mail: Bill Thayer	Help	Up	Home
previous: Foreword/Preface This webpage reproduces a chapter of Combined Operations by Hilary St. George Saunders published by The Macmillan Company New York, 1943 The text is in the public domain. This page has been carefully proofread and I believe it to be free of errors. If you find a mistake though, please let me know! next: Chapter 2

 p1  1. . . . To be known as Commandos

A little before dawn on the 27th December, 1941, a force of His Majesty's ships was moving through the calm waters of a Norwegian fjord. In the van was a 6‑inch cruiser. On her bridge stood a Rear‑Admiral and a Brigadier. Astern of her followed destroyers covering two infantry landing ships. The landing craft these carried were being rapidly and silently entered by two Commandos of a Special Service Brigade. A few minutes passed and there came to ears straining to hear it the sound of aircraft engines. Through the thick darkness overhead Hampden bombers of the Royal Air Force swept by. They were not out of earshot before the men in the ships saw coloured lights thrusting vehemently against the sky in a confused and fiery pattern, constantly changed and renewed, and heard above the din of gunfire the duller, louder sound of exploding bombs. The assault on the Island of Maaloy and the town of South Vaagso off the coast of Norway had begun.

It was a combined operation in which officers and men of all three Services took part, and it is the purpose of this narrative to give some account of the conduct of such operations in this present war.

Combined operations are no new development in our history. They are the inevitable consequence of sea power. We were already familiar with them in the sixteenth century when Spain was the adversary. Drake in the West Indies in 1585, Essex and Howard at Cadiz in 1596, showed how a combination of sea and land forces could inflict great hurt on the enemy. It was a lesson once learnt that has never been forgotten, though it has sometimes been badly applied. Against the failure of the expeditions to Walcheren in 1809 and to Gallipoli in 1915 can be set the capture of Gibraltar by George of Hesse-Darmstadt, Rooke and Byng in July 1704, of Quebec by Wolfe and Saunders in September 1759, and of Cape Town by Craig, Clarke and Elphinstone in September 1795. These "conjunct expeditions," to give them their eighteenth-century name, achieved permanent results. Others, such as the burning of eighty French sail in St. Malo in 1758 by a grandson of the great Duke of Marlborough, were  p2 raids designed to inflict loss in men, ships and stores on the enemy. It is into this latter class that all the combined operations conducted against the Germans fell until 8th November, 1942, when an army of the United Nations, supported by a United Nations fleet and air force, landed in French North Africa, and by so doing changed the whole course of this war. Up to then, no more had been attempted than a series of raids in varying strength carried out on the coasts of countries as far apart as Norway and Libya.

They began immediately after the fall of France, when the British Empire found itself fighting almost alone against enemies who held all the coasts of Western Europe save those of Portugal and Spain, who were established in North Africa and Abyssinia, who were soon to make themselves masters of Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete, and whose intentions towards Syria could not even be described as doubtful. Old ambitions, "non sufficit Orbis," that outworn boast which had seemed so proud to Philip of Spain, which had swelled the heart of King Louis and led Napoleon through Moscow and the blazing streets of Leipzig to Waterloo, stirred again in the mean minds of an Austrian paper-hanger and an Italian stone‑mason. In the early autumn of 1940, it must have seemed to Hitler and Mussolini that, of a truth, the world would not suffice. Indeed, the first made no secret of his designs — after the British Empire, Russia; after Russia, the United States; and the second was ready to follow provided his partner did the fighting. There was a change of programme as that lovely autumn gave place to an unyielding winter and the Battle of Britain ended in defeat, not for the Royal Air Force but for the German Luftwaffe. The order of the victims was altered, and Russia was placed first on the list. Thus was time given to us at what was, perhaps, the most critical moment of our history, to place ourselves in a state and posture not only of defence but gradually of attack.

The first beginnings could hardly have been more modest, a few raids by a few men on a few unimportant enemy posts. Then came stronger raids on more important places, some of them thousands of miles from England. In these, heavier ships of the Royal Navy and aircraft of the Royal Air Force played their parts. On 19th August, 1942, came a raid on Dieppe in which tanks were put ashore and the number of troops (mostly Canadian) and aircraft employed was far greater than in any previous operation. Eighty days later the invasion of French North Africa began, "the greatest combined operation of all time" with the  p3 possible exception of that mounted by the Persian Xerxes — and Herodotus was not very good at figures — some twenty-three centuries earlier and a few hundreds of miles further eastward in the same Mediterranean area. Thus is the process of passing from defence to attack and of building up that attack continuing to develop. One day it was reach its peak.

The Independent Companies

The first troops specifically chosen for raiding were the Independent Companies. They were raised in a hurry to meet the need for offensive operations against the enemy in Norway, and were all volunteers taken from every regiment in the British Army and placed under specially selected officers. Events moved fast — faster than their training programme. Half the companies, under the command of Brigadier C. Gubbins, M. C., soon found themselves in Norway fighting side by side with units of the Regular Army, notably the Scots and Irish Guards, until their final withdrawal from Norway. Their exploits and adventures form part of the Norwegian campaign and will be told when their story is written. Through force of circumstances they did not perform the duties for which they had been brought into being. They did not raid the enemy in the full sense of the word, but fought with him in a more regular manner, and in so doing gave a very good account of themselves. On returning to the British Isles they were established in Scotland and Northern Ireland, where they continued their interrupted training, being shortly afterwards transformed from Independent Companies into Special Service Battalions.

In the meantime the other half of the Independent Companies were still in England fitting themselves for their future task. In May the Norwegian campaign gave place to that of Holland, Flanders and France. Its tragic ending six weeks later found those three countries laid at the proud foot of the conqueror and our own armies back from Dunkirk in good heart but woefully short of weapons and munitions of war. Their survival depended on the avoidance of a straight fight until these were once more in their hands.

The Germans hesitated to embark on the hazardous enterprise of an invasion at least until they had won the mastery of the air. This being denied to them by the valour and skill of Fighter Command, they made no attempt to assault the British Isles otherwise than by bombing attacks carried out under the cover of darkness. A lull in land fighting  p4 ensued, during which the main armies of both sides were no longer in contact. Here, therefore, was an opportunity to engage in a kind of amphibious guerrilla warfare to which the British were, by temperament and tradition, peculiarly suited. The national love for the sea could be combined with the national love of the chase; and in this case the quarry would be "the brutish German infantry" now strung out from Narvik to Bordeaux to guard the stolen coasts of Europe and to oppress the peoples they had conquered. The Royal Navy would convey bands of trained soldiers up and down the length of those coasts to demonstrate on small bodies of the enemy that offensive spirit which their less fortunate comrades were, for the moment, unable by force of circumstances to display against his main forces.

This idea commended itself to the Prime Minister and to Sir John Dill, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and about a week after the evacuation of Denmark, Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. Clarke, Royal Artillery, of that Staff was ordered to prepare a scheme. He was a most experienced officer, with great knowledge of guerrilla warfare gained from service in Palestine at the time of the Arab rebellion. He set to work and in a few days produced the outline of a scheme which had been long in his mind. The men for this type of irregular warfare should, he suggested, be formed into units to be known as Commandos — a name which, he thought, suggested exactly what was wanted. Nor was the historical parallel far‑fetched. After the victories of Roberts and Kitchener had scattered the Boer army, the guerrilla tactics of its individual units (which were styled "Commandos") had, for many months, prevented decisive victory from crowning the efforts of forces vastly superior in numbers and arms. Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke had, himself, seen the like feat repeated in Palestine by Arab bands against a whole army corps of regular troops.

His ideas were accepted; so also, with some hesitation, was the name Commando. Two considerations were clear from the outset. First, the Commandos were formed because at that time, June 1940, there was no existing unit of the British Army which could be made available for raiding operations. That is the bald truth. So serious was our situation that not one battalion for many months to come could be spared from the paramount task of organising the defence of the British Isles against invasion. Secondly, the most stringent economy in weapons had to be exercised. All that the factories, working night and day, were able to produce was inevitably earmarked for the main Army. Only a few  p5 weapons of modern design were at the disposal of the troops engaged in raiding; or, to put it more exactly, the number of these troops depended on the number of weapons available. So short indeed was the supply of arms at that time that the Commandos had not enough with which to train, and only drew their full compliment of such weapons as tommy guns when about to set out on a raid. On their return, the arms went back to a central store.

The Independent Companies had been formed, and special training was given to them in order that they might be available as a force to supplement the Royal Marines, in whom reposes the tradition of amphibious warfare. Such a course was necessary, for the rapidly growing strength of the Royal Navy imposed a considerable strain on the resources in men of the Royal Marines, most of whom at the outbreak of war went to sea in His Majesty's ships and have remained at sea every since. The Independent Companies were designed to be complete units in themselves, and to be contained in a ship which was to be their home and their floating base. They could thus be moved almost anywhere at very short notice and in a comparatively short time. They were trained to dispense with the normal methods of supply. They were not to depend on the Quartermaster, but were to be, as far as possible, self-contained.

When the Independent Companies gave place to the Special Service Battalions which in their turn were transformed into the Commandos, the original conception of their tactical use was preserved. The Commando or Special Service Troops were to be amphibious. This meant, first and foremost, that they must learn to co‑operate with the Royal Navy. Schools for this purpose were established in various convenient places on the coasts of Great Britain so that the men might become familiar with the ways of life, the customs, the habits and the outlook of sailors. These Combined Training Centres were to be, and became, of great importance. They will be referred to again in the next chapter.

Jack and John Go Out Together

To get in and out of a small boat in all kinds of weather, to swim — if necessary in full equipment with firearms held above the water, to be familiar with all the portable weapons of the soldier from the rifle and the tommy gun to the three‑inch mortar and the anti‑tank rifle, to be able to carry and use high explosives, to hunt tanks and their crews — here are some of the things that the Commando soldier must learn. To do so, however, is only to become proficient in the use of the tools of his  p6 trade of war. He must do more than this; he must master his mind as well as his body and become not only a specially trained soldier but a trained individual soldier. In other words, self-reliance and self-confidence form an integral, vital part of his mental and moral make‑up. To achieve these mutually dependent qualities the men, on entering the depot, are treated as far as possible as individuals. They are required to do everything for themselves. It is not for them to await orders from their officer or their N. C. O. They must do the sensible, obvious thing just because it is the sensible, obvious thing.

In so doing they are developing a way of life first taught them when they joined the British Army as recruits, for nearly all of them came to the Commandos having already passed through the rigorous modern training undergone by our Army. Upon this essential and solid foundation the specialized Commando training with its emphasis on individual initiative is superimposed. To give an example. A Troop — the sub‑units of a Commando are known as Troops — will come off parade at, say, 3 P.M. and is then told that the next parade will be at 6 A.M. on the following morning at a place •60, 70, sometimes 100 miles away. How each Commando soldier gets to that place is his own affair. The difficulties he may encounter, the shifts to which he may be put to carry out this order do not matter. What does matter is that he be at the appointed place at the appointed time.

Self-confidence springs from the possession of confidence in those appointed to lead. At the depot the embryo Commando soldier soon discovers that his instructors do exactly what he does, only always a little better, however hard he may strive. The old principle of teaching of example bears ripe and rapid fruit.

He is also expected to use his individualism for the common good. If he has a suggestion to make concerning, for example, the best way of carrying one of his weapons, or for moving silently through thick country, he is encouraged to put it forward at once. All ideas are considered on their merits and, if found useful, adopted.

Finally, the young Commando soldier is taught to appreciate to the full the meaning and value of friendship in war. He is encouraged to do everything with a friend and to regard himself as being one of a team of two. Jack always falls in beside John. If Jack is a Bren gunner or an anti‑tank rifle­man, John is his number two and handles the magazines. When scouts are sent to front or flank, Jack and John go out together. Their team work is vital to the safety and success of the troop moving  p7 through enemy country. If Jack is on cookhouse fatigue, John bears a hand. One of the assault courses over which recruits are sent when under training is called "Me and My Pal." It means just what it says. Its obstacles — and they are tough and numerous — have to be overcome together in anticipation of those which will be met and vanquished together on the field of battle. Friendship between two men engaged in the business of war is as old as war itself. Achilles and Patroclus, David and Jonathan, Roland and Oliver, the names change; the spirit remains. Those who train the Commandos have recognised its worth; they foster and cherish it so that the officers who take them into action may know that their men will fight, not with steel only, but with strong united hearts.

The physical conditions of Commando training are strenuous, but well within the endurance of young men all of whom have passed a severe medical test. They march many miles over all kinds of country; they swim rivers or cross them on bridges made of toggle ropes (a toggle rope is a length of cord with a wooden handle at one end and a loop at the other — and is carried by every man).⁠a They go over specially-prepared assault courses where only live ammunition and live bombs are used. They climb cliffs; they do physical exercises in parties of eight together bearing a log •eight inches thick on their shoulders. When out on a scheme which may last for 18 hours or more, they cook their own food. In camp, they live in tents or huts which they are taught to maintain in a condition of clean smartness rivalling that of the Guards, and their drill, under Guards instructors, is of the same high standard.

Getting tough. Swimming in full equipment, crossing mined rivers on toggle-rope bridges, are part of the training designed to foster the spirit of attack and accustom the men to overcoming natural obstacles.

Thus, when they reach their Commando Units they are already hard men, physically and morally, able to perform considerable feats of endurance. They have need to be so, for the men they join are harder. One troop in training once marched in fighting order 63 miles in 23 hours and 10 minutes, covering the first 33 miles in eight hours dead. Another in field service order carrying five days' supply of all they needed, marched 130 miles in five days, covering the first •42 of these in 19 hours. Such marches are the rule, not the exception.

When not engaged in active operations the Commandos continue their training. They live, for the most part, in billets and receive no extra pay, but are allowed 6s. 8d. a day with which to keep themselves. In the maintenance of discipline, petty punishments are as far as possible avoided. They have not been abolished altogether, but they are infrequent and the necessity for their infliction does not often arise. The man  p8 who commits too many small crimes suffers the final penalty: he leaves his Commando. To judge from some of the letters written by men who have so left and who have asked in vain for a second chance — this is a hard service and second chances are not given — their feelings are akin to those of Adam after his encounter with the Angel bearing the flaming sword.

---

Thayer's Note:

a A picture is worth a thousand words. Royal Navy Reservist Ed Hallett has given us eight instructive photographs and good text: Toggle Rope.

						next ▸
Images with borders lead to more information. The thicker the border, the more information. (Details here.)
UP TO:		Combined Operations	British History		Home
			World War II History	Military History
A page or image on this site is in the public domain ONLY if its URL has a total of one *asterisk. If the URL has two **asterisks, the item is copyright someone else, and used by permission or fair use. If the URL has none the item is © Bill Thayer. See my copyright page for details and contact information.

Accessibility