You can follow the geography by opening the author's large map of Turkestan
in a separate window.

 p142   (p139)  Chapter 6
The End of the Revolt

Group Participation in the Revolt of 1916

1. The Well-to‑Do Groups

The term "well-to‑do" members of the population included the great, middle, and petty merchants in the cities while in the auls and towns it meant the great land­owners and cattle herders. The participation of these elements in the revolt was not uniform. In Semirechie, Transcaspia, and in the areas of the three basic oblasts well-to‑do elements not only participated in the revolt but led it. These were the remnants of the old feudal order, the great landholders, herders, mullahs, leaders of the tribes. Those who did not participate belonged to the post-feudal times, to the capitalistic classes made up of traders, merchants, and usurers.

In Semirechie the manaps had sufficient reason to oppose the call. Ruling over the lives of the Kirghiz and Kazakh with an iron hand as volost authorities, they saw that now they must lose that control with the departure of the young men to the front. They realized that their rule was tolerated only because the people were ignorant and superstitious, seeing nothing apart from their hills and auls, and were apprehensive as to the maintenance of the status quo when these young men returned. They also realized that their party enemies were only too anxious to lead the people in revolt if they declined to do so. Thus the manaps were faced with the dilemma — "head the uprising and grab  (p140) some easy plunder or cede to their opponents who wanted a general uprising of the people."​1 Moreover, as we have seen, many were faced with still another dilemma. If they drew up the lists of workers they were threatened with death, if they did not they were faced with prosecution by the Russian authorities. Thus in many localities  p143 they headed the revolt. Kanaat Abukin, one of the main leaders of the revolt, came from the manap class and had held several elective posts in the Abaildinsk volost of the Pishpek uezd. The Shabdan brothers were also members of the well-to‑do class, their father having rendered great services to the Russians, under whom he had attained high office.

The situation in Transcaspia is not sufficiently clear though it seems that influential Turkomans headed the revolt. The names of two of the three main leaders certainly are significant — Shikhr-Khan Divedzhi and Essen-Khan. Rod ties appear to have still had much force and the kinship group acted as a unit.

The well-to‑do classes of the cities in general stood against participation in the revolt. These classes were better educated, stood closer to the Russian population with whom they often had commercial ties, and realized the real strength of the Russians and their own people. They knew that an unarmed mass of people could offer no real resistance to a punitive force armed to the teeth with modern weapons. It event of failure they realized that they would suffer through their pockets. This feeling of impotence was shared by other segments of the population in the great cities, they too standing closer to reality. It was for this reason that in some great cities like Samarkand no disorders of any kind occurred, while in others like Old Tashkent they were comparatively insignificant.

The well-to‑do groups greeted the announcement of the supreme command with fawning servility. Delegations of "influential persons" met with Russian officials and assured them of their complete loyalty  (p141) to the government, promised fulfillment of the order, made vows, and held solemn patriotic services. These obsequious demonstrations occurred especially after the outbreak of disorders. Thus on the day after the outbreak of disorders in Old Tashkent on July 11 a group of native officials and influential persons appeared before the Governor-General and assured him of their "complete submission."​2

None of these delegations ever uttered any real protest to the authorities; at best in some cases they asked for a postponement  p144 of the order. When this was refused and they were told the order must be obeyed they accepted this reply without a murmur. Complete loyalty was sworn, prayers said, the Tsar's health toasted, and patriotic hymns sung.

On July 12 the influential persons of the city of Namangan at a meeting vowed "in honesty and frankness the wish for a victory of Russian arms."​3 On July 22 the Political Agent in Bukhara telegraphed the Governor-General: "There appeared before me today 20 of the greatest merchants, and inspired by feelings of genuine loyalty and love for Russia, they expressed their extreme displeasure concerning the rebellious actions of the Samarkandians"​4 (that is, the Jizak uprising). Similar sentiments of loyalty to Russia and displeasure with those who opposed the order were expressed in assemblies in Chimkent, Osh, Verny, Pskent, Margelan, Kokand, and other cities. Governor Kuropatkin during his tour of Turkistan records in his journal many demonstrations of loyalty to the administration.​5 Thus the well-to‑do elements, in general, played the same part here as they did in the Andijan uprising of 1898.

The call for workers was disliked by the great class of rich moneylenders and they petitioned to have it replaced by a capitation tax. In the event of the success of such a petition they would have gained in three ways: (1) they would have kept themselves from being conscripted  (p142) as laborers; (2) they would have kept under their thumbs the numerous class of peasantry owing them money; and (2) the need of the poor for money to pay the tax would have opened new horizons for their money-lending activities. Although the labor levy was not replaced by a pecuniary one, the Russian government in an effort to gain the support of the well-to‑do members of the population issued an edict at the end of July allowing anyone drafted for service to hire someone to take his place.

The open support given by the well-to‑do natives to the order alienated them from the common folk. This was noticed by the Russian administration itself. On July 22 the Andijan uezd  p145 head reported to the Governor of the Ferghana oblast: "the influential natives who used to exercise a great influence over the people have now lost that influence to such an extent that they openly fear even to speak to the people on the subject of the conscription of workers."​6

The clergy appeared as a sizable segment of the well-to‑do section of the population. What explains their often active participation in the revolt, notably in the Jizak uprising? One element in this was the fear of losing their influence over the masses. The alienation of much of the youth to religion under the influences of some of the seamy sides of Russian civilization has already been mentioned. Presumably the clergy saw that if a great blow was not now struck for a return to the strict morality and pristine belief of another time the chance might not again present itself. Added to this the clergy had an exaggerated belief in their importance among their followers. Finally the element of fanaticism appeared in the background.

The religious influence on the revolt, however, must not be overestimated. If mullahs and other religious personages were involved leading the people in revolt, we find on the other side mullahs lending their prestige and authority to the service of the Russian state, the activities of some already having been noted. The mullahs and others were well  (p143) represented in the delegations proclaiming their loyalty to the Russian government. The latter realized the usefulness of the mullahs and others and even gave bribes to secure their support. Thus in one secret telegram we find: "The Governor-General completely approves of the idea of using Ishan-Siakh to address appeals to the masses of followers in Ferghana and other oblasts of the krai. It might be made known to the Ishan that his loyal relation to our government's interests will not go unnoticed."​7

The Okhrana was so busy on the eve of the revolt watching both the Jadids and the Pan-Islamists that the revolt caught the government by surprise. In the words of Galuzo, "The Okhrana had the same outlook on events in 1916 that it had at the end of the XIXth century. It seemed to the government  p146 that a movement must always appear under the same signs under which the gazavat was sounded in the Kokand khanate 'cut down the infidels.' "​8 The revolt caught both the Jadids and the Pan-Islamists by surprise and neither participated in the revolt, although the classes they represented did take part. Preoccupation with the details of the Andijan uprising of 1898 blinded the agents of the Okhrana to the new forces at work.

2. The Poor

Whereas no general picture is characteristic for the well-to‑do native classes, it may be said of the poor that everywhere they participated in the revolt as insurgents. It was they who felt most keenly the land seizure, economic bondage, the bribe-taking of officials. It was this group, aided by the group intermediate between them and the well-to‑do classes, that gave the measures of opposition their scope and intensity. At whom were their blows aimed? The table below compiled by P. Galuzo gives the answer.​9

Thus it will be seen that whereas among the nomads the main blow against the officialdom was struck at the Russian officials, scarcely killing any of their native officials, the converse was true among the settled population of the three basic oblasts. Ferghana, the most economically developed oblast, had the greatest number of native officials killed and the least number of Russians. The backward oblast of Semirechie had the greatest number of Russian officials killed, with almost no native officials killed. In the settled areas it was their own officials who were the nearest to the people and were the most  p147 accessible of their exploiters, making their exactions felt directly.

The table also shows that Russian colonists suffered the most where they competed most actively for land with the natives. This was in Semirechie and to a much lesser extent the Samarkand and Syr Darya oblasts.

A word needs to be said about the general participation of women in the crowds during the demonstrations. In a country where the male was definitely the master in the house it is apparent that women were present in the crowd only by permission of their menfolk. The presence of many women in the crowds was a guarantee that Russian officials would be more disposed to talk and less disposed to order troops to disperse the crowd unceremoniously by force.​10

As in the Andijan uprising, the poor had not developed their own  (p145) leader­ship and were forced to follow leaders who came from other classes. Their demands were still weakly formulated and were directed against the immediate burden oppressing them — the call for the conscription of workers — though they showed their latent discontent and resentment by such acts as the killing of Russian railway workers.

B. The Question of Foreign Influence

The outbreak of disorders and revolt in Russian Central Asia seemed to be a golden opportunity for the enemies of Russia. The success­ful development of revolution here would divert much-needed troops from the Eastern Front and might very well touch off a powder-train that could change the whole course of the war. What were the responses to this opportunity of Turkey, of Afghanistan (which was on the brink of declaring war against Great Britain), and of Austria, Germany, and Bulgaria?

The reports of Okhrana agents from the beginning of the World War to the eve of the revolt have already been quoted to the effect that agents of Turkey and Germany and other powers were working very actively in Turkistan.​11 These  p148 reports continued the same theme throughout the revolt, while the papers were reporting rumors of the activities of enemy agents. General Folbaum, reporting on the causes of the revolt, cites as partly responsible "Propaganda penetrating from neighboring China (Kulja, Kashgar), where there are German agents and which has been spread by Chinese and Dungans arriving in great numbers in Karkara and Przhevalsk. Evidence has been found of the participation in the disorders in Semirechie of the Chinese anarchist party Ko Lao Hui, having a tie with German agents."​12

Despite all these assertions an examination of the Okhrana files,  (p146) official reports of those who suppressed the revolt, and the depositions of witnesses reveals little in the way of concrete proof of the existence and work of such agents, nor was a systematic effort made by the various insurgent groups to obtain help from abroad. On the eve of the revolt the Russian authorities were informed that enquiries were being sent to Afghanistan and Persia whether help would be given in the event of an uprising. Enquiries were also made in Bukhara of the high ecclesiastics there as to whether a holy war should be proclaimed.​13 All these enquiries, however, were made in the name of various individuals, without the knowledge and backing of any groups and with no sort of general plan or tie-up. Certainly no help was received from these quarters, while the Bukharan authorities worked hard to keep the revolt from spreading to that khanate.

Speaking of the disorders in the steppe among the Kazakhs one report has this to say: "This agitation was not instigated from without, either by the Germans, Turks, or the Austro-Hungarians or Bulgars. If it had been instigated by the latter there would have been an attempt to get a leader for the Kirghiz [Kazakhs] either by paying out money or other means  p149 and to supply them with firearms."​14 Nazir Khoja one of the leaders of the Jizak revolt, affirmed in his deposition that he received no support or encouragement either from Bukhara, Afghanistan, Germany, Turkey, or elsewhere​15 while Lt. Col. Dimitri Vodopyanov, one of the officers take part in this affair, reported: "From my own observation and according to reports no foreigners were noticed among the insurgents. No foreigner of any kind was among those killed."​16

Turkish Pan-Islamism failed completely in its mission in Central Asia as elsewhere. Lt. Col. Etherton, who succeeded Sir George Macartney as British Consul General at Kashgar in 1918 and who was a close  (p147) student of Central Asian affairs, wrote in 1923: "After close study of the matter I find very little indication of the Mohammedans of Central Asia being influenced by the Pan-Islam cry; sympathy with Turkey was certainly not pronounced, and she is not regarded as the hub of the Islamic world. The politically independent factors of the movement are divided amongst themselves, and they would be apparent if it came to a question of definite organization and control."​17

Placed in its international setting, the Jihad proclaimed by Turkey in 1914 was a failure as far as winning the war was concerned. The movements that took place against England, and to a much lesser extent France, by the Riffs, Egyptians, Persians, Indians, and Afghans did not occur until after the Armistice of 1918 and furthermore, seem to have been inspired not by the Pan-Islamic feeling aimed at by the Turkish Jihad but by the Western doctrines of "self-determination" and "the rights of small nations" used in the Allied propaganda war with the Entente Powers.​18

Several reasons account for this failure. Prominent among these was the inner contradiction between the aims of the nationalism of the Young Turks and the internationalism of  p150 the Pan-Islamic movement. The end of the Hamidian regime had meant the end of Pan-Islamism, although the Salónica Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress of 1908 formally endorsed the movement. This was further complied by the struggle taking place in Turkey between orientation towards Asia and orientation towards the West. On the one hand Turkey, threatened by European imperialism, sought refuge in Asia, looking towards its Turanian cousins for support. On the other hand, it sought to modernize (i.e., Westernize) the Turkish state.​19 The latter tendency was to triumph when Enver Pasha, the champion of Pan-Turanianism, was ousted and forced to flee after the Armistice of 1918 and when Turkey was stripped of her non-Turkish possessions,  (p148) especially the Arab lands, and left a national state almost homogeneous in composition.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904‑1905 had also left its mark. This success­ful challenging of a great European power by an Asiatic one had had repercussions on the Islamic world so that an essentially defensive attitude was replaced by an offensive one. Henceforth appeals to force were more in evidence than appeals to faith. Another factor which muffled the appeal of Pan-Islamism was the irreconcilability between the aims of the incipient nationalism of the Turks and the scientific militarism of the German state. While Abdul Hamid had been able to use the German alliance for his own ends and to further his Pan-Islamic aims, the Young Turks were very definitely being taken in tow by the Germans and being made subservient to the Drang nach Osten of the latter.​20

Still further in the background was the real lack of ties within the Islamic world or even within the Turanian part of it, save for an abstract acceptance of Mohammedanism. The Islamic world was split into Shiites and Sunnites and from this still further down into a bewildering variety of sects and beliefs, each jealous and antagonistic towards the other. Even in speech the Turanian world was far from uniform. Osmanli Turkish, corrupted by many accretions from the different languages of the Levant, was a far cry from that spoken by the  p151 other Turkic peoples. Ethnically the Turanian peoples were far apart. Central Asia, as we have already seen, had had a strong Iranian base since the earliest historical times. The Turkic strain in Turkey itself is quite small. History saw the super-imposition of a small Turkish warrior-elite over a non-Turkic population similar to the process that obtained in Bulgaria and Hungary.​21

The conditions favoring the propagandization of the Islamic idea varied among the people of the Islamic world. In the words of one observer: "Morally, the common aims and interests of Islam have achieved some progress which, as is usually the case, can be traced to the influence  (p149) of the Press but this applies only to the Turkish, Persian and Arabic newspapers for in Central Asia the mullahs and priestly caste exercise considerable influence, and they have eliminated everything that is at variance with early conservatism, and newspapers and secular literature are regarded with disfavor. It is therefore only the Muslim Press, especially the Turkish and Persian, that has brought together distant parts of the Islamic world. In the present stage there is little in the movement, and the progress it has made in Central Asia and Western China may be regarded as negligible."​22

If the Moslem peoples of Russian Central Asia received no support in their revolt in 1916 from neighboring Moslem countries, can the same be said of their brother Moslems within the Russian Empire, and did they manifest a feeling of unity with their Central Asian Bren? There were many factors bringing the 19 million Moslems of the Russian Empire together. A common religious faith and a common subjection to one centralized state were combined with a railway system which brought the different Moslem areas together (the Rostov-Baku, Transcaspian, and Orenburg-Tashkent railways). Moreover a system of economic reciprocity was being worked out between the different areas.

At the same time, however, many centrifugal tendencies were at work. The Moslems were widely scattered geographically.  p152 The Turkish-speaking Moslems (16 million) of Russia spoke widely varying groups of dialects so that the Osmanli Turkish spoken in Asia Minor differs widely from that spoken in Kazan.​23 There was a great difference in the duration of the ties of the various Moslem groups to Russia, the Tatars of Kazan and Astrakhan coming under Russian rule in the middle of the sixteenth century while others, like the Kirghiz, were not subjugated until second half of the nineteenth century. The variety of cultures among the different groups was great indeed, running from  (p150) the Kazan Tatars, living mostly in towns and engaged as professional and business men, and artisans developing a press and literature and engaging vigorously in Russian politics after 1905, to backward nomadic peoples like the Kirghiz. The variety of occupations was equally great extending from modern industrial capitalists to simple herders.​24

In addition to the economic and historical forces making for differences between these peoples, the Russian government pursued policies aimed at keeping them apart. Thus though Moslems were allowed considerable local religious autonomy, no religious centre for all Russian Moslems was tolerated; separate centres for the Caucasus, Volga Tatars, etc. were created. Again, a differentiation was made in regard to military service, which was limited to the Moslems of the Volga Ural region, Siberia, and the Crimea.

One potential source of support for the insurgents remains yet to be mentioned — the many German and Austrian prisoners of war in Turkistan. From the early days of the war the Tsarist government had a predilection for sending large numbers of the captured enemy to Turkistan where ways of escape were few and very difficult. By 1916 the number of prisoners in Turkistan had risen to 190,000, most of whom had been captured in the fighting around the fortress of Przemyśl in Poland. In this number were included many "civil prisoners," that is, civilians living in that area who had been seized to prevent them from giving valuable information on the movements  p153 of Russian troops. It might be presumed that the native insurgents would attempt to contact these persons and induce them to take part in the revolt as not only were they the nationals of countries at war with the Tsarist government but also as they suffered terribly in many of the Russian camps.​25 Frightful epidemics, especially typhus, ravaged the camps unchecked. Despite these favorable conditions for enlisting the support of the prisoners of war, they appear to have played no part at all, though there may have  (p151)  been isolated cases of participation. The single reference in the official documents mentions a Moslem being held in jail after proposing to Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war in the Saperny lager near Tashkent that they take part in the revolt.​26 Thus the prisoners of war appear to have had no influence on the revolt although escaped German and Austrian prisoners who fled to Iran were used by Count Kanitz, the German military attaché in Teheran, to provoke a revolt against the Allies in northern Persia.​27

C. Measures Taken for the Securing of the Peace in the Future

1. Military Measures

A series of military measures were undertaken by General Kuropatkin to prevent any renewal of resistance by the population. Guards were placed near all railways, in cities and some settlements in the Gurgen area in Turkoman territory and in Semirechie where it was difficult to send reinforcements quickly, sufficient forces were stationed to repulse in the main any flare-up.

Measures were taken to weaken the subdued insurgents economically. Thus in the Turkoman area Kuropatkin instructed General Madritov to take away all horses, and half of all cattle and kibitkas (nomad tents) from the insurgents. In the end he seized, together with 3,200 rifles, 780 horses,  p154 4,800 camels, and 175,000 sheep, 2,500 head of cattle, and 500 yurts.​28 Similar exactions were made on the insurgents of Semirechie.

In view of the disorders in the Khivan khanate it was decided to strengthen Russian rule there. To that end Kuropatkin concluded an agreement with the Khivan khanate whereby a military agent and staff were established at Khiva.

Kuropatkin put an end to the double citizen­ship and residence of  (p152) the Yomud Turkomans along the Persian frontier by the simple expedient of seizing the territory in Persia to which the Yomuds made their yearly migrations. A series of strong points were occupied by the Russians including Gumbet-khauz and Ak-kala on the Gurgen river, while posts were erected at some of the passes. Thus not only did Russian forces operate over much of the Astrabad province of Persia in suppressing the revolt but remained in occupation of Persian territory after the revolt was suppressed. Kuropatkin recommended that this territory be formally annexed by Russia with the agreement of Great Britain.​29

In regard to measures against the Kirghiz and Kazakhs in Semirechie, Kuropatkin was to write: "I have come to the conclusion that it is necessary, where possible, to separate these nationalities [from the Russians] for a long time."​30 To that end he called a meeting of officials in Verny on October 16, 1916, where it was decided to form an all-Russian area in the reign of the Chu river valley and around Issik Kul. This new uezd comprised the area of the Przhevalsk uezd and parts of the Jarkent and Pishpek uezds. The insurgents from this area who had fled to China were not to be allowed back to their former territory but were to be settled in a new all-Kirghiz and Kazakh uezd in the Naryn region. In addition 200,000 Kirghiz who were living in the area of the future all-Russian uezd were to be forcibly ejected. The ground cleared was to be given to Russian settlers, among whom were to be formed  p155 five stanitsas of Cossacks. The whole project was to be accomplished in the shortest time, by March 1917. This exchange benefited only the Russians, who occupied all of the rich valley around Issik Kul while the Kirghiz were forced into the barren hills of the Naryn uezd.

Taking a leaf from the Andijan uprising of 1898 Kuropatkin followed the principle set down at that time that all land "where Russian blood was spilled" should be confiscated by the Russian government. This principle was followed in two areas: (1) in the Przhevalsk, Pishpek,  (p153) and Jarkent uezds; (2) in the Jizak uezd. The fulfillment of this policy in the first area has already been discussed. In the Jizak area 2,000 dessiatines of land were seized, 800 dessiatines in the area between New and Old Jizak where Colonel Rukin was killed by a native mob, and the remainder in several areas where some 73 Russians were killed. It was announced that in the event of new disorders in addition to the punishment of those guilty more land would be taken away where Russians were killed. Kuropatkin was of the opinion that this would have a sobering effect upon the natives and hold back the vacillators.​31

It will be remembered that a general fine of 300,000 roubles had been levied on the natives of the Ferghana oblast after the Andijan uprising of 1898. Kuropatkin decided to repeat this system of collective responsibility and began to plan the details of a future general fine. The assessment of this fine was only prevented by the outbreak of the February revolution and the overthrow of the Tsarist government.

Finally, Kuropatkin proceeded with the punishment of those taking an immediate part in the revolt. A mass of persons was brought before the court on the basis of unverified denunciations, but most of the accused did not admit their guilt. The accusations were of a general nature as not only was it difficult to specify precise allegations concerning the actions of the accused but the latter, besides denying their guilt, might question the competence of the courts and assert they were martyrs suffering for a just cause.​32

The numerous death sentences and long prison terms were  p156 lightened by the Governor-General, presumably on orders of the central government. The death sentence was commuted in many cases to ten or four years at hard labor while a corresponding lightening of sentence was granted to many who had lesser terms. Be February 1, 1917, 347 persons had been sentenced to death but in the end only 51 were executed. There were many appeals for mercy. Five hundred and five were sentenced either to prison or banishment.

 (p154)  2. Administrative Measures

Kuropatkin found that one of the basic deficiencies of the system of government was the extreme paucity of Russian officials leading to a totally inadequate supervision of the subject peoples. The uezd head, aided by two or three pristavs or police chiefs, could not adequately cope with all the problems of supervision with which he was faced. Some of the uezds among the sedentary population had populations of half a million persons. To the end of a closer supervision of the native population Kuropatkin added 15 administrative-police officials on a temporary basis. The increased expenses from the addition of these officers were met from the receipts of sales of cattle seized from the nomads. With the confirmation of these offices as part of the regular administrative system, the expenses were to be met from regular funds.

Kuropatkin struck at the abuse of the agrarian laws. He found that sales of land were made in clear defiance of the laws, which stated that 6 tanaps of land must remain to each landholder so that he could not be stripped entirely of his land if he ran into hopeless debt. Measures were taken to enforce this law. Measures also were taken to ascertain the rights of the nomads to land left for their use, to their rights in securing fuel from forests, and for their protection against the encroachment of the Forest Service.

In the Merv uezd Kuropatkin found great abuses on the part of the Okhrana [secret police] agents. These agents had been carelessly recruited, even from among illiterate Turkomans, and since 1912 had distinguished themselves by their bungling and, in some cases, criminal activities. The agents settled accounts with their enemies by shutting them up in  p157 prison on the ground of political unreliability. Bribes were exacted to prevent the agents from carrying out their threats. Kuropatkin found many of the complaints against these agents to be founded on fact and released a number of persons they had placed in prison, at the same time imprisoning eight Okhrana agents.

Kuropatkin sought to remedy the previous mistake of not explaining sufficiently to the native population the essence of the supreme  (p155) order. In his tour of all the oblasts of the Governor-Generalship, Kuropatkin addressed many meetings of native dignitaries and told them the circumstances and goals of the order.

Realizing the seriousness of the food problem brought about by drought and disorder General Kuropatkin took measures to have grain shipped in from Russia and Siberia at prices within reach of the poor strata of the population. It was estimated that 20 million puds were needed to tide Turkistan (including the khanate of Bukhara) over until the next harvest. Measures were taken to provide grain for the Kirghiz and Kazakhs returning from their flight to China, although Kuropatkin was faced with great difficulty here. Snow in the T'ien Shan, the lack of roads for wheeled vehicles to say nothing of railroad lines, and the great height of the passes made the transport of grain difficult. Despite this solicitude for the country's needs in food, Kuropatkin recognized that there still was a war to be won and took measures for the further export of cattle, horses, camels, and fish despite the fact that this might leave the native population lacking in these items.​33

Finally, steps were taken to draw up a new polozhenie or law code for the country. This new code was to be in part a going back to conditions existing before 1887. The uezd head and other Russian officials were once more to exercise supervision over the general welfare of the population. The uezd and oblast authority was to be strengthened by coordinating, through councils, the activities of the other departments of government with with those of the uezd and oblast heads.

 p158  D. The Balance Sheet of Damage Suffered

The casualty list for the Russians during the Revolt of 1916 is officially given as 3,709 Russians dead or missing. Of this number 2,325 were killed and 1,384 were missing. The number of wounded was not determined as in many cases they were given attention by the feldsher or first aid man before casualties could be counted. The total of Russian  (p156) officials killed was 24, and that of native officials was 55. The losses of the Russian troops were quite small: 97 were killed, 86 wounded and 176 persons were missing.

The significance of the Revolt of 1916 may be partially appreciated by comparing the above figures with Russian losses during their conquest of Turkistan. The following table​34 gives these losses:

The above figures include not only the dead but the wounded also. Comparison of the figures for the conquest and the Revolt of 1916 shows that the rebellion cost the Russians more in blood than the entire conquest of the five oblasts of Turkistan!

The forces required by the Russians to suppress a revolt by natives untrained in military technique, undisciplined, and at best not having enough rifles to go around, without the assistance of railroads, automobiles, artillery, or machine guns was quite large by the usual standards of forces dealing with colonial peoples.​35 The Russians, in the suppression of the  p159 revolt, utilized 14½ battalions of troops, 33 sotnias of Cossacks, 42 cannon, and 69 machine guns. In addition such modern  (p157) aids as gunboats, automobiles, the telephone, and telegraph were also utilized. Even in the matter of rifles the Russians employed superior models in addition to having much larger numbers of them. Though the insurgents had some Berdans and other modern makes they were also dependent on flintlocks and matchlocks. They rarely had much in the way of cartridges or lead and powder to use with these rifles while the Russians, after the initial attack, sent in large stores of ammunition.

In a material way the Russians saw destroyed of their property 9,000 homesteads, large tracts of the railway, many bridges, schools, churches, and hospitals, stations, and other government buildings. The greatest material damage, as well as the greatest physical suffering, was in the Przhevalsk uezd, followed by parts of the Jarkent and Pishpek uezds. The Treasury suffered not only from the destruction of many of its installations but from the non-collection of taxes during the time of the revolt.

Great as the losses were for the Russian population they were slight compared to those suffered by the subject peoples, especially the Kirghiz and Kazakhs of Semirechie. In five of the uezds of Semirechie (excluding Kopal) the losses in population and property for the subject peoples are given below.​36

The figures for the oblast as a whole give a loss of 20% of the population, 50% of the horses, 39% of the cattle, 55% of the camels, 58%  (p158) of the sheep and goats. The area under crop was reduced by 163,000 hectares.​37

 p160  The loss in life among the non-Russians of Semirechie has never been officially estimated though it certainly numbered several tens of thousands.

The economy of the subject population in Semirechie was dealt a blow from which it took years to recover. Here is the report of one observer who in 1919 three years after the revolt, passed through a portion of the area where some of the bitterest fighting took place:

Among the Sarts the greatest damage by far to the native population, both physically and materially, was caused in the Jizak uezd. According to official figures one Russian unit alone destroyed 24 villages completely, 11 villages from one-half to three-fourths, and 11 villages partially. The number of natives killed is given officially at 958 though Miklashevsky asserts that it was in reality probably around 5,000.​39

The suppression of the rebellion did not at all mean an end to the suffering of the subject peoples at the hands of the Russian population,  (p159) who took advantage of their abject condition. Thus one Moslem agent communicates the following to the Russian authorities on January 5, 1917: "The population has so suffered from the punitive units and is so frightened that not only is it afraid to talk of any sort of attack but even to think of one. All the difficulties which they now have to undergo with the railway workers and the guards (the theft  p161 of household goods and sheep, goats, and swine) they take without a murmur, not even making any complaints to the administrative officials, to avoid any sort of misunderstanding. . . . The former local bais in the village do not, at present, appear as bais but as destitute persons, ruined completely by the late disorders."​40 A similar mood of abjection and extensive marauding by the Russian population can be reported concerning the nomads.

E. The Dispatch of Workers to the Front

The first dispatch of workers to the front occurred in the three basic oblasts of Turkistan after the suppression of the revolt at the end of July. Among these workers there was a good percentage of "volunteers," often mentioned in the official reports and in the newspapers at the time. These in reality were workers who had been hired by others to take their places. Demonstrations of loyalty by these "volunteers" were organized by the Russian officials which took place at the same time that the punitive units were doing their work. A typical such demonstration was reported by the head of the Namangan garrison on July 25:

Thus these workers were utilized not only to take the place of the well-to‑do members of the native population but also to take part in demonstrations instigated by the Russian authorities to whip up enthusiasm for the conscription order.

 p162  The dispatch of workers continued during the following months though the country was still in the throes of revolt in many places. On October 11 Kuropatkin notes in his journal that there had already been dispatched sixteen trains of workers and two train loads of Turkoman guards.​42 The end of October saw the beginning of the dispatch of workers from Semirechie.

Details are few regarding the provisions made for the equipping of the workers for their stay in a country strange to them. In the Aulie-ata uezd, according to the report of the uezd head, Colonel Kastalsky, to Kuropatkin, the cost was borne by a huge levy on the population of the uezd. Whereas the various taxes on the 50,000 kibitkas in the uezd amounted to 18 roubles per kibitka, per year, the special levy for the benefit of the 12,000 workers sent by the uezd amounted to an additional 100 roubles per  kibitka, or 5 million roubles for the whole uezd. Over 100 roubles went towards the furnishing of clothes for each worker while the worker also received 300‑400 roubles for himself.

By February 1, 110,000 workers had been sent. Of these 4,163 persons passed through Semipalatinsk to Omsk, 4,373 by the Central Asian railway to Krasnovodsk and on to Baku, while the bulk went via Tashkent by railroad to Orenburg. The dispatch of workers was halted for a time in February because of the severe cold, while the February Revolution at the end of the month was to bring an end to the dispatch of workers. On March 12 the commander of the armies of Turkistan ordered the sending of workers to be halted until further orders were received. Not long after this the Provisional Government at Petrograd  (p161) annulled the supreme command. The middle of 1917 brought the return of the conscripted workers home.

Part of the workers who were drafted were left in the Central Asian krai. By an order from Petrograd 10,000 workers were assigned to work in Turkistan on the railway and on defense work. In Semipalatinsk 1,000 workers were left in the country besides those classes already exempted by virtue of the fact that they were engaged in defense work, agricultural work,  p163 etc. Workers were also hired for the construction of the Murmansk railway.​43

The workers sent to Russia proper worked not only behind the front lines but in the industrial regions of Central Russia, the Ukraine, etc. The first months of 1917 found significant groups of soldiers in Moscow, Petrograd, Odessa, Nizhni-Novgorod, Kharkov, and on the railways.​a

The workers in Russia found conditions most unfavorable. They lived either in barracks or under the open sky while their food and clothing were both unsatisfactory. At the front they were sent to dangerous sectors to work while those in the factories worked at the most menial and exhausting labor.​44 Their pay was most unsatisfactory — from 1 to 10 roubles per month. Because of their lack of good clothing and quarters they fell prey to many diseases. Those who were returned to their homes because of illness had little good to say about their experience. One Russian official in Kokand wrote in his official report in March 1917: "they [the workers] describe to the population all that they saw in rather dark tones. In the main they express dissatisfaction with the food and also they are unused to the cold climate of European Russia."​45

The conditions existing among one group of natives are described by one officer detailed to make an inspection by the Asiatic section of the General Staff. This group of workers were located at the "Sortirovochny" station near Petrograd and were engaged in work under the  (p162) direction of the motor vehicle division of the Army. Second Lieutenant Matveev, who made the inspection on March 23, 1917, placed the number of workers here at 1,300. He found most of the workers living in earthen barracks poorly suited for living purposes, especially for the natives accustomed to a southern climate. The remainder of the workers, some 200 in number, lived in railway sleeping cars. Matveev characterizes the conditions he found in the barracks as follows:

Matveev then goes on to describe the conditions under which the workers quartered in the sleeping cars lived: "The conditions of the workers living in the sleeping cars from their very arrival and lasting through five severe winter months were even worse."​47

The administration, Matveev complains, did nothing to better these conditions even though much improvement could have been made with only a limited expenditure of money. In the matter of food, conditions were equally unsatisfactory. "The wasted appearance of the majority of workers completely emphasizes the insufficiency of food."

Working conditions were no better. The work day started at seven o'clock in the morning and lasted until six o'clock at night, but inasmuch as the workers were required to travel from one to one and a half hours to reach their place of work they were forced to arise at from five to six o'clock in the morning. They worked seven days a week and Matveev reported that they had had only two holidays off in five months.

Upon arrival in the camp the workers were issued 12 to 15 short fur  (p163) cloaks per  hundred, 12 to 15 felt boots, and 50 gloves per hundred, and all were given a pair of underwear. Matveev found the workers needing shoes badly, which item had been in short supply for a long time.

In the matter of pay the natives expressed bewilderment as some were given more and some less in the matter of pay. Since most of the workers were illiterate they had no way to check the wage rates.

The workers had access to a bath but, inasmuch as this was open from nine in the morning to nine at night, the workers had only an hour to an hour and a half at the end of the day to avail themselves of this facility. The workers told Matveev that in  p165 all the time they were there they had taken a bath only three times.

Matveev then concludes his report with the complaint that the non-commissioned officers present resorted to physical force at times when dealing with the natives, that bribe-taking was prevalent, that complaints were suppressed, and that the Russian authorities deliberately minimized the authority of the officials elected by the natives from their ranks (the "thousanders").

F. The Duma and the Revolt

Not only the Tsarist government but also the Duma were greatly alarmed when information about the first disorders in Turkistan were reported. At the same time that Kuropatkin was appointed Governor-General, the Duma sent a special commission to Turkistan composed of the Duma members Alexander Kerensky and the representatives of the Moslem faction Tevkelev. On September 10 these members reported their findings to a closed meeting of members of the Duma. These findings were discussed during the latter part of September at meetings of the military commission of the State Duma. Finally at the beginning of December three questions were asked of the government in the Duma. In the drawing up of these questions there participated the Moslem, Menshevik, Cadet, and Progressive sections of the Duma. Before proceeding with the questions themselves the inquiry of the Duma noted that it had repeatedly pointed to the irregularity of the principle which exempted the natives of Central Asia and the Caucasus  (p164)  from military service. The natives now were being called for work behind the lines which was relatively safe in comparison with service at the front. The Duma also pointed out that this measure had been adopted without the participation of the Duma, the legal institution for dealing with such questions. The government, especially the Ministers of War and of the Interior, had showed an utter incapability of dealing with the situation which had arisen in Turkistan. They had estimated the call without any preliminary regulations being issued. The three questions themselves were as follows: (1) Did the Prime Minister and the Ministers of the Interior and of  p166 War know that in taking the natives for work in the rear without the participation of the Duma in the question they infringed on the basic laws of the country, and did they not know that in not promulgating detailed regulations for the call of workers they had not fulfilled the second point of the supreme command of June 25, 1915? (2) An inquiry is made of the Minister of Justice as to why he allowed the promulgation of the said irregular measures and did not afterwards institute a criminal investigation against the guilty persons. (3) If the above is known to the said ministers what measures have been taken to make right the violated provisions of the law?

The Duma never received satisfaction in its interrogation, and the whole incident shows the impotence of the Duma in the face of the actions of the Tsar's ministers. On the other hand, it was even more drastic in its demands than the Tsarist government in that it demanded military service for all subject peoples, and not work conscription as an alternative.

---

The Author's Notes:

1 Report of the Dragoman of the Kashgar Consulate Stefanovich, Vosstanie 1916 g. v Kirghizstane, pp111‑112.

2 Shestakov, op. cit., p92.

3 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p257.

4 Ibid., p257.

5 See Journal of Kuropatkin: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii, pp45‑67.

6 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p258.

7 Shestakov, op. cit., p93.

8 Galuzo, op. cit., p156.

9 Introduction: Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii, op. cit., p43.

10 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p260.

11 Great credence was attached to these reports by the British; see Great Britain Naval Staff, Naval Intelligence Division, A Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism (London, c. 1918), pp228‑229, 231.

12 Report of Folbaum to Kuropatkin: K. A. 3, no. 16 (1926), p72. Ko Lau Hui (Elder Brethren Society): not "anarchist," but a Chinese secret society with peasant, soldier, and bandit ramifications and with Chinese nationalist, anti-Manchu traditions.

13 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p250.

14 Pamyatnaya zapiska o kirgizakh: "K istorii vosstaniya Kirghiz v 1916 g.," op. cit., p66.

15 "Dzhizakskoe vosstanie 1916 g." op. cit., p69.

16 Ibid., p82.

17 Lt. Col. Etherton, "Central Asia: Its Rise as a Political and Economic Factor," Journal of the Central Asian Society, vol. X (1923), p91.

18 Toynbee and Kirkwood, op. cit., p56.

19 Kohn, op. cit., p244.

20 George Young, "Pan-Islamism," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol. XI, p543.

21 Czaplicka, op. cit., p11.

22 Etherton, "Central Asia," op. cit., p91.

23 It is significant that at the All-Russian Moslem Conference held in Moscow in May 1927, the official language was Russian as it was the only language all the delegates could understand. See Arnold J. Toynbee, "Islam in Russia since the Revolution," Journal of Central Asian Society, vol. V (1918), p80.

24 Ibid., pp74‑79.

25 For a description of these camps by eyewitnesses see Capt. A. H. Brun, Troublous Times: Experiences in Bolshevik Russia and Turkistan (London, 1931); Gustav Krist, Prisoner in the Forbidden Land (London, 1938).

26 Miklashevsky, op. cit., pp249‑250.

27 George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918‑1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry (Ithaca, N. Y., 1949), p149.

28 Report of Kuropatkin to Nicholas II, Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii, op. cit., p90.

29 Persia, though nominally neutral, became part of the battleground in which the forces of Turkey, Germany, England, and Russia were engaged. See Maj. Gen. I. C. Dunsterville, The Adventures of Dunsterforce (London, 1920).

30 Journal of Kuropatkin, Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii, op. cit., p60.

31 Report of Kuropatkin to Nicholas II, Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii, op. cit., p87.

32 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p271.

33 Report of Kuropatkin to Nicholas II, Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii, op. cit., p81.

34 Ibid., p86.

35 Thus, during the French conquest of Indo-China François Gamier with only 17 officers, 175 sailors, and 2 artillerymen took the city of Hanoi, which was defended by 7,000 men. See Gabriel Hanotaux (Editor), Histoire de la Nation française (tome VIII), Histoire Militaire et Navale, vol. II (Paris, 1927), p468. During the Sepoy Mutiny in India a force under Henry Havelock of a thousand British soldiers, 30 Sikhs, 20 volunteers, and 6 guns defeated a force of 5,000 natives on July 16, 1857. See H. H. Dodwell (Editor), The Cambridge History of India, vol. VI, The Indian Empire 1858‑1918 (New York and Cambridge, England, 1932).

36 A. A. Anson, "Vosstanie kazakov." Sibirskaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia, vol. I, p531.

37 A hectare = 2.471 acres.

38 Pavel S. Nazaroff, Hunted through Central Asia (Edinburgh and London, 1932), pp165‑166.

39 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p272.

40 Ibid., pp272‑273.

41 Ibid., p269.

42 Journal of Kuropatkin, Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii, op. cit., p57.

43 Stepnyak, op. cit., p139.

44 Brainin and Shafiro, op. cit., p96.

45 Miklashevsky, op. cit., p273.

46 Deposition of Lt. Matveev, "Iz istorii vosstaniya kirgizov i kazakhov v 1916 g.," Borba Klassov, no. 7‑8 (1932), p138.

47 Ibid.

---

Thayer's Note:

a A reminder that even when the author wrote, Odesa and Kharkiv were not in "Russia proper" but in Ukraine; indeed, they've never been in Russia.

◂ previous						next ▸
Images with borders lead to more information. The thicker the border, the more information. (Details here.)
UP TO:		The Revolt of 1916	Central Asian History	Readings in Asian History	Home
A page or image on this site is in the public domain ONLY if its URL has a total of one *asterisk. If the URL has two **asterisks, the item is copyright someone else, and used by permission or fair use. If the URL has none the item is © Bill Thayer. See my copyright page for details and contact information.

Accessibility