneously by any nation, even under stress of war, and we started behind.

Until the Liberty motor had been perfected it was impossible for either our Army or Navy aviation to expand to war dimensions. The motors and machines they were using abroad were practically hand fitted. They had not reached a quantity production at any time. That was the only thing that would save us, to produce a standard type of engine that we could turn out by American manufacturing methods. Another thing, had we produced those special types where each engine was a unit, the number of spare parts necessary to send abroad would have overloaded our cargo space. We could not have sent the stuff over there. We had difficulty enough as it was. The Liberty motor's first successful trial was not until July 4, 1918, after making more than a thousand changes in it. There you have one answer to the delay in building up our aviation force.

When war was declared it was desired to expand the training of naval aviators as much as the facilities available permitted. Due to shortage of regular line officers in the service it was considered impracticable to assign any additional line officers to aviation instruction. Numerous applications have been received from civilians to join the naval service for special duty in aviation.

The best of the applicants have been enrolled in the Naval Coast Defense Reserve (Class 4 of Naval Reserve Force for aviation duties) and these men are being ordered to training as rapidly as the available facilities permit. In addition to Pensacola being supplied with as many as can be handled, training camps have been established at Squantum, Mass., and Bay Shore, Long Island. An officer has been detailed to supervise training at a camp established by private enterprise, first at Palm Beach, Fla., and later moved to Huntington, L. I. A contract has been made with the Curtiss Company for the training of 20 aviators at their field at Newport News, Va., under the supervision of a naval officer, and the question of increasing the number at this point is now under consideration. Arrangements have been made with the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. at Akron, Ohio, for the training at that point of 20 dirigible pilots. One hundred men and 4 officers have been to France. The question of sending men to England or giving their men preliminary training in this country has been considered. And arrangements are now being made to send 20 men to Camp Borden, Canada, in connection with 100 Army men for preliminary training and for the purpose of obtaining a broader view of training methods.

The number now under training as aviators is as follows: Pensacola, 45; Squantum, 24; Newport News, 20; Bay Shore, 25; Huntington, 27; Akron, 20; France, 104; Camp Borden, 20; a total of 286. There are also under training 356 student airmen for seaplane and dirigible crews. In addition to those now under training, men are being enrolled and will be called into active service as soon as they can be taken care of. The two obstacles in the way of calling more men immediately are (1) Lack of instructors, (2) lack of aircraft. As aviators are qualified they will be used as instructors for others, and in this way this difficulty will be overcome. Additional seaplanes are being procured  p140 as fast as they can be supplied by the manufacturers, giving due consideration to the urgent needs of the Army.

The United States Navy aeronautic station at Pensacola is being enlarged by addition of permanent hangars for 54 seaplanes and temporary hangars for 12 seaplanes. Construction of quarters for 1000 additional men is also being expedited. A temporary single hangar and a permanent six‑aeroplane hangar are to be constructed at the naval air station at Bay Shore, Long Island.

The cognizance of the Navy requires the establishment of coastal air stations as bases for aircraft operating in connection with the naval district surface patrol craft, or vessels of high sea fleet operating near shore. Strategic localities and sites have been selected by joint Army and Navy boards. Sites have been selected and arrangements are being made to construct air stations at the following points, Montauk Point, Rockaway Beach, Cape May, Hampton Roads, Key West, and Coco Solo Point, Panama.

The number of aircraft now in service and under construction is as follows:

Lieutenant Whiting had written orders to proceed with his detachment to France and upon his arrival to keep the naval attaché in Paris advised of his whereabouts. Before leaving this country he sought further and more detailed information with respect to his duties, but was unable to obtain either instruction or advice except that if he wanted to go to the war zone he had better leave at once before a change of policy might revoke his orders. Accordingly, upon his arrival in Paris, he proceeded forthwith to enter into negotiations with the French Admiralty, during the course of which he agreed, on the part of the United States, to establish certain naval air stations on the French coast.

This was done entirely on his own initiative, and even his presence in Europe was unknown to Admiral Sims until the subject was brought up for discussion at a meeting of the Board of Admiralty in London. Admiral Sims was asked to explain the reason for his secretive policy in concentrating a large air force in France when the most vital areas of the enemy submarine campaign lay in and adjacent to the coasts of England and Ireland. In reply Admiral Sims was obliged to explain that the entire commitment was as much a mystery to him as it was to them; that he had no knowledge of any officer being empowered to represent the United States in France; and, admitting the contention that England and Ireland offered a much more fruitful field for aerial operations against submarines, he would investigate the matter without delay. To this end he summoned Lieutenant Whiting from Paris and found that in the absence of any orders or instructions he had proceeded on his own initiative to commit the United States to the construction of several air stations on the coast of France. In view of this it was considered that his assumption of responsibility and his display of initiative in doing what he did was most commendable.

And so it was that our air stations in France had their beginning. It is probable that had their establishment been the subject of a conference between the Allies and ourselves, part of  p142 this force would have been diverted to England or to Ireland. As it was, however, these stations were very largely instrumental in driving the submarines from the French coast and in forcing them out to sea, where the concentration of shipping was less great and where in consequence less damage was suffered. Generally speaking, therefore, the concentration of our naval air service on the French coast was sound, but in excess of that which was justified by the exigencies of war.

In common with all the nations involved in the Great War, save perhaps Germany, America was unprepared in aviation. There was some excuse for this in the case of Great Britain and of France, for aeronautics was hardly beyond its beginning in 1914, but this offers no explanation of the lack of attention paid in America to air preparedness. Nor is it an excuse to say that we could not foresee our participation in the general world upheaval, for events proved that anything was possible and a reasonable amount of foresight in preparation would have been of incalculable value during 1917. Indeed it is more than strange that Americans should have noted the enormous expansion of aerial activities in Europe, and read the accounts of results obtained by the air squadrons both on land and sea, and yet remained so inert in demanding at least a nucleus of an air force.

Yet such was the situation. An inventory of our effects in the spring of 1917 showed that we had practically nothing in the way of material and very little in personnel. In fact, prior to 1916, no appropriations, save small ones for experimental purposes, had been made for naval aviation, the first appropriation of any consequence, $1,000,000, being made in 1916. Yet it must be admitted that we had something that was worth infinitely more than all we lacked — the will to victory. And behind that lay American ingenuity and the vast resources of  p143 our great country. We knew that we could not lose in the long run, but the important question was, 'Would our intervention be sufficiently prompt to insure success?'

That our outlook in aviation at the moment of our entry into the war was gloomy, to say the least, is obvious. We were not only unprepared but we had very little idea of how to prepare for aerial warfare, as is evidenced by the following telegram from the Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Sims, under date of April 20, 1917:

This request was complied with in minute detail and sufficient additional information was furnished the Navy Department to enable it to put forward plans looking to the construction of seaplanes and their accessories. The submarine campaign had at this time reached such an acute stage that it was deemed advisable to request priority of shipments of naval aircraft over those intended for army use, and this was granted.

Meanwhile an Estimate of the Situation existing in Europe was prepared and read as follows:

This general policy was endorsed by Admiral Sims and agreed to in principle by the Navy Department, and while the personnel and the material essential to our war operations were being assembled in the United States, we, on the other side, proceeded to dig ourselves in, so to speak, by building air stations.