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previous: Part I This webpage reproduces one of the Parts of The United States in the Air by Mason M. Patrick Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc. Garden City, New York, 1928 The text is in the public domain. This page has been carefully proofread and I believe it to be free of errors. If you find a mistake though, please let me know! next: Part III

 p73  Part II
Peacetime Aviation

The day before Labour Day, 1921, a telephone message came from General J. G. Harbord, then Deputy Chief of Staff, saying that he and the Secretary of War, the Honourable John W. Weeks, would pay a visit to Camp Humphreys the next day; that Mr. Weeks had never seen the place and wanted to look it over. The necessary preparations for receiving these two visitors were quickly made. They arrived the next morning about eleven o'clock, were met at the entrance to the post and shown all over it and over the engineering school. After a stay of two or three hours they returned to Washington.

A few days later General Pershing came down to spend the day with us and he was told of this visit of the Secretary of War to look over the post. General Pershing said, "I think Mr. Weeks came down to look over you. That means something about the Air Service."  p74 It will be necessary to recount briefly what had happened to the Air Service in this country after the war. Major General Charles T. Menoher, who had commanded the Rainbow Division in France, upon his return to the United States was placed at the head of the Air Service, which at that time consisted of two major divisions, one the Division of Military Aëronautics and the other the Bureau of Aircraft Production, which was really the supply department. General Kenly was then in charge of the Division of Military Aëronautics. But very soon thereafter General Mitchell returned from overseas and replaced General Kenly as chief of that division. This was the same General Mitchell who had immediate command of the Air Service organizations on the front line in France.

Almost from the very beginning there was friction between these two men. At first their offices were rather widely separated. General Menoher knew very little of what was going on in the Division of Military Aëronautics, and Mitchell, allowed to do about as he pleased, spent a great deal of his time agitating for a separate Air Service, advocating the consolidation of all  p75 of the military air effort of the United States under one head, a Cabinet officer co­ördinate with the Secretaries of War and of the Navy. In the early part of 1920 there were long hearings on this subject before a committee of Congress and much testimony was taken.

About this same time there arose a virulent controversy with the Navy. It will be remembered that aircraft during the World War played only a minor part in naval engagements, and there was no record of any surface vessel having been sunk or even greatly damaged by aircraft bombs.

Nevertheless, in season and out of season, General Mitchell continually insisted that aircraft would be the most effective weapons which could be employed against naval vessels, that an air force properly used would prevent a hostile fleet from attacking our shores, and that the bombs dropped from aircraft could destroy any surface craft that floated.

In June, 1920, Congress passed what has since been known as the National Defence Act. It rejected the arguments of those who had advocated a Department of Aëronautics with a Cabinet  p76 Minister at its head and instead directed that the Air Service be organized as one of the combatant branches of the Army. General Menoher remained as the Air Service Chief, with General Mitchell as his assistant. The Division of Military Aëronautics having been abolished, General Mitchell was placed for a time at the head of what was known as the Training and Operations Division of the Air Service. He was, however, shortly relieved, and then General Menoher, while giving him no specific duty to perform, broadly outlined the work he was expected to do as Assistant Chief, the work to consist mainly of advising upon all important Air Service matters, with the understanding that from time to time definite tasks would be assigned him.

Under such conditions, with really little else to do, Mitchell spent a large part of his time in political activities, agitating for a separate Air Service, and continuing the aircraft vs. surface vessels with the Navy.

Finally in January, 1921, the Secretary of War asked the Navy Department to make available certain vessels in order that a practical test might be made of these theories of General  p77 Mitchell. Instead, however, of turning over vessels to the War Department, the Navy decided that it would conduct the test itself, making use of certain German naval vessels which had been delivered to the United States. The Navy did, however, request the Army to participate in these tests under naval control, but with the understanding that the Navy would assume entire responsibility for them, for the programme to be followed, and would give all orders for aircraft in the execution of this programme. The Secretary of War accepted this invitation and the conditions upon which it was predicated. The Army Air Service was directed to take part in the tests and what was called the Provisional Air Brigade, with General Mitchell in command, was organized at Langley Field, Va., •about one hundred and twenty miles south of Washington.

The Army pilots were given as much practice as possible in bombing targets outlined on the ground and water, and all preparations were made for the proposed attack upon the German vessels, consisting of the submarine U‑177, destroyer G‑102, light cruiser Frankfurt, and battle­ship Ostfriesland.

 p78  In addition, the first part of the programme consisted of a test to determine whether or not aircraft could locate a vessel or vessels at sea. For this purpose the United States battle­ship Iowa was used, and aircraft were sent to search for her, knowing only that the Iowa would be a number of miles at sea and somewhere between Cape May and Cape Hatteras. The results showed very clearly that aircraft had little difficulty in picking up a vessel at sea, as the Iowa was readily located.

Thereafter came the attacks with bombs upon the German vessels. The Navy insisted that these vessels should be •at least fifty miles from the shore line, which made it necessary for the attacking aircraft to fly •about a hundred miles before they could reach their targets. As the Army fliers were using land planes which could not effect landings on the water, these long flights over water involved a considerable risk and there were numerous protests against this Navy requirement. It was charged that the Navy was doing everything in its power to obstruct the operations, to make them a failure,  p79 and again the controversy flared up and became most heated.

During the progress of the tests the dropping of bombs from aircraft was interrupted several times by the Navy's signals in order that the official observers might have time to note the effect of the bombs already dropped. This caused the airmen to fly around doing nothing for considerable periods of time, depleting the fuel supply of the planes and, from the Army standpoint, increasing greatly the risk to both planes and fliers. A great deal of bitterness was thus engendered and much recrimination was indulged in.

In spite of the alleged handicaps imposed by the Navy, these tests were, from the airman's standpoint, entirely success­ful. Every one of the vessel targets was sent to the bottom. The battle­ship Ostfriesland, one of the most modern of the German war vessels, was quickly sunk by the aircraft bombs.

There is no doubt but that the results of these tests were a great surprise and a shock to most of the Navy. In fact, the Navy programme as  p80 published indicated very little expectation that aircraft would do much damage, and planned, after the attacks from the air, to employ gunfire to sink the targets. On the other hand, General Mitchell's horn was greatly exalted​a and quite loudly blown.

A joint board consisting of Army and Navy officers, of which General Pershing was a member, had been directed to observe these tests and to submit a report embodying its conclusions. This report distinctly stated that in the opinion of the Board bombs from aircraft could put out of commission or sink any surface craft which up to that time, the summer of 1921, had been designed or built.

Subsequently the Navy turned over to the War Department the obsolete battle­ship Alabama, which was anchored in shoal water in Chesapeake Bay within easy reach from Langley Field. Against this target the Army Air Service operated and it was utterly destroyed. The object in placing it in water of so little depth was to enable the effect of the bombs dropped to be noted readily, and as much of the Alabama, when it finally rested on the bottom, was still above  p81 water, the terrific damage done by the explosive charges carried in the bombs was very evident.

Once more aircraft had triumphed, a battle­ship had been destroyed, and this fact was widely and loudly proclaimed. Those who were most enthusiastic over what the Air Service had done prophesied that surface war vessels could no longer be employed for national defence, that the battle­ship, heretofore regarded as "the backbone of the fleet," had thus been rendered obsolete, ineffective, that money spent in building them would be thrown away and ought to be used for purchasing aircraft to build up an air force. Naturally, such statements did not in any way lessen the friction between the Army airmen and the Navy. Rather it was intensified. General Mitchell, in particular, lost no opportunity of flinging these facts in the Navy's face. Every now and then he would burst into print, hitting at the Navy, or criticizing the administration of the Army Air Service under the War Department, charging among other things a poor state of training of the tactical units and a lack of development.

Each time this happened the War Department  p82 would take General Menoher to task. The latter would call General Mitchell in, and talk to him about these matters, but this did little good. After a number of attempts to bring General Mitchell into line, to make him work with the organizations then sentº up, General Menoher finally asked that General Mitchell be relieved and sent to some station distant from Washington. This he did in letters addressed to the War Department, but nothing was done about it.

Finally, however, General Menoher wrote a letter asking that he either be backed up by the War Department or that he be relieved from duty as Chief of the Air Service and given another command. Shortly thereafter the Secretary of War sent for him and told him that because of his failure to handle and discipline General Mitchell properly he was going to accede to his request and relieve him as Chief of the Air Service.

Toward the end of the month of September, 1921, I was summoned to General Harbord's office in the War Department and told that General Menoher was to be relieved from duty  p83 as Chief of the Air Service and that the Secretary of War had recommended to the President my appointment in that place. I told General Harbord that I was very loath to accept it. It was known that the Air Service was greatly disorganized; whoever was placed at its head would have to straighten out a tangled mess. This it had fallen my lot to try to do in France, but I was not at all sure I wanted to attempt it again and under peacetime conditions. General Harbord urged me to think it over; he said he thought it my duty to undertake this task and he believed I could handle it. While I agreed to consider it, I told General Harbord upon leaving his office that I was not at all certain that I would be willing to take upon myself what I could plainly foresee would be a most onerous duty.

I went back to my command at Camp Humphreys. A day or two later the President sent to the Senate my nomination to be Chief of the Air Service with the rank of major general. The morning this was published in the papers I went for a long horseback ride by myself to think things over, to make up my mind just what I ought to do. Upon my return to the office I was  p84 told that the White House had called me several times by telephone. I surmised at once that my possible reluctance to accept this appointment had been communicated to the President and I was to be urged to take the position for which he had designated me. I was, therefore, prepared to hear from the President's secretary something to that effect.

I called the White House by telephone, gave my name and the answer came: "Oh, yes, just wait a minute, Mr. Hoover wants to speak to you."

I went up a little in my own estimation for it was of course evident that instead of entrusting this matter to his own private secretary the President was going to have Secretary Hoover, one of the most influential members of his Cabinet, deliver his message to me. In a moment came a voice over the telephone:

"This is Mr. Hoover."

I answered, "Yes, Mr. Secretary, this is Colonel Patrick."

And then: "Oh, no, this is not the Secretary; this is Mr. Hoover, the chief usher at the White House. I want to know if I come down to Camp  p85 Humphreys whether I can get a boat to go fishing."

Although this blasted my expectation of being urged by the President to take the office, Mr. Hoover was told, of course, that he could obtain a boat any time he came fishing.

Shortly thereafter, my nomination having been confirmed by the Senate, I did accept it. I entered upon my new duties on October 5, 1921, and as I was reappointed after my four years' tour expired and continued in office until I retired on December 13, 1927, there followed for me six of the most strenuous, most interesting years of all my life.

When I thus succeeded General Menoher, General Mitchell remained as Assistant Chief of the Air Service. I had known him for more than fifteen years, including the time when were both in France, where I had also been Chief of the Air Service while he had immediate command of the airmen at the Front. Long before the World War we had served together in Cuba, hunted together, and had grown to know each other quite well. Mitchell is very likable and has ability; his ego is highly developed and he  p86 has an undoubted love for the limelight, a desire to be in the public eye. He is forceful, aggressive, spectacular. He had a better knowledge of the tactics of air fighting than any man in this country, and, as has been said, was jubilantly proclaiming the power of aircraft and would lose no opportunity to take a fling at the Navy. I think I understood quite well his characteristics, the good in him — and there was much of it — and his faults.

Immediately upon taking office I called General Mitchell in for a general talk about the Air Service matters. He told me that in anticipation of my coming he had prepared in writing a plan of the Air Service organization which he desired to present to me. This he did shortly thereafter. Even a casual reading of it disclosed the fact that if it were put into operation he would practically have charge of most of the Air Service activities while the Chief of the Air Service would have but little control over him.

This plan of General Mitchell's was promptly returned to him "disapproved." He was told that I proposed to be Chief of the Air Service in fact as well as in name; that I was content to  p87 have him m continue as my principal assistant; that I would be by glad and willing to consult with him about all Air Service matters, but that he would give no orders, and that while I would consider any recommendations he submitted, final decision in every case would be made by me. General Mitchell then said that he could not continue to serve under those conditions and that he would tender his resignation as an officer of the Army and the Air Service. This statement was made to me on a Saturday afternoon. I told him that I would not alter the conditions upon which I was willing to have him remain as Assistant Chief, and that if he proposed to resign we should go at once to the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff in the War Department and he could so so formally.

It so happened that General Harbord, the Deputy Chief of Staff, had left his office and would not return that afternoon. This made it necessary to postpone the visit to him until the following Monday morning. When that time came General Mitchell and I went to General Harbord's office where I announced briefly that General Mitchell found it impossible to serve  p88 with me under the conditions which I had enunciated and that he had come to offer his resignation. General Harbord asked how I proposed to make use of General Mitchell if he remained and also what General Mitchell's own ideas were as to the way in which the Air Service should be organized. These questions were answered fully, and then General Harbord turned to General Mitchell and said:

"Well, are you going to offer your resignation? If so, it will be accepted at once."

General Mitchell replied: "I have thought the matter over and now I have made up my mind that I do not care to resign, but I will assist General Patrick along the lines which he has laid down."

I had already reduced to writing what I had told General Mitchell, outlining his functions and duties, and this was handed to General Harbord, who read it out loud and asked General Mitchell whether he thoroughly understood it and was prepared to carry on in this way. Having received an affirmative reply, the interview with General Harbord came to an end and General Mitchell and I returned to my office.

 p89  It is but fair to say that, so far as I know, General Mitchell did abide by his undertaking. I did consult him about every major matter which affected the Air Service, and he submitted a number of recommendations, some of which were approved and some of which I was compelled to disapprove. As will be seen later, he "broke out" again, incurred the displeasure of the War Department, and was duly disciplined. My own relations with him, however, for the next four years were satisfactory enough and he performed quite well the duties which from time to time were assigned him.

As a whole the Air Service in this country, when I took charge, was in about as chaotic a condition as I had found it when some three years before I had been placed in charge of it in France. There was on hand practically nothing but war-built equipment, and of this vast quantities were scattered all over the country, costing large sums merely to care for it. But little, if any, tactical training was being given; no settled policies had been laid down; the men in charge of the various activities were going along without being directed; little or nothing was  p90 known of what aircraft and airmen could or should do, and this lack of understanding was most notable in the War Department itself, where a certain jealousy of the Air Service was markedly in evidence.

This air component of the Army was a new thing, an innovation, and like all such it met with opposition. It not only had to find itself, but it had to make known to hostile elements just what part it could play in military operations. On the one hand, there were the boastings of over-enthusiastic airmen, claiming that all other branches of the Army, the infantry, the cavalry, the artillery, were to be of but little use; that battles of the future would be fought in the air and that they would be decisive. On the other hand, the ground troops insisted that the Air Service was merely an auxiliary arm, one whose prime mission it was to aid the other branches in their military operations. These conflicting claims caused another controversy within the War Department itself almost as virulent as that which was still raging between the Army Air Service and the Navy. It was  p91 indeed no easy task to bring order out of this confusion.

Several things were plainly apparent. The Air Service property must be concentrated in few places, better training methods must be established, and more modern equipment was absolutely necessary. These problems were tackled vigorously, although, as will be seen, time was needed in which to solve them.

In October, 1921, there were being maintained some twenty-two separate depots and storage establishments, containing great quantities of war-built aircraft and motors. The abandonment of some of these depots was promptly recommended and ultimately all Air Service property was concentrated in five depots: one at Middletown, Pa., to serve organizations along the Atlantic coast; another at Fairfield, O., to take care of the central part of the country; one near San Antonio, Tex., whose main function was to care for the equipment in use at the flying schools; one near San Diego, Calif., to care for the Pacific coast, Hawaii, and the Philippines; the depot at Little Rock, Ark., used as a concentration  p92 point for the large number of aircraft motors which had been left over when the war ended. This ultimately resulted in a saving of not less than $500,000 a year in caring for Air Service property.

At that time the primary flying school, where young men were given their first lessons, was being conducted at Carlstrom Field, near the small town of Arcadia in Florida. Those who completed the course were then sent to a number of different places to finish their training. Again concentration was necessary. San Antonio, Tex., was selected as the site for all flying training. This had been used during the war, and although the buildings on the flying fields at this locality were of temporary wartime construction, it was believed that they would answer the purpose until more permanent structures could be erected.

Naturally, the taking away of the flying school from Florida encountered a good deal of opposition. I was directed by the Secretary of War to go to Florida and to explain frankly to the people there the necessity for cutting down expenses and for carrying on our flying training  p93 in some more centrally located point where it could all be under one control. It was demonstrated conclusively that the move would result in a saving of not less than $100,000 a year, and when this fact was laid before the people who had been interested in retaining the school in Florida they grasped it, consented to the move, and made no further opposition.

The two flying schools, the primary and the advanced, were put into operation on two fields •about seven miles apart, near San Antonio, Tex. The arrangement was a measure of economy and the flying training was much improved as time went on, as more experience was gained and the two schools could work closely together.

The matter of flying equipment — that is, airplanes — was the most serious of all. As has been already said, there were large numbers of war-built planes and motors on hand which had cost millions and millions of dollars. Of the Liberty motors, probably our greatest single contribution to aëronautics during the war, there were on hand at this time about 12,000 which had cost at least $50,000,000. Of airplanes there were the DH‑4's, observation planes, the only planes  p94 of this type which had been built during the war, and a large number of training planes, the JN's, generally called "Jennys." A few bombing planes of a new design had been built and these had proved their worth during the progress of the bombing experiments against German naval vessels. They were an advance over anything which had been previously constructed, but of them the Air Service had very few. Some two hundred and fifty single-seater pursuit planes had been ordered, the first whose building in any quantity had been attempted in the United States. These planes were designed in 1918 and were powered with a 300-horsepower motor, and while they had many faults, they were strong and manœuvrable and were used by the Air Service for several years.

The World War had seen many improvements in aircraft, but it was evident that these were merely forerunners of what was still to come. The art of designing and building aircraft was changing and improving almost daily.

There had been many charges made that the trouble with the Air Service in this country was lack of money, that Congress had not provided  p95 sufficient funds for the purchase of new aircraft. Congress had countered by directing that, of the money appropriated for the Air Service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1922, there must be expended not less than $5,500,000 for the purchase of new aircraft.

I had to appear before a Congressional committee in the early part of 1922, just a few months after taking office. I then stated that if this mandatory provision was carried out, if all of this considerable sum was spent for new aircraft, I was satisfied a large proportion of it would be wasted. At that time, and it is true even until now, when an order was placed for airplanes it was at least a year, sometimes much longer, before the manufacturers could deliver them. So rapidly were new designs being brought out that if in 1922 orders for new observation and pursuit planes were placed it was inevitable that better designs would be perfected long before these planes could be delivered, and they would thus be obsolete before they could be placed in the hands of the operating personnel. The committee of Congress was convinced of this fact, authorized the saving recommended, and  p96 then a couple of years later when designs had become more stabilized, upon being reminded that this saving had been effected, reappropriated the sum in question which could then be spent advantageously.

So far as observation planes were concerned, no design had then appeared which was any better than the old DH‑4's. It was decided, and I am sure rightly, that these war-built planes would be used by the Air Service for the time being after they had been thoroughly gone over, reconditioned, and put in as good shape as possible. This was, of course, pending the creation of a new and better design for such planes.

It is of course a fact that every country which had been in the war was faced with just this same problem, a vast accumulation of war-built aircraft and accessories, and each and every one did just what we were doing, issued this material to its airmen, after having put it in good condition, and continued it in use until better planes could be designed and built. These DH planes were built entirely of wood and some of their parts showed much deterioration when they were removed from storage, but they were practically  p97  entirely rebuilt and all bad parts were replaced so that the planes when put in the hands of airmen were as good as new. Later it was found possible to build the fuselages of these planes of metal, which made them better, stronger, less liable to deterioration while in use, and a few of these modified planes are still being flown but will soon be ordered discarded.

Much adverse criticism was directed at the Air Service by reason of its continuing to use the DH planes, but the reasons for so doing were sound and compelling. Furthermore, this course met with the approval of all who had to deal with the matter.

At this time the aircraft industry in this country was in a very parlous state. Vastly expanded during the war and with practically no demand for aircraft in the years which immediately followed, it was necessary for the manufacturers to liquidate, to scrap many of their plants, and of course to discharge large numbers of their workmen who were skilled in aircraft manufacture. These manufacturers, foreseeing, or at least hoping for, a better day to come,  p98 wanted to hold on, to continue to build aircraft, and for the little business in sight there was keen competition.

The Government found it cheaper to do most of the overhauling of the wooden DH planes in its own shops rather to let contracts for the rebuilding of these war-built craft; therefore, in the fiscal year 1922 practically the only orders placed for aircraft covered the building of certain bombing planes according to the new design, which has been already mentioned. This design had been developed by a particular manufacturer but it was decided, when future orders were to be placed, to invite bids from all manufacturers. The original designer and builder of this plane entered the competition, and he undoubtedly knew more than any of his competitors as to what would be the real cost of manufacturing planes of this type. His bid was higher than those of others, and several contracts were thus let to his competitors. Every single one of whom, having underestimated the cost, lost considerable sums of money. This was a severe lesson and at the same time it was a severe blow to the industry.

 p99  When one of these contracts for bombing planes was pending, the success­ful bidder one day appeared in my office and jubilantly exhibited to me copies of a picture which had been taken in the office of the Secretary of War which showed the bidder standing smiling at one side while the Secretary was handing the contract itself to a prominent politician. It so happened that this politician was soon to stand for reëlection and it was his intention to use these pictures in his political campaign as evidence of his interest in the labouring man and to indicate what he had done, by securing this contract from the War Department, for the workmen who would be engaged in the factory building the planes.

I took from this bidder every copy of this picture which had been made and found out from him the location of the plate from which they had printed. I went with them at once to the office of Mr. Weeks and protested most vigorously against any publicity being given to them. I told him that these pictures would be taken as evidence that political pressure influenced the giving of aircraft contracts; that if  p100 anything of the kind were to be published it would make it absolutely impossible to conduct the Air Service along proper lines. Secretary Weeks was one of the fairest and most broad-minded of men, and one of the clearest thinkers I have ever met. A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, he had had long experience in business, grasped an idea quickly, required few details to be placed before him, and trusted his subordinates. It took him just a moment to realize the aspect of this matter which I placed before him. He smiled a little, said:

"Oh, yes, I had not told thought of it in that way. This was an old friend of mine whose picture was taken but I can see that we must destroy all of them. You tear them up right now and go and smash the plate. We are not going to play politics in the Air Service."

Thereafter, on two or three occasions when the Secretary sent for me he recalled this matter and said smilingly when he gave me certain orders, "Well, General Patrick, we are not playing politics, you and I, are we?"

Still another matter was of grave concern to the aircraft manufacturers. The so‑called Engineering  p101 Division of the Air Service was located at Dayton, O., and there a great deal of experimental and research work was being carried on almost independently and without any considerable measure of control being exercised by the office of the Chief of the Air Service. While much of this work was of extreme importance and was being well done, there had been created a division of airplane designing, and a number of very excellent aëronautical engineers were employed in doing this work. The manufacturers, or at least some of them who had designers of their own, were most anxious to secure orders for building planes according to their designs. These, however, had to be submitted to the Engineering Division before they could be approved by the Chief of the Air Service. As such designs by outside agencies were passed upon by the Engineering Division designers and were really in competition with those which they created, there was the claim on the part of the manufacturers that the engineers at the Division always preferred, and gave preference to, designs which had originated with them. In other words, outside agencies were thus brought  p102 directly into competition with Government employés doing designing. It was but human nature for these Government employés to give the product of their own skill the preference. It was claimed that this was throttling initiative, really preventing the more rapid development of aircraft designing — as it was expressed: "taking the bread out of the mouth of the very hungry aircraft industry."

Furthermore, at this same Engineering Division aircraft were actually being built, not in numbers, but a few of an experimental character, and again the manufacturers complained that this was undue interference with their enterprises.

It took time to study these matters, to decide just what was the proper, the best course to follow. I became convinced that the complaints of the manufacturers were valid and that it was essential to change radically the Engineering Division's practice. I decided that we would build no more airplanes at the Division and, further, that no more aircraft designs would be created there. We would still maintain a designing  p103 staff, but its function would be to pass on the designs submitted to the Air Service, while it would be available for consultation with outside designers, manufacturers, and those who had ideas to propose.

It will be readily understood that the feeling of the manufacturers toward the Engineering Division when I took office was quite bitter. Although all who were interested in the development of aëronautics should have been working together and toward a common end, this antagonism between the Government employés and those outside was a serious handicap and actually prevented the development which was so necessary.

It took some time to bring about the needed reform. Only one step could be taken at a time, but ultimately the conditions were radically changed; the feeling toward the Engineering Division grew better and better. It was finally regarded not as an obstacle, but as an aid to progress, and thereafter advancement became more rapid and there was the real coöperation between these different agencies which was essential  p104 in order that we should, as we are now doing, keep at least abreast of the rest of the world in designing and building aircraft.

Encouraged by the definite establishment of this new policy at the Engineering Division, manufacturers started to prepare new designs and to offer them to the Air Service with the assurance that they would not come in competition with the designs of those who had to pass upon their merits. Two concerns offered pursuit planes which were much in advance of any which had ever been built in this country and substantial orders for both types were placed. Of course, from time to time minor improvements were made, but these planes have proved their worth and it is safe to say that they are as good as those in use anywhere else in the world.

The Air Service invited the submission in competition of designs for training planes and observation planes. The response was gratifying. From those which were presented there were chosen two types of observation planes and one training plane. Here again no mistake was made for the aircraft which were manufactured according to these designs have been entirely  p105 satisfactory and with but few changes will probably be usable for some time to come. What may be called the standardization of these three types of planes makes it possible to place orders for considerable numbers of each kind with reasonable assurance that they will not be rendered obsolete in the next few years. This likewise gives plenty of time for the perfecting of still better designs which no doubt will be produced after a while.

Largely as a consequence of the bombing tests against seacraft, naval constructors greatly strengthened the vessels to be built, and as a natural corollary made necessary the building of aircraft to carry larger bombs. The development of suitable bombing planes has made satisfactory progress and it is probable that within a year it will be possible to begin the purchase of modern planes of this type in considerable quantities.

Attack planes are used against ground troops and are armed with a number of machine guns and small bombs. Progress in designing such planes is also progressing and with gratifying results.

Cargo planes intended to transport men  p106 and supplies, spare parts for airplanes, new motors, and the like. It should be borne in mind that an air force is highly mobile — it can move rapidly from place to place, cover great distances in comparatively short periods of time — but in order that it may operate effectively its supplies must be transported with similar facility. It is expected that in the future such a force will make its entire change of base by air and thus greatly increase its effectiveness. Already some such cargo planes have been ordered and experience with them has proved that they are an addition to the air equipment which will render an air force more formidable.

It may be said here, and most emphatically, that in spite of the handicap of war-built planes and motors which had to be used up, in spite of the necessary delay in developing new types of planes and purchasing them in quantities, at no time since 1921 has the equipment of the Air Service been inferior in any respect to that of any other nation, type for type.

The Air Service, in addition to operating airplanes and training airplane pilots, also operated airships, or dirigibles, free and captive  p107 balloons, and trained their pilots. In October, 1921, this basic training was being carried on near Los Angeles, Cal., while the students had to be brought across the continent to Langley Field, Va., to finish the course, a waste of time and money.

During the war there had been started an immense airship hangar near Belleville, Ill, •some thirty or more miles from St. Louis, Mo., and a number of temporary buildings had been erected at this site, called Scott Field. This was geographically a central location, the great hangar was just about to be completed, and it was decided to concentrate here all lighter-than‑air training and the most of this class of equipment.

In this connection it may be worth while to call attention to the lack of foresight in the location of many, if not most, of the training stations during the war. No thought seems to have been given to any future use which might be made of these installations. In some cases political considerations, rather than present or future military, or national, needs seem plainly to have dictated the choice. Scott Field is a case in point. It is too far away to serve efficiently  p108 as an airship port for St. Louis, while the atmospheric conditions are not suitable for a training station. Nevertheless, the expenditure here of several millions of dollars tied the Air Service to it, and there it still is.

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Thayer's Note:

a Psalm 92:10.

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