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You can follow much of the geography by opening
Ian Macky's large map of modern Lithuania
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(The numbers link directly to the sections.)
1. | The Abdication of John Casimir (1668) |
2. | The Fruits of the Union of Lublin |
3. | Michael Wisniowiecki (1669‑1673) |
4. | John Sobieski (1674‑1696) |
Just as the reforms proposed for the Constitution of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic had led to Zebrzydowski's revolt in 1606, so projects planning to alter the law of free election of kings precipitated civil strife during the last years of John Casimir's reign and the closing stages of the Muscovite wars.
In 1648, John Casimir had married the French lady, Mary di Gonzaga, daughter of the Duke of Nevers, and second wife of his brother Ladislas. Due chiefly to the assistance rendered by the Austrians against the Swedish invaders, the Habsburgs had gained a greater influence at the Court of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic than their rivals, the Bourbons. Since, however, John Casimir remained without an heir, the activities of his French Queen began to find more and more expression in the politics of the day. And when in 1663, her niece, Anne of Bavaria, was wedded to Condé's son, the Duc d'Enghien, the movement to elect this Frenchman as John Casimir's successor (even before the latter's death) was ardently supported by Mary di Gonzaga and gained increasingly greater momentum. At the same time the Polish-Lithuanian ruler himself seemed to be quite willing to abdicate.
Fierce opposition to these plans, instigated by Austrian circles, appeared almost immediately under the leadership of George p150 Lubomirski, the Grand Hetman of Poland. He not only decried the intrigues of the queen, but even connived at the rebellious behavior of the disorderly military forces, who, both in Poland and in Lithuania, were insistently seeking salaries long overdue. Finally, having been indicted at the Diet of 1664 for fostering disloyalty in the army, Lubomirski organized a revolt, similar to that of 1606, to defend the integrity of the law of free election and to preserve the Constitution against reform. This short-lived uprising ended in 1666 with the Grand Hetman's submission to John Casimir and the latter's promise to introduce no innovations. The entire disgraceful incident seriously injured the prospects of Poland-Lithuania in the negotiations, which led to the truce of Andrussovo with Muscovy. In 1667, Mary di Gonzaga died; and the following year, John Casimir resigned, leaving Poland-Lithuania to retire to France.
With the last of the Vasas almost one century had elapsed since the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been created by the Union of Lublin. That one century had witnessed a sharp decrease in the frequency of the separate Lithuanian Convocations or National Diets. The reason unquestionably rested in the common cause the Lithuanian and Polish gentry had found in their struggles against the Swedes, who threatened their common ruler as well as their common Livonian possessions; and in the resistance they were compelled to offer the Muscovites, who sought to reduce the territorial expansiveness of both Lithuania and Poland. Similarly, that same century bore undeniable testimony that an effective and fruitful confederation of Lithuania and Poland was utterly impossible. The harmony and coordination necessary for such an alliance had not been attained. (Neither was any satisfactory understanding in these matters between the Lithuanians and the Poles established during the last century and a quarter of the dual Republic's existence.) Again, the Lithuanian magnates and boyars, who formed but a small portion of the nation, and who had p151 fallen under the influence of Polonization, continued to distinguish quite clearly between Lithuanian and Pole and pursued a definitely separatist policy.1 They seemed to be intrigued mainly by the exaggerated notions of liberty, which had been passionately nurtured by the Polish upper classes. And insofar as Lithuania's relations with Poland had enhanced and defended their personal privileges and apparently promised cooperation against the imperialistic tendencies of Muscovy, did the members of the Lithuanian gentry appear willing to maintain their political association with the Poles. Yet, although the efforts of Poland-Lithuania against Moscow achieved no tremendous success, it was the Polish conception of the meaning of true personal freedom, adopted by the Lithuanian magnates and boyars after 1569, that rendered the Republic a victim of decay, and led to the circumstances which deprived not only Poland, but Lithuania as well, of independence.
Undoubtedly the so‑called liberum veto marked the most idealistic and fantastic development of the idea of liberty. It was based on the conclusion that since all members of the gentry were equal, it would be impossible for the legislative organ of the state, the Diet, to enact any law or pass any measure without unanimous consent. Before the Union of Lublin, some seven Diets were dissolved in Poland by the use of this privilege after the year 1536. During the following eighty-three years (1569‑1652), no less than thirteen Polish-Lithuanian Diets were disrupted in this manner. And in the seventeenth century, the scope of the liberum veto became more extensive; it theoretically endowed an individual deputy (in practice, the support of some magnate seemed to be quite necessary) with the power to dissolve the Diet, thereby automatically invalidating all measures previously adopted, simply by expressing his disapproval or protest, even though his act were contrary to the will of an overwhelming majority. Consequently, in 1639, Lubomirski, Polish delegate from Cracow, and in 1652 p152 (at the time of the Cossack disturbances in the south), Sicinskis, the Lithuanian deputy from Upyte, abruptly put an end to the proceedings of the Diet by refusing to sanction the prolongation of the sessions beyond the customary six-week period. The latter was abetted by the magnate, Jonusas Radvila.
In fine, after one century of union with Poland, Lithuania had not only failed to banish the Muscovite peril from her eastern borders, but had also been drawn into an extreme parliamentarian system, which endangered all internal order and authority.
John Casimir having abdicated, the Vasa tradition in the throne of Polish-Lithuanian Republic ended. The election of 1669 proved to be a truly chaotic one. Among the foreign candidates were Philip William of Neuberg, who was the husband of John Casimir's sister, and had lost the support of the Habsburgs because of his relations with Louis XIV; Charles Leopold, advocated by the Emperor; and the Duc d'Enghien, son of the great Condé, the French contender. After prolonged wrangling in the Senate and even armed clashes, due mainly to the impatient actions of the lesser gentry, a native petty boyar, Michael Wisniowiecki, was uproariously proclaimed ruler of the Republic.
This new King was the son of Prince Jeremy Wisniowiecki, who attained a degree of fame by his heroic attempts to protect the gentry's possessions against the revolting Cossacks in the days of Bogdan Chmielnicki. His family claimed descent from Kaributas, one of the sons of Algirdas, Lithuania's Grand Duke in the fourteenth century. Having settled in the southern areas (later known as the Ukraine) of the Grand Duchy, they were not only subjected to Ruthenian influences, but also to the Polish, after Poland had acquired those territories from Lithuania at the Union of Lublin. Michael's father, however, had succeeded in becoming one of the wealthiest and most powerful landlords in those regions. His fortunes, nevertheless, were reversed by the Cossack uprisings.
Again, at this election, the Lithuanians were represented simply p153 by their senators and their deputies from the district dietines, whereas the Polish gentry, as usual, had appeared en masse. Boguslas Radvila, who with his few followers, had arrived at Warsaw from Koenigsberg supported the candidacy of Philip William of Neuberg. His rivals, the Pacas family, whose prestige was carefully respected by the majority of the Lithuanian delegates, at first favored the French prince, and when the latter's name was finally withdrawn by the separate decision of the lesser gentry, they turned to Wisniowiecki.
The year following his elevation to the throne, Michael married Emperor Leopold's sister, Eleonora Maria. This relationship with the Austrian Habsburgs made neither authoritative nor dignified his short reign, which had begun with such an ominous portent as the dissolution of the Diet at the coronation. His sole adherents seemed to have been the Pacas grouping in Lithuania and the lesser gentry in Poland. The French party, with whom John Sobieski was identified, and who had accepted large bribes from Louis XIV, had only bitter opposition to offer him. In fact, the discovery of a conspiracy sponsored by Sobieski, the Polish Grand Hetman and Prazmowski, the Primate, threatened to create a civil war between the former and the King's supporters, or, as the latter have been called, the Austrian party.
In the meanwhile, other events had been transpiring in the Polish Ukraine. The treaty of Andrussovo, through which Moscow had acquired the territories east of the Dnieper together with Kiev, had only served to intensify the antagonistic attitude of the Cossacks, who were quite anxious to reunite the partitioned Ukrainian lands. Their leader, Doroszenko, being favorably disposed neither towards Muscovite nor Polish jurisdiction and unable to free himself from either, had allied himself with the Turks; and, in 1672, the forces of the Porte, with their Sultan Mahomet IV and their commander Ahmad Kiuprili, invaded Podolia, captured Kamenets, and brought about the surrender of Lwow. By the treaty of Buczacz (1672), the Turks acquired Polish Podolia, suzerainty over Western Ukraine, and even exacted an annual tribute from Michael.
These hastily accepted terms were not well received in Poland, p154 especially by the French party. Civil war was averted by a temporary reconciliation between Wisniowiecki's and Sobieski's followers, effected at the Diet of 1673, and by a public rejection of the peace of Buczacz. In November of that year, Sobieski seemed to save Poland's honor by a victory over the Turks at Chocim.
The Diet of 1673 permitted the Lithuanians to demonstrate again their separatist tendencies. On this occasion, they succeeded in wresting for themselves an amendment to the provisions of the Union of Lublin. By refusing to assist the Poles in their Turkish wars, they induced them to agree that every third General Diet, whose Marshal was a Lithuanian, would be summoned thereafter at Gardinas in Lithuania.
The day after Sobieski's victory at Chocim, Michael Wisniowiecki died. Once more foreign candidates did not hesitate to seek the vacant Polish-Lithuanian throne. Among them were: Charles Leopold of Lorraine, who enjoyed the support of Austria and still sought to regain his territorial principality, which since 1670 had been in the possession of France; the son of Philip William of Neuberg, related to the late Sigismund Vasa; James, Duke of York; and one of the princes of Condé, whose supporters were chiefly interested in gaining the election of an individual intimate and friendly with Louis XIV.
It soon became evident that the candidates of the French and Austrian groups would be the only serious contenders for the crown of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic. The Pacas family, influential with the overwhelming majority of the Lithuanian gentry, lent their support to Charles of Lorraine. The Polish magnates remained in favor of the French party. However, since the more numerous Polish gentry had not forgotten their struggle against the French partisans during Wisniowiecki's short reign, and refused to support the candidacy of a Frenchman, the Polish Grand Hetman, John Sobieski, was proposed as the nominee of the French party. And when the latter appeared at the Election Diet of 1674, p155 he was proclaimed the new King, in spite of the bitter opposition offered by the Lithuanian representatives.
During the interregnum and at the Election Diet itself, the Pacas had demanded the rejection of any Piast2 candidate, undoubtedly fearing that the tremendous prestige acquired by Sobieski in his efforts against the Turks may have gained for him the popular support of the gentry. Previously, they had opposed him as a prominent member of the French party. And in his struggles against the Turks, they had neglected to coordinate their activities with his, even on the actual battlefield. Consequently, very unwillingly did they — and the majority of the Lithuanian deputies — recognize the validity of Sobieski's election.
The war with the Turks had not ceased. In 1675, Sobieski successfully defended Lwow from an attack of the Porte. But nine months after his coronation, he was compelled to accept the compromising treaty of Zaravno, which left the major portion of Podolia with its outpost, Kamenets, to the Turks.
In the meanwhile, Sobieski had entered into rather intimate relationships with France, perhaps because of his previous activities in the French party, or perhaps because of the influence of his French wife, Mary d'Arquien, or perhaps because he was spurred on by the hope of recovering suzerainty over East Prussia for Poland. By the treaty of 1675, Sobieski had established an alliance with France, received a guarantee of French assistance against Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg, and in turn promised to aid the Hungarian rebels against Emperor Leopold. Two years later, 1677, a similar agreement was concluded with Sweden, also directed against the Elector of Brandenburg. This project of Sobieski's, however, was condemned by the General Diet of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic. Michael Pacas, the Lithuanian Grand Hetman, showed little hospitality to the King's allies, and only unwillingly permitted the passage and return of Swedish troops through Samogitia, in 1678 and 1679.
Finally, in 1679, the attempted coalition against Frederick William was completely abandoned, when the latter came to rather p156 friendly terms with Louis XIV himself. Furthermore, the quarrel of Sobieski's wife with the same Louis XIV over his refusal to advance her father to a higher rank in France, as well as Sobieski's own disappointment with the treaty of Zaravno,3 had unquestionably assisted in the development of an indifferent attitude toward France on the part of the Polish-Lithuanian King and a tendency to cooperate with Austria. Leopold, at the time, offered his daughter's hand in marriage to Prince James (John's son) whose candidacy for the Republic's throne, after his father's death, he also pledged to support.
Emperor Leopold's policy of conciliation towards Emeric Tokoly, leader of the Hungarian rebels, proved futile (1679). Early in 1682, Tokoly had sent an appeal for assistance to the Turks (who had brought [1680] to an end their unsuccessful war with Muscovy for Eastern Ukraine and Kiev), and submitted himself to the protection of the Turkish forces; soon afterwards, he seized the strongholds of Upper Hungary. In December of that same year, Austria was on the verge of war with Turkey. And in 1683, John Sobieski, with the approval of the Diet, concluded an alliance with Leopold of Austria, promising his cooperation against a Turkish invasion.
After the Turks had besieged Vienna for almost two months in the face of the stubborn and desperate resistance offered by count Rüdiger Starhemberg, the combined forces of Charles of Lorraine, Maximilian Emmanuel of Bavaria, John George of Saxony, and John Sobieski, under the latter's direction and command, defeated and routed the Turkish troops and rescued the city on September 12th, 1683. In March of the following year, Sobieski joined Austria and Venice in the formation of the Holy League, each party agreeing to the continuation of the war against the Porte. Perhaps his efforts to conform to the terms of this pact induced Sobieski to transform the humiliating truce of Andrussovo into a permanent peace with Muscovy in 1686.
Very definitely, Sobieski's Turkish venture proved to be of p157 little practical importance to the Polish-Lithuanian Republic. His son James failed to win the favor of Emperor Leopold. His efforts against Moldavia and Wallachia were quite unsuccessful, contributed practically nothing to the cause of the Holy League, and in fact, tended to arouse the ill-feelings of Austria, who was especially anxious to succeed in these areas. Sobieski gradually lost the prestige he had once enjoyed as a military leader. And when he died in 1696, the Turks were still at Kamenets and in Podolia. His Queen, Mary d'Arquien, in the meanwhile, had renewed her intense loyalty to France, and was at odds with her eldest son, James Sobieski, who had married a Neuberg princess and had fallen under strong Austrian influence. Nevertheless, the crusades against the Turks, sponsored by the Holy League, ended three years later with the peace of Carlowitz (1699), which restored to Poland the lost territories of Kamenets and Podolia.
Sobieski's political activities throughout his entire reign had never directly concerned the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Poland's partner in the Commonwealth. He never did obtain the good will of the Lithuanian magnates, whose power prevailed over the lesser gentry. During the earlier years of his rule, the Pacas family opposed all his proposals. Later, the Sapiegas followed a very similar course of action. Thus, the Lithuanian Grand Hetman, John Casimir Sapiega, offered reluctant support against the Turks; he arrived with the Lithuanian contingent to render his services at Vienna, only after the battle had already taken place. Again, at the Diet of 1688, at Gardinas, the same Sapiega issued a violent, but successful protest against the presence of Sobieski's son beside the throne. This opposition existed both among the magnates of Lithuania and among those of Poland.
The internal chaos that dominated the affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic during the years of Sobieski's reign was clearly demonstrated by the fact that six of eleven Diets were dissolved, five after the year 1688. Likewise, the unruliness of the magnates was illustrated in unmistakable fashion by the conflict, which had ensued between the Sapiegas and Bishop Bzostauskas of Vilnius.
It seems that the Grand Hetman, John Casimir Sapiega, had p158 garrisoned troops on ecclesiastical estates against the bishop's will. This was contrary to the existing law which permitted troops to be stationed only on the Grand Ducal estates. All other means of settlement having failed, Bishop Bzostauskas was compelled to resort to court procedure. Neither king, senate, diet, primate, nor papal nuncio were able to bring the issue to a close. The ecclesiastical penalty of excommunication was pronounced against the Grand Hetman by the desperate bishop. But neither the gentry nor the clergy, for fear of offending the Sapiegas, dared to heed the bishop's order. At the Lithuanian conventions and dietines, the actions of the lesser gentry were simply controlled by armed force, even at the price of bloodshed.
With the death of Sobieski in 1696, however, a reaction sponsored by the petty boyars against the intrigues of the Sapiegas revealed itself in Samogitia and in Polock, Vitebsk, Minsk, the eastern provinces of the Grand Duchy. In Samogitia, organized groups of the gentry attacked and plundered the estates of the Sapiegas, whenever the opportunity presented itself.
During the interregnum, the Sapiegas came to terms with the bishop's delegates (Bzostauskas had departed for Rome) and agreed to remove the troops from the church lands. Their efforts to conciliate the boyars in order to strengthen their own influence at the Election Diet were not very successful. It was quite evident that the Sapiegas had prepared the way for the collapse of their tremendous power.
1 Sigismund Vasa's nomination of Maciejowski for the bishopric of Vilnius was rejected by the Lithuanian gentry as an act contrary to the provisions of the Lithuanian Statute, in spite of the fact that George Radvila, a Lithuanian, had been appointed to the see of Cracow at the same time. The dispute lasted eight years (1592‑1600), and Maciejowski's name was finally withdrawn in favor of the Lithuanian, Voina.
2 In the broad sense, the word Piast designated a native of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic.
3 He had agreed to this treaty mainly upon the advice of Louis XIV. The Turks, however, were already embroiled in a war with Muscovy the following year; and this course of events naturally would have made Sobieski's position a more acceptable one.
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