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Chapter 9 		This webpage reproduces a chapter of

Combined Operations
by Hilary St. George Saunders

published by The Macmillan Company
New York,
1943

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Chapter 11

 p71  10. Assault from the Sea: St. Nazaire

Only Brest and Lorient can rival the importance of St. Nazaire as a German naval base for enemy forces engaged in the Battle of the Atlantic. St. Nazaire contains not only every kind of facility for the maintenance, arming, provisioning and repair of U‑boats, but also the only dry dock on the Atlantic seaboard capable of holding the battle­ship "Tirpitz." It was towards this great dry‑dock, called by some the Forme Ecluse, by others the Forme Louis Joubert, which is •over 1,100 feet long, that the "Bismarck" was undoubtedly making when she was sunk on the 27th May, 1941. If her sister ship, the "Tirpitz," were to replace her in the Atlantic battle, she would, on return from her cruise, have to make use of the Forme Ecluse, or else find her way to the German North Sea bases to undergo the needed refitting.

St. Nazaire, with a population of 50,000, is by the most direct route •over 250 miles away from the nearest British port. It is situated on the right or north bank of the Loire, •six miles in from the river mouth which is itself six miles wide, and it is shaped like the letter "L" reversed — the town representing the horizontal and the port the vertical, pointing due south. The port consists of an outer harbour or Avant Port, formed by two jetties and two docks in a straight line. The outer dock, or Bassin de St. Nazaire, is connected with the Avant Port by the South Lock which renders the docks free from tides, and the inner and larger dock or Bassin de Penhouet, with the Bassin de St. Nazaire, by a narrow passage over which is a swing bridge. Ships up to 10,000 tons can enter the Bassin de Penhouet through the South Lock. There is also an East Lock gate lying about half‑way along the Bassin de St. Nazaire, reached through a narrow channel which is known as the Old Entrance and was to play an important part in the operation.

Directly opposite the Old Entrance on the far side of the Bassin de St. Nazaire are the massive submarine pens — nine completed and five under construction. The great Forme Ecluse lies at the south-east corner of the Bassin de Penhouet and emerges beside the mouth of the Old  p72 Entrance at an angle of about 45 degrees to it. Jutting out into the Loire, about half‑way between the jetty of the Avant Port and the lock gate of the Forme Ecluse, is the Old Mole, rising •25 feet from the water and providing the enemy with a perfect site for two anti‑aircraft batteries. The narrow strip of land, sandwiched between the waters of the harbour and of the Loire, with its power stations, pumping machinery and other lock installations, warehouses and the Old Town of St. Nazaire itself, covers •no more than one square mile in all and is an area as closely defended as any along the whole western seaboard of German-occupied Europe. It was against these formidable ramparts that one of the most hazardous and success­ful experiments in the history of combined operations was launched.

The Plan of Attack

From the outset, the plan of the combined assault on St. Nazaire⁠a had a more ambitious military objective than any raid previously undertaken. On 12th February 1942, the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" made their way through the Channel to northern waters. Six weeks later, in the early hours of Thursday, 28th March, H. M. S. "Campbeltown," emerging from a tornado of enemy fire, discharged her last duty and rammed the lock gates of the Forme Ecluse, thereby preserving St. Nazaire from the "Tirpitz." The strategic balance in the Atlantic had been materially, perhaps decisively, improved.

In the plan as finally agreed upon, it was decided to make the destruction of the lock gates and mechanism of the Forme Ecluse by H. M. S. "Campbeltown" the principal object, while the destruction, first of the smaller South Lock gates and their installation, secondly of other key points such as pumping machinery for the Bassin, and thirdly of any accessible U‑boats and shipping, were to be subsidiary objects in that order of priority.

The Naval Force consisted of H. M. S. "Campbeltown," which was the former American destroyer U. S. S. "Buchanan" put into commission with the Royal Navy, two escorting Hunt class destroyers, H. M. S. "Atherstone" and H. M. S. "Tynedale," a motor gunboat, a motor torpedo boat and a number of motor launches, four of which carried torpedoes and the remainder the Military Force consisting of 44 officers and 224 other ranks of No. 2 Commando and detachments from others. The Naval Force Commander selected was Commander R. E. D. Ryder, R. N., in peacetime an antarctic explorer and winner of the Polar Medal,  p73 while the Military Force Commander was Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Newman, the Essex Regiment, commanding No. 2 Commando.

Surprise was the essential ingredient in the success of the plan, and elaborate precautions were taken to secure it. A diversionary bombing attack was arranged, the purpose of which was to distract the attention of the defenders' guns from the oncoming Naval Force, not only by bombs but also by the din of the aircraft overhead which, it was hoped, would drown the noise of the ships' engines. Aircraft of Coastal and Fighter Commands were detailed to give protection to the Force on the outward and return journeys.

The military plan of attack was based on landings at three places, over the bows of the "Campbeltown," from motor launches berthed either side of the Old Entrance, and on the north side of the Old Mole. The Force was divided into three main groups covering areas within a convenient radius of these landing points. Each group was in its turn subdivided and given particular objectives to attack and destroy. To each objective was assigned a demolition and a protection party, and it was laid down clearly that the demolition parties were to avoid being distracted from their vital tasks and to leave whatever fighting there might be as far as possible to the protecting parties. With the success­ful completion of the demolition work, in particular the blowing‑up of the bridges which was designed to convert the dock area into an island and thwart any effective enemy concentration, the plan for withdrawal was a systematic convergence on the Old Mole. Two hours was the maximum time allowed for the Military Force to complete its operation, by which time the Naval Force would have to leave in order to get clear before daybreak and regain the escorting destroyers.

It was agreed by the Force Commanders that the "Campbeltown," which was to be under the command of Lieutenant-Commander S. H. Beattie, R. N., being the main unit, should have prime consideration in all matters, and that the light craft should lead her in and give her full supporting fire. Cruising and assault orders were worked out which allowed for any sacrifice in order that the "Campbeltown" might get through. An elaborate system of time fuses was arranged in the "Campbeltown," which made possible the blowing‑up of five tons of explosives after allowing first for her impact with the lock and then for her scuttling. This task was entrusted to Lieutenant H. T. Tibbetts, R. N., who was awarded the D. S. C. for a piece of work which has been described by Commander Ryder as "both original and brilliant" and as  p74 covering the Force Commanders "against a whole multitude of circumstances we could not foresee."

The planning staffs at Combined Operations Headquarters gave special attention to the draught of "Campbeltown" and the height of the tides in the St. Nazaire area. To these problems was added the need for a full moon, which limited the possible dates for the operations to about five days. But the most important factor of all was weather — not only for the night of the bombing diversion but also for the whole period of the Force's departure from and return to port. Here the prospects were reasonably good. In the early spring, spells of easterly wind are common in the approaches to the Channel, which meant that, once past Ushant, the Force would be under the lee of the land. The wind brings with it bright sunny weather so that the land becomes warmer than the sea, and this causes sea haze off the west coast of France involving low cloud up to •40 or 50 miles off shore, which descends to patches of fog near land. This was the weather wanted, and as it set in well in advance of the official date of departure and there was a risk of losing the advantages of it, the Force curtailed its training, which had already involved a full-scale dress rehearsal at a British port, and set sail a day earlier than was originally arranged.

Alarms and Excursions

In spite of all the feverish preparations, when at last on the 26th March the expedition crept quietly out of harbour, it was the first time that the whole Force had been in company. It was a fine spring day with a swell coming in on the port quarter. Haze and low‑flying fighters helped to cover the ships. Commander Ryder made H. M. S. "Atherstone" his headquarters ship during this phase of the operation. The cruising order was in three columns: the port and starboard columns consisted of the motor launches, and the midships column of the two Hunt class destroyers, "Campbeltown," and the motor torpedo boat in tow.

The camaraderie between the Services is a particularly heartening feature of combined operations. Chief Engine-Room Artificer Howard, R. N., describes the arrival of the troops on the "Campbeltown" "in good health and singing all sorts of songs." A petty officer gave everyone the details of the job in hand, telling them at the same time how to make themselves interchangeable in their duties should the need arise. "We  p75 set about gossiping," says Lieutenant D. M. C. Curtis, R. N. V. R., commanding the motor gunboat; "it was almost like a pleasure party. We carried on through the night."

The morning of the 27th dawned bright and clear with visibility now extreme and the Force in broad Atlantic beyond the range of its air escort. There was the ever-present danger that it would be spotted by enemy reconnaissance aircraft and a continuous watch was kept. The first threat of discovery, however, came from under the sea. At 7.20 A.M. the "Tynedale" reported an object which seemed to be a submarine conning tower, and was ordered to investigate.

The first impression was correct. At 4,000 yards the "Tynedale" opened fire and the submarine crash-dived. A pattern of depth charges brought her conning tower to the surface and she was probably hit by gunfire. No more was seen or heard of her but although her destruction was highly probable, the result of the action was sufficiently inconclusive to give Commander Ryder grounds for anxious reflection. "At this stage," he reports, "when we were •about 100 miles or so south-west of Brest, I considered that we should continue with the voyage." This decision was based on the sound opinion that if the enemy had in fact spotted the Force, he would certainly return to take another look or send aircraft to attack. With any luck, only the destroyers would have been seen by the submarine, and so, after keeping him under water for two hours, the "Tynedale" and the "Atherstone" returned at high speed in a southwesterly direction, rejoining the rest of the Force by an indirect route.

The action with the submarine was only the prelude to further worries. Two trawlers which might well have had enemy aboard, were witnesses of it. "However," reports Commander Ryder, "they legged it at such a rate that I felt confident they had not sighted our Force. In spite of considerable misgivings I decided to leave them alone." After a number of false alarms the Force was whipped in and cruising order restored by 11 A.M.

"Don't Forget Whose Father I Am"

By now there was a pall of low cloud which gave good cover from reconnaissance aircraft. Evasion of French trawlers however, which soon appeared from all directions, became increasingly difficult; at about 11.35 A.M. the "Tynedale" was ordered to investigate one which appeared to be coming across her track from the north, while at about  p76 mid‑day, the motor gunboat was dispatched to another sighted fine on the starboard bow of the "Campbeltown." Both trawlers were boarded and, after the crews together with charts and papers had been taken off, sunk by gunfire. The captain of one of them was about thirty-three years old; "he was a good type, and my apologies more than once expressed for sinking his ship were met with the reply, 'C'est la guerre.' "

The afternoon was unevent­ful, and Commander Ryder was able to get some sleep. The force was well up to its scheduled time, and was in a position to proceed during the daylight hours at no more than eight knots, which greatly reduced its chance of being seen. During these hours of tense expectancy, personal comforts were not forgotten. "Our principal food," Lieutenant Curtis recalls, "through that day was large quantities of raisins which I had put in saucers on the bridge — we helped ourselves whenever we felt hungry." "I was even better off," reports Lieutenant K. Horlock, R. N. V. R., commanding M. L. 13, "for there was a fine ham on board which was kept in the wardroom. Whenever any of us were hungry (I had by then seven officers on board) we would go down and cut a slice of ham. It lasted throughout the operation."

Just after 5 P.M., a signal was received from the Commander-in‑Chief, Portsmouth, confirming the existence of five enemy torpedo-boats (each roughly equivalent in fire power to a British destroyer) and giving warning that they might be encountered. Two hours later came the welcome news that two additional escorting Hunt class destroyers, the "Cleveland" and the "Brocklesby," were being sent at maximum speed as reinforcements. When evening came, there was still no sign of an attack either from reconnaissance aircraft or from the U‑boat. "Our spirits were high," reports Commander Ryder. "It seemed incredible that we could really steam here without being spotted. Anyhow, here we were, it was nearly dark and the sea oily calm." At 8 P.M. the ships were ordered to stop, and according to plan the Force commanders and their staffs transferred to the M. G. B., which hauled out ahead of the Force. Lieutenant Curtis describes how there were cheers when his M. G. B. left the "Atherstone," who signalled, "Don't forget whose father I am." "This moved us, as 'Atherstone' had been our parent ship for a long time and we appreciated the compliment. I was much stirred as I took my M. G. B. to the head of the line." At the same time, the "Campbeltown" slipped the motor torpedo boat which took station astern.

 p77  The Right Place at the Right Time

During the afternoon the Force had been taking a decoy course across the bay southwards in the direction of La Pallice and La Rochelle. The "Campbeltown" had now been ordered to steer north-east at 15 knots for St. Nazaire. During the approach stage the small striking force of the motor gunboat and two torpedo-carrying M. L.s was formed ahead, then the "Campbeltown," followed by the remaining M. L.s in two columns, and the motor torpedo boat bringing up the rear. By 11 P.M., after having been at sea 33 hours, the Force was brought by the most brilliant and daring navigation on the part of Lieutenant A. R. Green, R. N., Force Navigation Officer, to exactly the right place at exactly the right time.

The "Atherstone" and the "Tynedale" now parted company and patrolled to seaward with last instructions to proceed at slow speed and avoid detection. Shortly afterwards, the ships could hear passing overhead the welcome drone of our bombers on their way to carry out the preliminary air assault. By midnight, gun flashes were seen in the distance to the north-east. By 12.45 A.M. on the 28th, the northern shore could be dimly discerned. The "Campbeltown" was started on her course and her speed reduced to 11 knots. Commander Ryder says that at this stage their feelings were "very buoyant but suppressed." The M. G. B., with Commander Ryder and Lieutenant-Colonel Newman on the bridge, leading the line, entered the main channel •about a mile west of the main entrance to the harbour. The dark shape of a patrol vessel was seen and safely passed, though the sky was lit with a veritable firework display of blue, green and white tracer from the German A. A. guns.

"The Glare of a Disturbed Enemy"

Shortly after the M. G. B. had spotted the arms of the Avant Port, about a mile off, came the first enemy challenge. It was from someone flashing an Aldis lamp, for the searchlights were still concentrating on our bombers. The M. G. B., how travelling at 15 knots, and no more than two cables ahead of "Campbeltown," made reply; but less than five minutes afterwards the enemy was evidently roused, and every available searchlight concentrated on the estuary, floodlighting the entire Force. "Each boat," writes Commander Ryder, "with her silvery white bow and stern wave was clearly visible, with the 'Campbeltown' astern  p78 of us rising up above all the others. The glare of a disturbed enemy was upon us."

The resources of bluff and distraction were rapidly running out, with the "Campbeltown" still nearly •two miles from the lock gate. A few moments later a dozen searchlights caught her. The period of stealth was at an end, all was now sound and fury. No narrative can do justice to the intensity and splendour of the action that was now joined or give full coherence to the events of the utmost violence and confusion crowding in on each other from all side at once. The steady sequence of the planning room was lost in the turmoil of the battle.

Thayer's Note:

a Operation Chariot.

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