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Chapter 17

This webpage reproduces a chapter of


History of the Ukraine
by Dmytro Doroshenko

printed by
The Institute Press, Ltd.
Edmonton, Alberta,
1939

The text is in the public domain.

This page has been carefully proofread
and I believe it to be free of errors.
If you find a mistake though,
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Chapter 19

 p324  Chapter XVIII

 * * * *

(The numbers link directly to the sections.)

(102) Measures Taken by Turkey and Poland for the Colonization of the Right Bank of the Dnieper. (103) "Eternal Peace" Between Poland and Muscovy and Its Consequences for the Ukraine. (104) Subordination of Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the Patriarch of Muscovy. (105) Crimean Campaign of 1687 and Samoylovich's Downfall. (106) Hetman Mazepa. (107) His Home Policy. (108) Petrik's Uprising. (109) War with Turkey and Crimea.

 * * * *

102. Measures Taken by Turkey and Poland for the Colonization of the Right Bank of the Dnieper.

The conditions created in Ukraine of the Right Bank of the Dnieper by the Treaty of Bakhchisaray could not long endure. It was the artificial creation of political opportunism and very soon proved unable to withstand the pressure of events unforeseen by the Articles of any Treaty. After George Khmelnitsky's death, the Sultan gave the Right Bank of the Dnieper to his vassal, the Moldavian Prince, Duka, who undertook to colonize the devastated country according to the old local principles of Cossack organization by regiments. He issued Universals (manifestos) inviting people to settle, and promising all kind of liberties and privileges. Settlers began to arrive and soon the old ruined sites awoke to new life. The Hetman government in the Ukraine of the Left Bank of the Dnieper became alarmed and was compelled to hasten the definite settlement of the people previously forcibly evacuated from the Right Bank. They were settled in the southern part of Poltava province, between the rivers Vorskla and Orel, on the very frontier of the Zaporogian steppes.

Not only Turkey but Poland also had failed to observe the conditions of the peace treaty of Zuravna. Under the rule of their active and talented king, John Sobieski, and influenced by ideas of the struggle of Christianity with Mohammedanism, the Poles actually carried on uninterrupted  p325 border warfare with Turks, and in a few years had expelled them from Podolia, leaving only Kamenets in Turkish hands. The Polish government in their turn took active steps to repopulate the devastated areas of Podolia and of Kiev province. John Sobieski did not hesitate to revive the Ukrainian Cossacks in order to retain for Poland the Right Bank of the Dnieper. He nominated as Hetman, Kunitsky, formerly a Cossack officer under Doroshenko, and ordered him to organize a Cossack army loyal to Poland. Kunitsky took up his residence in Nemirov and in his turn invited settlers. Thus he succeeded in repopulating several old Cossack towns such as Korsun, Bohuslav and others, which had lain in ruins since Doroshenko's time. At the end of 1683, just when John Sobieski, having delivered Vienna from the Turks, was pursuing them in Hungary, Kunitsky with his Cossacks set out on a campaign in South Moldavia (present Bessarabia), burned Bendery and Akerman, but being met by superior Tatar forces, was defeated. The Cossacks elected a new Hetman, Andrew Mohyla, who took from the Turks several Ukrainian towns in Podolia, and continued the organization of the Cossack regiments on the old principles. In the celebrated campaign which John Sobieski conducted against the Turks around Vienna, he was accompanied by 5,000 Cossacks.

Having broken with the Turks and not feeling himself bound by the Treaty of Zuravna, John Sobieski formally renewed the old order on the Right Bank of the Dnieper. He published a manifesto on the renewal of the old Cossack organizations, and the Seim in Warsaw voted that those Cossacks who were faithful to the Polish crown, should be restored to their former rights and privileges. Ukraine was soon repopulated; towns grew up as if out of the ground over night. The tide of emigration from the Left Bank was so strong that Samoylovich was compelled to set sentries along the Dnieper to prevent people crossing.

 p326  103. "Eternal Peace" Between Poland and Muscovy and Its Consequences for the Ukraine.

This revival of the Cossacks on the Right Bank of the Dnieper was one of the chief obstacles to the conclusion of the "eternal peace" between Poland and Muscovy. John Sobieski, soon after his victory over the Turks, invited Muscovy to join the anti-Turk coalition to which, besides Poland, Austria, Venice, and the Pope belonged. Hetman Samoylovich did all that he could to prevent the conclusion of the "eternal peace", fearing that it would sanction and perpetuate the partition of Ukraine. He never abandoned hope of reuniting both parts of the Ukraine under the power of one Hetman. He also was much opposed to the conquest of Crimea by Muscovy, for the Ukraine surrounded on all sides by Muscovite possessions would then have not a single ally to rely upon. But in spite of Samoylovich's endeavors to the contrary, the "eternal peace" between Muscovy and Poland was concluded in the spring of 1686, as well as an alliance against the Sultan and the Crimean Tatars.

According to this peace treaty Poland renounced in perpetuity the Ukraine of the Left Bank of the Dnieper, and gave up Kiev and the Zaporogian Cossacks to the exclusive supremacy of the Muscovite Tsar. Poland also undertook not to renew or repopulate the central part of the province of Kiev with the old towns along the Dnieper. Muscovy promised to declare war on the Crimean Khan and in case of an invasion by Turkey, to send an army to help. Poland was to send help if the Tatars and Turks menaced Kiev.

104. Subordination of Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the Patriarch of Muscovy.

Hearing of the conclusion of the peace treaty, Samoylovich loudly expressed his dissatisfaction saying: "Ukraine will have to take care of herself". He also sent a letter to the Polish king protesting against the surrender of a part of Ukraine to Poland. But in thus openly  p327 opposing Muscovite policy Samoylovich failed to notice that he could no longer rely on his officers and that his opposition to Muscovy was a tool in the hands of his enemies which would be used against him. His readiness to sacrifice national aims to his personal interests made him destroy with his own hands one of the foundation stones of Ukrainian independence, the autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, for he helped to make it dependent on the Muscovite Patriarch.

From the very beginning of Christianity, the Church in the Ukraine had been dependent on the Patriarch of Constantinople. Until the Seventeenth century this dependence was only nominal, but after the political Union with Muscovy in 1654 it served to protect the Ukrainian Church against Muscovite interference. The Metropolitan, Silvester Kossiv, was very reluctant to take the oath of allegiance to Tsar of Muscovy; his successor, Dionisiy Balaban, (1658‑63) was openly hostile to Muscovy and preferred a federation with Poland. The next Metropolitan, Joseph Tukalsky (1663‑1671) was an active promoter of Ukrainian independence; he even transferred his seat from Kiev to Chihirin, the residence of the Hetman. After his death the Muscovite government prevented the election of a new Metropolitan and the see remained vacant for ten years. In 1684 the Muscovite government gave permission for the election of a new Metropolitan on condition that henceforth he should be dependent on the Patriarch of Moscow.

Hetman Samoylovich was ready to meet these wishes of the Muscovite government because he had a family interest in the matter, having proposed as candidate his kinsman Prince Gedeon Chetvertinsky, Bishop of Lutsk. The elections in which the laity were in a majority over the clergy, took place on the 29th of June 1685 in Kiev, and Bishop Gedeon Chetvertinsky was elected under pressure by the secular authorities. The new Ukrainian Metropolitan went to Moscow for his ordination by the Muscovite Patriarch, Joachim, and was presented with sables and gold. It was however, necessary to obtain the consent  p328 of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Envoys from the Tsar and the Hetman were sent to Constantinople, also taking with them sables and gold. But the Patriarch of Constantinople, as well as other Patriarchs and especially that of Jerusalem, would not hear of breaking the tradition that had already existed over seven hundred years. The Muscovite Tsar then appealed to the Sultan, who compelled the Patriarch to consent "voluntarily" to the separation of the Ukrainian Church from the Patriarch of Constantinople making it dependent on the Patriarch of Moscow. The Ukrainian clergy were very much upset at this change but they were of course powerless against the Hetman and Muscovy.

105. Crimean Campaign of 1687 and Samoylovich's Downfall.

Having signed an "eternal peace" with Poland, the Muscovite government broke with the Sultan and planned a campaign against Crimea with the united forces of Muscovy and the Ukraine. Hetman Samoylovich was very much against this campaign as he was also against the breach with the Crimean Khan. But his opinion was not considered, nor his advice to begin the campaign very early in spring so as to cross the dry steppe before the summer heat. The Muscovite government decided to penetrate this time into the very heart of Crimea, whereas Austria, Poland and Venice were to start operations against the Turks. An enormously strong army of about 100,000 men started on its way led by Prince Vassili Golitsyn, favorite of the Tsarevna Sophia who at that time actually governed Muscovy. It was not until the end of April 1687 that this army, with a transport of about 20,000 wagons arrived in the Zaporogian steppes where it was joined, between the rivers Samara and Orel, by the Ukrainian army of about 50,000 led by the Hetman. The united armies advanced towards Perekop. But the summer heat set in early that year: there was a drought and all the grass dried up and burnt under the power­ful sun. The heat and dust were unbearable. There was no water  p329 and no fodder for so many horses. Samoylovich suffered from his eyes and openly blamed the Muscovite government for the "senseless" war. Coming down as far south as the plains below the rapids, the army met with steppe-fires. Wide areas of dry grass were turned into a sea of fire and afterwards into a black charred desert. It was the usual device adopted by the Tatars to prevent the enemy from approaching their homes. Rumors were started among the Muscovites that the Ukrainians were responsible for the steppe-fire, having set it ablaze in collusion with the Tatars. The army thus compelled to advance under these conditions through the charred steppe under the burning sun was, moreover, suffering from disease: men and horses died in masses. At last not far from Perekop they were compelled to halt in order not to lose the whole army. It was decided by a council of war to send 20,000 Ukrainians and as many Muscovites south to the Turkish fortress Kizikermen on the Dnieper to watch that the Tatars did not advance into the Ukraine or Poland. The main force was to retrace their steps.

Thus the united army began to retreat under the same, if not worse, conditions not having seen a single enemy. All were enraged by failure and purposeless losses and suffering. As is usual in these cases, someone was sought to bear the blame and finally Hetman Samoylovich was selected as the scapegoat. He was held responsible for the failure of the adventure though he had warned against it. Already for some time past the Cossack officers had disliked him on account of his autocratic behavior, his haughty and overbearing ways and his treatment of them. He was accused of avarice, the selfish pursuit of his own interests and undue favoritism of members of his family to whom he gave the most important State offices. They took bribes and disregarded the law. The plot against Samoylovich was concocted by a group of officers during the campaign itself. They soon won over the Muscovite Commander, Prince Vassili Golitsyn. The Hetman was accused, among other crimes, of having an understanding with the Tatars, especially in the matter of steppe-fires,  p330 Prince Golitsyn was delighted to have found a scapegoat who could be held responsible for the disgraceful failure of a military enterprise on such a grand scale. He hastened to send the accusation against Samoylovich to Moscow and soon in reply received the order to despatch him to Moscow under arrest. Ukrainian Cossacks were to elect a new Hetman.

Samoylovich was arrested on the 22nd of July, 1687, in the camp on the river Kolomac and sent to Moscow. On the 25th of July the Council of Cossack officers elected as Hetman the Commanding General Ivan Mazepa.

Samoylovich, together with his sons, was banished to Siberia without trial or sentence. Thus perished the whole family. Hetman Samoylovich, in spite of his faults, was undoubtedly a patriot. He was a good statesman and an efficient administrator, but his personal interests only too often outweighed the interests of the State.

106. Hetman Mazepa.

The Cossack Council on the river Kolomac, on the frontier of the Zaporogian steppes, much resembled the Council in Kozacha Dibrova at which, fifteen years ago, Samoylovich was elected Hetman. An area on the bank of the river Kolomac was surrounded with Muscovite troops, the tent of Golitsyn being in the middle. The common Cossacks to the number of about 2,000 were to witness the election. When, after the religious service, Golitsyn asked them whom they wished to have as their Hetman, the name of Mazepa, according to previous understanding, was pronounced. Indeed, the previous day a Council of Cossack officers had been held in Golitsyn's tent, and it is probable that Mazepa's candidature was then decided upon. However, Mazepa's name, once pronounced, was received with acclamations and accordingly he was proclaimed Hetman. He swore to recognize the supremacy of the Tsar and signed the new "Articles" which were mostly a recapitulation of former Articles signed by every newly-elected Hetman. The Cossack officers tried to obtain the right to conduct international  p331 diplomatic relations, but in vain: all letters that might come from a foreign power were to be sent to Moscow. The Cossacks, as usual, demanded various rights and privileges, exemption from all taxation and levies and confirmation of their owner­ship of lands, forests, meadows, mills, etc. The burgesses also had their rights confirmed according to former "Articles". Muscovite garrisons were to remain in Kiev, Chernigov, Pereyaslav, Nizhin and Oster, commanded by Muscovite voevods who, however, were not to interfere in local affairs. The Rolls of the Registered Cossacks were fixed at 30,000. The Hetman's residence was to be in Baturin and a regiment of Muscovite musketeers (streltsi) was to be there at his disposal. Along the southern frontier of the Hetman territory, along the rivers Orel and Samara, a line of fortresses was to be built for protection against the Tatars.

In the person of the Hetman, the Ukraine of the left bank of the Dnieper obtained a highly gifted statesman and administrator of the school of Peter Doroshenko. Ivan Mazepa belonged by birth to the Orthodox Ukrainian landed gentry from the Bila Tserkva district of the province of Kiev. The old seat of their family was the place called Mazepyntsi, still existing. His father joined the Cossacks in 1654 and was commander of Bila Tserkva. The mother of the future Hetman also came from the noble family of Mokievsky and was known for her warm attachment to the Orthodox Church. She had been a "sister" of the Brotherhood of Lutsk and later, when widowed, she took the veil. At the time of her son's election she was abbess of a convent in Kiev. Mazepa's only sister was married to a Ukrainian nobleman, Voynarovsky, who having been converted to Roman Catholicism pressed his wife to change over also. She left her husband and took the veil with her daughter Martha. Her son, Andrew Voynarovsky, was brought up at the court of his uncle, the Hetman. This attachment of Mazepa's family to the Orthodox faith and their deep religious feelings were also characteristic of Ivan Mazepa himself.

The exact date of Mazepa's birthday is not known.  p332 Historians put it between 1629 and 1632. It is also uncertain where he was educated. There are indications that he was at one time a student in the Academy of Kiev. According to other information, he was at school in the Jesuit College in Warsaw and also somewhere abroad. At any rate for his period he was brilliantly educated and proved later to be a great patron of the Arts and Learning. But Mazepa's best schooling for life was at the court of King John Casimir where he was a page in the years 1649‑1652, with other young Cossacks whom the king wished to bring up in an atmosphere favorable to Poland. Later, Mazepa is known to have been employed on various diplomatic errands, carrying letters and presents from the king to the Cossacks and the Hetmans. But when King John Casimir embarked on his 1663 campaign in the Ukraine, Mazepa left his service and returned home to Bila Tserkva. In the year 1669 we find him in the service of Hetman Doroshenko.

At first he held the modest position of lieutenant of the Hetman's Guards but his gifts and his knowledge of the world and of men were soon appreciated by the Hetman of Chihirin and in a few years he became the Commanding Captain at Headquarters and later General Secretary there. He married the daughter of the Colonel of Bila Tserkva, Polovets, but had no children. In 1674, when Doroshenko's position was very precarious, he sent Mazepa to the Crimea to ask for help against Samoylovich and Muscovy. Mazepa was intercepted by the Zaporogian Cossacks, taken prisoner and would have been put to death but for Sirko, their leader (otaman), who saved his life and sent him to Samoylovich. Mazepa knew how to please Samoylovich who sent him to Moscow having promised, however, that he would be freed and allowed to return into the Ukraine. Mazepa indeed was set free and on his return entered Samoylovich's service. He had to start his career from the very beginning and after having been Doroshenko's General Secretary (Foreign Secretary) he became at the court of Samoylovich a "Hetman's gentleman". But here also he was soon promoted  p333 to the first ranks of Cossack officers and in 1682 was the Commanding Captain of the Cossack Headquarters. This points not only to Mazepa's talents but also to his knowledge of men and how to please them. In Samoylovich's service he carried out important diplomatic missions and was often sent to Muscovy where he had an opportunity of observing government circles and their policy at close quarters.

107. His Home Policy.

News of the events on the river Kolomac provoked disorders in the whole Ukraine. The peasants and common Cossacks everywhere molested and plundered their officers, showing the growing hatred of the oppression of the new Ukrainian aristocracy. The new Hetman was at once compelled to use his volunteer troops to restore order. Culprits and leaders were punished, and at the same time Hetman Mazepa issued a manifesto forbidding recourse to private vengeance for the wrongs caused by the rising; everyone was invited to appeal to the Courts of Justice for the settlement of damages and punishment of the guilty. A little later, in 1691, he issued an Universal in which he restricted the impositions laid on the serfs: land­owners were invited not to overburden the peasants on their lands with heavy labor and taxation or to encroach on their possessions of land, forests or meadows and in general not to offer any violence and "not to invent anything newfangled and overdone in the way of impositions".

Having subdued the popular agitation Mazepa was compelled to start fresh preparations for war against the Tatars. First of all, he made new settlements mostly of the refugees from the right bank of the Dnieper; and he also built fortifications along the river Samara which later served as bases for further advances against the Tatars, as well as defences from their unexpected invasions.

The new campaign took place in spring 1689. Austrian and Venetian successes against the Tatars encouraged the Muscovite government to organize a new campaign  p334 against the Tatars. A Muscovite army of about 112,000 men started in March 1689 led by the same Prince Golitsyn. Mazepa joined him in April. This time the united armies reached Perekop about the end of May. The Khan attacked them with all his forces but was repulsed. However, Golitsyn was not able to proceed further, the Tatars having again burned down all the country around. There was no water, no fodder and not sufficient food for such an army. Early in June they began to retreat and in about a fortnight the army again stood on the banks of the river Samara and soon returned home. Once again the campaign had turned out to be merely a military demonstration on a grand scale but without any immediate result whatever. Golitsyn succeeded in representing the campaign as a great success. His protectress, the Tsarevna Sophia lavished distinctions and rewards on him and on his companions as though they really had been victorious. But the days of her power were already numbered.

Early in August 1689, Mazepa arrived in Moscow with a great train of followers to be presented to the two young Tsars Ivan and Peter, who reigned nominally only and to Tsarevna Sophia who had been Regent since 1682. Mazepa had with him all the officers of the Cossack Headquarters and five colonels, his whole company numbering about 300 persons. Mazepa was received with great pomp such as was generally shown only to foreign potentates and their ambassadors. Audiences and receptions had just begun when a palace revolution broke out. The young Tsar Peter began an open struggle against his half-sister Tsarevna Sophia and deprived her finally of her power as Regent, shut her up in a convent and took the whole power into his hands. Sophia's favorite Prince Golitsyn was exiled; among other crimes, he was accused of his unsuccess­ful campaign against the Tatars. Shaklovitov, one of Sophia's chief followers who only recently had been on a mission to the Ukraine, was beheaded. During the struggle between the Kremlin, which was in Sophia's power and the Troitsko-Sergievsky monastery, the stronghold of the young Tsar Peter, Mazepa's position  p335 was very precarious. He had come as the partisan of Sophia's regime and was considered to be Golitsyn's friend. It was to be expected that Mazepa would share his fate. Mazepa decided, however, to go over to the young Tsar. He at once won the sympathies of the young Peter to such an extent that he not only avoided embroiling himself with the new government but enjoyed the young Tsar's entire confidence and friendship for twenty years until their ways parted. Now feeling himself strong and supported by the young Tsar's favor, Mazepa, on his return to the Ukraine, could carry out his policy with more assurance and firmness.

Conditions in the Ukraine of the left bank were on the whole very difficult right from the beginning of Mazepa's rule. The popular masses were profoundly agitated, often breaking out in open revolt. The Cossack officers having by all possible means, fair and foul, acquired considerable landed property, were burdening the peasants on their lands with ever heavier taxation and duties. The State monopoly on spirits, recently introduced in the Ukraine was very unpopular because the population was of old accustomed to free distilling and selling of spirits. This dissatisfaction was the greater as the income derived therefrom was employed to maintain the Kompaniytsi (Volunteer) troops which had been formed by the throwing together various elements of vagrants, unsettled vagabonds and rogues. These troops were guilty of all manner of violence and oppression, and were extremely unpopular among the population. Hetman Mazepa himself had many personal enemies who constantly plotted and intrigued against him, sending to Moscow veritable showers of denunciations. The demoralized Cossack officers, accustomed to make use of the Muscovite government in settling their home affairs and depose their Hetman with the help of Muscovite force considered Mazepa to be simply a clever man knowing how to take advantage of a favorable situation and use the propitious moment. To the bulk of the Cossack officers of the left bank Mazepa was a "stranger", a "Liakh" (Pole). Neither the common  p336 Cossacks nor peasants saw in the new Hetman anything to distinguish him from the rest of the new gentry and make him popular.

But out of all these difficulties Mazepa emerged victorious. By his clever, tactful, and consistent policy he strengthened his authority among his officers. Feeling behind him the support of the young Tsar, Mazepa dealt vigorously with his overt enemies and by generous grants of lands created around himself a considerable circle of devoted followers. During his long rule Mazepa showed a definite tendency to base his power in the Ukraine on the support of the rich and well educated class of Cossack officers. Ukrainian historians often reproach Mazepa for his lack of democratic idealism and for seeking support among the privileged class of Cossack officers with their aristocratic tendencies rather than among the mass of the people. We must not forget that Mazepa, the child of his age, held this to be the normal way of building up a State with the monarchial power reposing in the leading and privileged class, the national aristocracy, with which he shared his power. Within the limits of the political conceptions of his time Mazepa endeavored to do his utmost for the Ukraine. In supporting and developing the new national aristocracy with grants of land that made them an economically strong and politically independent class, he took great care of their education and promoted culture among them. The Cossack officers soon learned to appreciate their Hetman and he acquired their confidence and high esteem.

From the beginning of his rule Mazepa showed himself to be a strong protector of the Ukrainian Church and a liberal patron of National Arts and Learning. At his own expense he built a number of beauti­ful churches and monasteries in Kiev, Chernigov, Pereyaslav and other places. He erected a new building for the Academy in Kiev founded by Peter Mohyla and richly endowed it with lands, funds and bursaries in order to "enable all Ukrainian children to indulge any aptitude for learning". Besides the Academy he founded a number of schools and  p337 hospitals taking great care of their buildings. The contemporary style of architecture, baroque, in the Ukraine at this time is designated as "Mazepine baroque". He richly endowed Ukrainian monasteries and convents with their schools and printing presses which were at that time the chief centres of learning. He obtained for the Ukrainian Metropolitan Barlaam Yasinsky (1690‑1706) the title of Exarch of the Muscovite Patriarch in order to exalt the head of the Ukrainian Church. For his services rendered to the Ukrainian Church and national education Mazepa acquired the sympathies of enlightened Ukrainians among both clergy and laity. Hardly any Hetman had so many panegyrics, odes, poems and dramas composed in his honor as Mazepa.

Though Mazepa represented the Ukrainian aristocracy, we must admit that to a greater extent than any other Hetman, he protected the interests of the common Cossacks and peasants against the officers and restrained the cravings of the new aristocracy within the limits of the law. In his Universal (Manifesto) of 1691, he had strictly forbidden secular as well as spiritual landlords to impose unduly heavy duties on the peasants occupying their lands or to force the Cossacks into serfdom. He had also forbidden anyone to deprive the Cossacks of lands which "they had acquired with their swords and their blood" having divided among them the lands of former Polish owners. On the whole Mazepa insisted that the landlords should hold their lands "reasonably, according to Ukrainian custom without causing difficulties to the peasants from newly imposed obligations". About this time he deprived of their estates some of the landlords in Poltava province for having overburdened their peasants with obligations. In his Universal of 1692 he again reminded the landlords that they "keep in moderation, inflicting nothing new and immoderate, but be satisfied with the usual tributes and duties". In the Universal of 1701 the Hetman let it be known that he had impeached an officer before the Court of Justice for having overburdened his peasants with new and illegal obligations  p338 and again ordered that the peasants should not work more than two days a week for the landlord.

On several occasions Mazepa sided with the peasants when the Muscovite government tried to compel them to build fortresses and serve in the military transports. Mazepa decreed that only Cossacks should be employed in military service as was their privilege and not the peasants who already were overburdened with all kinds of duties. Later also he took up the defence of the Cossacks when Tsar Peter exhausted them with innumerable campaigns and the building of numberless fortresses. Regarding the State monopoly on spirits which was so unpopular, Mazepa had abolished it on coming into power, but was soon compelled to revive it as it was the only source of revenue for the payment of the Kompaniytsi troops, though he took care that people should not be "annoyed when buying spirits for marriage or baptismal feasts". Personally he was against a State monopoly on spirits. Thus after a long debate at a Council of Cossack officers Mazepa decided (1692) again to abolish this State monopoly and look for other sources of income. A special Universal was published to make this known to the population. At Easter 1693, the Hetman called in a new Cossack Officers Council from all the regiments, common Cossacks and burgesses, at which it was voted to "abolish the spirits monopoly as a thing hateful of old", for one year, and impose instead a special tax on all breweries and inns. But this new method did not last as it brought too little into the State Treasury. Among other reasons why Mazepa was against brewing and distilling on a great scale was that it destroyed forests, and he took special care of the forests as is seen from his numerous Universals for this purpose.

Hetman Mazepa greatly encouraged Ukrainian trade and protected the interests of Ukrainian merchants. When, in 1700, the Polish authorities put difficulties and hindrances in the way of the Ukrainian merchants in Poland, he specially intervened with the Polish authorities and persuaded that government to publish a special order and  p339  appeal to the population inviting them not to make difficulties for traders bearing Ukrainian passports in Poland. Generally speaking, the whole of Mazepa's home policy proves that, although supporting the privileged class of Cossack officers, as pillars of Ukrainian autonomy, he never lost sight of the interests of the Ukrainian nation as a whole.

The Zaporogian Cossacks were in constant opposition to Hetman Mazepa. They well understood that with the conquest of Crimea and the domination of the steppes on the shores of the Black Sea the very existence of the Zaporogian Sich, the outpost of the Ukraine against the Crimean robbers, would be endangered, and their role of defenders of the Ukrainian frontier would be at an end. Peace on this frontier and the cultivation of these great areas of steppe would render the Zaporogians needless. It was thus to the interest of the Zaporogian Cossacks to leave the steppes in their primeval uncultivated state. The settlement of an agricultural population on the rivers of Orel and Samara, quite near to the rapids and the building of fortresses were distasteful to the Zaporogians so that they at once came into conflict with the Hetman. As at the time of Bohdan Khmelnitsky, the Zaporogian Sich was still the refuge of all discontented elements of the Ukrainian population. It was from here that agitators proceeded into the Ukraine to carry on propaganda against the Cossack officers and the Hetman. Here it was also that a pretender to the Hetman's mace finally arose, who once again dreamed of delivering the Ukraine from Muscovite supremacy with the help of the Crimean Tatars. His programme included in addition, the abolition of the role of the Hetman and Cossack officers. He was a young clerk in the office of the Cossack Headquarters, Peter Ivanenko or Petrik.

108. Petrik's Uprising.

Petrik fled, in the spring of 1692, to the Zaporogian Sich, won over some of them to the idea of a rising against the Hetman, penetrated the Crimea and succeeded in interesting  p340 the Khan in his plan so far that they concluded a treaty and an alliance of mutual military support. This Treaty between the two powers, the Ukraine and the Crimea, stipulated: "an eternal peace and brotherly relations" and mutual defence against Poland and Muscovy. The Ukrainian Princedom, according to the Treaty, included both sides of the Dnieper and a part of Slobidska Ukraine. The Crimea and the Ukraine were to have resident ambassadors and peacefully settle all their misunderstandings. Free trade was guaranteed for both sides without any customs and the Ukrainians were to be allowed to fish and hunt in the region of the lower Dnieper, also evaporate salt without any duties or taxation. Having obtained the Khan's promise of help, Petrik advanced into the Ukraine inviting the population to overthrow "the tyranny of Muscovy and the aristocrats". Mazepa sent against him a force sufficient to induce him to flee to the Zaporogian Sich. Next year Petrik made another unsuccess­ful attempt to provoke a rising in the Ukraine. For several years he gave trouble to the Ukrainian authorities by his plotting in Crimea and took part in several inroads by the Tatars until 1696 when he disappeared. This episode of Ukrainian history is still insufficiently investigated and very little known. There are some unsolved and enigmatic sides to it: how far, for instance, was Petrik supported by some of the Cossack officers who were in opposition to Mazepa. As far as materials and documents go, it is difficult to draw definite conclusions.

109. War with Turkey and Crimea.

Hardly had the agitation caused by Petrik's rising subsided, when the attention of the Cossacks and the Ukrainian population as a whole, was drawn to the struggle which the Muscovite Tsar had started against the Turks and the Tatars for the possession of the approaches to the Black and the Azov Seas. In this long and strenuous war the Ukraine was to play an active part. This struggle also attracted the Zaporogian Cossacks and for some time diverted their spirit of opposition. Tsar Peter made a  p341 plan of campaign on two fronts; on one side operations were to be conducted on the lower Don for the possession of the Turkish fortress of Azov; on the other side the campaign was directed towards the lower Dnieper in order to open an approach to the Black Sea. The object of this war was within the grasp of the Ukrainian population. It lastly in the sphere of their vital interests and the Ukrainian Cossacks took an active and even enthusiastic part in it. Tsar Peter's first attempt at the siege of Azov, 1695, was a failure; but at the same time the Ukrainian and Muscovite armies led respectively by Mazepa and Sheremetiev in the region of the lower Dnieper were quite success­ful, the Turkish fortresses of Kizikermen and Tavansk and a number of smaller Turkish strongholds were taken. Most of them were destroyed but Kizikermen and Tavansk were occupied by garrisons composed of the Hetman's Cossacks and of the Zaporogians. Early in 1696 the Tatars with Petrik penetrated into Ukrainian territory as far as Hadiach but Mazepa soon expelled them.

In 1696 Tsar Peter opened his second campaign with the siege of Azov. Having built on the Don near Voronezh a special fleet, he sailed down the river. After a siege and hard fighting, supported by the Ukrainian forces, he took the strong fortress of Azov. The Ukrainian army, under the command of Colonel Lyzohub, played in this campaign a decisive role, according to the testimony of Tsar Peter himself.

The campaign lasted four years longer. One of its striking episodes was the heroic defence by the Cossack garrison of the fortresses of Tavansk and Kizikermen, when a few thousand Cossacks held the fortress against the united Tatar Turkish armies with power­ful artillery, until they were relieved by the Hetman with his main force. During this siege the Ukrainians lost but 205 men whereas the Turkish losses were about 7,000. Zaporogian Cossacks renewed their maritime campaign on the Black Sea attacking and plundering the Turkish shores. The allies, however, were not able to strike a decisive  p342 blow against the Mohammedans. The war was protracted and the Ukraine being the principal contributor to its expenses, felt the increasingly heavy burden every year. The situation was rendered more difficult by bad harvests with which the Ukraine was almost yearly afflicted at the end of the Seventeenth century.

In the meantime, Austria concluded a separate peace with the Turks at Carlowitz. Soon afterwards Poland did the same, having obtained Kamenets in Podolia. The Tsar Peter, abandoned by his allies, also started peace negotiations and on the 30th of July, 1700, a truce for 30 years was concluded in Constantinople. Muscovy received Azov and the northern shores of the Azov Sea. Both sides undertook not to build fortresses on the lower Dnieper and to destroy those that existed. The truce of Constantinople gave to the Ukrainians access to the Black Sea so vital to their economic interests. But this result no longer satisfied Tsar Peter, who now dreamed of opening the Baltic for his intercourse with Europe. In order to conquer the shores of the Baltic he started a war against Sweden and into this war he forcibly dragged the Ukraine also, though the interests of the Ukrainian population did not lie at all in this direction. This struggle against Sweden had, indeed, fatal consequences for the Ukraine.


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