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 p72   (p67)  Chapter 4
The Revolt of 1916: First Phase

War Comes to Turkistan

The outbreak of the first World War reacted unfavorably on the position of the colonies of the European powers in two ways. On the one hand the colony saw suspended all benefits which it had received in the form of European goods, technical know-how, and capital investment while on the other it was required to contribute man­power and great stocks of raw materials and other goods for the war needs of the mother country.

Although the peoples of Russian Central Asia in the first two years of the war were not required to serve in the armed forces or to contribute a labor force for work in Russia, they made heavy contributions to the war effort. The extent of this may be realized from the following statistics (figures of General Kuropatkin) on matériel sent to Russia.

In addition 2.4 million roubles were contributed to the needs of the war.​1

The demand for "donations" from the natives introduced a further source of malpractice, especially among the Kazakhs and Kirghiz. The demand for greater taxes and for contributions for the war effort enabled the administration to make  p73 further demands on the population. There were volost officials that took two to three times as much as they were asked by Petrograd to take, and if the government paid for the articles sent by the nomads these sums were kept by the volost authorities for themselves.​2 The Kirghiz paid 1‑3 roubles per yurt for the benefit of the Red Cross, but though there were 40,000 yurts (households) in the Pishpek uezd there was officially reported collected only 2,000 roubles.​3 Other "contributions" were levied for the benefit of the Damskaya Kresta and other charitable societies. Large quantities of yurts (tents) were collected for the war effort, often without recompense, and often these yurts were transported by the nomads to the railway gratis. Individual localities made separate contributions. Thus the village of Novo Nikolaievsk gave 90 horses. The nomads were also asked to provide hospitality without pay to units passing through the steppe.

The Kirghiz and Kazakh nomads fared much worse than the Sarts in one respect — in addition to special taxes and contributions they were required to furnish laborers to work the farms of Russians away at the front. The inhabitants of the three basic oblasts of Turkistan  (p69) (Syr Darya, Samarkand and Ferghana) were not affected inasmuch as as not only were the number of Russians settled there small but moreover these were excused from military duty according to the provisions of the old law encouraging immigration into these areas by holding out this privilege to Russians born in these oblasts.

The effects of this corvée were especially felt in Semirechie which had a Russian population of 300,000. The Kazakhs and Kirghiz furnished workers for ploughing, harrowing, sowing, harvesting, and threshing on the fields of Russians away at the front. Where workers were not provided, each soldier's wife was given 18‑25 roubles by the nomads for "assistance." There were cases where the "volunteer" workers received such shabby treatment that the authorities had to intercede. Thus in the village of Samsonovskoe they had to convince the soldiers' wives that they should feed their workers.​4

 p74  In addition volunteer native groups were sent to the front as soldiers. The most notable case was that of the Tekke Turkomans. The Tekke Regiment covered itself with glory in the fighting at the front and was later to take part in Kornilov's un­success­ful putsch against the Kerensky government. The other volunteers came from among the Kirghiz. Whether these were actually volunteers is open to serious doubt. Kanaat Abukin, one of the leaders of the Kirghiz in the Revolt of 1916, asserts that they actually were assigned at the rate of several persons per volost and that in talking to them he learned that they did not go willingly but because the government demanded it.​5 This statement receives much support from the fact that the volunteers came precisely from those localities where the most serious excesses occurred in 1916.​6

B. The Reaction of the Natives to the War

It would seem, at first glance, that the predominantly Moslem population of Russian Central Asia would prove a rich field for the  (p70) intrigues and machinations of Turkish Pan-Islamic agents with the adherence of Turkey to the side of the Central Powers. The Turks certainly attempted to utilize the Pan-Islamic movement to stir up the Moslem peoples of the world against the Allied Powers. A legal opinion (fetva) was secured from the chief religious jurisconsult of the Ottoman Empire to the effect that military operations against the Allies would constitute a Jihad or holy war, though Turkey was fighting on the side of infidel Germany and Austria-Hungary. There were good grounds for this holy war in view of the fact that except for a few Moslems in Bosnia and East Africa all Moslems of the world not found under the rule of Moslems were included under the rule of the Allies.​7 Russia alone had two‑thirds of the Turkish-speaking peoples of the world.

The material on the influence of Pan-Islamism in Russia during the war is not rich inasmuch as as the movement developed  p75 in Turkistan almost without organization, without a systematic system of propaganda, and was expressed in an elemental form.

The difficulties facing the Turkistan Okhrana in combating Pan-Islamism are presented in a report of the Okhrana section head of Turkistan to the director of the department of police on May 21, 1915:

During the entire period from the beginning of the World War to the Revolt of 1916 the reports of the uezd heads, pristavs, and secret service agents are full of references to the appearance of Turkish agents and of meetings to gather money for Turkey. But seldom do we get concrete, specific instances. All this is usually reported "on rumour," "from conversations," from "transmissions," etc. The reports of the agents give a highly colored picture. Thus on January 10, 1915, one agent writes, "the Moslem population of the Andijan uezd are very sympathetic towards Turkey, dragged into war with Russia, and are trying to help her materially . . ." "The Ferghana oblast is seething with Afghan agents and there is not a village where they have not been . . ." "The native administration is completely solidified with the common mass."​9 Another agent writes, "Afghan emissaries are flooding Bukhara." "The Bukharians as a mass would like to eject the Russian giaours  p76 [unbelievers] from their government but know that they have not sufficient strength."​10

The police, in an investigation in 1915, came upon hectograph copies of the following appeal:

 (p72)  Who was behind this appeal was never determined, though one of the great Andijan merchants became suspect and was exiled to Russia proper.

In February 1915 another appeal came into the hands of the Tsarist police. It read:

How accurate were the reports of the agents and officials, and did the appeals cited above testify to a dangerous and widespread movement in Turkistan? One of the communications of the Turkistan Governor-General in 1915 to the director of the Holy Synod tends to minimize the danger. "The native population react to the event — I have in mind the European war — indifferently and there can be danger only from the mullahs who may agitate in a manner undesirable for us."​13

Careful consideration of the situation bears out that the Governor-General's report characterizes the temper of the people more accurately than those of the Okhrana agents. The latter seized upon the vaguest and wildest rumors of Pan-Islamic activity and reported them. Their reasoning was that by doing so they were showing their "zeal" and alertness. The Andijan  p77 affair had frightened the Tsarist government about the potentialities of Pan-Islamism in Turkistan. All foreigners were kept under strict surveillance and every effort was made to root out subversive activities. Despite the great efforts made, few concrete examples of plotting could be brought to light. If the plotting was as deep and widespread as the Okhrana agents reported, there certainly would have been more determined forms of expression. It took the supreme command for the conscription of native laborers in the rear to bring out an outburst of resistance. The eve of the announcement of mobilization found both the Sarts and nomads quiet and at peace.

 (p73)  C. The Supreme Command of June 25

World War I caught the Russians with great gaps to be filled in their armament effort despite the fine work of the Duma beginning in 1908. The shortage was especially noticed in heavy artillery and shells. In the summer of 1915 the Russians could fire only a few hundred shells for every several thousand fired by the Germans. The output of rifles was far below actual needs and men were often sent to the front without arms. Whereas the lack of armament might be thought to limit the number of men under arms, in actuality it but increased reliance upon man­power. Fifteen million men were mobilized, withdrawing a third of the male productive force from factory and field. The entire period of Russian military operations on the Eastern front, from the frightful hecatombs of the Masurian Lakes and Tannenburg to the fall of the Tsarist government is a sickening tale of enormous lists of casualties — of the replacement of shells and guns as weapons by human beings. It is in this background of the ever-constant demand for human replacements and of a shortage of labor force as more males were called up that it was decided to call upon the native population of Russian Central Asia and the Caucasus to furnish men for work behind the front lines.

The entire question was decided at a meeting at the Stavka, the quarters of the commander-in‑chief of the Armies.​14 General Alexeieff, the Chief of Staff, announced that he needed a levy of  p78 500,000 men a month to cover the losses of the army. General Shuvayev, Minister of War, said he had only 1,175,000 persons in his reserve battalions, sufficing for only three months. The 600,000 men who could be secured from the five youngest age groups would require two months to train. All the generals present agreed that in view of the great urgency of the man­power question and the necessity to fill the places of those called from essential war work the labor levy of the Caucasian and Central Asian natives would have to take place on July 15.​15 The mobilization  (p74) order was signed by Nicholas II on June 25: 250,000 natives were to be called from Central Asia from the 19‑43 age bracket.

D. Meeting of the Governors of the Central Asian Krai

On the same day that the Tsarist supreme command was signed (June 25) there was called a special meeting of the military governors and other high officials of the Central Asian krai. This meeting was presided over by the acting Governor-General Erofeev and was called for the purpose of deciding by what means and manner the Tsarist order would be carried out.

The problem of how the natives were to be called was especially knotty, due to the fact that no record of births was kept among the population. Lieutenant General Galkin, the military governor of the Syr Darya oblast, expressed the opinion that, in view of the absence of birth certificates among the population, the re­quisition of workers strictly according to the instructions of the Ministry of the Interior was almost impossible as the administration did not have at its disposal the requisite forces while the very determination of the ages of the natives in the absence of birth certificates and in view of their practice of counting years by moon years and cycles would lead to malpractices on a mass scale. The call of workers by age group would lead them to think that they were being taken not as workers but as soldiers, thus causing agitation and even disorder. The call of the natives should be fulfilled by means familiar to the population and in such a manner as to obviate  p79 any misunderstanding. The call was to be represented as the fulfillment of a natural obligation on the part of the natives not different from tasks they already performed, such as corvée service for irrigation and road work and for the destruction of locusts. General Galkin thought that it was for the assembly only to determine the number of workers each oblast should give. The oblast governors, receiving from the assembly the number of workers they were to provide, were to apportion this number among the uezds, the uezds among the volosts, and so forth. In such a manner the task would be fulfilled easily and without complications. These views received the general assent of the assembly.

 (p75)  Another question discussed by the assembly was the probable attitude of the natives when informed about the conscription order. The consensus of those present was that there was no need to fear the outbreak of disorder. The governor of the Transcaspian oblast, Major General Kolmakov, asserted that there was no need to fear an uprising. He cited the examples of the Turkoman Tekke regiment performing such exemplary service at the front, and the many natives already sent to work on the Caucasus front. An appeal should be printed in the native newspapers explaining the aims of the mobilization order. Likoshin, the military governor of the Samarkand oblast, was of the opinion that no excesses need be expected if the call be presented as the fulfillment of natural duty by the natives.

General Gippius, the Governor of the Ferghana oblast, opined that the attitude of the masses depended upon that of the upper classes of the population, the mullahs, big merchants, landholders, etc. If the conscription order were carried out via the drawing up of family lists in which the ages of all the natives would be determined and all between the ages of 19 and 43 would be taken it would put the upper classes in a bad frame of mind as they would be taken also. Moreover the latter were physically weak and ill adapted for hard labor.

The Governor of the Syr Darya oblast concurred in the opinion that the conscription should be effected by order and not by family list.

Thus the authorities favored conscription by order and not  p80 by family lists for two reasons. In the first place it would require a great deal of time to prepare the lists of the natives of the ages 19‑43 and, in the second place, all upper-class natives who were in the subject age group would be included in the call. Under the plan favored by most of the assembly — the call of workers by order — the call to work would fall on definite individuals and not on a definite age group. Who these individuals would be was to be determined by the volost authorities. In this way the upper classes could be used in carrying out the conscription but would be themselves exempted.

Only one official spoke out against this scheme — a certain Bulatov by name. In his opinion the method was arbitrary and hence unjust and  (p76) furthermore did not correspond to the supreme order which called for all natives 19‑43 years old. With this opinion one other official concurred.

The assembly, however, recognized that conscription by order did not violate the supreme command, that the Ministries of War and the Interior by agreement left the method of determination of the ages to the assembly, that the method adopted would secure the workers with a minimum of time and effort. The selection of workers would be carried on with more equity if done by the natives themselves through their volost authorities than by Russian officials and, furthermore, if complaints of injustice arose they would be directed against their own officials and not at the Russians. Thus all the responsibility for future friction was laid on the shoulders of the native officials. They, on the other hand, received the widest scope for perpetrating injustices.​16

The assembly then dealt with the problem of assigning to each oblast and each uezd the number of workers to be called.

According to the latest official figures the native non-Russian male population was about 3,500,000 (3,332,200). On the basis of this number the number of workers to be called from Turkistan (250,000) was about 8%​17 of the total population, much higher in terms of males, 19‑43 years old.

 p81  On the basis of this the figures to be assigned to the oblasts would be approximately:

The above distribution was obtained by apportioning the number of male natives each oblast contained as against the number of the  (p77) entire krai. The assembly, however, did not confine itself to executing a mere mathematical exercise, but modified the break-down by oblast. What caused this modification was the desire to see that a sufficient labor force was left for the cotton-growing areas of Turkistan. Governor-General von Martsohn had telegraphed the assembly to that effect. Not only must a sufficient force be left for the gathering of the current cotton harvest but also for the cultivation of cotton in the coming year.

The conference pointed to the removal of prisoners of war from Turkistan to Siberia, once a source of labor as Turkistan had many German and Austrian prisoners of war. The number of workers from Persia, Afghanistan, and China was not great, and the number of native work hands did not suffice. The native women did not work in the fields while the Aulie-ata and Chernaevsky uezds had already provided 10,000 workers for work near the front. To secure a sufficient number of workers for the cotton industry the conference recognized that a reduction in the number of workers called for work behind the front lines from the cotton areas would have to be made at the expense of non-cotton areas. Ferghana oblast had the greatest area under cotton while Semirechie had none at all. Therefore Ferghana was to receive the greatest exemption of workers while Semirechie was to have the greatest additional conscription. With these considerations in mind the assembly redistributed the call for workers thus:

 p82  Further, the assembly decided that areas in the uezds having 50% of their area under cotton would provide one-sixth of the workers that would be assigned to the area on the basis of the number of workers it had of the total male population of the krai. Areas having an acreage  (p78) under cotton of 25‑50% would provide one‑third and areas under 25% would provide one-half.​18

Finally the assembly recognized that a further reduction of workers for the cotton oblasts at the expense of the non-cotton oblasts would be inadmissible. In view of this and of the insufficiency of labor which threatened to develop even with the above changes the assembly asked the Governor-General to petition for a reduction of the workers demanded come from Turkistan from 250,000 to 200,000.

Thus we see manifested a very great solicitude for the maintenance of the cotton acreage at its current figure. One Soviet writer asserts that the changes in the distribution were made after protests from officials of the cotton-growing districts in Turkistan, though the Moscow textile manufacturers were also much alarmed.​19

The assembly also decided that the workers would be organized in echelons of from 1,400 to 1,500 persons. For each group of 200 persons there was to be appointed one individual, if possible from the workers themselves, to act as translator and elder. One mullah was authorized for each echelon to satisfy the religious needs of the workers.

E. The Revolt among the Sarts

The first phase of the Revolt of 1916 may be termed the revolt of the Sarts. Disorders and agitation began among both the Sarts and the nomads at approximately the same time, but the real trouble with the nomads was not to come until the beginning of August. By that time the Sarts had revolted and had been suppressed. The beginning of the revolt among the  p83 nomads found the Sarts broken and subdued; no further trouble was to come from them.

The order for mobilization struck a hard blow at the Sart peasant. He was to be mobilized at the very peak of the cotton harvest, when every hand was needed desperately. The economy was such that it called for little capital and much labor. A holding of 8 tanaps of land (2  (p79) dessiatines) in Ferghana was not a small but an average holding and the taking away of a worker was nothing short of calamitous.​20 The situation for the peasant quite apart from any mobilization was desperate in 1916. The war had furthered the process of the replacement of land under food cultivation by land under cotton. In the war years the area under cotton rose from 567,000 dessiatines in 1914 to 714,000 dessiatines in 1916. The year 1915 was brought record one for cotton, the harvest being 20.5 million puds. In 1916, because of a bad harvest the harvest was only 15 million puds, despite an extension of the cotton area.​21 Thus, though the peasant had increased his acreage of cotton, the bad harvest gave him no increase in production in 1916. What was worse, the decreased acreage under food, combined with the sluggish transport of grain from Siberia and Russia, brought high prices for food. Nor could the peasant find salvation in receiving a good price for his cotton crop. Cotton prices were fixed by the government during the war years at a low figure. According to the Ferghana governor this setting of prices "was decided with the presence of only one side, namely the representatives of factories and banks."​22 The upshot of the whole situation was that the peasant did not receive enough for his crop to pay his way and was forced to consume his meager working capital in order to stay alive. Needless to say the money lenders did very well in this situation.

The placing of the responsibility for the drawing-up of lists of workers on the native officials provided them with a lever for extortion on a mass scale. Kerensky, sent by the Duma on a mission of investigation to Turkistan with another Duma member, revealed that he saw a 60‑year-old man who "as  p84 a matter of fact appeared on the labor conscription list as 30 years old because he could not pay 300 roubles, while at the same time a young man, 25‑30 years old, appeared as 50 because he was a rich person."​23 Speaking of these malpractices General  (p80) Kuropatkin was to write in his journal, "It is difficult to establish how many bribes were taken in the single oblasts of Ferghana and Semirechie, especially by the officials of the native administration. The general sum must not be measured at other than millions of roubles. Complaints come from all sides."​24

The order was announced to the population without any preparatory measures, causing incredible confusion. The wildest rumors were circulated. It was firmly believed by many that they were being taken as soldiers or that even if they were being taken as laborers, they would dig trenches under enemy fire in between the German and Russian forces.

An excellent account of the situation after the announcement of the conscription order is given by Lt. Col. Makkaveev, the Quartermaster General of the Turkistan krai. He writes in his "Short Survey of Events":

In Tashkent agents of the Okhrana reported rumors that the poor would settle accounts with the rich if the latter were given the right to buy their way out of the conscription. The rumor that a general uprising was to break out on July 18 caused a near panic among the Russians scattered over the country. Both they and the administration besought the government for arms to use against the imminent attack. In the places the nomads occupied there took place a migration of auls away from the cities. These peoples started moving into the steppes, the hills, and the border areas (especially to Chimkent uezd, Turkistan,​26 Perovsk, Kazalinsk, the Hungry Steppes, the border regions of Transcaspia, Semirechie) and even out of the Russian Empire.​27

The first outburst among the Sarts took place on July 4 in the city of Khojent. Here a huge crowd fell upon a guard post in order to secure  (p82) arms. The crowd was dispersed by shooting into it. The date of the attack is significant. Since the order for conscription was not announced to the population until  p86 July 8, it shows that the population already knew of the order before its announcement.

On July 7 in the village of Dagbit, Samarkand uezd, a native crowd fell upon the volost head, the scribe, and jigits (mounted native messengers and scouts) and killed them. The list of workers to be called, made up for the volost, was destroyed. Simultaneously on July 9 there occurred disorders in the city of Andijan. In Andijan the students of the medresseh started a demonstration against conscription. Troops were sent to break up the crowd. Shots were fired and ten natives were badly wounded. This only served to infuriate the crowd which began to struggle with the police and Cossacks, throwing sticks and rocks at them. This attack was dispersed by gunfire, leaving 12 natives wounded. One Cossack and several policemen were also wounded in the scuffle.

The movement in Ferghana spread from the cities to the rest of the oblast. There occurred in a series of settlements the killing of volost heads, scribes, and jigits. The individual movements were directed primarily at the police and native officialdom and had as their goal the stoppage of the drawing up of lists of workers to be called.​28

On July 11 disorders took place in the cities of Namangan and Dalverzan, Ferghana oblast. The official report of the assistant uezd head describes the events that took place in the city of Namangan:

In the village of Dalverzan the volost head had announced the mobilization order to the people. They greeted this announcement with defiant cries and when the volost head started to place his seal on the order to the effect it had been announced, the crowd pressed toward him. The volost head tried to defend himself by shooting, but the infuriated mob killed him and two jigits. There were no troops to call in the immediate area so that the crowd broke up of its own accord and went home.

By July 13 the movement had seized all of Ferghana oblast. On July 17 the entire Turkistan krai was placed under martial law. All civil departments were placed in subordination to the commander of the armies. The latter immediately issued orders calling for (1) the formation of provisional military courts, (2) that the administration should report three times a day regarding the disposition of the population, (3)  the dispersal of all "native mobs" in the zone of the railway by armed force.

The actions of General Gippius, the Governor of the Ferghana oblast, were, to say the least, most erratic. He announced that Tashkent had wrongly interpreted the supreme command, that in reality the command applied only to those who wanted to go to work in the  (p84) rear of the front lines. He announced this to the natives in thousands of appeals which he distributed over Ferghana oblast. He told Erofeev, the commander of the army in Turkistan, that his orders were leading to rebellion and announced that he was going to deal directly with the Premier, the Minister of War, and others. Gippius was of the  p88 opinion that if the good will of the natives were cultivated, if their patriotism were appealed to, they would volunteer in greater numbers than were needed.​31 On July 13 he appeared before a crowd of natives in Namangan dressed in native khalat or gown and skull cap holding a copy of the Koran in his hands. He read appropriate passages and kissed the holy book. "In this holy book," he declared, "there is told of the necessity to help the White Tsar against the Germans." According to Okhrana archives this produced a strong impression on the natives.

This attempt to get the natives to volunteer, however, proved a complete failure. Gippius issued further appeals but to no avail. Finally on July 16 he announced that the call would be postponed until September 15 in order to give the natives a chance to harvest their crops. According to one Soviet writer​32 he was prompted to do this by the Moscow committee of the Bourse who impressed upon him the necessity to save the cotton crop. He sent the latter the following telegram: "Despite the declaration of martial law in the Turkistan military okrug [district] I beg you to calm the commercial class regarding conditions in the Ferghana oblast. The outburst of disorders, occasioned by a perverted interpretation of the supreme command regarding the call of workers, is quickly being subdued under the influence of my oral and written explanations, life is getting back to normal and I will soon present a petition for the removal of martial law in Ferghana oblast."​33

In reality the disorders not only continued but grew worse, making removal of martial law unthinkable. The effects of martial law had a very unfavorable effect upon cotton production in Ferghana oblast. The imposition of martial law interfered with the transport of cotton as all  (p85)  transport of freight and people was regulated. The peasants were placed in a very unfavorable position inasmuch as the banks and commercial houses ceased to give them the usual advances on their crop. As an a upshot of the whole débâcle Gippius was forced to turn in his resignation.

 p89  In the Syr Darya oblast an additional irritant was provided by the high price of grain owing to the drought which was felt here more acutely than in the other oblasts of Turkistan. Opposition was expressed in a very elemental form and was confined to resistance to the drawing up of lists of workers subject to the call, during which six native officials were killed. Even the disorders which took place in Old Tashkent​34 on July 11 were significant only for the effect they had on the natives elsewhere, especially in Jizak.

On July 11 the piatidesyatniki or heads of 50 households of Tashkent were called together by the authorities for the purpose of explaining to them what the call was all about and how the lists were to be drawn up. An ever-increasing crowd began to form around the police building where this was taking place. In the crowd were many Moslem women, a feature characteristic of these demonstrations. The crowd began to demand that a halt be put to the drawing up of lists of workers. Their threats not having any effect, the mood of the crowd became ugly. They attempted to enter the building but the police barred the way. The crowd then killed the native guard outside, and someone seized a revolver from a policeman. The police fired into the crowd and then barricaded themselves inside the building. The crowd knocked  (p86) out the widows and tore down the communication wires leading to the building. Troops finally arrived and the crowd was dispersed. Four people were killed and six wounded.

The Tashkent affair was of very small dimensions compared to the greatness of the city. Its chief significance lay in the fact that the disorders took place in the capital of the krai, the  p90 very nerve centre of the administration. Exaggerated rumors of what took place greatly encouraged natives elsewhere as they thought the capital was with them.

The course of the disorders in the three basic oblasts was stereotyped, and did not provide a wide variety of form. The movements showed little organization or range. The usual sequence of events was that a crowd would assemble before the village or volost chancellery and ask to see the attorneys about the meaning of the order. When the authorities appeared, they would demand that the drawing up of lists be stopped. When this was refused, bloody events would occur. Troops would then arrive and disperse the crowd by force of arms.​35

Events in the Samarkand oblast took the traditional form of resistance described above, except in the uezd of Jizak. Here the movement was expressed in a much more advanced form both as to extent and intensiveness. General Kuropatkin was to term this "open revolt" and so it was indeed.​36

The Jizak uezd was primarily a grain-producing area. Also of importance were gardening and especially viniculture. It had greater opportunities of cultural and political development than many of the other Sart areas. It was situated near the great centres of the krai (Tashkent, Khojent, and Samarkand), had the railway running through its territory and was near the irrigated fringe of the Hungry Steppe. There was undoubtedly a tie between the Bukharan Pan-Islamists and the cultured circles of Jizak though precise information on this score is lacking.​37

The absence of such an intensive culture of cotton in Samarkand  (p87) oblast as there was in Ferghana was to have an unfavorable effect upon the number of conscript workers it was to furnish. As has already been noted, the special assembly of the Turkistan upper officialdom, because of this fact, was to raise the number of workers to be furnished by Samarkand oblast from an original 35,000 to 38,000, while the cotton-raising districts in each oblast were to furnish fewer workers than the grain-producing districts. Jizak, being a grain-producing  p91 area, thus suffered doubly; it was ordered to furnish 10,600 persons.

A less immediate though equally important cause for dissatisfaction among the population was the seizure of land in connection with the irrigation of the Hungry Steppe. This operation was the pet project of the Grand Duke Nicholas K. Romanov, a cousin of the Tsar, banished to Turkistan because of past indiscretions. Land was seized, water rights usurped, and the population was barred even from securing firewood in the woods, the latter a serious matter as winters in Turkistan are quite cold. In addition to the Sart agricultural economy the Jizak area included a well-developed Kazakh cattle-raising economy. The Kazakhs were squeezed out from the best pasture lands into the barren hills.

The movement in Jizak uezd began on July 2, 1916. On that date the Russian authorities gathered representatives of the population in old Jizak and announced the mobilization order to them. Thirteen Sarts were singled out, the responsibility of furnishing the required workers was placed on them, and they were given ten days to present the workers. The work of drawing up the lists was performed by the 5ki or Illik-bashi together with the Russian authorities. The lists were drawn up in such a way that the sons of "bais" and of the authorities were left off while the great percentage of those on the lists was made up of the sons of the poor. On July 12 the pristav and doctors arrived to begin the processing of workers in Old Tashkent. The call was completed for one section of the city and was to begin in another the next day. On July 12 there appeared among the assembled workers a certain Nazir Khoja Abdusalyamov, an Ishan who had been to Tashkent to find out the situation there and who had just returned. He reported that Tashkent had decided to revolt rather than furnish  (p88) workers. With this information in hand the workers called a meeting for the evening of July 12 where it was decided to take away the lists of workers to be called. This was accomplished on the morning of the 13th. During the proceedings Mirza Yar Khudoyarov, the district bailiff, was murdered after threatening the crowd with his revolver.

The gazavat or holy war was then announced and Nazir  p92 Khoja was proclaimed bek. The crowd, armed with sticks, knives, sickles, etc. headed towards new Jizak to demand that the conscription be stopped. Nazir Khoja walked at the head of the mob. Colonel Rukin, the uezd head, rode out from new Jizak to meet the mob. He attempted to pacify the crowd by saying that the mobilization would be stopped but the crowd did not believe him. He was pulled down from his horse and killed as was Captain Zotoglov, the pristav of the region, and a jigit who accompanied him. The crowd then continued on their way to Jizak but meeting the fire of the troops there they retreated to the old city. Here they prepared themselves for the coming battle. They gathered together what arms they had, stored provisions, and mobilized all artisans for the making of swords, axes, and other crude weapons.

The Russians, few in number, shut themselves up in the new city's barracks. The insurgents, not meeting any resistance, went for the railway installations where, under the direction of the native railway workers employed on repairing operations, they indulged in an orgy of destruction. They destroyed the 65 versts, was torn up. Sixteen Russian railway workers were killed and an attack was made on the trains.

The Russian population remained all night in the encampment guarding themselves with outposts and patrols. The next day saw the arrival of a detachment under a Colonel Afanasev which managed to confine the rebellion to the old city.

The news of the uprising in the city of Jizak caused rebellion to start in other points of the uezd. The main participants were the Uzbeks of the Sansarº river valley and around Zaamin and Bogdan.º Somewhere  (p89) rifles appeared and beks​38  p93 were proclaimed. Bands were formed, significant in number but poorly armed. The object of the rebellion was not only the stopping of the conscription but, if success­ful, complete independence from Russia. There was hope of aid from Afghanistan and Germany. In the Sanzarº district a native judge, Turadbekov, was proclaimed Khan.

In the Bodganº district one Abdurakhman Abujabarov Jevachi was proclaimed Khan and declared holy war against the Russians. He agreed to act together with Nasir Khoja against the Russians. An expedition was organized to come to the aid of Jizak.

As soon as Tashkent heard of the events in Jizak a special punitive force was dispatched from Tashkent and Samarkand. It was made up of 13 companies, 6 cannon, 3 sotnias of Cossacks, and three-fourths of a company of sappers. To this infantry force there was added a large cavalry detachment, the horses and saddles for which were obtained by re­quisition.

Part of this force was assigned to guard the railway, a small garrison was left in Jizak, while the rest of the force was divided into five flying columns whose mission it was to scatter and punish the insurgents. The latter were powerless against such a force though some further resistance was put up and an attempt made to tear up railway lines. The Russians retook the Russian settlement of Zaamin near the railway lines which had been taken by the insurgents. July 16 saw the restoration of the railway and telegraph lines in all the uezd and from that date there was communication between Tashkent and Jizak. The followers of the various native leaders gradually began to return to the village. Some fled to the hills but were pursued and forced into submission by three Cossack columns sent against them. Others tried to break through to Bukhara and Afghanistan. Abdurakhman Abujabarov  (p90) surrendered, Nazir Khoja was captured in the steppe after being given up by Kazakhs not taking part in the revolt, while Turadbekov succeeded in hiding himself. By the 26th or the 27th of July the uprising was crushed and the natives agreed to furnish the workers demanded.

The goal of the punitive unit under Colonel Ivanov was not only to pacify the natives but to impress upon them a  p94 lesson that they would not soon forget. One of the survivors of the pacification relates:

In addition the field courts set up dealt summarily with the many arrested persons brought in.

Finally on August 20 General Kuropatkin arrived in Jizak. After visiting the graves of the fallen Russian officials he assembled the influential natives and told them: "It would be best to hang all of you but we are allowing you to live so that you may be a warning example to others. The place where Col. Rukin was killed is to be enclosed for a radius of 5 versts. This will belong to the government. The people inhabiting this territory are to be ejected immediately."​42 Shades of Andijan!

In addition to the Russians mentioned above, the insurgents killed the Zaamin pristav, Sobolev, the inhabitants of the Russian settlement of Zaamin, members of the Forest Service, and a party of statisticians of the Ministry of Agriculture. The total Russian loss was 83 killed, 20 wounded. Seventy Russians were taken into captivity, mostly women and children, the majority of the women being raped. The property  (p91) damage to the Russians was estimated at 1 million roubles though Kuropatkin thought this figure was probably exaggerated.​43

One of the most significant actions of the Jizak insurgents, pointing to the great power of the movement, was the destruction of the railway; neither in Ferghana nor Samarkand was the railway destroyed. In view of the wretchedness of the Turkistan  p95 roads​44 this was a matter of crucial importance for the success of any rebellion. The Russians were completely dependent upon the railway for rapid transfer of troops from one point to another. If the railway had been cut in localities other than around Jizak the rebellion would have been much more difficult to suppress.

From all information, the fact that the Jizak movement reached such proportions as it did was due to the fact that the initial act of resistance to the Russians — the murder of Colonel Rukin, the uezd head — was not countered by immediate punitive measures. Success inspired and strengthened the belief of the people in themselves. They set out to accomplish two goals: (1) destroy the railway and thus prevent the dispatch of Russian troops against them, and (2) exterminate the Russian oppressors. Locally these efforts met with success; only with the arrival of troops from the outside, armed with cannon and machine guns, did the movement collapse.

Despite the greater depth and intensity of the Jizak revolt it was characterized by the fitting of means to the end only during the revolt itself; there was no master plan carefully conceived long before the revolt. "When the mass threatened the uezd Nachalnik hardly a single  (p92) individual consciously acted towards any kind of goal; the mass was under the influence of the moment, the individual under the influence of the mass."​45 They were inflamed by Nazir Khoja, himself too much under the fresh impression of the Tashkent disorders to appraise the situation correctly.

The Jizak revolt had a direct resemblance to the Andijan uprising. In both affairs beks were proclaimed, a holy war announced, and the white banner of national liberation raised.  p96 Both were non-radical movements led by remnants of the old feudal religious classes. While Nazir Khoja​46 was an ishan with modest property the other leaders like Kasin Khoja in Zaamin and Muktav in Jizak were wealthy land­owners. Turadbekov was of bek origin. The bulk of the movement was made up of the peasantry. While economic reasons were behind much of the peasants' dissatisfaction, their leaders, as in the Andijan uprising, used this resentment to stir them up against the Russians without planning to initiate economic reforms for their benefit in case of success. These leaders were wholly ignorant of the great changes that had been effected by capitalism and failed to realize that they could not turn back the clock to khanate days.

Religious fanaticism was undoubtedly one of the chief agents motivating the revolt. The outbreak of disorders in the city of Jizak found many medresseh (Moslem religious academy) students in the crowd which clashed with the Tsarist forces. The declaration of the holy war has already been noted.

The Jizak uprising differed from that of Andijan in one respect — it saw the introduction of a new force — the native railway workers. The great difference in pay, working conditions, and employment between native and Russian workers, especially on the railway, has already been noted. This undoubtedly served as an incentive in causing them to join the insurgent forces.

 (p93)  F. The Appointment of General Kuropatkin as Governor-General

The final suppression of the disorders among the Sart population roughly coincides with the appointment of General Kuropatkin, who received his appointment on July 21. The disorders were suppressed and the conscription of workers among the Sarts started in the closing days of July.

The actions of General Erofeev, the acting Governor-General, had since the beginning of the disorders been directed towards pacifying the population by brute force rather than by explaining the order to the natives or eradicating any of the abuses.  p97 He tried to show in his telegrams to Petrograd that his measures were having their desired effect but after each such telegram he had to report new disorders and murders of Russians.

Kuropatkin believed that the basis for his new appointment was served by his forwarding of a telegram from the khansha Guldzhemal of the Tekke Turkomans to Alexeieff, Chief of Staff of the Army, and copies to the Ministers of the Interior and of War. The telegram asked Kuropatkin to intercede in the call of the Turkomans as laborers. The Turkoman population had, without the slightest warning, been called to furnish workers by July 15, precisely the time the cotton crop was to be harvested. The concluding words of the telegram were these:

 (p94)  The telegram was forwarded to the above-mentioned officials together with a request by Kuropatkin for the Emperor to postpone the calling of the Tekkes till September 15.

On the morning of July 21 as the Minister of War, Shuvaev, contacted the Emperor and told him that in view of the serious disorders that had broken out in Turkistan he was asking that Kuropatkin be appointed to the Governor-Generalship in Turkistan to pacify the population. This proposition the monarch did not accept. A second report by Shuvaev, however, caused the Tsar to write out at 4:00 P.M. a supreme command for the desired appointment. When Kuropatkin heard  p98 of the appointment he asked that he be given the powers of commander-in‑chief in Turkistan to which the Emperor agreed.

Kuropatkin remained in Petrograd for a few weeks, not arriving in Tashkent until August 8. Before leaving Petrograd he received a visit from a General Pokotillo, who had just returned from Turkistan and who knew the region well. The latter painted a not too flattering picture of the officials in command there. He reported in part that "Martsohn, the Governor-General, has gone to pieces. The Syr Darya Governor-General, Galkin, is drunk every day. The Samarkand one, Likotin, is blind. The Ferghana one — Gippius — is crazy. The Transcaspian — Kolmakov — weak, without a will, the Semirechie — Folbaum — better than the others. The head of the chancellery, Efremov, who meddles in everything, is very suspect and, it appears, manages affairs fraudulently. The assistant Governor-General, Erofeev, is very inexperienced," and so on.​48

The bulk of Kuropatkin's actions belong to the second phase of the revolt and will be considered there. It is to this phase that we now turn.

---

The Author's Notes:

1 Report of Kuropatkin to Nicholas II: "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit., p80.

2 Report of the Dragoman of the Kashgar Consulate Stefanovich: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p110.

3 Broido, op. cit., p422.

4 Ibid., p425.

5 Deposition of Kanaat Abukin: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p155.

6 Deposition of the engineer Tynyshpaev: ibid., p142.

7 A. J. Toynbee and K. P. Kirkwood, Turkey (London, 1926), p56.

8 A. Miklashevsky, "Sotsialnye dvizhenya 1916 g. v Turkestane," Byloe, no. 27‑28 (1924), p243.

9 Events proved this quite untrue.

10 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p245.

11 Ibid., pp244‑245.

12 Ibid., p244.

13 Ibid.

14 The commander-in‑chief at the time was Tsar Nicholas II himself.

15 Journal of Kuropatkin, "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit., p48.

16 See Elaboration of the mobilization order: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, pp17‑22.

17 The khanates of Khiva and Bukhara are excluded. The order for mobilization did not apply to them.

18 Elaboration of mobilization order in Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p23.

19 Introduction by Shestakov: "Dzhizakskoe vosstanie v 1916 g.," K. A. 5, no. 60 (1933), p61.

20 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p248.

21 Shestakov, op. cit., pp88‑89.

22 Galuzo, op. cit., p155.

23 Ibid., pp153‑154. Alexander Kerensky (1881‑1970): Studied law at University of St. Petersburg where took degree. After graduation he joined the St. Petersburg bar where he won a reputation as a defense counsel in political trials. In 1912 elected to the 4th Imperial Duma where he joined the Group of Toil (Labor) as his own party, the Social Revolutionaries, could not appear as an organized party. Won a reputation in the Duma by his fearless eloquence. After the overthrow of the Tsar became the vice president of the Petrograd Soviet and Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government, March 1917. Became Minister of War in May 1917 and set energetically to work to reorganize the army reintroducing the death penalty. He was even able to launch a limited offensive in June under Allied pressure but this proved short lived due to the exhaustion of the army. Kerensky soon found himself caught between militarist reaction (the un­success­ful putsch of Kornilov) and the rising strength of the Bolsheviks culminating in the October Revolution and his government was characterized by vacillation and indecision. Other reasons standing in the background were: (1) the failure of his government to settle the agrarian problem, and (2) Kerensky's reluctance to shed blood by instituting a secret police to cope with the enemies of the government. (Perhaps St. Just was right when he remarked that "One cannot rule guiltlessly.") Kerensky escaped from Russia after the Bolshevik coup in October. He settled in Paris where he became the leader of the Social Revolutionary emigre group there, editing its paper, Dni, and writing books about the revolution. In 1940 Kerensky moved to Australia and in 1946 he came to the United States. Kerensky's brother, an engineer, was killed in Tashkent during the Bolshevik Revolution.

24 Journal of Kuropatkin: "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit., p51.

25 Quoted in Shestakov, op. cit., p91.

26 The city of Turkistan (also called Azret), not to be confused with the region of Turkistan.

27 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p249.

28 Report of Kuropatkin to Nicholas II: "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit., p68.

29 Ur = kill.

30 See Miklashevsky, op. cit., p260.

31 Kuropatkin's Journal: "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit., p47.

32 Shestakov, op. cit., p92.

33 Ibid., p92.

34 As in Europe the introduction of the railways into Turkistan was regarded by many of the local inhabitants with superstitious fear and suspicion. In consideration of the susceptibilities of the latter railway stations were erected and the railway routed a discreet distance from cities by the Russians. The commercial revolution brought by the railway convinced many of the local merchants that their future was bound up with that of the railway with the result that many commercial companies transferred their headquarters from the old city to the new one being built around the railway station. In this way there resulted "new" and "old" cities along the Transcaspian railway, the first dynamic, growing, and made up of a mixed Russian and local population — similar to the mushroom towns in the early days of the American West — the second, old, tradition-bound, and often declining as progressive elements transferred their activities to the new city.

35 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p259.

36 Report of Kuropatkin to Nicholas, Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit., p61.

37 "Dzhizakskoe vosstanie 1916 g.," op. cit., p61.

38 Bek (beg) A Turkish title. Ottoman bey, Kirghiz bī or biy. The various meanings given to this word may be summarized in three categories: (1) A beg is a noble in distinction to the common people; also the ruling princes. (2) The "prince" of a small tribe or area in contradistinction to the khan, the ruler of a larger area. (3) Any "position of authority" may carry this title, from the head of a village to a governor of an area. The earliest Turkic inscriptions use the word beg in all three meanings. See article on "bek," Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. I, p689.

39 Later Minister of War under Kolchak in Siberia in 1918.

40 Kishlak = Sart village.

41 Introduction, "Dzhizakskoe vosstanie 1916 g.," op. cit., p63.

42 Ibid., p63.

43 Report of Kuropatkin to Nicholas II, Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit., p67.

44 Skobelev, the conqueror of the Turkomans, wrote in 1877: "if known to Dante the Central Asian road would have served as an additional horror to hell." Curzon, op. cit., p400. Colonel Bailey, speaking of his experiences as a British agent in Turkistan during the Bolshevik revolution, writes: "Russian Turkistan is in one way a curious country. Railways were made before roads — at least before respectable roads. The result is that when the railway line was cut by the enemy [the White forces under General Dutov] there was not, as one might have expected, any possibility of communication by car. In fact, motor cars could only travel short distances from Tashkent." F. M. Bailey, op. cit., p36.

45 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p262.

46 Nazir Khoja was an agent of a Jizak dealer in millstones. He owned a small house and 4 tanaps of land in Jizak, valued at 2,000 roubles.

47 Journal of Kuropatkin, "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit., p46.

48 Ibid., p46.

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