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previous: Introduction This webpage reproduces one of the Parts of The United States in the Air by Mason M. Patrick Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc. Garden City, New York, 1928 The text is in the public domain. This page has been carefully proofread and I believe it to be free of errors. If you find a mistake though, please let me know! next: Part 2

 p3  Part I
The Air Unit in the War

In May, 1918, the crisis of the World War was rapidly approaching. The terrific German drives toward Amiens, toward Armentières, had nearly broken the allied lines, but had been checked after they had penetrated deeply. It was certain that another blow was impending, but it was not known where it would fall. The situation was exceedingly critical.

At that time I was in charge of all the construction work for the American Army in France, including the building of docks, hospitals, cantonments, and railroad work. At the beginning this had been carried on under great difficulties, as there was a sad lack of both materials for construction and of man power. Our forestry troops, which were under me, were now, however, turning out lumber in considerable quantities from French forests and more troops were being  p4 supplied to do the immense amount of building which was necessary.

About the middle of this month of May I was at Tours, headquarters of the S. O. S., the Services of Supply. Late in the afternoon I was called to the telephone.

"Is this General Patrick?"

"Yes."

"This is Colonel Collins, General Pershing's aide, speaking. The General would like to see you here in Chaumont at his office to-morrow morning. Can you get here?"

"Certainly. I will be there early to-morrow morning. Good-bye."

"Good-bye."

Quite naturally, I wondered why General Pershing wanted to see me. I thought my work was getting on quite well, but I had not seen General Pershing for several weeks and it was his custom to check up on all his subordinates, to ascertain for himself the progress being made. It was a fair assumption that this was his purpose in sending for me. I gathered together a number of blueprints and then, about ten o'clock at night, started in my car to drive to Chaumont. I  p5 arrived there early the next morning, and as soon as possible went to General Pershing's office. He was busy and it was several hours before he was accessible. This gave me a little more time to guess at the probable reason for his summons.

General Pershing and I had been classmates at West Point. He was a little older than most of us, more mature, and from the beginning was an outstanding figure in the Corps of Cadets. Our class made him its president, the highest honour we could bestow. The military authorities recognized his soldierly qualities by making him First Captain of the Corps, the highest office any cadet could hold. His career in the Army gave ample evidence that he more than fulfilled the promise of his early days. In the Philippines and in Mexico he had proved himself, and its no surprise to any of us when he was chosen to be Commander-in‑Chief of the army which we sent to France.

All these things ran through my mind while I waited. Finally I was ushered into his office. He greeted me very cordially and, as I supposed he would do, asked how my work was getting on.  p6 There were ready to show him the reports which I had brought. I told him, however, his staff was kept closely in touch with all of the work and would probably have the best idea of the progress actually being made. After a little further talk General Pershing said, "Well, this is not what I wanted to see you about. In all of this Army there is but one thing which is causing me real anxiety. And that is the Air Service. In it there are a lot of good men, but they are running around in circles. Somebody had got to make them go straight. I want you to do the job."

Never in my life did anything surprise me more. During all my years of service I had been doing engineering work and knew nothing whatever of aviation. I had paid no attention to it even in France and though there had been much written and printed of the exploits of airmen, of what we ourselves would do in the air after we entered the war, to these things I had given little thought, being too much absorbed in the work which I was doing and which was along familiar lines. All this I told General Pershing briefly, but as clearly as possible. He said:

 p7  "Never mind, I think you can do this job. It needs a strong hand and a man who can see far. Go and talk to McAndrew [then General Pershing's Chief of Staff]. He will tell you more about what must be done and give you some of the reasons why too little has been done already."

I went in at once and had quite a long talk with Major General James W. McAndrew. He told me that for some time General Pershing had been trying to find a man to take charge of the Air Service and had finally decided that he wanted me to handle the matter for him. General McAndrew further elaborated what General Pershing had already said, gave me the names of a number of men who were connected with the Air Service, told me something of their characteristics, then asked me to recommend a man to take over my engineering work at once, as it was desired to have me start immediately to perfect the Air Service organization. At that time Brigadier General Benjamin D. Foulois was Chief of Air Service, A. E. F.

A few days later, with General Foulois, I saw General Pershing in Paris at a house which had been placed at his disposal by its owner, an  p8 American. We discussed at some length the way in which the Air Service, A. E. F., should be organized. One view advanced was that there should be one man in charge of all of the activities at the Front, with actual command of the fighting air units, and another man in charge of all matters behind the lines, training, the preparation of squadrons to be sent to the Front, and the supply of airplanes, motors, and all of the other things needed for air operations. General Pershing summarily rejected this proposal. He stated that he wanted one man in complete charge of the Air Service, both at the Front and in the back areas, one man upon whom all responsibility could be placed and to whom he could look for results. This was the duty he imposed upon me. He said, however, that he desired to have General Foulois in charge, under me, of all matters at the Front.

On May 29, 1918, the order was issued making me Chief of the Air Service, A. E. F., and almost immediately thereafter an order carrying into effect General Pershing's direction that General Foulois should be placed in charge at the Front.

 p9  Needless to say, it was necessary for me to make an intensive study of the new work devolving upon me. It may be well to sketch here briefly just what had been done in the Air Service prior to this time.

When we declared war against Germany in April, 1917, the Air Service of our Army, then called the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, had a strength of only about 65 officers and some 1,100 men. It had about 200 training airplanes, but not a single plane fit for use in battle, nor were any such planes being built in the United States. We had neither the experience nor the knowledge upon which to base plans for the development of an aërial army nor for putting it in the air.

It soon became apparent that we must call upon the Allies, who, during the nearly three years the war had been raging, had done much in the air, for the vitally important information we needed to enable us to decide what airplanes we should build and how to build them. Many of the technical details had never been put down on paper and could be secured only by conferring with those actually engaged upon this work.

 p10  Consequently, in June, 1917, an aëronautical mission was sent to Europe in charge of Major (later Colonel) Raynal C. Bolling. This mission included two flying officers of the Army, two officers of the Navy, a number of industrial experts, and ninety-three skilled mechanics and factory experts whom it was planned to place in aircraft and engine factories to obtain first‑hand information of methods of manufacture which could not readily be embodied in drawings and specifications. These mechanics later took back to the United States a great deal of useful information and many samples of aëronautical material.

One of the first things to settle was just what planes could be built in the United States. In July and August 1917, the mission submitted its recommendations based upon careful study and concurred in by all of the allied experts.

First of all it recommended that we should build the so‑called DH‑4 planes, thus named from their designer, Geoffrey de Havilland, an Englishman. These were two-seater planes, suitable for observation work or for bombing. In the spring of 1917 these planes had been tried out  p11 by the British and were found to be much better than any other such planes which up to that time had been in use over the lines. The Liberty engine, then being developed here, lighter and more power­ful than the motor of the planes built in England, was to be used in the American DH's.

Under war's stress airplane designs were being constantly improved, and this was especially true of the smaller, faster, single-seater pursuit, or fighting, planes. No one type of this kind had ever held its supremacy for long but had soon been out-dated by a better one. There was every probability that this would continue to be the case, and therefore if the United States undertook to building fighting planes after the best design then obtainable, they would be obsolete before they could reach the Front. Influenced by this reasoning, the mission strongly advised that we should not attempt to produce any of these single-seater planes, but should confine our efforts to building the larger ones like the DH‑4, which would probably be subject to fewer modifications and improvements, and to the manufacture of engines.

 p12  The United States has been often severely criticized for not having put "a single fighting plane of American manufacture at the Front." Nevertheless, in the light of all we know now, I am thoroughly convinced that these recommendations of the mission were well considered and were eminently sound.

Colonel Bolling, who headed this mission, was a very remarkable man, a lawyer. He had been general solicitor for the United States Steel Corporation, but had taken time to learn to fly. In Europe he showed his great ability. He concluded many agreements with the Allies, notably one with the French, August 30, 1917, by which they undertook to deliver to the Air Service of the American Expeditionary Force by June 1, 1918, 5000 airplanes and 8,500 engines. On its part, the United States was to furnish certain raw materials needed for the fulfilment of the French obligation. Colonel Bolling also initiated a number of building projects, the greatest that at Issoudun, which later became our largest flying training centre. In fact, he was given charge of all aviation matters back of the front lines, in the Zone of the Interior as it was then called,  p13 and in September, 1917, was appointed Assistant Chief of the Air Service.

Unfamiliar with military procedure, Colonel Bolling had done his work quite independently and without much consideration of the other needs of the American Expeditionary Force. General Pershing's headquarters notified him that all construction work was to be carried on under one agency, and that as I was then in charge, he would turn over to me the carrying out of all the projects which he had started. This Colonel Bolling promptly did, and although it is certain he was somewhat disappointed at not being allowed to continue the work he had in hand, he was broad enough to see the reasons for the change and accepted it in a very manly manner. I came in contact with him a number of time in connection with this construction work and was greatly and favourably impressed by his ability and his willingness to do, in any capacity, such work as might be given him.

Colonel Bolling's activities were still further circumscribed after about the first of January, 1918 and he asked the then Chief of Air Service to be allowed to prepare himself for work at the  p14 Front with the fighting air units. He was given a roving commission and in March, 1918, alone in his driver, alone in his car with his driver, a man named Hodder, he inadvertently approached too closely the advancing German lines near Amiens. His automobile was fired upon and he and the driver took refuge in a shell hole. A number of Germans rushed up to its edge and called upon the two men to surrender. Colonel Bolling drew his pistol and fired at them. They returned the fire and killed him. He was the first American officer of his rank to fall in battle. His driver was taken prisoner, carried to Germany, and after the Armistice came to my office and told me the story of Colonel Bolling's death. In his home town, Greenwich, Conn., there is erected a statue to his memory. I was present at its unveiling and paid a brief, and what I know was a well-deserved, tribute to him.​a

Shortly before we entered the war, Colonel William Mitchell, with four other officers, had been sent to Europe to observe the air operations of the Allies. He arrived in France in June, 1917, and thereafter spent most of his time the with the air components of the French and English  p15 armies, learning a great deal of the methods of air fighting and of the conduct of air operations. He was given control of all our Air Service activities at the Front.

On September 3, 1917, Major General W. M. Kenly was made Chief of the Air Service, A. E. F., and under him were Colonel Mitchell at the Front and Colonel Bolling in immediate charge of all other air matters. I saw General Kenly two or three times in the next two months in connection with some construction work to be done for the Air Service. As will be mentioned presently, General Kenly was soon superseded and was sent back to the United States, where he was to supervise the training and sending forward of Air Service organizations.

In November, 1917, General Benjamin D. Foulois, who had been made a brigadier general before leaving the United States, arrived in France accompanied by a considerable staff, composed of Regular officers and of business men who had been commissioned in the Air Service. General Foulois was at once made Chief of the Air Service, A. E. F., repla­cing General Kenly. The men who came with General  p16 Foulois were described by General Pershing as good men "running around in circles." And I soon found that this was an apt description of just what they were doing. While each one was working hard, he did not know how what he was doing fitted in with the work of others. It was a chaotic condition of affairs.

Within a few days after taking charge of the Air Service I submitted a memorandum broadly outlining my ideas as to its organization and this was duly approved by General Pershing. It was found that nowhere on record was there any well-defined plan, estimate of the number of men, of the material, airplanes, airplane motors, and observation balloons which we must have. There had been, especially in the United States, most extravagant statements made of what we would do in the air, how we would fill the air with planes, and how we would overwhelm the German airmen. It was popularly supposed at home that almost from the very beginning these fleets of American planes would be dealing death and destruction to the Germans, and yet more than a year after we entered the war not a single American-built airplane had appeared  p17 in France. Congress had poured out money like water to inaugurate our air effort, but the results so far had been nil. The echoes of the murmurings at home reached us in France, where among our own troops there was the same feeling that our frantic boasts had been empty ones and that we had accomplished nothing.

The first thing to be done was to find out from the General Staff just how many air squadrons they wanted to have as the air component of the American Army. After much study it was announced that by the first of July, 1919, it was desired to have at the Front, and there to maintain, 358 squadrons. It needed but a little consideration to show that it was absolutely impossible for us to meet this programme. Instead, the Staff was told that the maximum number of squadrons which could be organized, equipped, and sent to the Front by the date mentioned was 202. This was what was later known as our "202 Programme." Although I doubted whether it could be carried out in its entirety, it gave us a "mark at which to shoot"; it furnished a basis for an estimate of the men and material needed.

On May 27th the Germans launched their third  p18 great attack directed toward the Marne and Paris, just two days before I was made Chief of the Air Service. This blow, delivered at a point where it was not expected, quickly broke the French line and the progress of the onrushing enemy was only checked by American divisions which were thrown into the battle. There was immediate demand for American air organizations with planes and pilots to take part in this terrific struggle. But we sadly lacked both men and planes.

An agreement had been made with the English by which we undertook to place and to keep in England 15,000 Air Service troops. These were to be given their training at English airdromes and then to be sent to France, their places in England to be taken by other untrained men sent from the United States.

The terrific German attacks had inflicted serious losses upon both the English and the French armies. Urgent appeals were made by the Allies for the sending of American ground troops in greater numbers and this finally resulted in what was thereafter known as the Abbeville Agreement, which provided that, "In order to meet  p19 the present emergency . . . American troops should be brought to France as rapidly as allied transportation facilities will permit, and that, as far as consistent with the necessity of building up an American Army, preference be given to infantry and machine‑gun units."

This agreement, of course, prevented the sending of Air Service men to England to replace any which should be sent from there to France. Our need for these men was, however, absolutely imperative. General Pershing directed me to go to London and see whether or not it would possible to obtain for our Air Service in France any of these men who had been training in England. This was found to be most difficult. The English themselves sadly lacked man power and they were using these American soldiers to do work at their own airdromes, which had to be done in order to maintain their own air organizations in France. They were most reluctant to let any of them go without the replacements which had been promised.

The Royal Air Force had recently been created by joining the hitherto separate air components of the Army and Navy and it was operating under  p20 the Air Ministry. I saw Lord Weir, Air Minister, General Guy Livingston, who was, under Lord Weir, the Chief Air Officer in England, and others, and placed our situation clearly before them. While they were willing to discuss the particular matter which brought me to England, I found the Air Minister most interested in our development of the Liberty motor in the United States. Great things were expected of it and it was understood that we would soon be turning out these motors in quantities. The English were very insistent that a number of Liberty engines should be furnished them to put in the planes which they were building. They dwelt upon this at great length. The Air Minister and his subordinates also seemed to be somewhat concerned over our closer contact with the French. It was stated that they, the English, had great difficulty in dealing with the Americans; they could reach no understanding which was not subject to review in Washington causing what they thought unnecessary delays. Even when they thought that they had arranged something definitely with General Pershing's headquarters, they found that Washington not infrequently took a hand  p21 and upset matters. Lord Weir insisted that there should be some one man empowered by the United States to say a final Yes or No on all air subjects. He said they welcomed the news of my appointment as Chief of the Air Service, A. E. F., and hoped that I would be given power to settle any air question which might arise. He further made it evident that the English desired to be our chief advisers, and suggested that I should make my headquarters in London in order that we might more readily confer with each other. He was told, of course, that this was impossible. It was necessary to complete the organization of our own Air Service and this could be done nowhere but in France.

After much argument it was finally agreed that there would be released to us about 3,500 of the men then training in England and that they would be sent to France as rapidly as possible. It was understood that the men thus made available for us in France would be replaced in England as soon as possible, and that as these new men came, others who had been trained would be sent across the Channel. Having thus partially carried out the mission which took me to  p22 London, I returned at once to France where it was found that some progress had already been made along the lines laid down for the reorganization of the Air Service.

Shortly after my return from England I went to the headquarters of the English Independent Air Force and called upon General (now Sir) Hugh Trenchard. General Trenchard had under him a number of bombing squadrons constituting what was called the Independent Air Force, which operated directly under the orders of the English Air Ministry and was in no way controlled by the Commander-in‑Chief of the British Army in France. General Trenchard told me that he had fought for several years against this independent show, but that it had been forced upon him. He was then carrying on bombing operations against Germany, striking at industrial centres and the German lines of communications. He cautioned me particularly not to send squadrons to the Front until it was certain that they could be maintained at their full strength with men and with airplanes. It was better to let them stay far behind the lines until this was possible rather than to put them  p23 at the Front and have them become discouraged because of lack of equipment. When the pilots growl at the poor work being done at the repair depots, he said, send them back to see for themselves just how it is being done. Tell the repair men to humour the pilots. Remember they have to do the fighting. If they have not confidence in their machines they cannot do their best. Fix little things as they want them. He said it was not good tactics to send fighting planes into the air with directions to protect observation or bombing planes. Let these fliers have both eyes on the enemy. If one eye is on the plane they are protecting, and therefore only one to look out for hostile airmen, they will themselves surely be shot down. Let the protection given these other planes be merely incidental, and direct the fighting planes to be continually on the watch for the enemy and to attack them vigorously whenever they are seen. These comments of General Trenchard were found to be very pertinent and they were passed on to our own air personnel.

At that time we ourselves were planning to join in the bombing operations against Germany.  p24 An agreement had been made with the English by which a number of the large Handley-Paige machines were to be available for this purpose. The parts for these machines were to be made in the United States, shipped over to England, assembled there, and then the planes flown to France. The assembly plant was to be so located as to give work to a number of the employés of the English cotton mills who were unfit for service at the Front, who were idle, but who could be quickly trained to do this airplane work. Furthermore, these planes were larger than any others being built, and if they had been put together in the United States they would have taken up a great deal of room on the vessels, while, on the other hand, the parts could be packed more closely, thereby saving valuable cargo space.

It will be remembered that in accordance with General Pershing's orders, General Foulois had been placed in charge of all of our air of resins at the Front. Up to that time, since his arrival in France, General Foulois had given nearly all of his time and attention to matters  p25 in the back areas, training and supplies, including arrangements with the French and English for air material. When he went to the Front he found Colonel Mitchell, who had been occupied with the fighting part of the air game and who had under his command all of the air organizations which had then been sent to the Front. There came the clash of personalities, which, under the circumstances, was almost inevitable.​b The result was that Colonel Mitchell remained in command of the fighting air units while General Foulois undertook their final training and equipping and established them on the airdromes they were to occupy while operating at the Front.

In June, 1918, near Château-Thierry, I found Colonel Mitchell with the 27th, 94th, 95th, and 147th Pursuit Squadrons actively engaged in air fighting.

It was in the vicinity of Forêt de Fère, •some thirty miles northeast of Château-Thierry, that Lieutenant Quentin Roosevelt​c fell. On April 19, 1917, he applied for a commission in the Air Service. He was sent to the Curtiss School at Mineola for instruction. The records show that  p26 among the qualifications listed as making him especially suitable for the Air Service was his practical knowledge of the upkeep and repair of gas motors; three years' experience in radio; his record in football, rowing, and horseback riding, and the fact that he had previously made flights as a passenger. Lieutenant Roosevelt was sent overseas and landed at Liverpool on August 8, 1917. He went at once to France and on the 17th of August reported at the flying school at Issoudun, where he proved very apt and there completed his flying training. On March 1, 1918, he was sent to the aërial gunnery school at Cazaux. Having finished the course there, he returned to Issoudun and, on March 24, 1918, was given charge of the instruction of other pilots on Issoudun Field No. 7. Lieutenant Roosevelt had made application, of course, for duty at the Front and on May 31, 1918, he reported at Orly, near Paris, on his way to join a squadron at the Front. On June 21st he was assigned to the 95th Aëro Squadron. This organization was thereafter constantly engaged with the enemy and among its records there appears this entry, a French citation:

It was only a little more than three months from the time I took charge until our attack upon the Saint-Mihiel salient on September 12, 1918. By that time, however, we had sent to the Front twenty squadrons, and Colonel Mitchell, who had been placed in command of the air units for this our first major offensive operation, had under him, composed of our own and of allied organizations, the largest air force that had at any time been gathered together for operations on the Western Front, or, as a matter of fact, on any front during the entire World War. It comprised 701 pursuit planes, 366 observation planes, 323 day bombardment and 91 night bombardment airplanes, a total of 1,481 planes. This air force gave an excellent account of itself and was greatly praised by General Pershing for the part it took in the attack which wiped out the salient and gave the Germans  p28 an idea of what could be expected of the American Army when operating alone and under its own command.

It was just before Saint-Mihiel that there came to France Mr. John D. Ryan, who had been made an Assistant Secretary of War, and who had been given charge of all aviation matters. The Secretary of War, Mr. Newton D. Baker, was also in France at that time and told me that Mr. Ryan wanted to go thoroughly into the Air Service problems with me and to ascertain first hand just what was being done. With Mr. Ryan I called upon a number of the French air officials and then took him with me to General Pershing's headquarters at Chaumont, and later to visit the air units at the Front. While Mr. Ryan was no doubt a strong and able man and was probably interested in these air matters, he talked but little about them, asked few questions and it was difficult to tell whether or not he really understood the magnitude of the work were were trying to do. The day before the Saint-Mihiel attack we were together near the Front, knew that the battle would start the next day and that our airmen would play an active part. Mr. Ryan decided  p29 that he would not wait to see it, but, as his time was limited, would go back to where the airplanes were being assembled and where our training was in progress.

At Romorantin, •about a hundred miles south of Paris, we had constructed an immense assembly plant where there were employed about ten thousand men. The DH‑4 planes made in America by that time were coming to France in large numbers. It was necessary, of course, to assemble them and prepare them for use by the squadrons at the Front. The murmuring, it might almost be called growling, at our slowness in putting planes in the air had caused a sudden burst of energy in the United States and shortly after Mr. Ryan was appointed these DH planes were shipped in quantities. It became apparent at once that they had not been sufficiently tested or perfected in the United States. They were equipped with Liberty motors, and while these were a remarkable product of our motor engineers, the first ones which came to France needed many changes. The airplanes themselves had been built in different factories in the United States and their parts were not interchangeable.  p30 All these things made it necessary for us to do an immense amount of work at Romorantin before the planes could be pronounced ready to fly. Mr. Ryan went through the shops at this assembly plant and made a number of suggestions as to the way in which the work should be done and was particularly insistent that we should guard against the ever-present fire risk.

From Romorantin we went to the great flying school at Issoudun. Here hundreds of pilots were being trained, and as they graduated from the school they were being sent at once to the Front. Mr. Ryan had received a telegram that Mr. Winston Churchill, a member of the English War Cabinet, wanted to see him in Paris and so he was able to give but a few hours to the flying school. I learned later that Mr. Churchill wanted to take up with Mr. Ryan the matter of furnishing Liberty motors for the English. This I had already discussed with Mr. Ryan, who had brought with him a schedule showing the anticipated output of these motors, and I strongly urged that he should state definitely both to the English and the French exactly how many motors they might expect by a certain date. Upon this  p31 recommendation he finally acted favorably and before he left France had given definite figures to both the French and the English.

In addition to this great flying school at Issoudun, we were carrying on the training of air observers at a school near Tours, giving bombardment training at another school near Clermont-Ferrand, and training in aërial gunnery near the seacoast at Saint-Jean de Monts. By that time, of course, air fighting had been specialized. There were the so‑called pursuit planes, single-seaters, whose prime mission, fighting in the air, was to sweep enemy planes from the air and incidentally to attack slower-moving observation planes and bombing planes. The observation planes, each containing a pilot and an observer, endeavoured to obtain information of enemy movements, of the effect of gunfire, to locate the Front lines during an advance, by visual reconnaissance and by photography, to determine just what there was and what was going on in all of the territory in front of the battle line. The bombing planes which we employed likewise carried two men and endeavoured to drop their bombs on all sorts of targets, ammunition dumps,  p32 troops marching on roads, railroad centres, lines of communication, and other vital points. All planes of all kinds were armed with machine guns and it was necessary to train the airmen not alone to fly, but to operate this armament effectively.

September 26, 1918, saw the beginning of our Meuse-Argonne offensive, our greatest military effort during the war. All that day I spent visiting our air squadrons and watching their operations. Our pursuit group under Colonel Davenport Johnson, at Belrain, was in good spirits and had already shot down seven German planes. Things were going well, too, with Major Harold E. Hartney's​d pursuit group at Rembercourt. From there I went to the bombardment group under Major J. L. Dunsworth. In their attack that morning they had lost heavily. Five of their planes, each containing two men, had been shot down in flames and two others had been brought back by their pilots with their observers dead in their cockpits. In spite of these losses the men were as determined as ever, and while I was with them there came an order for them to go forth upon another bombing mission. It was  p33 inspiring to see the way in which they ran to their planes and took them into the air. This time they came back after having executed their mission and without having had any casualties.

Four days later I was back at an airdrome near Paris to test out the wireless telephone with which it was intended to equip our planes. Here for the first time I talked from the ground to a pilot in a plane a mile high, saw him obey the oral orders given him, and heard his comments perfectly. It was evident at once that this telephone device would make much easier the sending of information from the air and would also enable a commander in the air to direct his air force more effectively.

On October 12th I was at General Pershing's headquarters at Souilly. The Argonne offensive was progressing satisfactorily, although our losses had been heavy. General Pershing told me that he was very well satisfied with the way in which the Air Service had been operating and also with our success in sending squadrons to the Front. As Colonel Mitchell, who had been in command of the air force, had done excellent work, I recommended that he be made a brigadier general and  p34 General Pershing told me that his promotion would be given him.

General Pershing then took up certain comments which he said had been made to him by Mr. Ryan before leaving France. Mr. Ryan had said that he thought in my conduct of the Air Service I did not get close enough to my subordinates and that some of them hesitated to come to me with matters needing my attention. Further, he feared I had not given my subordinates enough power and required them to bring to me too many details. He thought things in England were not in competent hands and, finally, that Colonel Mitchell was wasteful of material and inclined to send men in the air without sufficient training. Apparently Mr. Ryan had made similar remarks to at least two other officers, members of General Pershing's staff, for they also repeated them to me. General Pershing said again that he himself was thoroughly satisfied with the way things were going and that he had told Mr. Ryan that he, General Pershing, had observed carefully all of the Air Service operations, was familiar with the problems, and thought that Mr. Ryan's criticisms  p35 were not justified by the facts. Mr. Ryan's own inspection of the Air Service activities was quite cursory. It was plainly evident to me that he had been talking with some of my subordinates, some of these men who had been made to "run straight" and who did not like it, and that his comments were merely a repetition of their statements to him. I was, however, surprised that Mr. Ryan had seen fit to carry this gossip to the Commander-in‑Chief and to other officers and had not said a word to me about it. If he had fault to find he should have told me so and given me either an opportunity to set him right or to change anything which was shown to be wrong. Mr. Ryan was supposed to be one accustomed to dealing with men and to handling large enterprises. In France, as I have already said, he asked very few questions and at each of the important places which we visited he remained for a very brief time. The Commander-in‑Chief plainly indicated that he was not influenced in any wise by Mr. Ryan's comments and criticisms and assured me that he had entire confidence in myself and had no fault to find with the way in which air matters were going.

 p36  A few days afterward I saw Brigadier General Charles G. Dawes with whom I came in contact frequently while in France. General Dawes had come over to France as a lieutenant colonel of an engineer regiment raised in Chicago. He and General Pershing were friends of long standing. General Dawes was soon detached from his regiment and later was placed in charge of all of the purchasing of supplies for the American Expeditionary Forces. I told him of Mr. Ryan's comments which had been repeated to me, and General Dawes said I need give no further thought to them, that he had recently seen General Pershing, that the condition of the Air Service had been discussed, and that the General had expressed himself to General Dawes as being heartily satisfied with the way things were going.

General Dawes's dynamic personality impressed itself upon all of us who knew him. At that particular time he affected long cigars rather than his now celebrated pipe. He had two distinguishing characteristics: one was his ability to do more real business with less talking than any man I ever encountered. On the other hand, when it was necessary to be emphatic he would  p37 spring into action and talk, vigorously, effectively, to the point and convincingly. General Dawes conceived the idea of pooling all of the resources of the three armies — the English, the French, the American. Before our coming and even afterward there were many times when the English Army lacked essential material of which the French at the same time had a surplus, and, similarly, often when the French lacked, the English had more than they needed. General Dawes proposed that all of this material, motor trucks, ammunition, artillery, and the like, should be regarded as the joint property of all three, and that when the need arose, that which was necessary should be assigned to one or the other of the three forces in accordance with actual necessities and without regard to its prior owner­ship. To this plan he readily obtained the sanction of General Pershing and of M. Clemenceau for the French. He then went to England to get Mr. Lloyd George's signature to the agreement, and he himself told me what took place there.

He went, of course, to the American headquarters in London where the Commanding  p38 General, John Biddle, called up Mr. Lloyd George's office to make an appointment for General Dawes. Lloyd George's secretary answered and after considerable conversation over the telephone arranged for General Dawes to see the Prime Minister the second day following at two o'clock. General Biddle so informed General Dawes, who said at once, "That won't do. Give me the telephone." Whereupon the following conversation took place:

"Hello, who is this talking?"

"This is the Prime Minister's secretary."

"I don't want to know whose secretary you are. My name's Dawes. What's yours?"

After a little hemming and hawing, the secretary gave his name, we will call it Johnson.

"Now look here, Johnson. I have come over to England on a most important matter and I can't wait until day after to-morrow. It has got to be done right now. I am coming right down and you tell Lloyd George I will see him at once."

General Dawes hung up the telephone, went to the Prime Minister's office, met him in the hall, and within five minutes had obtained his signature to the agreement.

 p39  All the while the Argonne battle was in progress we were working day and night to provide airplanes to take the places of those which had been damaged or destroyed and pilots to man them, keeping up a constant flow of men and material to the Front, visiting the airdromes, watching the air fighting, encouraging and commending the airmen.

On October 19th at Belrain I planed a number of Distinguished Flying Crosses to the pilots to whom they had been awarded for exceptional bravery in battle. It was a raw day, muddy under foot, but the entire command was paraded and these outstanding pilots, each of whom had won a number of air victories, were drawn up in line; with the officers accompanying me, I passed from one to the other. The citation awarding each cross was read and I then pinned the cross upon the breast of the officer's uniform. Quite a ceremony was made of this.

A short time thereafter, at Toul, I bestowed upon Lieutenant Wallace A. Coleman the Distinguished Flying Cross which had been awarded him for great gallantry while on a flying mission  p40 near Jaulny early in September. Flying with his observer, Lieutenant William Belgel, they were attacked by an enemy plane; waiting until the enemy was at close range, Lieutenant Coleman fired upon him and he went down out of control. The next day these same two fliers were attacked by seven enemy aircraft. Although alone, they made no effort to avoid the conflict and at once opened fire, but owing to their guns becoming jammed, they were forced to withdraw to our lines where, after clearing the jam, they returned to finish their mission. They were once more attacked by a large patrol of enemy planes, and again their guns failed to function. After skilful manœuvring they succeeded in getting one gun to work, tried for the third time, but were driven back. Then for the fourth time they returned, succeeded in accomplishing their mission and in transmitting most valuable information to their headquarters. This is just a sample of the gallantry of our airmen, who, no matter what the odds against them, as was said of Lieutenant Coleman, "Undaunted, they carried out their missions."

Another example: Some time later at Clermont- p41 Ferrand I presented to Lieutenant A. F. Bonalie the emblem of the Distinguished Service Order which had been conferred upon him by the British, with whom for a time he had served. This award was likewise made for a most notable achievement. On August 13th Lieutenant Bonalie was leading two other planes on a long photographic reconnaissance. In spite of the presence of many enemy planes, he had succeeded in taking all the required photographs and was returning to our lines. He was intercepted by six German Fokker planes which dived to the attack. In the combat which ensued Lieutenant Bonalie saw that one of his planes was in difficulties and was attempting to reach our lines with one of the Fokkers close after him, on his tail. Lieutenant Bonalie at once broke off his combat with the other enemy planes and dived to the assistance of the machine in trouble. He drove off the attacking enemy regardless of the machine‑gun bullets which were ripping up his own plane from the other enemy Fokkers. Half of Lieutenant Bonalie's tail surfaces were shot away, the elevator wires were shot through, and his plane began to fall in stalling sideslips. Lieutenant Bonalie  p42 managed to keep his airplane fa­cing toward our lines while his observer and the men in the third airplane drove off the enemy planes which were still attacking. His elevator controls destroyed, Lieutenant Bonalie's machine was very tail heavy, so his observer left the rear cockpit, crawled over Lieutenant Bonalie, and lay along the cowling in front of him. The plane thus practically disabled recrossed our lines at a low altitude and thus avoided a fatal crash. It was later found that the observer in the disabled plane to whose rescue Lieutenant Bonalie had gone had been killed and the pilot wounded. Had it not been for the gallantry of Lieutenant Bonalie, this plane, with its injured occupants, would undoubtedly have been shot down in enemy territory. When Lieutenant Bonalie landed it was found that his airplane had been literally riddled with German bullets. Prior to that time he had taken part in twenty-seven success­ful bombing raids and photographic missions, and in them all had shown great gallantry and determination. This, in substance, was the citation accompanying the award of  p43 this English decoration and there is no doubt that it was well deserved.

There is sometimes an inclination on the part of unthinking people to minimize the importance of such awards, of the so‑called decorations given the soldiers who distinguish themselves in one way or another. This is entirely wrong. The crosses, or medals, are in themselves small things, but it is human nature to be somewhat pleased with the thought that what one has done has been recognized as worth while, and it is inevitable that the marks of such recognition should be treasured by those upon whom they are bestowed. Every care was taken in the American Expeditionary Forces that such awards were not cheapened by being bestowed for deeds which were too small. A man who earned the Distinguished Service Cross had shown himself exceptionally brave in time of battle. He must have stood out above his fellows and have really done more than might be regarded as his plain and simple duty. These flying men to whom the crosses had been given were distinguished for their bravery, their coolness in battle, their skill, and thoroughly deserved the awards given them.  p44 Furthermore, this greatly improved the morale of the Air Service. It was known that the personnel was being observed and that those who saw what was done were willing to give credit for exceptional performance.

As an indication of the great gallantry displayed in action against the enemy by the Air Service personnel during the war, it may be mentioned that the men received 611 decorations and citations. One officer received the Congressional Medal of Honor, the highest mark of distinction which can be bestowed by the United States; 2 received the British Distinguished Service Cross and 20 the British Distinguished Flying Cross; 39 were awarded the French cross of the Legion of Honour; 5 the Médaille Militaire; 158 the Croix de Guerre, and 149 others, French citations. Of the Americans serving with the Italians, 50 were decorated for their outstanding valour in the presence of the enemy. In addition, there were 13 Belgian, 2 Rumanian, 1 Serbian, 1 Chinese, and 2 Montenegrin decorations given to Air Service personnel.

No finer body of young men than these Air Service pilots ever went forth to do battle for  p45 their country. Flying was such a new thing, it had an irresistible attraction for them. There was a glamour about it, this going up in the air, playing hide-and‑seek among the clouds, pitting your own skill and courage against those of an opponent, and the issue life or death. The only thing comparable to it is the story of the stirring deeds of the knights of old who rode forth to redress the wrongs of the distressed, or who challenged each other to mortal combat for the mere joy of fighting or to win the favour of their lady loves. These knights of the sky rode the winds, and with the earth far beneath them, alone in the immensity of space, travelling faster than man had ever done before, they fought gallantly and fairly and those who fell died bravely.

Just about this time there came to France Mr. Atwood, a partner or associate of Senator James Reed, of Missouri, sent by Senator Reed to see for himself just what was being done in the air. Mr. Atwood was undoubtedly a shrewd man, of the bluff, hail-fellow-well-met type, but one who would be hard to fool. He told me that Senator Reed had intended coming himself, but that illness in his family had prevented and that therefore  p46 he, Mr. Atwood, had been sent to represent him. Mr. Atwood was informed that he would be given an opportunity to see anything, to talk to anybody, and to obtain every particle of information which was available. He was sent with one of the Air Service officers and visited every Air Service station. When he was about to leave France he told me that he had prepared a report for Senator Reed which was distinctly commendatory of everything he had seen, that he had no criticisms, except minor ones, to offer, and that he would tell Senator Reed that the Air Service was being administered well and that it was doing wonders in the air.

On October 28, 1918, I for the first time heard the rumour that the Germans were asking for terms or an armistice. The fighting in the Argonne was intense. Our troops were pushing ahead continually and the French and English were likewise driving the Germans back.

On October 30th I had a message from Marshal Foch's Chief of Staff, General Weygand, who said that the Marshal wanted to see me. I went at once and found him at Senlis. Marshal Foch asked a number of questions, particularly about  p47 our facilities for training pilots, said he knew that we lacked personnel, and offered any help which the French could give. He wanted to know in detail just what our plans were and the numbers of men and of planes that we thought could be placed at the Front. There was no indication during this interview that Marshal Foch believed the end was so near.

On November 5th I visited the pursuit group on the Toul airdrome, especially to see the 17th and the 148th Squadrons which had just come to us from the British. On my visit to London in June, as one of the inducements to release a number of our Air Service men, it was arranged that these two squadrons, the pilots of which had been trained on Sopwith-Camel planes, would be allowed to remain with the British Air Force for a time. These two organizations while with the Royal Air Force had done remarkably fine work. They had shot down more than a hundred and ten enemy airplanes with a loss to themselves of only thirty-five men.

On the 7th of November we heard that the Germans were sending commissioners to Marshal Foch to ask for armistice terms. And then, on  p48 the 11th of November, as the whole world knows, the Armistice was signed at five o'clock in the morning, fighting ceased at 11 A.M., and the war was over.

A few days later I had a long talk with General Pershing, and told him I wanted to congratulate him; in turn, he said, "Well, I congratulate you." He spoke enthusiastically of the Air Service, said he had no words to express his admiration of the work our aviators had done. He went on to say that the success of our drive north of Verdun had made the position of the German Army very perilous; that if the fighting had continued two weeks longer he was convinced a complete rout or abject surrender of the German Army would have been forced; that it would have been one of the greatest defeats in history; that as he was sure of this he had strenuously opposed the granting of the Armistice.

General Pershing then inquired what we meant to do with all the airplanes we had in France and told me to go ahead and close up all the Air Service matters in Europe, that he had no special instructions to give me except that  p49 I was to prepare to send back our personnel as fast as possible.

As has been stated already, when we entered the war the Air Service of our Army was a negligible quantity. When hostilities ceased on November 11, 1918, there were in France a total of 6,861 Air Service officers and 51,229 men, all under my command. About 750 officers and nearly 20,000 men were training in England. There were actually assigned to our armies 45 American squadrons, 767 pilots, 481 observers, 23 aërial gunners, and the proper complement of enlisted men. These squadrons were equipped with 740 airplanes, with armament of the latest type, and the flying personnel trained in Air Service schools was second to none in the world for aggressiveness and skill. Twelve of these squadrons were equipped with American-built airplanes and Liberty engines.

On the Marne, at Saint-Mihiel, and in the Argonne our air forces were pitted against the best which Germany could produce and the results show that the enemy more than met his match. Our pilots shot down 781 enemy airplanes, which  p50 figures were officially confirmed, and many others too far behind the lines to be confirmed by our witnesses, but which were, nevertheless, undoubtedly destroyed. They also destroyed 73 enemy balloons. Our total losses were 289 airplanes and 49 balloons brought down by the enemy.

Our squadrons took part, in round numbers, in 150 bombing raids, during which they dropped 275,000 pounds of explosives on the enemy. They took thousands of photographs of enemy positions and on innumerable occasions regulated the fire of our artillery; they flew in contact with the infantry during attacks, and from a height of only a few yards from the ground they machine-gunned and bombed enemy batteries, convoys, and troops on the march.

Our most remarkable concentration of air forces took place during the Argonne offensive during the late afternoon of October 9th, when something more than 200 bombing planes, more than 100 pursuit planes, and 53 three-place machines were sent over the enemy lines. This force dropped a total of 32 tons of bombs on an area where it was known that the Germans were  p51 concentrating for a counter attack. This air force was strongly attacked by the enemy in the air and during the engagement we brought down 12 enemy airplanes, while only one of all of our own failed to return to its airdrome.

There were being operated twenty-six training schools for pilots and observers, and, in addition, American officers were being trained in three schools operated by the Allies. From the training schools on November 11, 1918, there had been graduated 1,674 fully trained pilots and 851 observers. There had been sent to the Front 1,402 pilots and 769 observers. Certain of these schools were retained in operation after the Armistice and between that date and January 1, 1919, they graduated an additional number of 675 pilots and 375 observers.

From our balloon schools there had been graduated a total of 199 officers and 623 enlisted men, specialized, who were taught to operate the balloons, to do reconnaissance work, to observe artillery fire and radio operation.

After hostilities ceased there was the let-down feeling which always follows the cessation of intense effort. The way in which the news of the  p52 Armistice was received has been told over and over again. After the first rather hysterical outburst this let-down feeling was much in evidence. It was soon found, however, that "after the war" had its own problems and they pressed for solution. First of all, we had to prepare the small air contingents which would accompany our troops into Germany. This was not a difficult matter and was soon arranged. A certain amount of shipping was found to be available and it was possible to send back almost immediately nearly all of the Air Service troops then in England.

The matter of the money settlements with the British, with the French, and with the Italians then came to the fore. Colonel Grayson M. P. Murphy had been sent to England at the suggestion of Mr. Ryan to handle our affairs in London. He was instructed to take up with the British all of the questions which arose concerning the material furnished by them for our Air Service and he effected a fair and reasonable settlement. Colonel Robert Glendinning and Major Frank H. Maguire had been sent to Italy on a mission similar to that of Colonel Murphy's in London.

 p53  During a few months after I became Chief of Air Service we had been represented in Italy by Captain (later Major) F. H. la Guardia, then a member of Congress, who had been commissioned and served as an officer in the Air Service, this of course without drawing his pay as a Congressman. Captain la Guardia was of Italian descent and, of course, peculiarly fitted to deal with these people. At this same time our Navy had representatives in Italy and both they and Captain la Guardia were endeavouring to arrange to obtain, the one for the Navy, the other for the Army, planes of Italian manufacture. They were really competing with each other. Captain (later Admiral) H. I. Cone, of our Navy, was in charge of all of the Navy air effort​e and this matter of our competing with each other was taken up with him. He was found to be very reasonable, very ready to do anything which would bring about a better state of affairs. He agreed that Captain la Guardia should handle all matters with the Italians, both for the Army and for the Navy. The arrangement endured for a time, but later Captain Cone came to me and said that it could continue no longer.

 p54  Just about this time a number of our pilots who had been trained in Italian schools were ready to be sent to the Front. I arranged that, with Italian airplanes, they should join the Italian Air Force and Captain la Guardia was placed in charge of these pilots at the Front. He was succeeded in the conduct of business matters with the Italians by the two officers, Colonel Glendinning and Major Maguire, mentioned above. After the war ended these two men assisted materially in arriving at a satisfactory settlement with the Italians, covering all of the training they had given our pilots and the value of the material which they had furnished.

In addition to winding up Air Service matters and effecting the settlements with the Allies, I was appointed with Admiral Knapp, of our Navy, a member of a commission to draft rules for aërial navigation and also to consider any aviation questions that the Peace Conference, then in session, might refer to it. The many improvements which had been made in airplanes during the war emphasized their importance in a commercial way as well, and it was apparent that aircraft would undoubtedly be greatly used for  p55 commercial air transportation, the carrying of mail, express matter, and passengers. It was proposed that this commission should draft a convention which would govern international flying. The task was an important one and likewise presented a number of problems which heretofore had been unsolved. And there were, of course, difficulties to overcome in order to frame rules and incorporate them in a convention which would be satisfactory to all of the countries represented on this commission. The other members of the commission were delegates from England, France, Italy, Japan, and there were also two or three delegates who represented all of the small countries.

The commission held a number of meetings and finally drafted the convention, incorporating in it, by direction of President Wilson, certain provisions which joined it to the League of Nations. This document was signed by all of the delegates, although to one or two of the provisions, particularly to some of the annexes, the United States made reservations. As this convention was similar to a treaty, it was necessary for it to be acted upon favourably by our Senate  p56 before we formally became a party to it. As, however, it was thus linked with the League of Nations, it has never been referred to the Senate by the administration, but has reposed in the files of the State Department. Nevertheless, the convention has been the basis of all subsequent attempts to draft rules governing air navigation.

I was also a member of the committee charged with drafting the military terms to be incorporated in the treaty and imposed upon Germany. Of course the specific matters with which I was to deal were the terms governing the surrender of all of the German aircraft, engines, and other material, and prescribing the air activities which would be permitted in Germany after the signing of the Peace Treaty.

With the representatives of the Allies who had been connected with aviation these matters were debated at great length. What Marshal Foch subsequently called the "potentialities of air warfare" had been strongly impressed upon all of us. There was the fear, particularly on the part of the French, that if Germany were allowed to develop aircraft and aircraft motors there would be the danger of her creating a great air fleet  p57 which at some future time might be used against France almost on a moment's notice. The English, likewise being within easy range of such an hostile air raid, were as willing as the French to throttle any attempt on the part of Germany to develop such an air force. Furthermore, foreseeing the importance which aircraft would play in commercial transportation, both the English and the French were determined that they would eliminate any possible competition by Germany along these lines.

While we ourselves would be too far from Germany to fear, in the near future, any attack by air from any country in Europe, there was still the possibility that at some time we should not be sufficiently safeguarded by the distance across the Atlantic; and we were also very willing to aid those with whom we had been associated during the war in preventing an air attack which was not only possible but which might be regarded as probable. The air terms to be imposed upon Germany were, therefore, very drastic. At a meeting of the Peace Conference they were presented and adopted by it.

I was present likewise at a number of meetings  p58 of the Military Committee, headed by Marshal Foch, which was charged with drafting the other military terms to be incorporated in the Peace Treaty. This Committee was composed of the commanding generals of all of the countries in Europe which had fought against Germany and one of the most important questions with which it had to deal was the strength of the army which Germany would be permitted to maintain after peace had been concluded.

As the result of many discussions, the Committee finally proposed that Germany should be allowed a peacetime army of 200,000 men, drafted for one year with the colours. When this plan was presented to the Peace Conference by Marshal Foch it met with most vigorous opposition, particularly on the part of the British. Mr. Lloyd George denounced it in scathing terms. He said that by allowing Germany such an army the result would be that in a few years' time there would be hundreds of thousands of these soldiers, each of whom had been trained for a year. He was unalterably opposed to the Foch plan. It was pointed out that all of the military men who had composed this Committee, including the  p59 British representatives, had agreed to the plan. Mr. Lloyd George went on to say that no matter how many generals had agreed, he himself would never agree to it, and that he would say then and there that under no circumstances would he sign a treaty with Germany which included this provision for such a peacetime army.

The matter was then sent back to the Committee for revision. When it was again debated there was much bitterness in evidence. The British representatives insisted that the committee had been directed to revise its plan radically and provide for a German army of the proper strength composed of volunteers who would serve for a long period, such as ten or twelve years. To this the French objected equally vigorously, stating that it would be necessary to maintain an army in France at least as large as that in Germany and that the cost of a volunteer army would be immensely greater than one raised by conscription. It was finally decided, however, that the Committee would have to bring in a plan for the maintenance by Germany of such a volunteer army, and then the question of its strength was the subject of another  p60 long debate. It was at first proposed that Germany should be allowed to maintain under arms 200,000 men. Again the French objected and one of the French delegates, evidently greatly moved, said, "Gentlemen, I say to you frankly I am afraid. I am afraid of Germany. We must take every precaution to prevent the devastation of France again in the future." The Committee finally agreed to fix the strength of the German Army at 140,000 men.

Then came the question of how this plan would be presented to the Peace Conference and whether the original proposal of the Foch Committee should be put in with it. The British said No, that the plan had been definitely rejected. The French insisted that it had not been formally turned down by the Peace Conference and that Marshal Foch should present to the Conference the two plans. He would state briefly the arguments for and against each and then would say, "Gentlemen, here are the two plans. Choose the one you prefer, but understand well that the responsibility for the choice rests with you."

At the next meeting of the Conference this new  p61 plan was duly presented, fixing the strength of the German Army at 140,000 volunteers. Marshal Foch made a strong plea for a reduction to 100,000 men. Finally Mr. Lloyd George said that all recognized the fact that France lay next door to Germany, that within the memory of living men France had twice been ravaged by the German hordes, that upon France must rest the burden of being prepared to receive the shock if Germany attempted once more to imperil the peace of the world. Under such circumstances great weight should be given by the Conference to the views of the French and to their suggestion as to the size of the army Germany should be permitted to maintain.

This statement of the British Prime Minister had apparently been carefully prepared beforehand and it was quite well and effectively delivered, with the result that the size of the German Army was fixed at 100,000 men.

Marshal Foch then tried to have inserted a number of provisions concerning the holding of manœuvres, the raising of horses, and other rather elaborate details, but it was pointed out that their incorporation would merely cumber  p62 the treaty and really give Germany greater chances to avoid its terms than if it were drawn on broader lines and subject to interpretation later.

The question arose as to the possibility of Germany herself being attacked and her need for a force to resist invasion. Colonel House smilingly suggested that we might guarantee Germany's neutrality as she had guaranteed that of Belgium.

The air terms which had been drafted by the sub-committee, of which I was a member, were scarcely debated at all and were adopted precisely as drawn.

As is well known, the Peace Conference dragged along, but finally the treaty was perfected and then came the important question as to whether or not the Germans would sign it.

Early in June I was suddenly summoned to attend a conference at the Hôtel Crillon and this proved to be the most interesting at which I had ever been present. There were gathered together all of the American peace commissioners and many of their technical advisers. President Wilson presided and said that this was strictly a family party and it was desired that everyone  p63 should exchange ideas freely. There seemed to be some doubt whether the Germans would sign the treaty as drafted and he proposed to consider the matter and to try to ascertain whether any changes should be made in the treaty draft.

The first subject brought up related to the economic terms of the treaty and to reparations. Some of the financial experts present once more insisted that it would be better to fix in the treaty the total sum for Germany to pay. All of the President's financial advisers had taken this view, but to this it was impossible to induce the French and the British peace commissioners to agree. They had insisted to both their peoples that Germany would be made to pay the entire cost of the war. This cost was, however, so huge a figure that it was plainly evident even then that it would be impossible for Germany ever to repay it. Nevertheless, to fix the total of German reparation at anything less would have so seriously injured the political prestige of the British and French leaders that they did not dare to consent to the American proposal for incorporating in the treaty a total sum, within the ability of Germany to pay, which should be fixed as the  p64 measure of all reparations to be exacted. At this meeting our own financial experts expressed the opinion that the maximum sum which Germany could pay would be somewhere in the neighbourhood of $15,000,000,000.

Then one of the most prominent of the President's advisers brought up the question of expediency and said, "It is necessary for Europe to get to work. How much can we yield in order to get this treaty signed and bring about this result?"

Upon this President Wilson took strong ground. He said in substance: "If this treaty is just we should stand by it and insist upon its being signed. That its conditions are hard upon Germany does not matter so long as they are just. Germany brought this needless war upon the world and must learn the cost and pay it. If we have made mistakes in drafting this treaty, if there are injustices in it, we should be willing to correct them, but if not, the treaty should stand. The English and the French are greatly alarmed and fear that the treaty will not be signed. It is difficult to sympathize with those who fear the Germans will not sign because the  p65 treaty contains things they insisted should be put in it. If this treaty had been drawn along the lines originally urged by them, the Germans would have gone home as soon as they read the draft. We did succeed in getting substantial and sensible changes made. Being convinced of the justice of the treaty, we should insist upon Germany's signature. If we do not get now by a signed treaty that for which we have justly fought, I will be willing to go on fighting until we do get it."

As there were no suggestions on the part of anyone that mistakes had been made in drafting the treaty or that its terms were unjust, the meeting was ended with this pronouncement by the President and it was understood that we should insist that the treaty as drafted be duly signed by the German representatives. And, as is well known, at a colour­ful ceremony in the Hall of Mirrors in the Palace of Versailles the treaty was duly signed on June 28, 1919.

Going back for a moment, the deeds of our airmen had been noted with admiration, particularly by the French, and someone had suggested that to each one of our air squadrons there  p66 should be given a standard, a flag, made by a French woman. This idea was eagerly grasped and work was started upon 202 of these flags, the number corresponding to the squadrons which we expected to place in the field. Each woman chose her own design and the flags, beauti­fully embroidered samples of what these workers could do, were ready for presentation.

It was arranged that this ceremony should take place on April 12, 1918, at the Opéra Comique. Mrs. Woodrow Wilson had consented to be present and I called for her at the house the President was occupying, and there while waiting for Mrs. Wilson and her secretary, Miss Benham, I saw the President for a few moments and told him we were sorry he himself could not attend. The President said that he regretted it also, but that he was assisting at a continuous performance these days and could not get away from it.

The opera house was filled to overflowing. It was a gala performance. As has been already said, when the war ended we had forty-five air squadrons at the Front. There were three others just ready to be sent, so that the representatives  p67 of these forty-eight squadrons were present on the stage with the same number of notable French fliers. With them were General Duval, Chief of the French Air Service, and myself. M. Lusanne​f made a short speech. These beauti­ful flags were then unfurled by the French flying men and were handed one at a time by a French flier to our own pilots.

I then thanked the women of France for the thought which had prompted them to make for us these standards, which would always be treasured and which would ever after be preserved most carefully as evidence of the ties which had bound us, especially the airmen of our two countries, together.

Then followed a beauti­ful ballet and the singing of the opera Pagliacci. When this was ended the entire audience stood and the "Marseillaise" was sung gloriously.

Twice after the war ended and in the intervals when I could leave my work I went into Germany to visit our Army of Occupation to note just what the Air Service was doing, how it was training, and to be assured that it was in readiness for any advance into Germany, which  p68 was contemplated all along as a possibility. On one of these occasions I visited the engineer regiment which I had taken to France and which had given a most gallant account of itself in battle. It had lost heavily, but had done its part manfully, and I was very proud of having had a hand in training it, preparing it for its wartime work.

Having finally concluded all of the matters entrusted to me after the war, I reported this fact to General Pershing and told him that I was ready to go home. He again expressed his admiration for the work which the airmen had done. He told me once more that he was entirely satisfied with it and that, while he was very willing for me to return home, he knew there were several commissions which were to be sent to different parts of Europe. If I were willing to stay longer and accept member­ship on one of them, I might, he thought, be able to do more of what he called my "excellent work." There were many reasons, however, why I decided it was best for me to return at once to the United States and, although complimented by General Pershing's suggestion, I so informed him.

 p69  I sailed from Brest on the Aquitania and landed in New York on July 20, 1919. Here I was met, as was of course expected, by an order demoting me, and I therefore reverted to my pre-war rank of Colonel in the Corps of Engineers and was directed to report to the Chief of Engineers in Washington.

When I arrived there I found in progress the Frear Congressional Investigation. I was summoned before the Committee to give an account of what we had done in the air in France. I found that considerable prominence had been given to the fact that after the war we had burned a number of airplanes. For this I assumed entire responsibility. It was undoubtedly a proper and economical thing to do and I believe that I was able to convince the Committee of this fact. At any rate, very little was ever said about it afterward.

After a short leave of absence I was sent to New Orleans on engineering work on the Mississippi River and along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. Just as the year 1919 was drawing to a close, I was ordered back to Washington on temporary duty, and upon my arrival found it  p70 was desired to have me draw up plans for equipping engineer regiments which might have to take part in other military operations which it was then thought might soon have to be undertaken. This work took only a little while, but it so happened that after its completion I was retained on other duty in Washington until June, 1921, when I was sent to Camp Humphreys, about twenty miles south of Washington, to take command of the engineer school. With this move I was very much pleased. The duty was most congenial. Camp Humphreys covered a large area along the west bank of the Potomac River, most of which had been acquired during the war. There was ample opportunity for an outdoor life, and one's leisure time was occupied with riding, fishing, and hunting, all of which appealed to me very strongly. I looked forward to remaining there for a number of years and settled down accordingly.

Thayer's Notes:

a A biographical sketch of Colonel Bolling at the Greenwich Historical Society keeps his memory alive. For the statue, see The Historical Marker Database.

b In matters jurisdictional, Gen. Foulois could be as bristly as Gen. Mitchell: a Navy point of view is given by Turnbull and Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation, pp137‑138.

c The youngest son of President Theodore Roosevelt.

d Canadian military aviation pioneer Harold Evans Hartney, 1888‑1945.

e For the World War I naval aviation program directed by Hutchinson ("Hutch") Ingham Cone, see Turnbull and Lord, History of United States Naval Aviation, pp 104‑105 and 122‑125.

f Whether the name is correctly spelled or not, I've been unable to discover who he was. If you know, I'd be happy to hear from you!

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