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 p44   (p37)  3
The Political Background to the Revolt of 1916

The Administration of the Country

Tsarist Russian Central Asia may be characterized as a military-police state ruled by a viceroy (the Governor-General) who was endowed with very great powers. There were governor-generals in other parts of Russia (Poland, the Caucasus), but none had the wide powers accorded to their Turkistan colleague. General von Kaufman, the first Governor-General of Turkistan (1867‑1883) was attended by the pomp and show of a king although his successors preferred to be more modest.

Unlike the rest of Asiatic Russia the Turkistan Governor-Generalship was subject to the War Ministry and not to the Ministry of the Interior. Since the Governor-General was the alter ego of the War Ministry and owed his rank of general to it, their views coincided on matters and they ran the country as it pleased them, the Tsar being usually too undecided to take any active part. In this situation not only was the Ministry of the Interior checkmated but also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. General von Kaufman was given full diplomatic powers to make treaties with the Central Asian khanates while his successors also enjoyed wide powers. As with Ermolev in the Caucasus and later Alexeiev in the Far East these viceroys greatly complicated the conduct of foreign relations by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On the lower level there was the oblast or province governed by a governor, the uezd or district governed by a nachalnik, and the uchast  (p38) or sub-division, formed for police purposes, was headed by the pristav or police chief. All of these officials were military men, the governor being of general and the nachalnik and pristav of field rank (major or colonel).

In addition to the military administration of the country there were large bodies of troops stationed there. In 1889, after a  p45 trip to Russian Central Asia the year previously, Lord Curzon wrote, "Russian Central Asia is indeed one vast camp, and the traveller, who in the course of several weeks' journey scarcely sets eyes upon a Russian civilian, comes away with respect for the discretion, but without much surprise at the peaceful attitude of the people."​1 The presence of large bodies of soldiers excited comment by other travellers. In 1911 the number of Russian soldiers was given as 125,000,​2 even though the danger from the side of the British had passed. The cost of such an occupation was great and only by not including military costs incurred there could the Governor-Generals avoid showing a deficit in the budget for Russian Central Asia.

Only in the fields of Finance, Education, and the Postal and Telegraphic services did the general legislation of the Empire apply. In other departments important deviations were introduced in keeping with the special position of the country. Especially important were the changes in agrarian regulations, justice, and taxation.

The Governor-Generalship of Turkistan with headquarters at Tashkent had at its root the oblasts of Ferghana, Syr Darya, and damask. These were governed on the basis of the Turkistan polozhenie or law code. To the governor-generalship there also belonged Semirechie (which prior to 1897 had been under the Steppe Governor-Generalship) though governed by the Steppe polozhenie and the Transcaspian oblast governed by the Transcaspian provisional polozhenie. The khanates of  (p39) Khiva and Bukhara stood in a vassal protectorate position to Russia and were not included in the Turkistan Governor-Generalship.

Outside of the Turkistan Governor-Generalship there stood the Steppe oblasts of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Uralsk, and Turgai, governed, together with Semirechie, on the bases of the Steppe polozhenie. They were subject to the control of the Ministry of the Interior (except Semirechie). A Steppe Governor-General headed the oblasts of Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk  p46 (formerly Semirechie also) and had his headquarters at Omsk. Governors headed the oblasts, with military governors of oblasts in Semirechie and Uralsk. The headquarters of the governments were: the main headquarters for the oblasts of Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk at Omsk; for the oblasts, Akmolinsk was provisionally at Omsk, Semipalatinsk at the city of Semipalatinsk, Semirechie at Verny, Uralsk at Uralsk, and Turgai at Orenburg. The uezd headquarters were in the cities that bore the name of the uezd.​3

Steppe Oblasts

 p47  Turkistan Oblasts

 (p41)  The uezd name corresponded with the most important city in the uezd, except for Skobelev uezd where Kokand was much more important than Skobelev city.

Below the pristatvos there was a division into village communities, the so‑called aksakalstvo composed of from 1,000‑2,000 households and making up one village. Even the nomads were grouped into village communities, the so‑called aul (about 15‑20 kibitkas), more auls into a volost, which corresponded somewhat to the old tribal division.​4 These units were headed by a native official called volostnoi, aksakal (white beard), or, more commonly, starshina (elder). In addition there was the native judge called among the Sart population kazii and among the nomads bii. More influential than the elder among the  p48 nomads was the clerk or scribe who was interposed between the natives and the Russian authorities and who used his function of interpreter recklessly. In the Sart towns the houses were divided into sets of 50. From the 50 householders one was chosen to be Ellik-bashi or "head of fifty" while over him was a Ming-bashi or "head of a thousand," who was responsible to the Russian authorities. The native officials were appointed by the Russian officials, usually the governor, but in 1886 with the promulgation of a new polozhenie these were made elective with confirmation by the Russian authorities. The elder could not be elected more than twice in succession and his term of office was for three years.

 (p42)  The best element of the administration of Turkistan were the uezd heads and the pristavs (two to four per uezd). They were military officers with years of service in the army, who often knew well the country and the inhabitants. But there was little scope here for a career. The governors of the provinces were generals sent out by St. Petersburg while there was nothing comparable to the British Indian service in conditions of service. Salaries were poor and no bonus was given for service in a strange country so different from Russia proper. The number of Russian officials was quite inadequate to the needs of the country while their imperfect acquaintance with the native tongue forced them to deal through interpreters who often had their own axes to grind. The service also suffered from the first from the tendency to regard Turkistan as a rehabilitation centre for officers who had fallen from official favor or those whose reputation had become tarnished for one reason or another.

What was the success of the Russian administration among the natives? To answer this question let us first take the Kirghiz and Kazakh nomads.

At the time of the Russian conquest the Kirghiz and Kazakh peoples were divided into rods​5 or tribes, the leaders of whom were called among the Kazakhs "sultans" and among the Kirghiz "manaps." The rank was hereditary with the eldest  p49 son; the rod leader is pictured by a series of authorities (Grodekov, Barthold, Baron Meyendorf, and others) as the active organizer of the life of the rod.​6 It was he who organized the migrations, concluded agreements with other rods and governments and directed the holding of court. Though he had no personal property he could dispose of the property of the tribe.

The conquest of the Russians changed the position of the manap. Although the volost in the beginning corresponded with the rod this  (p43) was changed so that the volost artfully included two rods or more. This was a deliberate attempt by the Russian officials to undermine the authority of the rod leader as the peace of the steppe was feared for as long as he preserved his power over the rod.​7 The collection of taxes in the volost was concentrated into the hands of the volost head along with the power to impose fines of up to 3 roubles. Control over the collection of these sums was poor especially in view of the nomadic character of the life of the inhabitants.

The new situation brought about a great struggle for election to office among the rods. The Russian official was placed in a very advantageous position inasmuch as he could reject the candidature of any nomad aspirant to office. Hence there was competition to secure his favor by means of bribes. The increasing division between the poor and the rich,​8 the displacement of the material economy of the tribe by a trade-money economy and the substitution of the rule of the manap over the rod for that of the volost brought a disintegration of the old patriarchal order. Some of the manaps brought their wealth into play to buy office while the others were elbowed out of power.

It is in this setting that we see the workings of the "party" system. The "party system" was in essence the contesting by one manap with another one for the right to hold office. Each gathered around him his adherents or "party."

 p50  Elections took place in the following manner. The auls elected the piatidesyatniki (representatives of 50) and then the latter elected the volost head. All this took place under the supervision of the uezd nachalnik and with the active participation of his interpreter. Each party had before the election tried to secure a majority. One of the favorite methods used was the registering to the volost of fictitious or temporary kibitkas, the owners of whom were represented as having broken away from another aul. It was the duty of the election overseer to accept these kibitkas as bona fide or to reject them.

 (p44)  Manipulations for the change of auls were carried on long before election time. An example will serve to illustrate the manner in which the system worked. Let us suppose that there are 97 kibitka owners in an aul, having the right to elect two piatidesyatniki with party A having 50 votes and party B, 47. Party A could then elect two representatives while party B would elect none. But if five kibitka owners belonging to party B in a different village petitioned success­fully to the uezd nachalnik to be enumerated in the first aul the tables were reversed and party B elected the two representatives. And if there were 25 piatidesyatniki in the volost, with party A having 13 and party B 12, the transferring of the five kibitka owners to party B would have remarkable results. At the elections party A would elect 11 piatidesyatniki while party B would elect 13‑14 and thus elect the volost head judges and other volost officials from their party.​9

It will be readily apparent from the foregoing what a tremendous lever the Russian officials had for making exactions on the winning party through their power to reject candidates, institute investigations, accept or reject petitions for transference of kibitkas, etc.

Sometimes an aspirant would institute a criminal investigation against a rival candidate who seemed capable of winning. The uezd head could either reject the charge or suspend the candidate and institute an investigation.

In some elections there developed a three-cornered fight. If one of the parties doubted its chances of winning it might ally itself with the party that seemed about to win and ready  p51 to pay the most. Or, if it feared the majority party, it might ally itself with the other, weaker, party.

As soon as the election was over the winning side began to take measures to secure victory in the next contest. Similarly the losing party took steps to win the next election. In trying to turn the favor of the "nachalstvo" towards its side no one was overlooked from the uezd head to the last jigit or mounted native escort. The expenses of securing an election took on huge dimensions. A candidate might spend  (p45) 5,000, 10,000, 20,000, 30,000, and even 40,000 roubles when his future salary for the three-year term of office would not exceed 900‑1,500 roubles.​10 The most backward and insignificant volost would call for an expenditure of 2,000‑3,000 roubles.

The winning party, after the election, began recouping their election costs and exploiting their privileged position. This was done in various ways. In the first place a multitude of illegal exactions and taxes were levied which were used in part to prepare the way for the future election. The best hay field and pasture lands were presented to party members at the expense of the opposite party. Various duties and services were also levied on members of the opposition party such as road duties, the re­quisition of horses for the travel of various officials, the feeding of many officials in the steppe for which the uezd administration usually paid nothing, the presentation of yurts (native tents) for the use of administration employees, surveyors, markers, agronomists, botanists, hydrotechnicians, railway men, and others. In the latter case the volost government was paid for the yurts, which meant that the majority party kept the money paid for the yurts of the minority.​11 If the yurts were not given them they were taken and the recalcitrant was packed off to jail for "resistance to the government."

The dominant party used various methods against unsubmissive persons. Physical force and even murder were employed.​12 The people's court was employed; a false criminal  p52 proceeding was instituted, the recalcitrant was most commonly found guilty of horse-stealing, and the court decision carried out by the general administration.

When counselled by some people to turn to the Russian authorities the oppressed replied that they would not be allowed to go to the governor while the uezd head would turn them away.​13 Or the complaint  (p46) might be "investigated" and quashed, it being declared made "out of party hatred" (a magical phrase in Semirechie).​14

Under this system the pettiest of officials prospered (strazhniki or mounted policemen, translators, etc.). In Semirechie bribe-taking was not the usual crude type but of an organized and hierarchic form. The party leader, in the majority of cases, distributed the rewards through the ranks. In this manner all members of the administration were closely tied to one another and this guaranteed that no complaint would be received or if received that nothing would be found to substantiate the charges inasmuch as to give anyone else away would be to give oneself away.

Among the Sarts there was not such a luxuriant development of the fine art of corruption but here too the incidence of bribe-taking, illegal or excessive exactions, etc. was great. The situation among the Turkomans seems to have been better than in other parts of the krai, though information on this point is scanty. General Kuropatkin in 1916 found that while the rest of the krai was dissatisfied with their native judges the Transcaspian oblast was content with theirs.​15

B. The Political Situation up to 1898

From their first appearance in Central Asia the Russians showed great interest in securing the peace and internal security of the country. One of the most effective means of doing this was by a system of gerrymandered boundaries​16 and the establishment  p53 of "native states" (Khiva and Bukhara).​17 The result of this was that no one people was entirely included in a single oblast or native state; each people had different governments to face. Thus the Uzbeks were found in the native states of Khiva and Bukhara and in the oblasts of Samarkand,  (p47) Syr Darya, and Ferghana; Kazakhs were present in large numbers in Syr Darya and also in Semirechie; the Tajiks occupied portions of the Bukharan khanate and Ferghana oblast; the Kirghiz were present in Ferghana and Semirechie; although most of the Turkomans were in Transcaspia some were also found in the khanate of Khiva. There were also present in Transcaspia Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Kara-Kalpaks. The division of nationalities rendered any national political combination against the Russians difficult.​18

Probably the most potent enemy of Russian rule was the Moslem clergy, notably among the sedentary population. The accounts of early travellers like Vambery readily attest to the fierce fanaticism of the Moslems.

General von Kaufman saw Islam as an enemy which might stir up the people to rebellion. To the end of weakening it he undertook a series of measures. He suppressed the post of kazi-kalyan​19 as well as that of reis, a custos morum whose job it was to see that the people followed the rules laid down by the Shariat, and obtained an exception to the law of the empire, under which the authority of the mufti of Ufa (city now in Bashkir Republic of Soviet Union)​a extended to all oblasts of the Empire, so that it had no force in Turkistan. Later the pilgrimage to Mecca was suppressed for a time, the zyaket tax​20 was removed and the further endowment of vakuf land was allowed only with the permission of the governor, which was rarely given.

Despite the measures that von Kaufman took which earned him the hatred of the clergy, he left much undone in the way  p54 of controlling Islam. He felt that Moslem culture was doomed to disappear and that if left to itself it would die a natural death.​21 While he did not leave the spiritual life of the natives completely alone he apparently subjected  (p48) it to a weak supervision. His successors went even further and completely neglected the religious life of the natives: the schools, clergy, and religious orders were left without any kind of supervision by the government.

The contact of the native masses with the Russian official was even more lessened by the new polozhenie of 1886. The number of Russian uezd officials before 1886 was insufficient but the new polozhenie decreased the number to a dangerous low. It is sufficient to point out that the Ferghana oblast with 1.5 million people was reduced, in the number of uezd heads, their assistants, and the uezd police inspectors, to only 17 persons while the Elizavetpol gubernia​22 in Russia proper, similar to it in the composition of its population and with 800,000 persons, had 43; moreover the duties of the latter were much less complicated.​23

In addition the polozhenie took the appointment of native volost officials out of the hands of the Russian officials and made them elective while there was also effected a separation of the judiciary and the administration. The Russian official was stripped of the power to look after the general welfare of the people and became exclusively a military-police official.

The spirit of opposition of Russian rule was expressed most vigorously in Ferghana oblast (the former Kokand khanate) the most economically developed oblast of the krai. From the time of its conquest until 1885 there hardly went by a year that some band of mutineers or brigands did not wander about Ferghana. In the 1870s there occurred the uprising of Pularkhan seizing almost the whole Ferghana oblast. In the 1880s we come to the period of the "pseudo-khans," called such because the leaders of the robber bands represented themselves as heirs of the deposed khan of Kokand. These leaders found  p55 ready material at hand in the many former officials, soldiers, and servants of the former  (p49) khan, out of a job and ready to listen to the appeal of any fanatic or robber. The Russian administration attached no political significance to these bands as they robbed the native population as well as the Russians.​24 The Russian authorities were forewarned of every revolt in preparation. The movement of the "pseudo khans" in the early 1880s was broken and fifty leaders were caught by the administration, five of whom were hanged.

In 1885 during the period of Anglo-Russian tension and the Pendjeh incident between the forces of Afghanistan and Russia, a wave of agitation spread over Turkistan and reached Ferghana oblast. Confused rumors were circulated about an imminent war between Russia on one side and Afghanistan and China on the other and of the appearance of a "Mahdi" or Moslem messiah, while announcements were circulated about an imminent Jihad or holy war against the Russians. Again there appeared bands of "pseudo-khans" making raids upon the kishlak or Sart village, on the homes of bek and volost heads and even taking Tsarist officials as hostages. The leader of the movement was a certain Dervish-khan — Tyura by name — reportedly counting on a general uprising of the people of Ferghana. Though an expedition was dispatched and the bands broken up, Dervish-khan was not caught.

The composition of these bands may be gathered from the following quotation. Writing of captives taken from a unit of Dervish-khan in 1885, General Medinsky stated, "Those of the participants arrested after the disorders, more than 60 persons, presented a piti­ful sight, the majority being without homes."​25 Also represented were the poor dekhans, sharecroppers, landless, and homeless wanderers. The great displacement and impoverishment caused by King cotton in Ferghana, the leading cotton oblast, is apparent.

The incidence of robber-band activity did not diminish and it is with this background that we approach the Andijan uprising of 1898.

 p56   (p50)  C. The Andijan Uprising

On the night of May 17, 1898, there gathered a crowd in the kishlak of Ming-tyube, Margelan uezd of the Ferghana oblast, composed of Kirghiz and Kipchaks from the Osh and Andijan uezds and many local Sart dekhans. They were responding to the declaration of a gazavat or holy war against the unbeliever proclaimed by one of the most popular Ishans​26 of Turkistan, Mahomet-Ali-Khalifa, better known as Madali. After forming these people into units, inflamed by his fanaticism Madali started out for Andijan, horsemen in front and the rest of the mass in the rear. How many people were included in this band is not clear, though according to some sources there were 2,500 persons with Madali. Reaching Andijan at about three o'clock in the morning, the insurgents fell on the barracks of the 20th battalion. The attack was made in complete silence and was totally unexpected by the soldiers. The natives surrounded the camp and set about killing the sleeping soldiers. Part of the soldiers, however, managed to awaken and take arms and under the direction of a Lieutenant Karzeladze rushed at the natives with bayonets and fired shots at the natives who were not armed with firearms. This appeared sufficient to repulse the attackers, who fled. According to the account of witnesses the whole affair took about 15 minutes from the beginning of the attack to the rout of the mutineers. The Russians suffered casualties of 22 soldiers killed and 16 wounded. The attackers were not pursued as the Russian soldiers ran out of ammunition and furthermore had no cavalry force. This was both the beginning and the end of the Andijan uprising. It was not followed by any battles between insurgents  p57 and  (p51) the government, sieges of cities, or partisan activity usually associated with revolts.

At first glance the whole affair seems to be quite insignificant, and worth only mention in passing. In actuality the Andijan uprising was one of the most important moments in the Tsarist rule of Russian Central Asia. It revealed a widespread dissatisfaction with Russian rule on the part of the natives and a plot to revolt that embraced a significant portion of Turkistan. It is necessary to mention that the insurgents were supported by the people of Andijan, that when they approached the city they were joined by 200 Andijanians. But much more important, it was revealed that not only were the Andijan and Margelan uezds involved in the movement but also all of Ferghana, present-day Kirghizia, and in part even Samarkand oblast. According to the plan the Andijan operation of Madali was to take place at the same time as attacks by other parties of insurgents on Osh and Margelan. These other operations were, however, betrayed to the Russian authorities in time for them to take suitable action. Thus the Osh attack never took place, because on May 17 the volost head Karabek Khasanov told the uezd head about the preparations. The leader of the rebels, Umarbek Datkhi was arrested and other precautions were taken. The extent and nature of the plot were discovered only slowly and then only incompletely. Thus General Kuropatkin, the Minister of War, reported to St. Petersburg that "the discovery of this organization and the degree of participation in it of other localities in the region comprises not an easy task in view of the existing means for its fulfilment, facts only now are beginning to fall into our hands."​27

Part of the significance of the Andijan uprising lies in the fact that it was an attack not on the "peaceful inhabitants" of Central Asia, the officials of the administration or Russian colonists — which would have been new — but was an open attack upon a Tsarist military garrison. The leaders of the rebellion counted upon the support of the people in a real rebellion against the Russians, not a futile action of  (p52) protest or a predatory act. Its political nature was recognized by the Russians and a very great interest was shown in its suppression  p58 and investigation by the highest authorities — General Kuropatkin and Nicholas II.

In its economic motivation the uprising was a measure of the despair of the poor over the cotton crisis which had seized Ferghana in 1897 and 1898 as a consequence of the fall of world cotton prices. The situation may be seen in the following table.​28

The years of crisis sharply worsened the position of the peasantry and brought them to the side of the Ishan. Thus there was represented in the social composition of the revolters not only the clergy, former officers of the Kokand khanate, half-settled Kirghiz and Kipchaks, but a goodly number of Uzbek dekhans or peasants and, to use the expression of the military procurator, a "motley rabble" of day laborers, small traders, "wandering folk, not having a definite calling, and having nothing to lose."

But though the peasants had great economic grievances the leading part was played by religious fanaticism. In reading the depositions made by the leading participants after the revolt one is struck by the fact that nowhere are economic grievances mentioned. When Madali was asked by the Russians why he had revolted he replied:

1. That after the conquest by the Russians there took place a strong deterioration in the morals of the people.

2. The non-compliance with the demands of the Shariat.

 (p53)  3. That the Russian government though lenient in their relations with the natives forbade pilgrimages to Mecca.

4. That they abolished the zyaket or religious tax.

5. The tampering with vakuf laws.

6. That they did not trouble about the support of morality and family life.​29

 p59  The polozhenie of 1886 had laid a land tax upon vakuf land to which it had not been previously subjected and took from its control some landed areas, thus depriving the clergy of much revenue. The deterioration in morals, noticed by many Western travellers,​30 involved the Moslem youth and alienated them from the clergy. Madali felt deeply about this and ascribed the fall of the Kokand khanate to the fall in morality; the coming of the Russians had made matters much worse. Gambling, drunkenness, and prostitution became synonymous with Russian rule. The abolition of the office of reis greatly loosened the hold of the Moslem clergy on the common people.

Madali was apparently sincerely convinced that his great mission in life was to turn the people from the fleshpots and back to the strict morality of some past age. While still a youth he had made a pilgrimage to Mecca and while there reportedly had visions in which his future role was announced. After his return to Turkistan he soon attracted many followers to his side by his asceticism and sanctity. In addition he acted as a physician to the sick. The many Sufis​31 and pupils who attended him constantly told of his magical powers. Thus it was said that he cooked pilau​32 without a fire.

The fame and power of the Ishan grew to such proportions that in 1895 he appointed reis in the localities near Ming-tyube (despite the abolition of the office by the Russians). As in khanate times they were  (p54) armed with whips and went about chasing the people to the mosques and beating them for non-fulfillment of the demand of the Shariat. In addition Madali sent a letter to Abdul Hamid, the Turkish Sultan, telling of the deterioration of the moral and religious fiber of the people and of the great need to reform this parlous state of affairs. This was written by one of his followers as Madali himself was illiterate. In answer to this letter he received what purported to be a firman or moral decree from the Sultan of Turkey (in his capacity of Khalif of Islam) as well as an old khalat or robe from the shoulders of the Sultan. Madali firmly believed that  p60 both were sent by the Sultan and he became exalted both in his own eyes and in the eyes of the people and believed, probably, that he was called upon to save the people from the Russians. Both the letter and the khalat were forwarded to him by a certain Hadji Abdu-Jalil Mir-Sadyh Karyev.​33 To the letter from  (p55) the Sultan was affixed a royal seal. The document testifies, in its beginning, to the fact that Madali is a true Ishan and ends with an impersonal exhortation to fulfill loyally and sincerely the teachings of Mohammed and to prove this by deeds.

What was the part played by Turkish Pan-Islamism in this movement is difficult to determine.​34 The firman was almost  p61 certainly a forgery. Both the paper and the handwriting were Turkistani while it is extremely doubtful that the Sultan would have bothered himself personally with such an insignificant personage as the Madali. But that Abdu-Jalil was acting as a Turkish agent is probably true, though we have no precise information on this score. In his struggle to blow life into the fey Ottoman Empire and secure it against the further encroachments of the Western Powers​35 Abdul Hamid made great use of the Pan-Islamic movement initiated in the reign of his predecessor Abdul Azziz and the revival of the Caliphate in the person of the Turkish Sultan. To counter machinations of the Russians in Armenia and the Balkans Abdul Hamid sent his agents into Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Trans-Volga, the Caucasus, etc. It is in this background that there appeared in Peshawar in 1885 a certain Abdul-Kerimbek scattering proclamations calling for a holy war and the exchange of accredited envoys between Afghanistan and Turkey. He adopted the title of "Defender of the faith," began to mint money to finance a Holy War, and had printed in Kabul two books on the Jihad under his direction.

The Tsarist government showed great interest in the question of Pan-Islamic connections with the Andijan affair. In reading the report of General Kuropatkin about the uprising the Tsar underscored the lines telling of the Sultan's letter, and later the Russian ambassador  (p56) in Constantinople was instructed by St. Petersburg to find out if the Sultan actually wrote the letter. Possibly it was more pleasing to the Tsarist ego to explain the revolt as the result of Pan-Islamic instigation rather than in terms of native dissatisfaction with Tsarist exploitation and corruption.

The revolt was led by the clergy and feudal remnants. What was the role of the other classes? Though the Ishan announced on several occasions before the rebellion that members of the well-to‑do element were on the side of the people and had affixed their seals to the pact calling for a holy war, in actuality  p62 only 12 such persons signed the pact and this class was in general opposed to the rebellion. They feared the Russian power and they were in a much better position due to their better education, contacts with Russians, official and commercial, to know the real struggle of the two opponents. After the rebellion they vied with each other in expressing their loyalty and devotion to the Russian administration. Thus the Tashkent "influential natives"​36 expressed "their very loyal feeling and their dissatisfaction in relation to the wicked attack on Andijan, and asked permission to collect among themselves a sum for the families of the lower ranks who were killed." In his trip through Samarkand, Katta Kurgan, and other places the new Governor-General, General Dukhovsky, heard similar sentiments expressed by deputations of these influential persons.​37

The common people believed in the holiness of the Ishan and were not in as good a position to know the real strength of Russian arms. The locality was an isolated one and contact with Russians was limited. Russian rule was thought of as accidental, transitory, unnecessary, and needlessly burdensome. In addition to there had been a decrease in recent times in the number of troops stationed in Ferghana. There were only two companies of soldiers in Andijan and moreover, it being May,  (p57) the Cossack and artillery horses were out to pasture far from the barracks.

The native volost officials proved to be a great disappointment to the Russians. Instead of actively helping the government they were at best passive spectators while there was one case (the Kulinsky volost head) of active help to Ishan. Though they must have known of the preparations only one (the Ming-tyubinsk volost head) reported it to the Russian authorities and then only on the eve of the attack though he admitted he knew of the plot on May 13.

Punishment was meted out not only the actual participants in the revolt but to all who were involved in any way in its  p63 preparation. The first measure was the general flogging with nagaikas or Cossack whips of those arrested on orders of General Povalo-Shveikovsky, the former Governor-General. Concerning this flogging he reported to St. Petersburg that this "created a splendid impression both on the native population and on the army" though General Korolkov who was to make an official enquiry into the causes of the revolt was to admit later that the prison hospitals were filled to overflow from the effects of this measure.

Over 400 persons were convicted, 18 of whom were hanged including the Madali and his nephew whom he had named to occupy the throne of Kokand. The rest received sentences of penal servitude and banishment. The guilty villages of Ming-tyube and Haukata were razed to the ground, the inhabitants ejected and the ground seized for the settling of Russian colonies. A fine of 300,000 roubles was levied on the inhabitants of Ferghana oblast.

The Russian authorities attributed the revolt to Moslem fanaticism and the "liberalism" of the polozhenie of 1886. They called for its repeal and a return to the status quo ante. General Kuropatkin,​38  (p58) probably the most enlightened and best  p64 informed administrator of Russian Central Asia, in his report to Nicholas II reported the following recommendations made by General Korolkov: higher salaries for the officials, more officials, 48 instead of 18 uchast pristavs, increasing the military forces in Ferghana, the strengthening of the Russian element, the control by officials of Moslem religious life, the provision of dispensaries especially for Moslem women, persuading the Orthodox Church to exercise more cultural influence over the natives, the giving to the Governor-General of the right to banish ishans and undesirables, not allowing Moslems to head uezds and uchasts, increasing the opportunities offered native youths upon graduation from Russian or city schools, giving officials more jurisdiction over Moslem daily life, and finally certain administrative reforms.​39

Though perhaps a seemingly inordinate amount of attention has been devoted in these pages to the Andijan uprising, it is justified by the very intimate connection between this uprising and the events among the Sarts in the Revolt of 1916. As we shall later see there is a close parallel between the two revolts, 1898 and 1916, in the nature  (p59) of class participation, the leader­ship, the suppression, and the recommendations made. In his recommendations and the justification of his actions after the Revolt of 1916 General Kuropatkin, who was a leader in suppressing both affairs, cited directly the actions taken during the Andijan affair as a precedent guiding his actions.​40

D. The Political Situation after 1898

1. Enquiry of Count Palen

In examining the scene after the uprising of 1898 one is immediately struck by the impression that though the Tsarist authorities were given quite a start by this incident, little was done beyond severe punishment of the rebels and the strengthening of forces in the country. The Russian element was  p65 strengthened and the Russian population was provided with military rifles. This armament had begun in the early 1890s but after the Andijan uprising and especially after the Boxer Rebellion in China it was expanded to a general armament (one rifle per family).

How little the causes of discontent had been removed was shockingly demonstrated by the official enquiry of Senator Count Palen made in 1906. The graft, corruption, land-grabbing, etc. that had been decried in the earliest days of the Russian conquest were found to have become much worse in recent years. The report of Count Palen shook the confidence of the country in the Turkistan administration. After 1906 the question of an over-hauling of the entire structure received much attention, but the Revolt of 1916 found the reforms still waiting to be put into effect.

2. The Political Situation among the Sarts

The first stirrings of a political revolutionary opposition in Russian Turkistan were found not among the natives but among the Russians resident there. In the period 1905‑1907 there developed among them a few feeble responses to the great events of the 1905 Revolution  (p60) taking place in Russia. There was a "movement" among the liberal official-intelligentsia class, demonstrations with red flags, soldier uprisings (Tashkent, Ashkhabad, Kushka), and railway strikes. But there was no connection between these manifestations and the great native mass of the population. This movement was regarded by the liberal lawyers, engineers, doctors, and officials as solely the affair "of the Russian progressive community."​41 The Russian soldiers and workmen were attracted to the SR party.​42 The "SDs," or Social Democrats, the future Bolsheviks, were very weakly represented although they succeeded in 1907 in electing the former vice-governor Nalivkin to the 2nd State Duma.

Traces of Pan-Islamism in Russian Central Asia have already been remarked before and during the Andijan affair and these were to be strengthened during the years ahead. In opposition to it there grew up among the Sarts a progressive nationalist  p66 movement, the followers of whom were known as Jadids (literally adherents of the new method). This was fostered by a number of factors: the increasing number of Sarts going to Russia for study and travel and their contact with progressive Russian opinion, the decreased fanaticism of the natives,​43 and contact, though limited, with other progressive movements in the Islamic world. Abdul Hamid had unwittingly aided the development of such progressive tendencies when he had set the minds of the Moslem peoples back to the time when they were all united and at the zenith of their power. Research by Moslem scholars was beginning to show that greater freedom of religious thought coincided with the halcyon days  (p61) of the Islamic world. Moreover the stimulus of Pan-Islamism showed that reforms would have to be made if Islam were to effectively resist the advances of Europe.​44

The Jadids represented the left wing of Pan-Islamism in Russian Central Asia. They came from the ranks of petty and middle traders and the intellectual class with occasional support from the great merchants.

The Jadids were represented by two organizations, the "Young Party" located at Kokand with about 50 members in its ranks in 1912 and the group located around Old Tashkent. In each group there was a radical and a moderate faction. The differences between the two may be summed up by quoting a report of the Okhrana or Secret Police.

The comparison of the Mlado Tatar (Young Tatar) Jadids with the "SRs" shows the presence of a group favoring a revolutionary outburst against the Russians to liquidate their rule. Thus in 1908 one of this group, Abdu-Vakhit-Kariev, issued a manifesto calling all Moslems to arms and for a general rising "against the the accursed Russians."

Be that as it may the main group of Jadids was much more moderate in its aims. This group had no political platform in the usual sense. Its basic demands were for the establishment of new method schools, the introduction of a new orthography, the elimination of the Arabic-Persian scholars, and the propagation and development of national culture.

This national cultural movement begins with the year 1905. The Jadids plumped hard for the introduction of new schools and inasmuch as  (p62) as this represents their basic activity some idea of their success may be served by considering the number of schools they opened.​46

Thus in seven years the Jadids opened 55 new method schools. This number testifies rather to the insignificance of their practical accomplishments than to their success. However, in spite of small numbers the result was important as it brought the creation of a secular (and increasingly anti-clerical) intelligentsia.

The Right Wing of Pan-Islamism was represented by the Ulema or Moslem Bookmen, the upholders of the old traditions.  p68 This movement was made up of the clergy, gentry, and great merchants. While the Jadids centred themselves in the area of the greatest economic development, around Kokand, the Ulema was centred at Bukhara where there was found the greatest concentration of gentry, clergy, and Moslem scholars. While the Jadids were confined to Bukhara, Tashkent, and Kokand the Ulema was represented in all the cities of Central Asia.

Though both groups had as their goal the union of all Moslems a bitter struggle ensued. The Ulema greatly objected to the neglect by the Jadids of the rules of the Shariat, their wearing of European clothes, shaving off their beards, and letting the hair grow on their  (p63) heads. They called the movement "treachery to Islam" and attacked the "Godless" Europeanization.​47

The year 1905 also saw the appearance of a series of local newspapers. There had already appeared in Turkistan at the turn of the century the Crimean paper Tardzhiman ("The Interpreter") edited by the well-known Ismail Gasprinsky calling for a Moslem Turkic cultural revival. These newspapers were published in the native tongues while five or six years before the Bolshevik Revolution there appeared in Russian the progressive Golos Turkestana, or "Voice of Turkistan."

The effects of this cultural, political, and nationalist activity were very limited. Except that, because of their impotence when acting alone, many became disposed later to go over to the Bolsheviks. They were confined to the cities and even there only to the small intellectual élite. The Pan-Islamists appealed more to Allah than to the population with their talk of a gazavat or holy war. The illiterate artisans, proletariat, and dekhans continued their labors and ways consecrated by millennial torpor.

3. The Political Situation among the Kazakhs and Kirghiz

The development of political organization and agitation among the Kirghiz and Kazakhs took place very slowly and in a very weak form. The leading reasons for this were: the  p69 small numbers living in the cities​48 where political organization is always more easy to begin, and the illiteracy,​49 lack of school facilities, and remoteness and seclusion of many of the nomad areas. Until 1912 there was not one newspaper, and no books, in Kirghiz or Kazakh. Broido, speaking of his experiences in Semirechie, writes: "I never chanced to come upon a single, even rich, yurt [nomad felt tent] where the dwellers knew Moslem writing well, or to find any sort of book and very rarely even the Koran."​50 In view of this it is understandable why the nomads took  (p64) no part in the great events of 1905; but it should be remarked, it is equally understandable that when the nomads were directly affected, as in 1916, they reacted in a vigorous return to their ancestral traditions of violence and raiding warfare.

The first signs of political life in the steppes were connected with the Manifesto of 18 February 1905 concerning the calling of a Duma and the Ukaz of 17 April concerning toleration. These acts led to the first political meetings among the nomads which were occupied greatly with the religious and agrarian questions. The discussions led to the separation of two main factions, one religious, Pan-Islamist and Eastern in orientation, the other Western turning towards the Russian intelligentsia and culture. The first was led by the clergy, the second by the intelligentsia. By 1906 the intelligentsia had clarified its political thinking further and there was a gravitation towards the Cadet​51 Party in general though others were attracted to the SDs and SRs.​52 All this, however, was to be submerged by the Stolypin program of reaction after 1907.

 p70  The struggle was thereafter carried on by writers and agitators from among the intelligentsia and the growing youth closely affiliated with the Cadet Party. The year 1914 marks an important milestone — the founding of the paper Kazak by a group headed by Baitursunov, Bukeikhanov, Dulatov, and others. This group on the one hand struck  (p65) out at the intelligentsia for having lost contact with the common folk and for its prelection for office and rank, while on the other hand it attacked Pan-Islamism. Other goals were the placing of military duty among the Kirghiz and Kazakhs on the same basis as that enjoyed by the Cossacks, instruction in schools, and transition to a sedentary life. The Russification policy of the government was attacked, as was its policy of squeezing out the nomad from the land.​53

The subsequent period up to 1916 may be summarized as witnessing the wider participation and organization of the intelligentsia, the students, and youth in general for promotion of the national and cultural aspirations of the people. Illegal and legal groups were formed among the students, especially, at Omsk, which was the great centre of education. Among the intellectuals there appear individuals and groups dissatisfied with the line taken by the Kazak and its directors. They objected to the tie of these persons with the Cadets, their conciliatory line with the Russian officialdom, their appeals to patriotism, and for the participation of the Kirghiz and Kazakhs in military service. There was formed in Tashkent in 1912 the paper Ushzkuz which carried on a controversy with the Kazak. Its adherents appeared in Semipalatinsk, Omsk, and other places. In 1916 this group took on on a socialist tinge.​54

Thus on the eve of the 1916 uprising there was a thin scattering of intellectuals and students among the nomads agitating  p71 for political goals. Though the clergy played some part in these proceedings their influence was much more modest than among the Sarts. There was not and could not be any tie in political development between the nomad and sedentary peoples inasmuch as the Uzbek appeared as a usurer and oppressor among the nomads. Each people was to go its own way in the struggle to come. Islam was, in any case, less organized and more informal among nomads. Islam among settled Central Asians was fortified by considerable property holding. Among the nomads there was no strong property or institutional base.

---

The Author's Notes:

1 Curzon, op. cit., p386.

2 William L. Curtis, Turkestan, The Heart of Asia (New York, 1911), p109. Everything was militarized, even the river fleet (the Amu Darya flotilla) and the railway lines, on which there were stationed military railway battalions.

3 For the administrative setup see Aziatskaya Rossiya (St. Petersburg, 1914), vol. I, pp54‑59.

4 Essad Sabit, "Die politische Lage in Russisch-Zentralasien," Deutsche Rundschau, Band CCII 1925), p272.

5 The Russian word rod is a rather indefinite expression meaning "family," "kin," generation, tribe, clan, blood, stock, etc. Here it may be translated as "tribe," used in the sense of a rather loose and constantly shifting confederation rather than in a strict genealogical sense.

6 Broido, op. cit., p414.

7 Galuzo, op. cit., p29.

8 By 1910 according to the figures of A. Bukeikhanov the poor section of the Kirghiz population numbered 60.52% while the rich 21.9%. Shestakov, op. cit., p96.

9 See Broido, op. cit., pp414‑415; Galuzo, op. cit., p31.

10 Deposition of the engineer Tynyshpayev: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirgizstane, p138.

11 Broido, op. cit., pp417‑418. The yurt is a cylindro-dome-shaped felt tent used by Turkic tribes.

12 Report of the Kashgar Consulate dragoman Stefanovich: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirgizstane, p111.

13 Broido, op. cit., p416.

14 Ibid., p416.

15 Report of A. N. Kuropatkin to Nicholas Romanov, "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit., p76.

16 The same policy pursued by Chinese vis‑à‑vis the Mongols, see Lattimore's article "Mongolia" in China Year Book, 1933, p192.

17 For the Chinese policy in creating such "native states" in Sinkiang, see Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia (Boston, 1950), p8.

18 William Mandel, The Soviet Far East and Central Asia (New York, 1944), pp100‑101.

19 Kazi-kalyan — a superior Moslem spiritual authority.

20 Zyaket — a religious tax levied by Moslem law on land, cattle, the product of trade, etc.

21 Barthold, op. cit., p284.

22 "The Russian name for province is Guberniya (Government) or Oblast (Territory). . . . Those called Guberniya were of greater importance, both numerically and economically." Jochelson, op. cit., p13.

23 Report of Lt. Gen. Korolkov to Gov. Gen. Dukhovsky, Aug. 3, 1898: "Andizhanskoe vosstanie 1898 g.," K. A. 1, no. 86 (1938), p158.

24 Report of Maj. Gen. Medinsky to Lt. Gen. Kuropatkin, ibid., p136.

25 Foreword by E. Steinberg: ibid., p125.

26 Ishan. As used in Turkistan the word means shaikh, murshid, pir, teacher, or guide, in distinction to murid, adherent, pupil. The origin of the word is still obscure though it was used in the Middle Ages. The rank of Ishan is frequently handed down from father to son. The Ishan usually lives, together with his followers, in a monastery or sometimes in the tomb of a saint from which at times he issues forth into the steppes to work among the Kirgiz from whom he receives more substantial presents than from the Sarts. See Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leyden and London, 1927), vol. II, p533. See also Prince V. Masalsky, Turkestansky krai (St. Petersburg, 1913), p355 et seq.; Franz von Schwarz, Turkestan, die Wiege der indogermanischen Völker (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1900), p198.

27 Ibid., p128.

28 Galuzo, op. cit., p46.

29 V. P. Salkov, Andizhanskoe vosstanie 1898 g. (Kazan, 1901), pp79‑81.

30 See inter alia Curzon, op. cit., p399; Woiekof, op. cit., p335.

31 Sufi — follower of a mystical cult of Islam. Present in all Moslem countries but especially in Iran and Central Asia. Sufism taught a renunciation of the material world, seclusion, and a mystical perception of God's truth.

32 Pilau — a native dish of steamed rice, vegetables, and mutton.

33 The Russian authorities believed that if the plot and the announcement of the gazavat was not conceived in connection with the appearance of Abdu-Jalil in Ferghana, then his presence contributed significantly to its further development (see Report of General Dolinsky to General Dukhovsky: "Andizhanskoe vosstanie 1898 g." K. A. 1, no. 86 [1938], p169). Abdu-Jalil was an Andijanian by birth but in early youth made the pilgrimage to Mecca, remaining abroad many years. In 1895 he returned to Turkistan from Constantinople, where he had lived at a Dervish monastery, by the route of India, Yarkand, Khotan, Kashgar, and Kulja, in Sinkiang, penetrating into the Samarkand oblast. He visited Tashkent and finally in the winter of 1895‑1896 appeared in Andijan. Rumors were quickly circulated that he brought a hair from the beard of the Prophet.

Hearing that the Andijan authorities were investigating his actions he went to the Margelan uezd where he lived for some time in the villages of Kuva and Sharikhan. Then he disappeared, presumably returning to Turkey.

Abdu-Jalil reappeared in the Samarkand oblast in the winter of 1897‑1898, visited Kokand, Margelan, Kuva, and then settled again in the village of Sharikhan. Soon anonymous letters appeared in Kokand asking the rich people to prepare for a gazavat (holy war) and a zyaket (Moslem religious tax) and kheradzh (tax on goods in former Kokand khanate) for the last 15 years.

Before the Uraza* he visited Madali presenting him with the letter from the sultan and the Sultan's khalat and exhorted him to begin a gazavat against the Russians.

During the attack on Andijan he remained at Sharikhan. With its failure he fled to Kashgar, in Chinese territory in Sinkiang.

* Uraza — Moslem fast in the month of Ramadan, the ninth month of the Moslem calendar. The fast lasts a whole month, though fasting takes place only in the day time. With evening the fast is ended, and the holiday and celebration begins, often lasting all night.

34 The entire problem of the origins, aims, and influence of Pan-Islamism, in its present state of study, is ridden with contradictory views, obfuscation, and general lack of information. On this see the important article by Dwight E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," American Historical Review, vol. XLVII (1941), pp278‑287.

35 Pan-Islamism was used even more by Abdul Hamid and by the conservative force of the entire Moslem religion to oppose at home the innovationists of European notions of nationalism, freedom, and democracy. H. Kohn, History of Nationalism in the East (New York, 1929), p51.

36 The term "respectable natives" (pochetonye lits) occurs again and again in Russian official documents and refers to the well-to‑do, prominent members of the community as opposed to the common people.

37 For this situation of part of the old ruling class identifying itself with the new Russian ruling class, see Owen Lattimore, Situation in Asia (Boston, 1949), p16.

38 Alexander Nicholas Kuropatkin (1848‑1921). Entered army in 1864. Participated in the conquest of Samarkand and Kokand, and in the Kulja operation. Greatly distinguished himself in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877‑1878 where he served as chief of staff to the younger Skobelev. His book on the war — Lovcha and Plevna (1885) is still the classic work on the subject. After the war he commanded the Turkistan Rifle Brigade and enhanced his fame still further by taking part in a march of 500 miles from Tashkent to Geok Tēpē, where he participated in the storming of the latter place which closed the campaign against the Turkomans. In 1882 he was promoted to the rank of major general and was generally regarded by the army as natural successor to Skobelev. From 1890 to 1898 he served as Governor-General of Turkistan and from 1898 to 1904 as Minister of War. In the Russo-Japanese War he was given command of all forces. The Japanese forces inflicted a series of defeats on Kuropatkin, who nevertheless managed to pull his forces northward to Mukden in skilfully executed retreats. The rout of the Russian forces at Mukden caused Kuropatkin to resign his command to Gen. Linievich after which he commanded one of the three armies in Manchuria. Kuropatkin's failure may be explained partly by the meddlesome interference of Admiral Alexeiev, the viceroy of Russia's Far East possessions, and by Kuropatkin's own mistakes — mistakes which he admitted himself in his account of the war (The Russian Army and the Japanese War, 1909).

Kuropatkin commanded an army during World War I until July 1916, when he was appointed Turkistan Governor-General. In April 1917, he was ousted from his position after the overthrow of the Tsarist government. Later in the year he appears teaching in a village school. He died in Shemshurino (Pskov) in February 1921.

39 Report of Kuropatkin to Nicholas II: "Andizhanskoe vosstanie 1898 g.," K. A. 1, no. 86 (1938), pp173‑178.

40 K. A. 3, no. 34 (1929), pp86‑87.

41 Safarov, op. cit., p53.

42 Social Revolutionary Party. See footnote 52.

43 The Syr Darya oblast governor in 1909 made the following statement: "During the last half century the position of the ishans in society has changed significantly. Before the people bore themselves with superstitious fear towards representatives of the ishan class. . . . One may say with certainty that by this time the religious fanaticism of the natives has weakened in a significant measure in the sense of intolerance towards . . . foreigners. The ishans themselves do not always manifest the moral qualities indisputable for religious leader­ship of the Sarts and the people have noticed this." Quoted by Galuzo, op. cit., p144.

44 H. Kohn, op. cit., pp51‑52.

45 Galuzo, op. cit., p145.

46 Ibid., p147.

47 Safarov, op. cit., p54; Galuzo, op. cit., p252.

48 In 1920 only 2.3% of the Kirghiz of the Kirghiz SSR were city dwellers.

49 1.7‑4.9% literacy according to gubernia.

50 Broido, op. cit., p421.

51 The Cadets or Constitutional Democrats were a group made up of liberal capitalists, professional people, and land­owners. They called for the setting up in Russia of a bourgeois republic or a constitutional monarchy as in Great Britain.

52 The "SRs," or Social Revolutionary Party concentrated their attention on the peasantry and became the revolutionary party par excellence of the latter. Their socialism consisted mainly in demanding that all land should belong to the peasants. The SRs were distinguished from the SDs or Social Democrats (made up of Bolshevik and Menshevik wings) in a number of ways. The SRs concentrated their attention on the peasantry while the SDs concentrated on the small industrial proletariat class. The appeal of the SRs was wider, their organization was looser, and they were less hampered by instructions from the centre than the SDs. The SDs had close ties with Western European Socialism and their patriotism was that of the working class of the world. The SRs were distinctly Russian in flavor, outlook, and patriotism. The SRs were inclined to advocate terrorism while the SD leaders roundly condemned this.

53 Z. Mindlin, "Kirgizy i revolyutsia," Novy Vostok, vol. V (1924), p219.

54 Ibid., p220.

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Thayer's Note:

a Ufa is currently — 2024 — the capital of Bashkortostan, a "republic" under the Russian Federation. Most of Bashkortostan's inhabitants are non-Russians, although Russians represent a scant plurality (37%). Due for the most part to disparities in birth rates, the indigenous Bashkirs (31%) have been gaining on the Russians for several decades.

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