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 p99   (p95)  Chapter 5
The Revolt of 1916: Second Phase

A. The Revolt of the Kirghiz and Kazakhs

1. The Announcement of the Supreme Order

The circumstances surrounding the announcement of the mobilization of workers to the Kirghiz and Kazakh peoples and the reaction that followed was much the same as among the Sart population although resistance took much longer to crystallize definitely. As with the Sarts, there was no preparatory work undertaken to soften the blow or to present in a patriotic light the sacrifice the natives would make for the war effort. This absence of preparatory steps was recognized by the highest officials of the country. Thus in July 1916 the Viceroy of the Caucasus, the Grand Duke Nicholai Nicholaevich, sought a change in conscription orders as applied to the country entrusted to him on the ground that "any measures affecting the Moslem population require for their fulfillment a series of preparatory measures which in their turn require considerable time."​1 On July 31 Kuropatkin wrote in his journal: "Stürmer [Prime Minister] and Shuvaev [the War Minister] did all that was possible to stir up the population. The order for the call of the natives to work was given by Stürmer without interrogation of the officials on the spot and without receiving from them  (p96) their opinion concerning the arrangements and dates for the fulfillment of the call for natives to work."​2

One of the bon mots which made the rounds of St. Petersburg society before the first World War was that "Russia has departments but no government." The first attempts at fulfilling the order for conscription of workers were to prove that there was much truth in this quip. The success­ful fulfillment of the order was predicated upon the coordination of the activities  p100 of the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Interior. Such coordination there was not. On day following the announcement of the supreme command the Minister of the Interior telegraphed to the governors of the oblasts affected that they should begin the mobilization of the first contingent of Kazakhs and Kirghiz, 18‑25 years old, in the shortest space of time.

On the spot there was complete confusion, the degree of which may be gathered from the case of Sokolovsky the Astrakhan Governor. In conformity with the instructions of the Minister of the Interior Sokolovsky brought all the forces and means he had at his disposal towards the calling up of his first contingent of natives on July 10. This call he was forced to cancel after receiving a telegram from the Ministry of the Interior which declared that the War Department was seriously hampering the transport of the native workers.

Sokolovsky then entered into relations with the staff of the Kazan military okrug or district. On July 23 he received from the Astrakhan uezd military head the statement that he could accept daily 1,000 natives beginning with August 5. Sokolovsky thereupon issued a second call for workers but on July 26 he was told by the uezd head to postpone the reception of workers until a plan of transportation was received from the War Department. "Thus in a short time I was twice forced to announce a call and twice to rescind the order," Sokolovsky stated.​3 Sokolovsky considered this situation very harmful for all concerned.  (p97) The natives had to traverse as many as 300 versts to get to the collecting stations and then to go home to await another call, thus causing needless economic loss. Furthermore this might be interpreted as showing the weakness and vacillation of the Russian government and thus give agitators a chance to stir up the native peoples.

As with the Sarts, the conscription order became a lever for mass extortion and malpractice on the part of the native administration. Bribes were taken to keep natives off the list. Volost heads used the order to settle accounts with their party enemies including all of their antagonists in the age group  p101 19‑31, the first contingent. Or they might be denounced as opposing the government and brought before the Russian authorities. The rich Kirghiz in preparing the lists wrote the ages of their sons older than they actually were so that there were cases of 20‑year-old bits or native judges (officials exempt from the conscription order) when the law required they be no younger than 25.​4 When faced with injustice the population often took the law into its own hands which usually took the form of taking the lists away from the volost head. This occurred in the Turgai, Uralsk, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, and Semirechie oblasts. Other native authorities, fearing violence from the Kirghiz youth, fled to Russian centres like Uralsk and Ilek and there made up their lists in extraordinary circumstances.

The same wild rumors were circulated as to the real object of the conscription as among the Sarts. The illiterate translators, forced to translate expressions they had never heard before, such as "re­quisition," "defense construction in the theater of military operations," "military communications," did so incorrectly and bluntly, leaving the impression that the Kirghiz and Kazakhs were being taken as soldiers directly to the front without any military training. Or if it was believed that they were taken as workers there were repeated the assertions that they would dig trenches in between the Germans and Russians while the latter fired at each other. In Semirechie the Russian  (p98) peasants told the Kirghiz that they were being sent to the front to die and that the peasants would then seize their land. The very term "re­quisition," rekvizitsia, used in the official documents in connection with the conscription of workers, offended the natives' sensibilities.​5

If the conscription call caught the Sarts in the middle of the cotton harvest, the call among the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs caught many of them, especially the Kazakhs, in the middle of agricultural operations. In the northern uezds of the Steppe oblasts the Kazakhs lived interspersed among the Russians on farms not dissimilar to those of the Russian peasants and needing  p102 workers just as much as the peasant farms. In the Uralsk, Aktiubinsk, Kustanaisk, Petropavlovsk, Kokchetavsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, Pavlodarsk, Semipalatinsk, Barnaul, Ust Kamenogorsk, and Zaisan uezds the Kirghiz and Kazakhs were the only labor force left, because of the absence of the Russian peasants at the front. The call caught them in the midst of haying and on the eve of the harvest of grain.

In some localities it was believed that the call was voluntary, inasmuch as the people had been told that they paid the various numerous taxes and contributions since the beginning of the war in lieu of military service. Others believed that the order conscription was entirely the work of the local authorities to show their zeal to the central government and thereby receive promotions by forcing the Kirghiz to become volunteers. The Kirghiz based this conviction on the knowledge that the Przhevalsk uezd head had demanded in the previous year that some Kirghiz volunteer for service in the active army.​6

The movement of protest against the malpractices of their volost officials by the Kirghiz and Kazakhs brought the first appearance of Cossack detachments in a generation. The burden of feeding these forces was placed upon the local native communities. The official report of the informal meeting of the steppe peoples on August 7, 1916, thus characterizes the results of this intrusion:

 p103  Whereas conscription in any form had been totally unexpected for the Sarts, among the nomads, especially the Kazakhs, the question had been in the air for some time. M. Tynyshpaev,​8 an influential Kazakh among the native intelligentsia, tells how Chaev, the director of military construction works, approached him in September 1915 to learn his opinion concerning a project to call up the Kazakhs as soldiers. Tynyshpaev expressed his opinion and wrote about the project to the editor of the Kazak.

On February 3, 1916, to enquire into the whole question of the conscription of the Kirghiz and Kazakh a group made up of A. Bukeikhanov,​10 leader of the Alash Orda, A. Baitursunov, editor of the Kazak, and N. Begymbetov set out for Petrograd. While in Petrograd they visited several persons including General Polivanov, then Minister of War. On their return the delegates announced in the Kazak that the whole question had been dropped for the time being. Tynyshpaev asserts that  p104 nevertheless the whole question was discussed actively in the Kazak right up till the time of the announcement of the supreme command. The whole question, at least in the minds of the Alash Orda Kazakhs, was tied to the agrarian conditions existing among their people. Bukeikhanov and the others had gone to Petrograd with the goal of "bringing to the attention of the Government and the Duma the general opinion of the Kazakh nation concerning the future call" for workers while this general opinion consisted of this — that "in the event of an ineluctable call — to be placed in the cavalry and not the infantry with an equalization of the Kazakhs with the Russian Cossacks in land utilization."​11 In other words, the Alash Orda wanted the Kazakhs formed into Cossack communities with all the perquisites of that status.

The statement of Tynyshpaev that the Kirghiz and Kazakh people regarded military service as a welcome phenomenon in their lives, especially as with service in the cavalry they would secure land,​12 must  (p101) be accepted with reservation. The Kirghiz Kanaat Abukin mentions in his deposition the lively discussion that took place in the fall of 1915 regarding military service for the nomads but asserts that the general opinion expressed was to the effect that the Kirghiz and Kazakhs were unprepared for any such service as they did not know the Russian language or city life and that the whole plan for conscription was a figment of someone's imagination.​13 It was widely believed among both Sarts and nomads that the Russians had told them that they would never be subject to military duty when they first conquered the country.

The announcement of the order of conscription for workers, not soldiers, placed the Alash Orda group in a difficult position. While on the one hand they definitely did not want to see the Kirghiz and Kazakhs mobilized as workers, on the other hand they had pledged their support to the maintenance of the Tsarist Empire and further they realized the utter futility of offering armed resistance to the very superior armament of the Russian forces. This group, after the announcement of the supreme order, decided to support the action of the government.  p105 Appeals were printed in the Kazak urging the fulfilment of the order by the people and the group was active in trying to calm the population and bring it around to the acceptance of the call for workers. The difficulties they encountered may be seen by quoting the experience of Tynyshpaev:

 (p102)  These same peasants also repeated the usual stories that the natives would be forced to dig trenches under fire, between the German and the Russian forces.

Not all of the Kazakh intellectual class accepted the order with such good grace. The Astrakhan goare Sokolovsky in a telegram of July 20, 1916, mentions the activities of a certain Kulmanov, a Kazakh who had graduated from the university and had served as a member of the First and Second Imperial Dumas belonging to the Moslem faction. Kulmanov reportedly had collected a large sum of money from the Kazakhs and had gone to Petrograd to petition that the call be rescinded for them. He placed his hopes on the Moslem faction of the Fourth Duma.​15 On July 25, Sokolovsky reported another delegation of three Kazakhs who had started out for Petrograd for the object of petitioning for the removal of the conscription order. All had served at some time or another as officials and all had been discharged from their posts for some reason not made clear.​16

 p106  2. The Revolt in the Steppe Oblasts​17

The announcement of the order caused the many Kazakhs employed by other rich Kazakhs, Russians, Russian and non-Russian merchants, Cossacks, and the Cossack army to abandon their work and to return to their auls, spreading panic there. Those Kazakhs neither employed by nor employing others also returned to their auls. The youths of subject age sold their property and brought a better horse or simply seized one from a neighbor. Gangs were formed of 50, 100, and even 1,000 armed with sticks, scythes, teeth from horse-rakes, and, in rare cases, hunting pieces. These bands of youths rode among the auls and gathered together their coevals with the object of offering resistance to the authorities. The hay remained uncut or, if cut, was  (p103) left on the ground to rot. The grain also was not harvested. In a word, the whole steppe was in an uproar.

The excesses of these bands were directed against their own officials, especially those aksakals, volost heads, and scribes who made up the lists. In some cases they contented themselves with merely seizing the lists; in others, they murdered the officials. When clashes occurred between natives and Russians it was usually in connection with attempts of the uezd head to protect the native officials and safeguard their lists from seizure by the dispatch of Cossacks.​18

Disturbances among the Kazakhs are recorded at about the same time as they took place among the Sarts. Thus on July 8 a volost head was killed by the Kazakhs in the Uralsk uezd, followed by a clash between Kazakhs and Cossacks in the Lbishchensk uezd. Other outbursts are recorded for the Petropavlovsk and Turgai uezds. By the middle of July disorders were recorded not only in the Turgai oblast but also in the Temirsk and Uralsk uezds and several settlements of the Akmolinsk oblast. The end of July saw a great movement in the Bayan-aul region. Resistance took the specific forms of killing of native officials, burning their chancelleries, looting post offices, and skirmishes with army and Cossack detachments. Cases were even reported of the seizure of Russian  p107 women in the fields, tearing off their clothes and then leaving them to go home naked.​19

It was in this setting that an informal meeting of the natives of the Turgai, Uralsk, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk and Semirechie oblasts took place on August 7, 1916, at Turgai with the permission of the Turgai oblast governor. The governor opened the meeting with a speech in which he explained the essence of the supreme command of June 25 and asked those present to help him in the work of the peaceful calling of the Kazakh and Kirghiz peoples. After proposing that those assembled elect a president the governor left the hall. The assembly elected as president A. Bukeikhanov and as secretaries M. J. Dulatov and O. Almasov.

 (p104)  After reviewing the circumstances under which the call was made and their consequences the assembly recommended that the mobilization proceed on the basis of (1) the proper preparation of the population, (2) partial mobilization in the course of a more or less extended period of time in keeping with the need, (3) the application of exemptions necessary for the preservation of the interests of individual Kazakh households, (4) the participation of representatives from the population so that the calling up of workers from the Kazakh population would go more smoothly.​20 In pin-pointing these general recommendations the assembly called for the postponement of the call of workers until January 1, 1917 (for the southern uezd, until March 15, 1917); to call initially one‑third of the 19‑31 age group, preferring the younger age group because among them there were the greatest number without families; allowing persons to appear for work either at the place of registration or where they were living; to leave in each family at least one worker; to leave those called up to work at home on government defense as far as possible (instead of going to the war areas); to give those taken the right to replace themselves with someone else; to leave one mullah for each aul community; to leave a teacher for every 50 kibitkas for the instruction of the children; to exempt the Moslem teachers in the medressehs in the cities; the old lists, made up hurriedly and incorrectly to  p108 be replaced by new lists made up by a committee of representatives chosen at the rate of one for every ten households. The new lists were then made up in the presence of an aul assembly; two representatives for every volost must represent the native people with the right of vote; the further selection of officials in view of their malpractices to be suspended until after the call for workers had been filled; the workers to be given the right to form artels or cooperatives of 30 persons, each artel to have one translator and every ten artels a mullah; sick workers to be provided with medical facilities on the same basis as Russians wounded at the front; the Kirghiz and  (p105) Kazakh workers to participate in the city and zemsky institutions; free wagons to be provided to the workers for the transport of food and clothing; and, finally, leave passes to be provided for workers in case of necessity. The final article proposed petitioning the government to put these in force.​21

Whether the government satisfied any of these requests is unknown. They have been cited in extenso as they show the mind of the part of the population which wanted to support the government in its call for workers. The provisions relating to the substitution of workers and the exemption of religious teachers testify to the class interests of those present in the assembly.

The disorders continued throughout August. The legal authorities of the Akmolinsk oblast sent the following communication to Petrograd on August 21: "The Kirghiz [Kazakhs] are acting in a very provocatory manner, ride about only in large parties and threaten the population of the Russian settlements that they will kill and burn in all directions, especially the very new settlements. The Russians cannot defend themselves as the men of the Russian settlements have been taken away for the war. The Kirghiz [Kazakhs] attacked the Russians working in the fields, and took away all their draught animals, machines, carts, and harnesses. . . . In place of the usual 25‑40 kibitkas the Kirghiz [Kazakhs] began to group themselves into 300‑400 kibitkas. The Kirghiz [Kazakhs] gathered into a group of 15,000 around Lake Kurgalajin."​22

 p109  The call for workers finally was postponed until September 15 in order to give the natives a chance to gather their hay and crops. Thanks to this, conditions in the steppe became more peaceful but the end of September saw a recrudescence of the disorders once again assuming serious proportions. Punitive units were dispatched into the steppes and a cruel pacification was begun.

On October 25 the Kazakhs of Akmolinsk uezd went en masse into the Kenderlinsk forest tract where they "mercilessly" began to cut  (p106) down the forest. Cossacks were sent against them. The Kazakhs, seeing the Cossacks, jumped on their horses and armed only with homemade spears, charged the Cossacks. Volleys fired by the Cossacks converted this charge into a sauve qui peut. Forty-two Kazakhs were killed and an unknown number wounded. The Cossacks in pursuit came upon another band of armed Kazakhs and 20 more were killed. The punitive units swept on, killing, burning auls, winter quarters, and encampments, and robbing Kazakhs food transports. On November 17 again 50 Kazakhs were reported killed, then 28. A skirmish between soldiers and Kazakhs brought 20 deaths to the latter. On November 23, 35 Kazakhs were killed in the Akmolinsk region. Disorders here finally came to an end on November 30, 1916.​23

The revolt among the Kazakhs of the steppe did not reach the great proportions or as savage an expression as elsewhere, especially among the Kirghiz of Semirechie or even the Kazakhs of Semipalatinsk. Several reasons may be assigned for the much milder resistance put up.

(1) The Kazakhs of the steppe had a much longer history of contact with the Russians with considerable fusing of the two cultures through marriage and contact. Many of the Kazakhs had adopted a sedentary existence and practiced agriculture interspersed among the Russians. The Kirghiz, on the other hand, had a much shorter period of contact with the Russians, inhabited remote and inaccessible localities, and furthermore, were considered less tolerant of the non-Moslem than the Kazakhs.​24 The Kazakhs had a long tradition of  p110 acting in concert with Russia against the enemies of Russia. On the basis of the charter of the Empress Anne in 1731 to Abul-khair, Khan of the Little Horde of Kazakhs, the latter agreed to defend the frontiers of the Russian Empire from external enemies. This charter was invoked in the same century when the Bashkir mutiny was put down. Napoleon was pursued from Moscow in 1812 by forces including Kazakhs, headed by Baizhazyk Kushukbaev, right to the gates of Paris. The conquest of Turkistan by Generals Chernyaev,  (p107) Kaufman, and Skobelev was accomplished with the material assistance and personal participation of the Kazakhs, while Chernyaev and Skobelev were counted as Kazakh national heroes.​25

This long association bore fruit in the revolt in that the Kazakhs fought much more "like gentlemen" than the Kirghiz and others. Writing of this difference Governor Folbaum of Semirechie was to say, "It is necessary to remark that while the steppe Kirghiz [Kazakhs] treated their victims mildly the Kara-Kirghiz [true Kirghiz], and especially the Dungans, showed striking cruelty to the defenseless Russians, inflicting torture before killing, gouging out eyes, cutting off ears, bosoms, etc., cutting children to pieces."​26

(2) The absence of leader­ship. Unlike the Turkomans and Kirghiz, the steppe Kazakhs failed to produce a leader of any stature. An official report was to comment on this: "But what was noticed was that the Kirghiz [Kazakh] youth searched for a leader but did not find him, therefore the agitation took the character of disorganization not different from the usual friction caused by every new development in the national life. This did not comprise a sign of rebellion or of agitation with the aim of separation from Russia."​27

(3) The great distance separating the steppe Kazakhs from the border. The steppe Kazakhs, as a whole, found it much more difficult to migrate to some foreign country, for this reason, than did the Turkomans and Semirechie Kazakhs and Kirghiz. It is not a coincidence that the sharpest expressions  p111 of revolt developed among the Turkomans and the Kirghiz situated nearest the borders of Persia and of China.

(4) The lack of armament. Evidence shows that the steppe insurgents were more poorly armed than the Kirghiz and especially the Turkomans. Their armament consisted of crude home-made spears, axes, etc. While many of the Kirghiz were similarly armed, there also were significant numbers with rifles.

 (p108)  (5) The nature of the country. The steppe was an easier terrain for the operations of punitive units than the hilly, remote country of Kirghizia, not yet linked by railway with the rest of Turkistan, or the remote desert country of the Turkomans.

3. The Revolt in Semipalatinsk

The revolt of Kazakhs of Semipalatinsk took a more severe form than among the other Steppe oblasts though not approaching the revolt in Semirechie in intensity and range.

The announcement of the call to the native population by the Steppe Governor-General seems to have been made earlier than elsewhere. General Sukhomlinov announced this in an order of June 30, 1916, explaining that: "The re­quisition order does not call these persons [conscripted workers] as soldiers into the army but for work necessary for the army in return for pay and provisions from the Treasury."​28 Despite these assurances the Kazakhs became very much alarmed. Rumors were circulated that the Kazakhs were being taken as soldiers and were to be baptized. The Kazakhs were clearly in an ugly mood.

Disorders are first officially recorded on July 14 in the Ust Kamenogorsk and Zaisan uezds. July 16 finds the disorders in Zaisan growing. Volost heads were killed and the Kazakhs began to leave for Sinkiang. More serious was the situation in the Karkaralinsk uezd beginning August 7. When the order was first announced there the people began immediately to show signs of dissatisfaction. The city of Karkaralinsk witnessed the influx of many Kazakhs who spent their time hotly discussing the conscription order, plainly shunning the  p112 Russians. Some of the Kazakh intelligentsia tried to win the people over to the acceptance of the order with no results. With the murder of many officials the situation became so serious that the Governor of Semipalatinsk was forced to make a trip to Karkaralinsk to try to talk sense to the Kazakhs.

The trip, however, was a failure. The Kazakhs killed a volost head  (p109) and a scribe in the presence of the Governor and attacked a pristav. The Kazakhs abandoned the fields and went off into the steppe. The Russian population displayed great fear for their lives and sent many petitions to the government for help, painting the existing situation in dark tones. The military force in Karkaralinsk was small and had only 15 cartridges per man.

In the meantime the disorders had spread over all five uezds of the oblast. Three clashes with the Cossacks were recorded. The Governor issued the following order to the end of pacifying the population:

The order goes on to enumerate a long list of categories of work considered useful for the war effort. They included workers on peasant, Cossack, and Treasury agricultural tracts; those engaged in government service or as officials; native volost officials and mullahs; postal workers and drivers; Treasury flock herders; factory employees engaged in defense work (including flour mills, leather and shoe factories, wool washing, etc.); employees of gold, coal, and manganese mines and at salt lakes; those working on steam-boats, barges, rafts, beacons, as stevedores, and at wharves; railway employees, those caring for the military herds; fuel and produce transport workers, and, finally, graduates of upper and middle educational schools and those presently studying there.

This order did little to quiet the agitation. The Kazakhs  p113 continued to attack and kill their volost officials when the latter made up conscription lists. The grain and grass of the cyclists were trampled down, peasant herds were seized, and the Kazakhs refused to gather the hay and grain of the colonists. Finally the Governor-General Sukhomlinov  (p110)  postponed the call until September 15, but the agitation and disorder did not abate.

By this time the authorities had had time to form Cossack punitive detachments. For the suppression of the disorders the Semipalatinsk and Akmolinsk administrators coordinated their efforts. The pacification and carrying out of the conscription order went ahead slowly. Thus from the third to the twentieth of August there appeared only 127 persons at the collecting stations. The forwarding of workers in a body did not take place until the beginning of 1917.

The other main centre of resistance was the Zaisan uezd. Here the flight to China began at an early date. On July 16 the uezd authorities tried to explain the order without much success. A petition for postponement of the call telegraphed by some of the Kirghiz on July 17 was success­ful and the call was postponed until September. The Kazakhs quieted with this but the end of September saw disorders break out again. One peasant official, Seleznev by name, decided to ask for another postponement until winter. This petition was telegraphed to the highest officials. The result this time was unfavorable; Seleznev was arrested. His deposition contains much that is of interest as to the effect of these troubled conditions on the people, both Kazakhs and Russians:

The disorders in Zaisan uezd ended on January 10, 1917. January 15 was designated as the beginning date for the call-up of workers.

In the Tomsk gubernia the Kazakhs began agitating on July 27 in the Biisk uezd. In this case the Kazakhs sought to avoid the call for workers by fleeing to Mongolia with their herds. Troops were dispatched to prevent this emigration; these were met on the Mongol border by armed Mongols.​31 The rich Kazakhs usually did not join the movement but utilized this as a chance to buy wool cheaply from those leaving for Mongolia.

4. The Revolt in Semirechie

The area of the most developed and intense expression of resistance to the Russians coincided with that of the most intense colonization by the Russians. Semirechie contained 300,000 of the 500,000 Russians in Russian Central Asia.

The outbreak of the revolt presented many difficulties for the Russian authorities. The men of military age were at the front, as military exemption was given only to those born in Syr Darya, Ferghana, and Samarkand oblasts — the three basic oblasts of the Turkistan Governor-Generalship. The military needs of the war denuded the country of most of its garrisons; even the few left behind for garrison duty were not regular army men. The settlers had been issued Berdan army rifles to protect themselves against any revolt by the native peoples, but during the latter part of 1915 and the beginning of 1916 these had been collected to help satisfy the desperate needs of the front. These rifles — some 7,500 in number — were found to be  p115 practically useless owing to the poor care given them by the peasants. The Russian colonies were difficult to defend. They formed a series of settlements  (p112) mostly along the postal road to the city of Verny. The usual settlement was strung out in a line for 5‑6 versts. Finally the natural features of the oblast — the steppe, deserts, almost impassable hills and gorges — created great difficulties for any punitive expedition.

The uprising of the Kazakhs and Kirghiz began with the beginning of August, much later than in the other oblasts of Turkistan.

Governor Folbaum of the Semirechie oblast early foresaw that revolt was inevitable in Semirechie and made suitable arrangements to meet it. In July he divided the oblast into 17 sections and over each section set a commander with troops. The troops in Verny were put on the qui vive to be able to rush to any trouble spot. Cossacks not on active service were mobilized. Folbaum saw clearly that flight would be attempted into China and so he dispatched a considerable part of his forces to the frontier. Both he and Kuropatkin determined where revolt was likely to occur. Passes and canyons through which the insurgents might pass were studied, and a plan was worked out to squeeze any possible insurgents into the narrow mountain passages where they could then be massacred.

The arrival of Kuropatkin in Turkistan brought a further elaboration of these preparations. On August 11, 1916, several days after disorders had broken out in Semirechie, Kuropatkin sent a most edifying telegram to Folbaum:

The effect of the supreme command upon the Kazakhs and Kirghiz of Semirechie was not dissimilar from that on their cousins in other  (p114) oblasts. The same wild rumors were circulated about the real nature of the call. The native hired hands and "volunteers" working on the farms of the Russians left their work saying that they must go home as they soon would be going to war as soldiers and would have to arrange matters at home. In some cases the Russian soldiers' wives expressed dissatisfaction, while in the settlement of Samsonovka they went so far as to petition the authorities to make them return to work by force, asserting in addition that the Kirghiz were preparing a mutiny. Another circumstance calling the Kirghiz home was the fact that the volost authorities in their manipulations of the lists of workers, placed those away at the top of the list since they had no opportunity to protest.​33

As in the steppes there was a great demand for horses with which to flee. The price of horses at the Przhevalsk bazaar increased by three to five times.​34

Actions to counteract any possibility of revolt were taken from several directions. The Alash Orda leader Tynyshpaev and the gubernia interpreter I. Dzainakov did all they could to explain the order to the people and urge them not to break the peace. They distributed the paper Kazak widely. The position the Kazak took was that while soldier status and service would be preferable, the Tsarist command was genuine and would have to be obeyed. The papers opined that if the  p118 natives obeyed the supreme order and did their work well they could then petition for service as soldiers.​35

The authorities left no stone unturned in trying to win over the influential classes of the population. The Jarkent uezd head called the mullahs to his assistance. In his report he singles out the activities of a certain Khusainbek Yunusov. This mullah delivered pro-government speeches in the mosques, and propagandized the other mullahs basing his actions on the maxim of the Koran stating "Whoever is the ruler be he Moslem or unbeliever, the subjects must obey him."​36

 (p115)  The authorities also approached the bai class and assured them that they would be exempt from the call. This exemption was later confirmed in an order by General Kuropatkin. The uezd heads called meetings of volost authorities and the manaps and explained the order to them. They were told that the lists must be drawn up as that was the order. These meetings seemed to fulfill the desires of the governor and uezd heads, though one of the Dungan volost heads (Novo Nikolaevsk settlement) Bulgar Mogui stated he would not make up any list and rode away. (He was later put in chains and taken to Verny on orders of Folbaum.) Folbaum was to telegraph the Governor-General concerning one of these meetings, taking place in Verny uezd on July 22: "The old folk, moved to tears, kissed my boots and said that all would be done as I commanded."​37

Folbaum also took steps to remove subversives and agitators from circulation. These were arrested for "instigations and disorders" and placed in jail. On July 17 alone the arrest of 34 Kazakhs was announced in three volosts of the Verny uezd.

Folbaum seems to have been satisfied with the fruits of his labors. On July 25 he was to telegraph the Governor-General: "The population of Verny, Pishpek, and Przhevalsk uezds acknowledged completely what is asked of them and are ready to ful the necessary order. In the Kopal, Lepsinsk, and Jarkent uezds the proximity of the Chinese frontier has brought some complications. . . . The population has jumped at the idea of flight."​38 The first to go to China were the Dungans,  p119 starting with July 14. They were followed by the Kirghiz and Kazakhs, in the volosts of Jarkent, Lepsinsk, and Kopal, nearest the Chinese frontier. This movement started on July 17.

The manaps and volost heads had not been home long from their meetings with the uezd heads before they came back to the uezd government saying that they feared for their lives. They had been threatened with death if they drew up lists of workers while many of the  (p116) piatidesyatniki had their seals taken away so that they could not seal any orders. Concerning malpractices, many of the manaps and volost heads began to see that the drawing up of lists of workers was too serious a matter to tamper with. The common people would endure many things but not this. It was advocated that the whole question be decided by calling out all the Kirghiz of draft age to a volost meeting where the lists could be made up by drawing lots with medical examination in view of all present. The volost authorities saw themselves in a dilemma. They were threatened with prosecution if they did not make up the lists, while the population threatened them with death if they did. In the case of the Przhevalsk uezd the native officials begged to be arrested and put into prison.​39 This proposition was refused. The manaps of the Pishpek uezd sent a telegram to General Folbaum asking that they be allowed to have all natives appear at the volost seat and decide the whole question by drawing lots and conducting medical examinations before the assembled natives. The telegram was sent on August 2‑3 and the answer received on the 5th or 6th was in the negative. They then asked for protection, which was given them. Bodies of troops rode out with the volost heads. To many natives it appeared as though the Russians were backing the party in power in the volost against those out of power.

The first open resistance to the Russian authorities in Semirechie took place on August 3 in the eastern part of the Verny uezd in the valley of the river Yassy, where a band of Kirghiz subject to the call attacked the authorities sent to make up the lists, leaving one dead and three wounded. A Cossack unit was quickly dispatched and the volost made an example of. The  p120 movement, however, spread over most of the other volosts of Verny and thru the Kastek pass reached the Kirghiz of the Pishpek uezd. On August 8 an attack was made on a post office near the station Dzhil Arik. On August 9‑12 settlements near Tokmak were attacked and on August 13 the city of Tokmak itself was besieged by a great mass of Kirghiz numbered at 5,000. Messengers  (p117) were dispatched in all directions not only to carry out agitation but to seek to coerce the vacillating Kirghiz to revolt. Unlike the other localities of the revolt, that in Semirechie early expressed itself in attacks upon the Russian colonies. A series of settlements were attacked and where success­ful the male population was killed while the women and girls were generally taken into captivity. The Russian settlement of Koltsovka was destroyed, of its population of 650, only 35 remained alive in captivity.

The revolt took on a general nature on August 10 when the Przhevalsk uezd and a part of Jarkent uezd revolted. The uprising occupied all the banks of Issik Kul, the valley of the Karkara and Tekes rivers. Bands of insurgents armed with sticks, spears, and firearms fell on the farms, stations, and isolated hamlets all around Issik Kul and on the postal road to Verny. The population was murdered, women and girls taken prisoners, and the houses and other buildings burned. Others tried to flee from the avalanche, leaving behind property which was burned by the Kirghiz. The refugees made their way to the larger centres of population where the administration had already fashioned a militia organization. Many were killed on the road by the Dungans of the Mariinsk volost who revolted on August 10. This was repaid with usury by the furious Russians. Units were sent into Mariinsk where they exterminated the Dungans and destroyed their villages. The arrival of additional forces in Semirechie from outside on August 19‑21 brought the real work of pacification to a start.

The Przhevalsk uezd saw by far the greatest number of killed Russian settlers, the other uezds suffering little by comparison. By November 1 the casualty figures for Semirechie listed 3 officers and 52 soldiers killed; wounded 41, missing 73. Two officials were killed and 12 civilian employees. The list for the population is quoted as: killed, 2,025 persons; missing,  p121 1,088. The enormous loss in Russian lives as compared to the other oblasts is easily illustrated when we bear in mind that figures for all the oblasts give 2,094 people killed and 1,163 missing.

General Folbaum explained the reasons for the temporary success of the nomads in his official report thus: "For the Russian population  (p118) and the administration especially the revolt of the Kara Kirghiz in the Przhevalsk uezd was unexpected owing to the insidious treachery of the influential leaders who, on the very eve of the revolt, gave assurances of full loyalty to the government."​40

Of great importance in converting the passive resistance of the natives of Semirechie into an active one was an event which took place near Rybachev in the Przhevalsk uezd before the outbreak of the revolt. On the 6th or 7th of August a band of Kirghiz fell on a convoy of three or four soldiers accompanying a transport of arms and ammunition. Killing the soldiers, they made off with the stores which included 200 rifles and 3,000 cartridges. The simple nomads were blinded by what seemed to them an inexhaustible supply of armament, being wholly unaccustomed to seeing such a cache of arms. These arms were dispatched to other groups of Kirghiz and did much to stiffen their will to resist. It was this acquisition which, according to one witness, decided the Kirghiz to adopt an attitude of active resistance.​41

One of the greatest actions of the Revolt of 1916 was the siege of Tokmak in Pishpek uezd starting on August 14. Estimates of the Kirghiz besieging the city vary from 4,000 to 5,000. The Kirghiz showed a great deal of organization in their operations. The force was divided into 28 units, each distinguished by a flag of a different color. The whole operation was under the command of an upper-class Kirghiz, Kanaat Abukin by name, while each volost had its own leader. But, apparently, he was only primus inter pares, the other leaders having equal rights with him as he himself later testified. This is proved by a document discovered by the Russians with  p122 the heading "command of the chief leaders of the Moslems" where his signature is on a par with the others.​42 The leaders were not armed except for Kanaat, who had  (p119) a saber. In battle they rode in the rear of their units — all cavalry — and chased the sulkers forward. The flags of each unit served the purpose of keeping the units together and not mixing with the others.

As to general armament the force was partly equipped with rifles, which included Berdan army rifles, flintlocks, and matchlocks. The ammunition was not plentiful — about 10‑15 rounds per man. The rest of the force was armed with spears and axes mounted on long poles.​43

The Kirghiz employed one tactic which deserves mention. In order to disorganize the ranks of the defenders they first stampeded cattle into the town and then followed closely in their tracks.​44 They also utilized homemade cannon.

The Kirghiz surrounded Tokmak on all sides, even from that of the river Chu. After the arrival in Tokmak of additional Russian units with cannon (two batteries) and machine guns on August 30, the struggle took on an especially intensive character, the struggle beginning each morning and ending only at night. The Kirghiz attacked from all sides save the north where there was mud. The defenders of Tokmak barricaded the streets leading out of Tokmak at all ends. When the Kirghiz attacked in one direct and failed they quickly changed the direction of their attack.​45

The great heroism of the Kirghiz in these encounters has not often been surpassed. Folbaum reports that on August 20 the attacks of the Kirghiz "were so furious that despite the machine gun fire mowing down whole rows they threw themselves into the attack three times."​46 An attack was also made upon the cannon themselves where the Kirghiz succeeded in getting within 20‑30 sazhen​47 of them before they were shot down at point-blank range.

 p123  The arrival of the additional units and machine guns and cannon removed all chance of success in the taking of Tokmak. On August 22  (p120) the Kirghiz bowed to the inevitable and made their way into the hills surrounding the southern bank of Issik Kul.

A siege of lesser dimensions took place on August 9 when 5,000 insurgents attacked the settlement of Stolypin in the Kochkorka valley. The siege lasted two days and was success­ful. A quantity of arms were seized including some broken machine guns.

The revolt in Semirechie reached into the Syr Darya oblast where on August 11 agitation was begun among the Kirghiz of the eastern part of the Aulie-ata uezd, bordering on Semirechie oblast. By the end of August and the beginning of September this agitation was converted into open revolt. The Kirghiz made raids on postal stations and Russian settlements, killing peasants and destroying property. The settlement of Novo Troitskoe, located far from other Russian settlements on the border of Aulie-ata and Pishpek uezds, suffered especially. Forty of the inhabitants were killed, homesteads were burned, and most of the peasants' cattle were driven off. The disorders ceased only on September 24 when a special punitive unit arrived.​48

The Lepsinsk uezd of Semirechie oblast, settled by Kazakhs, remained comparatively quiet throughout the revolt except for a few volosts. Here there were no Russians killed and no attacks made on Russian settlements. According to the report of Tynyshpaev to Kuropatkin​49 the troubles that took place here were due entirely to the abuses and machinations of certain of the native administration. His account of what happened may be summarized in the following manner: Many volost authorities in the uezd understood that the conscription order was too serious an affair to be involved in the usual party politics and began to draw up the lists of workers on the basis of justice and fairness. A few of the volost authorities, however, could not let such a favorable opportunity pass for  p124 making new exactions on the people. In the Makanchi-Sadyrovsk volost Kasym Jakambaev, the volost head and his associates, the native judge Okysh Omarov, and  (p121) Jeksembek Knyazez, began to demand money and cattle from the Kazakhs of their volost, promising that if they gave these they would be freed from the call for workers. Some gave, not sparing their property, while others refused.

To revenge himself on the latter Jakambaev reported to the Russian authorities that they were offering resistance to the government. Cossacks and soldiers were dispatched. Ninety Kazakhs were killed in one incident where the Cossacks fell upon an assembly of Kazakhs dissatisfied with the volost head and his associates. Numerous arrests were made, even of Kazakhs who had not been at the assembly. These were dispatched to the city of Lepsinsk, but before they reached their destination many were killed without just cause. This occurred when Kazakhs, tired from walking and needing rest or wishing to attend to their natural wants, stopped on the way. In two such incidents first twelve and then six persons were killed.

The power and development of the revolt in Semirechie was in a large measure due to the element of organization developed by the insurgents. Banners and metal emblems on the caps of some of the insurgents served to distinguish them. In the hills, workshops were set up for the preparation of powder and the forging of weapons. The insurgents had a well-developed system of scouting, and visual signals were employed to warn of the approach of Russian units.​50 The insurgents also strove to break means of communication between the cities and the settlements. Roads, bridges, telegraph lines were destroyed.​51 The Kirghiz were especially success­ful in their efforts to isolate Przhevalsk and its vicinity from communication with the outside. For a long time nothing was known of what was happening here and it was only with the arrival of punitive units from Verny and Jarkent, August 15 to September 1, that news began to be received concerning the situation.

The great centres of the revolt in Semirechie were the mountainous southern part of the Pishpek uezd, all of the Przhevalsk  p125 uezd, and  (p122) the southern part of the Jarkent uezd adjoining Przhevalsk uezd. Here almost all of the Russian settlements were destroyed.​52 The survivors fled to the hills of Pishpek and Przhevalsk or flocked to the city of Tokmak. The Kirghiz and Kazakh population in the other localities of Semirechie for the most part remained peaceful and fulfilled the demands of the administration not only for workers but for yurts and horses for the army. Even in the areas of open revolt not all of the population was disposed to oppose the Russians. In his report to Kuropatkin General Folbaum writes: "Fortunately not all of the population of the revolting volosts were hostile in disposition; among them there was no agreement: the usual party quarrels continued. The active elements often by force brought the vacillating to adhere to the rebellion."​53

The success of the Kirghiz in Przhevalsk was due in part to the personal inadequacies of many of the Russians there. Speaking of the situation in Przhevalsk city and its environs at the beginning of the revolt one witness asserts, "Some of the men were very cowardly and hid from the fulfilment of defense duty. To our shame many base cowards were found even among the intellectuals."​54 The witness goes on to attribute to this the killing of many Russians in the neighboring villages and the destruction of the villages. "The Przhevalsk agricultural school in my opinion also owes its destruction in part to the cowardliness of some representatives of the Przhevalsk intelligentsia and in part to the routine and procrastination which reigned in the Przhevalsk military council directed by the old and half-deaf General Korolkov."​55

General Folbaum organized militias in the cities and villages and sent what detachments he could against the insurgents. These forces were quite insignificant and Folbaum asked for rather large additional  (p123)  quantities of troops. The dispatch of troops to Semirechie was begun on August 9 when Lt. Col. Geitsig was sent from Tashkent in command of a force made  p126 up of two companies of infantry, two batteries, a sotnia of Cossacks, four machine guns, and telegraph, telephone, and sapper detachments. Another force was dispatched in a few more days, composed of four companies of riflemen, one sotnia of Cossacks, a sapper detachment, and 160 mounted scouts. Still more troops together with four machine guns and two pieces of mountain artillery were sent on August 17, and on August 23 Tashkent sent an arms shipment of 2,000 rifles.​56

These troops were drawn not only from Siberia and the other oblasts of Central Asia; from the front there were dispatched two Cossack regiments with batteries of artillery and two Colt machine gun detachments, one of the regiments coming via Chimkent and the other via Semipalatinsk.

The routes taken by the other detachments were via three directions: (1) from the direction of Andijan to the Narin stronghold; (2) from the side of Chernyaev (Chimkent) along the postal route to Pishpek and Tokmak, and (3)  the roundabout way by railway to Semipalatinsk and from there by march to Sergiopol, Lepsinsk, and Verny.​57

The hopelessness of the position of the weakly armed Kirghiz in the face of such a growing preponderance of strength may well be illustrated by the telegram sent by Kuropatkin to Folbaum on August 21: "Together with the units you have formed, with the arrival of reinforcements directed to you, not including two Cossack regiments and a horse battery, you will have at your disposition 35 companies, 24 sotnias, 240 mounted scouts, 16 cannon, and 47 machine guns. Chernyaev, Romanovsky, Kaufman, and Skobelev conquered the oblasts of Syr Darya, Samarkand, and Ferghana with fewer forces."​58

The weakly armed insurgents naturally could not make a success­ful  (p124) stand against such a force and therefore it is not surprising that by September 1 resistance was offered only by small bands of partisans in remote and isolated localities. These partisans tore up the telegraph (between Pishpek and Verny), attacked small detachments, made raids on the railway and on  p127 Russian settlements. The majority of the insurgents, however, fled into the hills while some fled to China. By the end of September the revolt may be considered to have been liquidated except for the Zaisan and Jarkent areas, which were to keep up the fight into 1917, and for groups of basmachi.​59

In the pacification of the country the Russian forces showed the utmost cruelty. Entire villages were levelled by artillery fire while against the insurgents themselves Kuropatkin gave the order "not to spare the cartridges." The nature of the pacification may be judged by citing a few reports. Thus one Russian detachment operating on the southern bank of Issik Kul killed 1,000 persons and took away most of the nomads' cattle. General Pokrovsky reports he "burned an encampment of around 1,000 yurts" while another general, Berg, reported that he exterminated "800 desperate Kirghiz warriors," besides driving off a great quantity of cattle and sheep. The Russian soldiers brought little credit upon themselves in suppressing the revolt. Kuropatkin complained in his journal: "Already during the pacification of the disorders in the Jizak uezd there were justifiable complaints against the army for the useless destruction of native dwellings, robbery, useless killings. This is also taking place in the operations in Semirechie."​60 The troops were not regular soldiers for the most part but made up of reservists and conscripts. The forces were little disciplined and coordinated.

One of Folbaum's basic lines of action against the insurgents — from the earliest days of the revolt — was the systematic seizure of their  (p125) herds in an effort to undermine their economy and render them less capable of offering resistance. This seizure of herds reached huge proportions, as may be gathered from one report of Folbaum to Kuropatkin: "in the vicinity of Przhevalsk there were brought together over three hundred  p128 thousand head of cattle, in that of Kochkorka . . . around a hundred thousand . . . more moderate gain is still to be had in Tokmak . . . Further actions of the units will augment even more the quantity of cattle."​61 On September 3 Kuropatkin complained in his journal that Folbaum devoted more attention to rounding up the nomad insurgents' cattle than to rounding up the nomads themselves.​62 Finally even Folbaum came to see the difficulties created by his actions: "The cattle are being given to the administration but the latter is not able either to keep nor guard them without the help of the army, cattle may waste away and perish due to the lack of care and feed. But the troops tied to the herds lose their mobility."​63

A great many innocent persons were killed during the suppression of the revolt; thus in the city of Przhevalsk 700 Kirghiz were killed who had in no way taken part in the revolt.​64 The indiscriminate handing out of arms to the Russian population brought very unfortunate results. Under the pretext of suppressing the insurgents, bands of Russian peasants rode about murdering and robbing without discrimination. Kuropatkin recognized this unfortunate state of affairs. "We must firmly establish that Lynch law on either side will be severely punished. Wantonness among the population is great. Sokolinsky [one of the Russian uezd officials] complains that he conciliates the Kirghiz and is accused of treachery. Everyone who defends the Kirghiz is accused of treachery. One must punish the Kirghiz severely but one must also firmly put an end to the Lynch law of the Russians otherwise normal life will not be restored . . . Many [of the Russians] are depraved to the core. Sokolinsky and the uezd nachalniks are of the opinion that  (p126) there are many disreputable, dissolute and even criminal elements among the Russian population."​65

Even those natives who were arrested were not secure from  p129 the violence of the mob. A series of ugly incidents took place where the Russian population attacked these arrested persons under the very noses of the soldiers accompanying them or in the prisons where they were confined. According to a Colonel Ivanov: "Not rarely there were cases where the arrested did not even reach the yurts where I was situated; the crowds, mostly made up of women, threw itself on them the prisonersº and obtained satisfaction in a very cruel manner. It was unthinkable to oppose such an action in view of the small number of soldiers I had at my disposal; it must also be taken into consideration that all these soldiers were local inhabitants, some of whom had lost their near ones or their property together with the peasants as a result of the revolt."​66 An especially horrible incident took place on August 13 in the village of Belovodsk when 517 arrested Kirghiz were brutally murdered while "trying to escape" by a savage mob of Russians without the least interference from the troops nearby.​67

It is small wonder then that even the natives who had taken no part in the revolt sought refuge either in the hills or in flight to China from this whirlwind of violence and bestiality. The plight of those who fled into the mountains of Russian Central Asia was difficult indeed. The crops and winter dwellings abandoned by them were lost. While they preserved some of the property and cattle they brought with them, the absence of food for the cattle and the occurrence of drought in the spring of 1917 made their position extremely difficult. The fate of those who fled to China will now be considered.

 (p127)  5. The Flight of the Insurgents to China

The first to flee to China after the announcement of the supreme command were the Dungans or Chinese Moslems. The Dungans in Russian Central Asia were settled for the most part in Semirechie, their largest settlements being situated not far from the cities of Karakol, Verny (Alma-Ata), and Pishpek (now Frunze).​a The special grievance of both the Dungans and the Uighurs was the so‑called opium duty. While opium  p130 was cultivated by these peoples before the war in the Jarkent, Przhevalsky, and Pishpek uezds, this cultivation formed only a small part of their crops though an important cash crop. During the war, however, because of the need for this drug for the front, the Tsarist government forced them to cultivate the poppy seed exclusively and at prices that were very low; the buying of the crop was placed in the hands of the Treasury and all other sales were strictly forbidden, any infraction being prosecuted by the local administration and by specially constituted field courts. Wealthy Dungans did manage, however, to carry on a contraband trade with Western China.​68 The illegal influx of opium into Sinkiang was a problem for the Chinese authorities not only during the Tsarist regime but also during the Bolshevik Revolution.​69

The first Dungans to cross the border did so about the middle of July in the direction of Aksu and Kulja. This was a party of those subject to the call and was made up of from 70 to 80 persons. The Dungans were aided in this by the fact that during their 40‑year stay in Russia they had maintained trade and kinship relations with the main Dungan communities in Sinkiang, and thus they could avail themselves of these relations to hide from investigation and search. This was an important consideration in view of the fact that the Russians were in a strong position both legally and otherwise to demand the return of these refugees. The principle that refugees crossing the frontier either from the Chinese or Russian side should be returned by the other  (p128) party had been expressed with increasing vigour in the series of treaties between Russia and China beginning with the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689). The Russian position, however, was strong not only de jure but de facto. Before the Revolution the Russians were strongly entrenched at Kashgar. The Russian Consul General "was usually a diplomat of high rank with an escort of a hundred Cossacks and a very considerable retinue. Owing to this and to the relative proximity of the Transcaspian centres of Russian culture, the Tsarist Consulate-General was the preponderating element in Kashgar society."​70

 p131  The second batch of Dungans to cross the frontier came from the Przhevalsk uezd where they had joined the Kirghiz in revolt against the Russians. Their main centre, Mariinsk was, however, burned on August 13 by Russian forces and they were the first to lay down their arms and flee. According to one report the Dungans took part in the revolt in order to take advantage of the turmoil to take away opium to China.​71 What is certain is that a large group of Chinese merchants had gathered in Mariinsk at the time of the opium harvest when the revolt broke out. It is interesting to note that the Dungans outside of the Przhevalsk uezd not only took no part in the revolt on the side of the Kirghiz but even took part in the suppression on the side of the Russians.​72

Dungans of this second wave first appeared in the city of Uch Turfan in Sinkiang on 15‑16 August and numbered only several persons. This soon was increased to several thousand persons a day. This exodus also included Chinese subjects who had occupied themselves with trade and other professions in Russian territory. The Russian Consul General at Kashgar quickly dispatched the dragoman of the Consulate, Stefanovich, to Uch Turfan in order to take effective measures against this flight. The latter could do little, however, initially inasmuch as the Chinese could neither eject those who crossed the border nor prevent others from coming across. The great influx of Dungans  (p129) was completely unexpected by the Chinese and at the moment of the appearance of the refugees in Uch Turfan they had only 60‑70 soldiers at that point. The most that could be done was to keep the refugees out of the city itself and to provide them with grain and provisions so that, exhausted by the rigours of the road, they would not create trouble.​73

Refugee Kirghiz first appeared in Chinese territory in small numbers in the first days of September. The exodus from Russian territory was greatly increased by the latter part of September when the augmented Russian forces began a great drive against the insurgents. This migration was to last until  p132 the first part of November. Two routes were followed: (1) past Ft. Naryn through the Aksai valley to the passes of Turugart and Keltebuk in the upper reaches of the Kokshal river and (2) south from the city of Przhevalsk through the Bedel and Kaiche passes to the Uch Turfan and Aksu oases. The first route was impracticable for large groups. The proximity of Ft. Naryn served as a constant threat, the mountains are difficult to traverse, and there was an absence of pasture. The only Kirghiz who went via this route were those from the two nearest volosts who habitually migrated south from Naryn. The second route was followed by the mass of the insurgents. Good pasture was to be had all the way to the Russian frontier and the frontier was difficult to defend at this point.

The refugees from the Naryn region took the first route and were people who from the very first had little taste for the revolt. They fled from the Kirghiz insurgents themselves who, they were afraid, would either force them to join the rebellion or rob their herds.​74 In this case virtue triumphed and they were soon talked into returning to Russia, returning with their herds almost intact.

Far different was the fate of the refugees from the Przhevalsk and Pishpek uezds, most of whom had taken an active part in the uprising. These natives followed the second route to Uch Turfan and Aksu and numbered from 100,000 to 120,000 persons. Pursued by the Russian forces and loaded down with belongings, the difficult passes they  (p130) encountered took a frightful toll of the large herds that they tried to drive with them. Along the Bedel pass alone over 10,000 head of cattle and horses were counted fallen by the wayside. One Russian official in Sinkiang estimated from the various sources of information at his disposal that these refugees from Przhevalsk and Pishpek uezds in their flight from the middle of September to the beginning of November lost almost all of the Russian cattle they had carried off. His figures are horned cattle, none left; horses, 10 percent left; sheep, one-fourth left; camels, about  p133 one half.​75 But at that the tribulations of the refugees had just begun.

The first period of relations between the Chinese authorities and the Russian officials was a good one from the standpoint of the latter, and lasted from the beginning of the revolt in the early part of August to the last ten days of September. The Chinese government in Sinkiang became alarmed at the influx of Dungans and other persons. Memories of the Dungan uprising of the 1870s against the Chinese were revived and moreover the Chinese noted that most of the later trouble in Sinkiang had been started by migrants from the former Kokand khanate. Ma‑titai, the strong man of the Kashgar area at the time,​76 cooperated fully with the Russian authorities after the Russian Consul General pointed out the necessity to act against this influx of refugees. The troops at Uch Turfan were increased to 300‑400 cavalry and infantry, sent from Aksu, Yarkand, and Kashgar. The Aksu tao‑t'ai (chief official of a provincial district) Ch'u Jui‑ch'i was sent to Uch Turfan where he remained for three months until the movement of refugees into Chinese territory had stopped. Stefanovich had already spent some time in Uch Turfan, having arrived there in July, before the disorders began. Stefanovich persuaded the tao‑t'ai not to enter into any kind of relations with the envoys of the insurgents. The tao‑t'ai posted guards at the frontier, not allowing the refugees to cross and at  (p131) the same time made it known throughout the hills that the insurgents would not be allowed to cross and that their petitions for Chinese citizen­ship could not be entertained. Petitions the tao‑t'ai received from the refugees he handed over to Stefanovich, who took steps to persuade the refugees to return to Russia.

Oddly enough Stefanovich was most hampered in his efforts to repatriate the refugees by the actions of the Russian authorities and forces themselves in Semirechie. To quote from the report of the Russian Consul General: "but the measures of the latter [Stefanovich] to return the Kirghiz back to Russia,  p134 despite the desire for this on the part of the Kirghiz, did not attain his goal. By this time there had gathered in the Przhevalsk uezd a considerable mass of various troops and they pursued the insurgents so energetically that often they did not distinguish them from peaceful inhabitants. As a consequence of this, special messengers were sent by . . . Stefanovich to the uezd head in the city of Przhevalsk to ascertain the conditions for the return of the refugee Kirghiz, but these did not succeed in their mission inasmuch as the Cossacks rode about shooting at all who appeared on the road to Przhevalsk."​77

The Kazakh refugees of the rod of Alban succeeded in negotiating with General Folbaum through the Uch Turfan authorities to allow them to return, but General Folbaum struck a hard bargain. He authorized the return of 17 volosts only on the condition that they deliver 1,000 horses to Przhevalsk so that the peasants there could use them to harvest their crops; that they send 3,000 of their best horses for the needs of the Russian army; that they give up all arms and all their leaders. If they fulfilled all these conditions they could return.

Until the last ten days of September the Russians had considerable success in their efforts to return the refugees home. The Russian Consulate General at Kashgar, aided by the moral suasion of the Kashgar authorities arranged success­fully the return of the Kirghiz congregated in the area of the Keltebuk and Turugart passes. When Stefanovich  (p132) left Uch Turfan on September 15, only about 20‑30 families of Kirghiz remained in Chinese territory, these having arrived by the most difficult and inaccessible routes.

The Russian Consul General was forced to recall Stefanovich to replace Pozdolsky as secretary of the Consulate, as the latter had been appointed to a post in Kuanchentsi. With the departure of Stefanovich from Uch Turfan, and with no one to take his place, the situation rapidly deteriorated. A great flood of refugees was allowed to cross over the frontier by the Chinese authorities, who now felt a great deal more free in their relations with the refugees. This situation was utilized by the Chinese as an opportunity for expropriation on a colossal scale.  p135 The refugees were forced to leave their property, cattle, arms, and even wives and children with the Chinese authorities as a condition for being allowed to cross the border. Even the leaders of the revolt were allowed to cross; the Shabdan brothers, leaders of the revolt around Issik Kul, were allowed to cross with their herds on the payment of 35,000 roubles. Once across the border, the defenseless Kirghiz were harried by the attacks of the Kalmyks​78 in Sinkiang.

 (p133)  Harried on all sides, the refugees in the Kulja regions of Sinkiang, hearing about the formation of the special all-Kirghiz uezd of Naryn by Kuropatkin in November​79 began to return to Russia. The return march of these refugees was frightful. In that year snow fell early and the passes were already covered when the Kirghiz crossed on their way back home. Most of the cattle they had left were lost on the way owing to lack of food. The people themselves died like flies from the cold, hunger, and the difficulty of the way. The old and the children were abandoned to their fate. Typhus and smallpox broke out, reducing their number even more. The entire line of march was strewn with bodies.

Those who finally reached home were literally almost naked. Their situation even then was extremely inauspicious. Their  p136 winter quarters were destroyed, the harvests they had abandoned were lost, the remaining yurts had been plundered or destroyed, their cattle lost and their goods taken by the Chinese authorities while they were in exile.

The Chinese authorities continued to show a non-cooperative attitude towards the Russian authorities. The Aksu tao‑t'ai called the refugees his "guests" and said that any attempt to act against them would cause great agitation. The Dungans were reportedly sent to the Lob Nor region where they were given free land. Though the Russians sent a force of 60 Cossacks to Uch Turfan to seize the leaders of the Kirghiz, they managed to seize only 12 rank-and‑file insurgents.

The situation of the Kirghiz and Kazakhs who remained in Sinkiang became ever more desperate. The influx of such a huge horde into Uch Turfan and Aksu sent prices of grain skyrocketing; whereas formerly Uch Turfan supplied Kashgar and other cities with grain, it was now finding it difficult to supply itself. Refugees with Russian roubles found the rate of exchange fallen to the equivalent in Chinese money of 25 kopecks per  rouble. The price of cattle dropped while that of grain went up.

The refugees had a very difficult time staying alive through the winter. They had to sell their last belongings in order to live. The Uch Turfan bazaar was bloated with Kirghiz and Kazakh belongings — felts  (p134) from yurts, kettles, lariats, saddles, household items. The refugees found it difficult to hire themselves out as laborers as the region not only had enough laborers of its own but a surplus, who were accustomed to go to Russia as seasonal workers.

Late in November or December the Aksu tao‑t'ai was replaced by a certain Lu. This marked a new change in Chinese policy. At the first meeting between Lu and Stefanovich the question of the ejection of the refugees was first raised by Lu, who asked Stefanovich to petition the Turkistan Governor-General to receive the refugees back. This volte face was due to very understandable reasons. The Chinese were finding it difficult to supply the population with food owing to the great drain on food supplies and the high prices caused by the presence of the refugees. Scurvy and typhus had broken out among the  p137 refugees and were threatening the Chinese subjects also. In order to live, the desperate refugees turned to robbery and murder and disorder was becoming chronic. Most of the refugees were finally repatriated both from the Kulja and the Kashgar areas the following spring.

The refugees in their flight to China took along many Russian prisoners, mostly women and children. Stefanovich, when at Uch Turfan, worked to liberate these people when they crossed the frontier with their captors. This had an unfortunate effect in that the Kirghiz, hearing of this, killed their captives. When Stefanovich was relieved at Uch Turfan the Consul General sent trusted natives to the passes used by the refugees to persuade them both to return to Russia and to liberate their captives. Sir George Macartney, British Consul General at Kashgar at the time, describes seeing these people: "Well does the reviewer remember how later on a few Russian women, in rags and with shoes worn through, came into Kashgar, weary, emaciated, and diseased; they had been discarded by their captors, and had trudged on foot all the way from the mountains round about Uch Turfan, at last to find shelter in the Russian Consulate."​80

 (p135)  B. The Revolt of the Turkomans

Although the revolt among the Turkomans was longer in duration than even in Semirechie (starting on August 15 and ending only in the last days of December) it was not so sharp in character as in either Ferghana or Semirechie oblast because of the special geographical position of Turkmenistan. Russian colonization in this region had not begun until after 1905 and was still too slight to cause the great resentment that existed in Semirechie and elsewhere. Even where disorder and revolt took place it was confined to two localities — the cotton-growing region of the oases of Merv and Tejend, and the herding area on the Persian border along the Atrek river. In the first, the movement was under­ground, breaking out sporadically in incidents but with no "open" revolt. In the second, there was open insurrection against the Russian authority.

 p138  The announcement of the supreme command was greeted peacefully by the Turkomans though individuals petitioned the head of the Merv uezd on July 9, 1916, for a replacement of this duty by a contribution of money or by being allowed to hire workers in their place.​81 The Turkomans, proud of their warrior tradition, looked down on work in the fields as degrading and were accustomed to hiring laborers from Persia and Afghanistan to do this for them. The cotton areas of Merv and Tejend were suffering from a shortage of workers, and the call for laborers, set for the end of July, threatened the cotton harvesting which was due to begin in August.

Opposition in the cotton-growing area was expressed in September and October by several attacks, mostly confined to Sarakhs and Tejend, on railway workers, watchmen, and the post office. The railway line was torn up between Ashkhabad and Tejend and a railway bridge was burned. There were no turbulent outbursts and no clashes with military forces. The subsequent announcement by the Tsarist government that the Turkomans would be called for guard duty and not as workers calmed down the Turkomans here. November saw the end of  (p136) all agitation when 37 Turkomans were arrested in Sarakhs and the first echelon of native guards was dispatched. A movement of a similar sort took place among the Yomud Turkomans of the Khivan khanate.

The Yomud Turkomans situated along the Persian border proved much more difficult to deal with. These Yomuds had shown their rebellious disposition before when in 1912 and 1915 those subject to the Khivan khanate revolted. In 1915 an attack was organized against the city of Khiva and was beaten off only with the help of Russian troops under General Galkin. The activities of the punitive expedition under Galkin increased Yomud dissatisfaction even more.​82

The Yomuds along the Persian border migrated each winter to Persia. In the second half of August large groups of Yomuds started to migrate to Persia earlier than usual, after refusing to provide workers for the war areas, and telegraph lines along the border were torn up in places. The migration  p139 continued to September when from the Krasnovodsk uezd there migrated 2,000 kibitkas of Yomuds. Units of troops with artillery and machine guns were sent against these migrants. Clashes occurred when Yomuds on Cossack patrols with Berdan and .30‑caliber rifles. In September the fortress of Ak‑kala was seized by the Turkomans. When a unit arrived from Ashkhabad to take the fort the Yomuds opened a strong fire against it, using dum-dum bullets. They were dislodged only after a two-hour bombardment during which many were killed, the remainder fleeing towards the Caspian.

Basing themselves behind the Persian frontier the Yomuds carried out a series of raids on Russian convoys and patrols. The audacity of these raids may be realized by describing one of them. On September 30 a Russian force of 250 soldiers, with three machine guns and two cannon, left Chat guarding a transport of food and other goods. This convoy was twice attacked by Yomuds armed with quick-firing modern rifles, killing Captain Pozharsky, and killing or wounding several of the officers and men.

From September 25 to 29 the Yomuds destroyed three Russian estates  (p137) near the Gurgen river and attacked several Russian settlements. Of the latter four were destroyed and two partially destroyed. The inhabitants were success­fully evacuated to neighboring settlements under the guard of Russian soldiers.

Sporadic fighting took place between the two sides all through October. Railway installations and stations were attacked, and herds of camels and cattle carried off. In the vicinity of Tejend there were attempts to damage sections of railway, bridges, and telegraph lines. On October 6 an attack was made on Tejend itself, but the Russians were forewarned and it was success­fully repulsed.

When the native population near Sarakhs dispatched a party of guards the Yomuds tried to break it up but the group was safely dispatched to Tejend.

The month of November was marked by the same type of raids mentioned, but there was noticed a much larger grouping in the bands and the appearance of recognized leaders. A series of serious skirmishes took place November 1 at Chat, where the Yomuds suffered great losses though they succeeded in breaking  p140 telegraphic communication between Chat and Gumbet. Attacks were made on the fisheries on the Caspian Sea between Gumish-Tepe and Karasu but were repulsed by artillery fire and a landing from one of the Caspian Sea patrol boats. From the middle of November great bands of insurgents appeared near the Gurgen river valley. More clashes occurred between the insurgents and the Russians.

By the beginning of December a special expeditionary force had been organized under Lt. General Madritov. It was a very considerable force by European colonial standards, numbering 10,000 men, and including 6 battalions, 15 sotnias of Cossacks, 18 cannon, 17 machine guns, and automobiles. This force was landed at the Persian port of Karasu and the port was made a base of operations against the insurgents. The Russians were justified to some extent in operating on Persian territory inasmuch as not only did the Russian Yomuds operate from behind the Persian frontier but they were joined in these operations by their cousins, the Persian Yomuds.

 (p138)  General Madritov began his operations by retaking Ak‑kala which had been occupied by the Yomuds. The western part of the Ashkhabad province was cleared, several leaders seized and a thousand rifles taken away.

The Russian strategy was to attack the insurgents from both the north and the south and thus squeeze them in the mountains from both sides. A unit under General Narbut pressed south from Kara-Kala toward Morava-Tepe. A great skirmish took place in the Segirim-Dagh pass on December 18 between the Yomuds and Narbut's men. The Turkomans numbered about 3,000 men, half of whom were armed with spears and sabers and half with various type of rifles. The bravery and courage of the Turkomans drew words of admiration from the Russian commander. The Turkomans were finally forced to yield and were pressed into the mountains. Meanwhile General Madritov's force was approaching from the south. The insurgents tried to save themselves by flight towards the west but were overcome by the pursuing troops in battles from 21 to 31 December. This signalized final defeat for the Yomuds. The leaders of the rebellious tribes were either seized or gave themselves up. In the final battles 3,200 camels and over 15,000 sheep were taken from the insurgents.

 p141  Though small bands were pursued by Cossacks throughout January the great mass of the insurgents made their peace with the Tsar and agreed to do all that was demanded of them. By January 20 there were seized from the Yomuds 2,433 rifles, 315 sabers, and 61 daggers.

In the north Cossack units operated against small groups of insurgents and "scattered" them.

The total losses of the Russian forces in suppressing the Turkomans were given as: killed, 2 officers and 50 soldiers, and a similar number wounded. The losses for the Turkomans are not given but must be very much higher.​83

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The Author's Notes:

1 Foreword by A. Chuloshnikov, "K istorii vosstaniya kirghiz v 1916 g." op. cit., p53.

2 Journal of Kuropatkin, "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," pp45‑46.

3 Telegram of Sokolovsky to director of Zemsky div., "K istorii vosstaniya kirghiz v 1916 g.," op. cit., p36.

4 Proto­col of the informal meeting of Kirghiz [Kazakhs], ibid., p58.

5 G. Stepnyak, "Kirghizskoe vosstanie v Semipalatinskoi gubernii v 1916 godu," Sibirskie Ogni, vol. I (1928), p133.

6 Deposition of Kanaat Abukin: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p155.

7 Proto­col of the informal meeting of the Kirghiz and Kazakhs at Turgai: "K istorii vosstaniya kirghiz v 1916 g.," op. cit., p59.

8 Tynyshpaev, belonging to the Kazakh bai-manap class, with leader of the Semirechie Alash Orda. He was educated as an engineer, attending school at St. Petersburg. As deputy from the Semirechie oblast in the 2nd Imperial Duma he adhered to the Cadet faction. During the Revolt of 1916 he accompanied General Kuropatkin in his tour of the country as interpreter. He became a commissar under the Provisional Government and later member of the "government of Kokand autonomy" in Turkistan, 1917‑1918.

9 Deposition of the engineer Tynyshpaev, Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p142.

10 Alikhan Bukeikhanov — member of the First Imperial Duma from Semipalatinsk, collaborator on the Kazak from 1912, commissar for the Turgai oblast under the Provisional Government. In 1917 elected head of the provisional Kazakh government, Alash Orda, 1917‑1918.

11 Brainin and Shafiro, op. cit., p38.

12 Deposition of Tynyshpaev, Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p143.

13 Deposition of Kanaat Abukin: ibid., p154.

14 Deposition of Tynyshpaev: ibid., p143.

15 Telegram of the Astrakhan governor, July 20, 1916, "K istorii vosstaniya kirghiz v 1916 g.," op. cit., p55.

16 Telegram of the Astrakhan governor, July 25, 1916, ibid., p56.

17 Excluding Semipalatinsk, which will be dealt with separately.

18 Pamyatnika zapiska o kirgizakh: "K istorii vosstaniya kirghiz v 1916 g.," op. cit., p67.

19 Shestakov, op. cit., p98.

20 Proto­col of the informal meeting of Kirghiz, "K istorii vosstaniya kirghiz v 1916 g.," op. cit., p58.

21 Ibid., pp60‑61.

22 Quoted by Shestakov, op. cit., p98. Emphasis added by Shestakov.

23 Ibid., p99.

24 O. Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, op. cit., p134.

25 Pamyatnika zapiska o kirgizakh: "K istorii vosstaniya kirghiz v 1916 g.," op. cit., p67.

26 Report of General Folbaum to the Turkistan Governor-General, ibid., p73.

27 Pamyatnika zapiska o kirgizakh: ibid., p66.

28 Stepnyak, op. cit., p133.

29 Ibid., p135.

30 Ibid., p143.

31 Shestakov, op. cit., p100.

32 Taken from T. Ryskulov, Vosstanie tuzemtsev v Srednei Azii v 1916 godu, pp46‑47. Quoted in Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, pp80‑81.

33 Broido, op. cit., p426.

34 Iz sudebnogo dela po Przhevalskomu raionu: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p32.

35 Brainin and Shafiro, op. cit., p44.

36 Ibid., p47.

37 Ibid., p45.

38 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p264.

39 Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p31.

40 Report of Folbaum to Kuropatkin: "K istorii vosstaniya kirghiz v 1916 g.," op. cit., p70.

41 Deposition of the witness I. A. Potselnev, Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p47.

42 Ibid., p163. Kanaat Abukin was a great manap who was illiterate and advanced in age. He was later betrayed to the Russian authorities by his own son. He died or was intentionally killed while in prison — the circumstances surrounding his death never have been satisfactorily explained.

43 Deposition of Jushak Mametbaev: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p62.

44 Brainin and Shafiro, op. cit., p60.

45 Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p162.

46 Quoted by Brainin and Shafiro, op. cit., p60.

47 1 sazhen = 7 feet.

48 Report of Kuropatkin to Nicholas II, "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit., p68.

49 "Report of the Governor-General": Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, pp76‑77.

50 Kuropatkin to Nicholas II, "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit., p69.

51 Shestakov, op. cit., p100.

52 In the Przhevalsk uezd only two settlements came out unscathed. Report of Stefanovich: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p113.

53 Report of Folbaum to the Governor-General, "K istorii vosstaniya kirghiz," op. cit., p73.

54 Ibid., p45. Deposition of I. A. Potselnev: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p45.

55 Ibid., p45.

56 Brainin and Shafiro, op. cit., pp61‑62.

57 Introduction: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p9.

58 Brainin and Shafiro, op. cit., p62.

59 Etymologically this word comes from the Turkish verb "to oppress," "press," "violate," and hence in Turkistan came to mean "bandit," "robber," "violator." In the struggle with Tsarism 1916‑1917 and especially in the fight against Bolshevism in Russian Turkistan the word lost its pejorative quality and came to signify a nationalist rebel. See article by Mustapha Chokaieff, "The Basmatchi Movement in Turkestan," Asiatic Review, vol. XXIV (Apr. 1928), pp273‑288.

60 Journal of Kuropatkin: "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit., p50.

61 Shestakov, op. cit., p103.

62 Journal of Kuropatkin: "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit., p50.

63 Shestakov, op. cit., p103.

64 Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p161.

65 Journal of Kuropatkin: "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii,", op. cit., pp59‑60. A Przhevalsk uezd police official asserted in his report that the "scum of European Russia" was sent to Semirechie. Miklashevsky, op. cit., p254.

66 Report of Colonel Ivanov to the vice-governor of the Semirechie oblast: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p38.

67 See ibid., pp163‑164.

68 Brainin and Shafiro, op. cit., p18.

69 Lt. Col. P. T. Etherton, In the Heart of Asia (London, 1925), p190.

70 C. P. Skrine, op. cit., p66.

71 Iz sudebnogo dela po Przhevalskomu raionu: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p32.

72 Shestakov, op. cit., p100.

73 Report of the Russian Consul General: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p105.

74 Report of the Dragoman Stefanovich: ibid., p114.

75 Report of the Military starshina Bychkov: ibid., p103. The insurgents took along from five to seven animals per person.

76 Titai = commander in chief. For a fascinating account of this despot, and his demise, see C. P. Skrine, op. cit., pp85‑89, 261‑268.

77 Report of the Russian Consul General: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, p107.

78 Kalmyks — These peoples form the western branch of the Mongols, living partly in Europe and partly in Asia. The Asian Kalmyks are grouped mainly in Chinese territory: in Kobdo and Jungaria, the eastern portion of the T'ien Shan, East Turkistan, the southern fringe of the Gobi Desert, the Koko‑nor range, and in the province of Kansu. There are also Kalmyks in Asiatic Russia — near Kulja in the territory of Semirechie and in the Altai mountains. The European Kalmyks are widely separated from their brothers in Asia and are situated on the banks of the Volga around the cities of Astrakhan and Stavropol northwards, and in the steppes between the Volga and the Ural River. Before 1600 it is doubtful that there were any Kalmyks west of the Altai. A series of migrations into Asiatic Russia began around the year 1626 culminating in 1703 when the Kalmyks who had remained behind in Sinkiang resolved to escape from the persecution of the King of Jungaria. The Manchu Emperor extended an invitation to the Kalmyks to return after the re-establishment of Chinese control over Sinkiang after 1757. After one segment of the Kalmyks returned in 1771 large numbers of Kalmyks, dissatisfied with Russian rule, set out to do the same. The rigours of winter in addition to intensive attacks by the Kirghiz made this migration an extremely difficult one for the Kalmyks. Of the 169,000 who set out on the journey some 100,000 are said to have perished on the way. The Kalmyks then, had ample historical justification for attacking the insurgent Kirghiz who made their way into China during the revolt of 1916.

79 To be dealt with in Chapter VI.

80 G. Macartney, Review of Mustapha Chokaieff's book, "Chez les Soviets en Asie Centrale," Journal of the Central Asian Society, vol. XVI (1929), p102.

81 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p250.

82 Shestakov, op. cit., p109.

83 Information about the revolt of the Turkomans is not plentiful and is to be found principally in the article by Shestakov, op. cit., pp106‑112; the Journal of General Kuropatkin, and the Report of Kuropatkin to Nicholas II, "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," op. cit.

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Thayer's Note:

a Briefly named Frunze for a Communist revolutionary, Pishpek has now reverted to a form of its previous name: Bishkek.

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