Short URL for this page:
bit.ly/CHASOL17
mail:
Bill Thayer |
![]() Help |
![]() Up |
![]() Home |
|||
|
You can follow much of the geography by opening
Ian Macky's large map of modern Lithuania
in a separate window.
(The numbers link directly to the sections.)
1. | Election of Frederick Augustus II (1697) |
2. | "The Equalization of Rights" (1697) |
3. | The Lithuanian Civil War (1700) |
4. | The Great Northern War (1700) |
5. | The Return of Frederick Augustus (1710) |
6. | The Succession of Frederick Augustus III (1733) |
7. | The Family of the Czartoryskis |
The interregnum of 1697 witnessed the enormous influence that bribery and foreign agents had attained among the gentry of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic. No less than eighteen candidates were in the field, seeking to become the successors of John Sobieski. Among the more prominent were: the late King's son, James, sponsored by Austria; Henri, prince of Condé and François Louis de Bourbon, prince of Conti, representatives of French interests; Elector Frederick Augustus and Margrave Lewis William from Saxony and Prussia, respectively.
Louis of Conti was eventually elected by the majority of the Polish and Lithuanian gentry, in spite of threats of invasion made by Muscovy, and was proclaimed by the Interrex as the new King. The Sapiegas had received 100,000 talers to support this candidate. Nevertheless, Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony, who had renounced Lutheranism for Roman Catholicism and whose financial resources seem to have been greater than those of the French agents, had succeeded in winning the support of a very definite majority, among whose ranks also were numerous members of the Austrian party opposed to Louis of Conti. Aided by his p160 strong Saxon army and by the payment of tremendous bribes, Frederick Augustus, easily enough, paved the way for his coronation at Cracow on September 16, 1697. But it was only two years later, after the unsuccessful attempt of the French prince to invade Danzig and contest the claims of the Elector of Saxony, that Frederick Augustus was accorded formal recognition by the Diet of 1699.
At the Election Diet of 1697, two important changes were introduced in the administration of the internal affairs of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; namely, the restriction of powers attached to the offices of the Lithuanian Grand Hetman, Treasurer, and Chancellor, as well as the substitution of the Polish language for the White Ruthenian in court decisions.
In spite of the fact that the reorganization of the Lithuanian administrative government, which had taken place during the last years of the reign of Sigismund Augustus and had been ratified by the Lithuanian Diet in 1566, closely imitated the existing system in Poland, nevertheless a few differences had been retained. Some of the Lithuanian ministers continued to possess more extensive rights than ministers of the same dignity in Poland. The Grand Hetman of Lithuania was permitted to station his armies wherever he saw fit to do so, whereas in Poland the military forces were located in definite areas designated by the Diet. Again, the Treasurer of Lithuania received and controlled the Grand Duchy's monies, whereas in Poland such monies were held in the district or county treasuries, whence the Hetman with the approval of the Diet could draw funds for the maintenance of the armed forces. Furthermore, in Lithuania it was impossible to enforce a sentience of exile without the consent of the Chancellor.
Two brothers of the House of Sapiega occupied the influential positions of Grand Hetman and Grand Treasurer, and by reason of their powers acted with little restraint. As a consequence of the gentry's uprising against them, a demand was issued for the equalization of the powers of the Lithuanian ministers with those of p161 Poland, which, in reality, was but a means of suppressing the hated magnates. In spite of the stubborn protests of the Sapiegas the Diet passed the law known as coaequatio iurium. And although the territories of Gardinas, Alytus and Pinsk were selected as camps for the Lithuanian armies, the Grand Hetman, J. Casimir Sapiega, manifested no intention of submitting to the will of the majority. The Treasurer, Benedict Sapiega, likewise continued to require that payments be made to him and not to the district or county treasuries.
Only during the days of Jogaila and Vytautas had written documents gained some prominence in the internal affairs of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Previously, they had been used solely for the purpose of communication with foreign states. Various decisions and particular grants were usually made by word of mouth. However, with the expansion of Lithuania into the territories of the Eastern Slavs, the problem of establishing an official written language for the people within the borders of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy became quite difficult. The Ruthenian subjects speak a form of Slavic and the Lithuanians, their own Lithuanian language which appeared in writing very rarely at that particular period. As a result, besides the traditional Latin, the ancient White Ruthenian, a written, not spoken, form of Old Church Slavonic, was adopted as the official writing medium in the Chancery of the Grand Duchy and its diplomatic spheres. As employed by the Lithuanians, it acquired additions of Lithuanian words and was therefore even looked upon by Muscovy as the Lithuanian language, although the true Lithuanian was always spoken solely within ethnographic Lithuania, and in the sixteenth century began to manifest itself more frequently in the literary circles.
During that same sixteenth century, however, Polish influence became unmistakably evident in Lithuania Proper. Since their Grand Duke quite often lived in Poland, as the ruler of both countries, the Lithuanian magnates had learned the Polish language and even used it among themselves. After the Union of Lublin and the initiation of common Polish-Lithuanian Diets, even the lesser boyars found it convenient, if not necessary, to know Polish. Gradually Polish writings appeared in Lithuania. At the p162 end of the seventeenth century, most official documents were being written in Polish by the Polonized Lithuanian gentry, with the exception of court decisions which still retained the ancient White Ruthenian. And at the Diet of 1697, this ancient White Ruthenian was abolished and substituted by the Polish (although Latin continued to be used in Poland). This decision only superficially affected the bulk of the Lithuanian nation, the peasants and the serfs, who were acquainted merely with their native tongue.
The reaction, which had started against the House of Sapiega during the last days of John Sobieski's reign, had not ceased even during the interregnum. Under the leadership of Katilas, Oginskis, Krispinas, Zaranka, Pociejus, the gentry continued at various times to attack the Sapiega estates in Samogitia and in the White Ruthenian areas of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy. Neither was the position of these high-ranking Lithuanian magnates any too favorable in the eyes of Frederick Augustus, whose election they had opposed, and whose opponent, Prince Conti, they had even prepared to support at Danzig. The violence displayed by the Lithuanian gentry was usually quelled by Casimir Sapiega, head of the Grand Duchy's military forces.
When the Grand Hetman had departed for Podolia to render his assistance to the Poles in their struggle against the Turks,1 the Lithuanian gentry at home seized this opportunity to organize a revolt against the Sapiegas. Towards the end of the year 1698, at Gardinas, fully equipped and mobilized, the boyars stopped the advance of Casimir returning from Podolia. Flemming, leader of Augustus' Saxon armies, intervened to prevent a serious clash and succeeded in bringing about a conciliation under compromising terms for the magnates. Casimir Sapiega agreed to dismiss a number of his soldiers, and to maintain the remainder of his troops in the places designated by the Diet in accordance with the coaequatio iurium p163 of 1697. The gentry, in turn, promised to abandon their demands for the removal of the Sapiegas from the offices they occupied in the administration of State affairs. The Sapiegas, nevertheless, immediately proceeded to rehire the released men at their own expense.
After this truce, which temporarily averted a civil war, Augustus' Saxon army was posted in Samogitia, near Palanga, under the pretext of making arrangements for the construction of a port at Sventoji. In reality, it was but a preparation for war against Sweden. Late in 1699, various negotiations, instigated by the Livonian exile, John Patkul, between Moscow, Denmark, and Frederick Augustus for the partitioning of Sweden, were completed. The success of this alliance was to bestow upon Tsar Peter the possession of Estonia and Ingria and give Muscovy access to the Baltic; allow Frederick IV of Denmark to establish his authority over the dukedoms of Holstein and Gottorp; and grant Livonia (Vidzeme) to Augustus in his capacity as the Elector of Saxony, thereby demolishing the Swedish empire.
In Samogitia, however, the Saxon forces soon found themselves at odds with the Lithuanian gentry, who together with the Poles in Poland demanded the removal of Saxon armies from all the domains of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic. At this point, the Sapiegas, acting contrary to the opinion of their fellow citizens, expressed their approval of the King's alliance against Sweden, and thereupon received permission to enlist more mercenaries.
In the year 1700, the most serious of all insurrections of the gentry against the domination of the Sapiegas took place in Lithuania. The Lithuanian boyars and magnates with their armed forces and militia gathered at Asmena and Lyda and marched on Valkininkai, where the troops of the Sapiegas and their few loyal members of the gentry were concentrated. Here the former held a council of war and decreed upon the complete annihilation of the Sapiegas. Katilas and Visniaveckis were appointed to the posts of Marshal and Hetman, respectively. The intervention of Bzostauskas, the Bishop of Vilnius, failed to pacify the revolutionaries. In the resulting battle at Leipunai, the supporters of the Sapiegas were crushed, and Michael, son of the Grand Hetman, was captured p164 and with several other prisoners, cruelly put to death. The victorious gentry indicted the Sapiegas as traitors of the country, ordered the confiscation of their property and their immediate dismissal from ministerial positions. Visniaveckis was assigned to the post of Grand Hetman of the army; Katilas and Oginskis were delegated to act as co‑treasurers for a term of two years. (The remaining members of the Sapiega family, in the meantime, had fled to Poland.)
Shortly afterwards, the revolting boyars sent a delegation to Frederick Augustus and requested him to sanction their decision. In the name of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, they presented a written declaration, framed at Valkininkai and signed by all the leading members of the Lithuanian gentry, whereby, in unmistakable language, they renounced their right to elect the ruler, abandoned their privilege to use the liberum veto, and bestowed upon Augustus, as the Grand Duke of Lithuania, all the powers of an absolute monarch, with hereditary rights for his offspring. This act of the Lithuanian gentry, however, was rejected and officially denounced at the General Diet of Warsaw in 1701, and produced no immediate results, undoubtedly due to the war with Sweden, which had then become a serious and dangerous reality.
While these events were transpiring in Lithuania, the league against Sweden had initiated action, although not too successfully. In May, 1700, the Saxon troops of Frederick Augustus, who had invaded Swedish-occupied Livonia and attacked Riga, were repelled by the forces of Dahlberg and compelled to retrace their steps across the Dvina. By the treaty of Traventhal in August of the same year, Charles XII subdued Denmark. Three months later, he routed the Muscovite forces at Narva. And at this point, Tsar Peter and Frederick Augustus renewed their agreement at Birzai, Lithuania, to prosecute their war against Charles XII of Sweden in unison. The former agreed to supply the latter with reenforcements and munitions.
p165 In July, 1701, Charles XII defeated the Saxon and Russian troops at Dunamunde (Ust-Dvinsk) and took possession of the Polish-Lithuanian fief, Courland. Attempted negotiations with Charles (for the purpose of preventing the imminent Swedish invasion) by the representatives of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic, whose own troops had not till then participated in the hostilities, were fruitless. Charles insisted upon the banishment of Frederick Augustus from Poland-Lithuania. He likewise entered into relationship with the Sapiegas, who had failed to win the favor of the King and the Diet in their struggle against the Lithuanian gentry, and sent his troops into Lithuanian Samogitia under the pretext of protecting the Sapiega estates. The opposition offered by the Grand Duchy's forces under the Grand Hetman, Visniaveckis, merely resulted in the Swedish occupation of all of Samogitia, Kaunas and Vilnius by January, 1702. The Swedes then entered Poland and within six months, Warsaw and Cracow surrendered to Charles. Meanwhile, the Sapiegas had returned to Lithuania and Casimir Sapiega, the former Grand Hetman, resumed his duties at Vilnius, assuming command of a number of Swedish troops assigned to him. Oginskis and the other boyars sought to resist the Swedes and the Sapiegas with disorganized forces and without any apparent success. Finally, after repeated victories in Poland, Charles XII, with the assistance of Horn and Rehnskjold, summoned an Election Diet of Poland-Lithuania, which, although created unconstitutionally and attended only by a minority of the gentry, after prolonged deliberations, dethroned Frederick Augustus and proclaimed Charles' choice, Stanislas Leszczynski, the Palatine of Poznania, as the new King, July, 1704.
The following month, Frederick Augustus again renewed his alliance with Tsar Peter, which agreement embraced also the Polish-Lithuanian territories and once again guaranteed him (as the Elector of Saxony and the deposed Polish-Lithuanian ruler) assistance in the form of men, supplies and money. A little more than a year later, Stanislas Leszczynski was crowned and a pact, linking the Polish-Lithuanian Republic with Sweden against Muscovy, was arranged.
In the meantime, Tsar Peter had (since 1701) captured Tartu p166 and Narva, had laid the foundation for the future city of St. Petersburg (Leningrad) in the marshes of the Neva, and in 1705, he even took possession of Courland, Vilnius, and Gardinas (Grodno). But in 1706, the allied Saxon, Muscovite, Polish and Lithuanian forces under Augustus were routed by the Swede, Rehnskjold, at Fraustadt, and Tsar Peter's armies retreated eastward from Gardinas. This reverse of fortunes was followed in September by the peace of Altranstadt in Saxony, where Frederick Augustus renounced his claims to the Polish-Lithuanian throne in favor of Charles' puppet Stanislas, and agreed to abandon his ties with Tsar Peter and to maintain the Swedish forces in Saxony for the next year.
After this settlement with Frederick Augustus, Tsar Peter remained the sole survivor of the original league formed against the Swedes. Muscovite armies, as the allies of Augustus who certainly had not given up his intrigues to reestablish himself in Poland-Lithuania, had overrun portions of Poland as well as the eastern areas of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The gentry of the Commonwealth was not united in its support of the new King. In Lithuania, however, the Sapiega faction, favorable towards the Swedes, had, after the deposition of Frederick Augustus, been joined by Zavisa, Visniaveckis and some others.
Charles XII, having rejected all compromises, decreed upon the utter defeat of Tsar Peter. The plan formulated seems to have consisted of a threefold attack on Muscovy, directed in the north by Lybecker, in the south by Stanislas Leszczynski, and in the west through Lithuania by Charles XII himself, assisted by Lewenhaupt. Consequently, late in 1707, Charles departed from Saxony, marched through Poland, and from Smurgainys (Smorgoni) near the river Neris, began his offensive against Peter. Five months later, he succeeded in taking Mogilev on the Dnieper in Mstislavl, the White Russian palatinate of Lithuania. Having reached the Grand Duchy's boundary with Muscovy, seriously handicapped by the "scorched earth" retreat of the Russian forces, Charles turned southward to join Mazeppa, the leader of the Cossacks in the Eastern Ukraine, whom Stanislas had encouraged to revolt against Muscovy. And, it was in the south that Charles met his p167 decisive defeat. Lewenhaupt had been able to reach him from the Baltic shores only with very meager supplies and reenforcements. Mazeppa's alliance proved to be a distinct disappointment; he joined the Swedish expedition in November, 1708, merely with the remnants of his armies, having previously fled from Menshikov, whom Peter had sent to the Ukraine, once he had suspected the Cossack's treachery. Furthermore, the bitter cold of the 1708‑9 winter worked additional havoc among the invading Swedes. Finally, while still waiting for the arrival of the Swedish army from Poland with Krassow and Leszczynski, Charles suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Muscovites at the battle of Poltava near the Vorskla River (June, 1709). The wounded Swedish King fled with Mazeppa, and a few hundred survivors to the Turks.
With the defeat of Charles XII at Poltava, the short reign of Stanislas Leszczynski came to an abrupt end. The latter was compelled to take refuge in Swedish Pomerania with the Swedish troops under Krassow. In the meanwhile, Muscovite forces overran practically all of Poland and Lithuania. Having denounced the peace of Altranstadt, Frederick Augustus concluded a treaty with Tsar Peter near Thorn in October, 1709, by which he elicited Muscovite aid to reestablish himself in Poland-Lithuania; he also agreed to recognize Russian jurisdiction over Livonia, which territory Peter was able to seize from the Swedes by July of the following year, together with Pernau, Reval and the Finnish stronghold of Viborg. This pact really marked the beginning of the incessant meddling on the part of Moscow in the chaotic internal affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic until the last partitions.
In 1710, at the General Diet of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Frederick Augustus was officially restored to the throne under the threatening presence of the Muscovite armies. However, the return of the Saxon Elector gave the Republic neither equilibrium nor peace. Since Charles XII had not given up hopes of vanquishing Russia, he sought through his Polish ambassador, p168 Stanislas Poniatowski, to enlist the assistance of the Turks against Muscovy, and — even while his Swedish possessions in Germany were attacked by Russians, Saxons, Prussians and Danes — to regain his domination in Poland-Lithuania. The result was that the Commonwealth, especially Lithuania, although not an actual battlefield for foreign powers, was forced to tolerate the plundering practiced by the Saxon and Muscovite troops within its borders, while the war with Sweden was carried on in other areas. The former were, furthermore, paid and maintained from the funds of the Grand Duchy's Treasury. The latter simply enforced the wishes of Tsar Peter. At times, it became evident that Frederick Augustus, collaborating closely with Peter and conniving at the depredations wrought by his own Saxon forces and by his Russian allies, aimed at attaining a high degree of absolutism as the ruler of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic. But finally, a revolutionary reaction (1714‑5), in the form of numerous confederations, created by the gentry in opposition to the policies of Frederick Augustus, revealed that Moscow entertained its own plans for the future administration and government of the Commonwealth.
It is at this moment that the Tsar intervened through his delegate Dolgoruki to settle the dispute between King and gentry. He justified has actions on the grounds that he intended to protect and defend the endangered rights and privileges of the Polish-Lithuanian upper classes. As a result, a Russian dictated reconciliation took place at the so‑called "Dumb Diet" of 1717, where, intimidated by the Muscovite army surrounding them, the members of the gentry accepted in silence all the conditions "proposed" by the representative from Moscow. The terms of the agreement called for the immediate return of Augustus' Saxon forces to Saxony, the abolishment of the gentry's right to confederate, the restriction of the powers of the Hetmen in charge of the Polish-Lithuanian troops, and the limitation of the armies of the Republic to 24,000 men — 18,000 for Poland and 6,000 for Lithuania. This fact of actual intervention in the internal affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth added importance to the privilege, which the Tsar had secured by the treaty of 1686, whereby he had been at least implicitly recognized as the guardian of the p169 Orthodox Christians living within the borders of the Republic.
Of course, such intervention, which entirely ignored the sovereignty of Frederick Augustus, was not acceptable to the Polish-Lithuanian ruler, although there was little he could do to alter the situation. Russian forces continued to remain within the territorial limits of the Commonwealth. Frederick Augustus sought to win support from various sources against the encroachments of Muscovy; and at Vienna, in 1719, he successfully concluded an alliance with George I of England and Emperor Charles VI of Austria. In turn, Tsar Peter arranged a treaty with Prussia (whose Elector Frederick had assumed the title of king in 1701), both parties agreeing to maintain an order in Poland-Lithuania suitable to their designs. Again, the General Diets of 1719 and 1720 refused to place their trust in Augustus' projects to free the Republic from the influence of the Tsar, and were dissolved through the use of the liberum veto by members of the gentry acting as bribed Russian agents. Finally, the landed gentry adopted a policy of thorough neutrality in all political matters. Before 1717, no less than seven Diets summoned by Frederick Augustus were dissolved by the abuse of the principle of unanimity. After the "Dumb Diet," thirteen of some eighteen subsequent Diets failed in similar fashion. Slight seemed the prospects of improving the degrading status to which the Commonwealth had fallen.
The Great Northern War, precipitated by the league formed against the Swedes, was at last concluded after Sweden had made peace with Hanover, Prussia, Denmark and then, at Nystadt, with Russia in 1721. Sweden's power as an empire had been destroyed; Tsar Peter had assumed possession of the eastern portions of Finland, as well as Ingria, Estonia and Livonia ( with the exception of Latgale). Frederick Augustus, both as the Elector of Saxony and as Polish-Lithuanian King, gained nothing from his participation in the struggle. He had rather brought upon the Polish-Lithuanian Republic a series of disasters. Lithuania had been ravaged by Saxon, Swedish and Russian armies, by conflicting groups of the Lithuanian gentry, and by the independent companies of outlaw bandits. The plague of 1708 — linked with the cold winter of 1709, famine and other diseases in the midst of advancing and p170 retreating armies — is estimated to have caused the death of one‑third of the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, chiefly between the years 1708 and 1711. Approximately 25,000 people perished in the city of Vilnius in the year 1710 alone. Numbers of peasant-serfs had fled to Prussia and even with the Muscovite forces into Russia. Thus, the ducal estates at Alytus, Gardinas and Brasta (Brest) and other regions of Lithuania, were reported by Frederick Augustus in 1712, as having become looted areas, made barren of homes and inhabitants. Magnates and boyars found themselves impoverished. The amnesty granted in 1717 to the revolting gentry could restore neither their lost wealth nor their devastated estates. Furthermore, a fact still more dangerous to the political existence of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy and its partner in the Commonwealth, Poland, had become a reality during the years of the Northern War; namely, the residence of the Muscovite forces within the realms of the Republic quite against the wishes of the majority of the gentry.
The aim which dominated the last years of Frederick Augustus' unhappy reign seems to have been expressed in his efforts to guarantee the succession of his son to the Polish-Lithuanian throne. For this purpose he sought to enlist the assistance of Stanislas Poniatowski, the former ambassador of Charles XII to the Turks, and the Czartoryskis, the leading Polonized Lithuanian family among the aristocracy. So anxious was he to salvage at least some of the Polish-Lithuanian domains for his son, that he even considered the partitioning of the Republic among Saxony, Austria, Prussia and Russia. However, these plans did not mature before his death in February, 1733.
During the interregnum, a strong movement was inaugurated for the return of Stanislas Leszczynski, whose daughter Marie had married Louis XV of France in 1725. Among the supporters of this exiled Pole was the Interrex, Theodore Potocki, the Lithuanian family of the Czartoryskis, Poniatowski, and Count Monti, p171 the French agent. Nevertheless, the Convocation Diet of May, 1733, was able to produce no unanimous opinion among the ranks of the Polish-Lithuanian gentry. Moreover, Russia, Austria and Prussia disapproved of any candidate for the Polish-Lithuanian throne whose associations were French. But when these interested foreign powers failed to gain the candidacy of the Portuguese Infant Emmanuel, both Russia and Austria then proposed to give their support to the Elector of Saxony, the son and the sole legitimate heir of the late Frederick Augustus II. Consequently, in August, Carl Gustav Lowenolde, representative from Moscow, entered into an agreement with the Elector of Saxony. The latter promised to introduce no amendments to the Constitution of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic once he gained the throne, and to place Tsarina Anne's favorite, Biren, in charge of the Polish-Lithuanian fief of Courland. Again, by accepting the Pragmatic Sanction, he also won the favor of Emperor Charles VI; through this action he renounced all claims, which by virtue of his marriage with Maria Josepha, daughter of Emperor Joseph I (1719), he may have attempted to foster towards the Austrian domains.
On August 26th, the Diet of Election was summoned at Warsaw. And upon his arrival, Stanislas was proclaimed the new King by an overwhelming majority (September 9th). But his reign lasted an extremely short while. Even before a fortnight had elapsed, he was compelled to flee before the Muscovite troops from the Polish capital of Warsaw into Danzig, together with his supporters, the Czartoryskis, Potocki and Poniatowski. And in October, a phantom Polish-Lithuanian Diet, summoned under the direction of Tsarina Anna's General Lacy, and representing only a very small minority of the ordinary electors, declared Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony, as the new and lawful King of the Republic. And in June of 1734, the siege of Danzig, where Stanislas awaited French assistance, ended with a triumph of Frederick Augustus' allies, the Muscovites. Having escaped into Prussia, Stanislas issued desperate appeals to France and to the disorganized gentry of the Commonwealth. But finally, in 1736, he officially agreed to his abdication, and five months later, in June, the General Diet at Warsaw recognized Frederick Augustus III as the King, and p172 received his promise to arrange for the removal of Saxon and Russian military forces from the realms of the Republic.
During the thirty year reign of Frederick Augustus III, the dual Republic steadily fell into greater decay and to a new level of inactivity. Every Diet summoned after 1736 ended with the abuse of the privilege of the liberum veto and was dissolved, chiefly due to the rivalry existing between the Czartoryski and Potocki factions. No new laws, therefore, could be enacted; and no new taxation, although quite necessary, could be imposed. The Polish-Lithuanian gentry foolishly considered the safety of the Republic guaranteed by the very facts that it lacked an army and was dominated by disorder; in this way it certainly was quite harmless to the neighboring powers. The dietines almost invariably witnessed bloody clashes. The Saxon King himself seemed to be quite contented with placing all powers of administration in the hands of his Saxon minister, Heinrich von Brühl.
The reign of Frederick Augustus III, nevertheless, offered a splendid opportunity for the Republic to introduce needed reforms and to wrench itself free from the influence of Russia, Prussia and Austria. The occasion was indeed propitious since the latter were embroiled in a series of wars, namely, the Russo-Turkish war 1735‑39, and the three wars of the Austrian Succession in 1740‑42, 1744‑48, 1756‑63.
Instead of reaping any benefits from such existing confusion, the Polish-Lithuanian Republic rather suffered irreparable harm. Foreign armies not only marched through its territories, but were even quartered there, respecting neither the presence of any authority nor the neutrality of the Commonwealth. During the Seven Years' War, Lithuania suffered particularly when several Russian forces passed through her domains in order to reach Prussia. Besides enduring the devastating effects of plunder, Lithuanian and Polish recruits were drafted into Russian and Prussian armies. And when Frederick the Great had occupied Dresden, p173 where Frederick Augustus had transferred the mints of Poland and Lithuania, the coinage of the Republic was debased, lost its value, and became unacceptable to foreign merchants.
During all the years of Frederick Augustus' reign, the Lithuanian family of the Czartoryskis definitely played the leading political role. They ranked not only as the wealthiest magnates of Poland-Lithuania, with their center at Pulawy, but were also political powers by reason of Michael's position as the Vice-Chancellor of Lithuania (1724‑1752)2 and Augustus' prominence as the Palatine of the Polish province of Galicia.
The activities of the Czartoryskis fostered the introduction of reforms into the Polish-Lithuanian Constitution and sought to concentrate all power in their own persons. At an early date, they had succeeded in ingratiating themselves with Brühl and winning his favor by obtaining for him the status of a naturalized noble of the Republic. Momentarily, after 1748, when Frederick Augustus' son and daughter had entered into matrimonial alliances with France and Austria, it seemed that the Czartoryskis were on the verge of attaining their aims, for the King offered his cooperation in abolishing the liberum veto. Nevertheless, their efforts were crushed by the insistent opposition of the Potockis, wealthy magnates of the Ukraine, as well as by the unmistakable disapproval manifested by Russia, Prussia and Austria.
At this point, the Czartoryskis abandoned their dependence on Frederick Augustus III and Brühl, and turned to Tsarina Elizabeth (1741‑1761). Through Moscow's ambassador at Warsaw they offered their suggestions for the deposition of Augustus III and the reformation of the Republic's Constitution. Their intrigues rapidly gained momentum, when through the influence of the Russian Chancellor, their nephew, Stanislas Poniatowski,3 was sent to St. Petersburg as the Saxon minister. Two years later, through the influence of the Grand Duchess Catherine, he received his appointment as the ambassador of the Polish-Lithuanian Republic to Russia. However, his conspiracy with Catherine against the succession of Peter soon deprived him of this post. Finally, p174 after the death of Elizabeth and the assassination of Peter III, the Czartoryskis reopened negotiations with the new Tsarina, Catherine II (1762‑96), to dethrone Frederick Augustus; but the latter died shortly afterwards, in October, 1763.
1 This struggle, after the victories of Eugene of Savoy, was concluded with a series of treaties on the part of the Porte with Austria, Venice, and the Republic.
2 Chancellor of Lithuania, 1752‑1775.
3 Son of Stanislas Poniatowski, supporter of Charles XII.
Images with borders lead to more information.
|
||||||
UP TO: |
![]() T. G. Chase: The Story of Lithuania |
![]() History of Lithuania |
![]() European History |
![]() Home |
||
A page or image on this site is in the public domain ONLY
|
Page updated: 11 Oct 24