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previous: Chapter 10 This webpage reproduces a chapter of Twentieth-Century Ukraine by Clarence Manning published by Bookman Associates New York, 1951 The text is in the public domain. This page has been carefully proofread and I believe it to be free of errors. If you find a mistake though, please let me know! next: Chapter 12

 p105  XI

Western Ukraine and Poland

As we have seen, the Western Ukrainians took advantage of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October, 1918, to set up the Republic of Western Ukraine. This was at once attacked by the Poles, who demanded control of the whole province of Galicia. The officers of the republic were finally forced into exile and by the late summer of 1919, the Poles were able to extend their military control over the territory at stake.

Throughout the whole of 1919 the situation greatly disturbed the representatives of the Allied Powers and their confusion was reflected in the Treaty of Saint Germain which brought about peace between Austria and the victorious Allies. The latter, while anxious about the warfare that was still going on in Eastern Galicia, were in a way helpless in the face of circumstances. They were already deeply involved in the attempts of the White Russians to overthrow the Bolsheviks and they were not fully aware of the seriousness of the problem that was offered by the independence drive among the various nationalities in the old Russian Empire. So long as they were undecided about the future of Russia, it was hopeless for them to think of a final solution of the problem of Eastern Galicia.

It was obvious that if there were a Russia with a Ukraine  p106 peacefully and willingly incorporated in it, Eastern Galicia should be added to it. Sober realism recognized that that condition was not going to prevail in the near future. On the one other hand there were the Poles to be reckoned with. The wave of nationalism that had followed the independence of the Polish state led them to demand the restoration of the boundaries of 1772 before the first division of the country and they were not content with a Poland that comprised merely the Polish ethnographical territory where they formed a majority of the population. At times Pilsudski seems to have had a vision of a federation of the adjacent nations of Ukraine, Lithuania and Byelorussia under the aegis of Poland but the opposing groups headed by Dmowski and Paderewski demanded a unified state based on their interpretation of the Union of Lublin of 1569. Above all they demanded the inclusion in Poland of the two cities of Wilno, formerly the capital of Lithuania, and Lviv, the most important city in Western Ukraine. Furthermore, they wanted the whole of Eastern Galicia and were willing to fight for it.​1

The Allies vainly advanced one compromise after another. France, conscious of the danger from a reviving Germany, was an ardent and consistent supporter of a strong Poland and in all international gatherings could be relied upon to plead the Polish cause. Great Britain was inclined to be critical of the Polish claims, while President Wilson and the United States were more interested in securing support for the League of Nations. No Great Power understood or tried to understand the Ukrainian position or seriously defended the Ukrainian cause.

The Treaty of Saint Germain recognized the abnormal status of Eastern Galicia by leaving open its future disposition. On November 21, 1919, the Council of Ambassadors prepared a Statute for Eastern Galicia under which Poland would have control of the province for twenty-five years but the province would be fully autonomous with its own diet, school system and military units.​2 At the end of the period there was to be  p107 a plebiscite in the area, for it was hoped that by that time the problem of Russia and of Bolshevism would have been solved. The Poles rejected the proposal on the ground that, having occupied the area to bar the spread of Bolshevism with the permission of the Allies, they were entitled to remain there. They rejected also the notion of the "Curzon line" as a boundary. This was a vague attempt to bound Polish territory at the time when the Allies were asking the Poles to occupy and organize territory farther east to bar Bolshevism.​3

Under these circumstances the government of the Republic of Western Ukraine continued to flounder. In one sense its reason for existence had ended when it merged with the Ukrainian National Republic but this was so tenuous and so disturbed by the Bolsheviks that the regime of Petrushevych continued to speak for the Western Ukrainians. This was the more true when in the spring of 1920, in last efforts to secure Polish aid, Petlyura tacitly waived Ukrainian claims to Eastern Galicia at the time of his campaign against Kiev. Petrushevych and his followers moved to Vienna, where they remained as a government in exile, and later they went to Prague and finally to Berlin. Throughout they were the recognized leaders of their people and their influence on the life of the country was far greater than we might assume.

Ukrainian refusal to accept Polish rule and Allied indecision as to the future of Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia) had the inevitable consequence that the Ukrainians (and the other minorities) boycotted the Polish elections in the spring of 1919 and were not represented in the Constituent Assembly which drew up the Polish Constitution and remained the legislative body of the country until 1922.​4 Thus at the critical period in the development of the Polish state, the advocates of a strong centralizing policy were put in absolute control.

It was very much the same in 1922, when again most Ukrainians stayed away from the polls.​5 They had been promised by the Allies autonomy for Eastern Galicia and the creation of their own diet there and so they naturally stayed  p108 outside of the Polish political arena. At the same time the Poles had no intention of granting them these privileges and the dispute over Eastern Galicia appeared constantly on the agenda of the diplomatic meetings, without any solution ever being reached.​6

In the fall of 1922 another attempt was made to settle the long-smoldering question. The Polish Diet passed a resolution providing for the setting up of "Ruthenian" diets in the districts of Lviv, Ternopil and Stanyslaviv. The law was purposely vague as to the powers and functions of these diets but it was clear that it did not presuppose any possibility of co‑operation between them on a provincial level and it did not extend any privileges to the Ukrainians living in Volyn and Pidlyashshya, whom the Poles classed as a different people from the "Ruthenians." It was quite evident that there was no honest intention of granting this autonomy, such as it was. The measure was adopted to impress the Council of Ambassadors, which finally swallowed the bait and on Polish assurances that all would be well and that they would grant some sort of autonomy duly recognized Eastern Galicia as a part of Poland on March 15, 1923.​7 The Ukrainian National Rada sent delegates to Paris to register its protests, but these were never heard and the decision was allowed to stand.​8

From 1919 on, conditions in the Ukrainian areas were unsettled, to speak mildly. The Poles arrested large numbers of the more patriotic Ukrainians and sent them to jail for long periods. The turbulence and the Polish reprisals heightened the tension between the two nationalities and renewed the ancient clashes which had been so disastrous for medieval Ukraine and medieval Poland.

The final denial of all their hopes for international action brought about a change in the thinking of Ukrainians. They were forced to accept the fact that Western Ukraine would remain under Polish sovereignty until the next European upheaval and they began to take measures accordingly. Their attitude had been expressed by the a Ukrainian delegate, Samuel  p109 Pidhirsky, in the Diet of 1922, when he declared: "The creation of an independent Ukrainian nation is the goal of the Ukrainian people, but counting on the practical condition, the Ukrainians are ready to co‑operate with the Polish people and all peoples who are within the Republic, if they will be assured full and free development in all fields of life."​9 By 1918 most Ukrainians were electing members to the Polish Diet and exercising their duties as Polish citizens without giving up their hopes for independence.

Almost without exception the Ukrainian political parties formed a solid bloc of opposition to the government. They advocated measures of social reform which would benefit Ukrainians. At times they boycotted the parliament, but (what the Poles would never appreciate) they were still more bitterly opposed to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and had no desire to join it. Some of the conservative parties seemed to acquiesce more willingly in Polish domination and were regarded as collaborationists by their fellows.​10

There was an irreconcilable core of Ukrainians who rejected all co‑operation. These were represented first by the Ukrainian Military Organization and then after 1929 by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Colonel Evhen Konovalets. He was the officer who had led the Ukrainian troops into Kiev after the fall of Hetman Skoropadsky and he now became the head of a secret militant organization which was responsible for the murder of a number of Polish leaders noted for their anti-Ukrainian tendencies. This group naturally had the sympathy of much of the population and could count on their support, especially in moments of crisis. Konovalets was finally forced out of Poland and was murdered in Amsterdam in 1938 by a Bolshevist secret agent who handed him a disguised bomb.​11

The establishment of the modus vivendi between the Poles and the Ukrainians would have been delicate but the Poles completely misjudged the situation. They insisted that all the Ukrainians were eager to become Poles except a small  p110 minority that had been bribed by the Germans. At the time when the followers of Pilsudski were planning for German support, they covered their actions by accusing the Ukrainians of being a German inspired party.

The Polish hope of eliminating the Ukrainians by assimilation was equally tactless. Count Grabski, minister of education and a statesman, declared that within twenty-five years there would not be a Ukrainian left in Poland and the government attempted a policy of forced assimilation and of pressure against outstanding Ukrainian leaders.​12

The Polish land reform bills were applied in Ukrainian territory for the distribution of the estates of the large Polish land­owners there, but the land was not given to the Ukrainian villagers in the neighborhood but to groups of Polish veterans who were brought into the Ukrainian districts in order to alter the character of the population.

In the same way pressure was applied on the educational system. The government refused to allow the formation of a Ukrainian university in Lviv, a demand that had been put forward in the days of Austria-Hungary. They admitted only a negligible number of Ukrainian students to the Polish university in Lviv and to get an education, Ukrainians were obliged either to go abroad or to study informally in a secret Ukrainian university that was established in Lviv without the knowledge of the Polish authorities.​13 While there were a few Ukrainian high schools in the area, the Polish language was the real medium of instruction and the work in Ukrainian in most of the so‑called "Ukrainian" schools was usually confined to the most elementary grades and taught largely by Poles who had an inadequate knowledge of the Ukrainian language.

On a higher scale, the work of the Shevchenko Scientific Society was hampered in every way. Its funds were either confiscated or lost in the periods of inflation. Many of its collections were stolen and the institution was under constant  p111  suspicion. In an effort to counterbalance its influence and remove Ukrainian influence from Lviv, the Poles in Warsaw agreed to allow the establishment of a Ukrainian Scientific Institute. The new institution did a great deal of valuable work but it shared the sentiments of the older organization and the two maintained the same point of view.​14

In addition to these general policies, there came moments of especial attempts at suppression. Thus in 1919 and 1930 the government attacked Ukrainian Boy Scout troops, closed Ukrainian libraries and reading rooms, seized the property of various co‑operative societies, and forced the situation to a point where there was something very close to an armed revolt.

These actions were of course contrary to and in violation of the minority treaty which Poland had signed under protest in 1919 at the conclusion of the World War. The Ukrainians and their friends presented petition after petition to the League of Nations but to little or no effect. Even after the Pacification of 1930, when a specially strong protest was made not only by the Ukrainian representatives but by many leaders of world opinion, the League contented itself with a mild reprimand for the Polish government and a statement that some of its lesser officials were undoubtedly guilty of excessive zeal in maintaining order.​15 It was merely another example of the helplessness of the League when it came to fulfill its functions against one of its members and only added to the growing weakness of the entire organization, on which the peace of Europe and of the world seemed to depend.

In 1934 the Polish government denounced the clauses of the treaties signed in Paris which guaranteed the protection of minority rights and it then opened concentration camps in which large numbers of Ukrainians were incarcerated without trial on the flimsiest pretexts.

By 1935 both sides were weary of the impasse. In that year the UNDO, the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, representing most of the Ukrainian parties, worked out a compromise  p112 with the government, especially Professor Koscialkowski, the minister of internal affairs. In return for ceasing their opposition, they were offered nineteen seats in the reorganized Polish parliament and promises were held out to them of the establishment of a Ukrainian university in Lviv. Yet this "normalization" meant little, for the government continued to make mass arrests of so‑called members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalist, intern Ukrainians and close their institutions.​16

Next the government turned against the Ukrainian Orthodox. In 1938 it seized over a hundred Orthodox churches on the ground that they had been Catholic at some time in the past, and demolished several. The measure was protested not only by the Orthodox but also by the Uniat Greek Catholics, especially Archbishop Sheptytsky. On the whole the move completely backfired, and served only to solidify all Ukrainians under Polish rule without regard to religious affiliation.​17

Despite this sad picture of conflict with the government, the Ukrainian position constantly improved, especially in the economic and cultural spheres. The Ukrainian co‑operative societies not only remained in existence but multiplied many times in member­ships and in capital. They established a flourishing Ukrainian bank for which they were able to supply the funds. One Ukrainian agricultural society alone grew to have 160,000 members.​18

Cultural work grew in the same proportions. Literature and journalism flourished. Institutions for the youth, like the Sokols, grew in number and various athletic groups such as the Luh (Meadow) came into being and increased rapidly despite Polish opposition. With each year the Ukrainians gained in wealth and power, despite the incoherent and brutal efforts to government to check and undermine them.

It is easy to see the difference between the position of Ukrainians in Poland and of those in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. With all of their reactionary, unjust and brutal policies, the Poles made no attempt to wipe out the Ukrainian  p113  population as a whole or to alter the fundamental characteristics of their life. The Ukrainian villagers were able to take advantage of the rise in living conditions and to adapt themselves to the modern European civilization. They were able to accept and assimilate the new ideas that were spreading throughout civilized Europe. They were able to vote and to elect their own people to the Polish Diet as they would, even though the authorities would frequently interfere on behalf of Polish candidates, break up election meetings and arrest anti-Polish candidates on trumped-up charges and employ every other means of stealing elections. In a word the repression of the Ukrainian cause was carried on by the methods of a traditionally reactionary and of unenlightened government machine.

Poland placed herself under a tremendous handicap by this all-absorbing effect to subdue and master a large minority. It was perhaps natural, for the sense of historical continuity between the independent Poland of the past and the present revived state was strong. During the last centuries of the old Polish Republic the Ukrainians had been forced into a subordinate position and subjected to a strong Polonizing influence. In the new state the average Pole could not imagine any change. The Poles were well aware of the harm which had been done to them in the seventeenth century by the Kozak revolts but they could not see their way clear to initiating a new policy of friendship and true co‑operation.

As the most power­ful of the revived states of Eastern Europe, Poland could have become the natural leader of those peoples between Germany and the Soviet Union. At times Pilsudski realized the possibilities of this but he was never able to formulate a working policy to bring it about. The trend toward a unified state was so strong that it swept the entire Polish population with it and gave the idea that their national existence depended upon their success in dominating the minorities. This unfortunate mode of thinking drove the Poles from one unhappy situation to another and cost them  p114 abroad much of that wholehearted support which they had won during World War I, when the population almost with one accord was striving to recover its lost liberty.

The record of the Polish dealings with that part of Western Ukraine that was under its control contrasts sharply with its many positive achievements in other lines. It left behind a hostility and a discontent which boded ill for the new state if it were to be involved in a major struggle with its neighbors. Yet it must be emphasized again that although almost all the Ukrainian parties were opposed to Poland, few were tempted to turn that opposition to the profit of Communism. The Ukrainian Soviet Republic had done its work so well that it proved to the Western Ukrainians that whatever was their hostility to Poland, their hatred for Russian Communists was still of necessity more intense and more fundamental.

---

The Author's Notes:

1 See Malbone W. Graham, "Polish Politics, 1918‑1939," in Poland (Berkeley and Los Angeles), pp81 ff.

2 See the summary of this statute in the article of Basil Paneyko, "Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia," Slavonic and East European Review, IX, 580 f.

3 See Buell, op. cit., pp269 ff.; Poland, pp81 ff.; Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy, pp820 ff. For the extreme Polish point of view, see A. Bruce Boswell, Poland and the Poles (New York, 1919), pp163‑66.

4 See Buell, op. cit., p85.

5 See Buell, op. cit., p272. Hrushevsky, op. cit., p562.

6 Hrushevsky, op. cit., p563. See also Paneyko, op. cit., p581‑82. It is to be noted that the Poles here drew a distinction between the Uniats (Catholics of the Byzantine Rite) and the Orthodox Ukrainians who were formerly in the Russian Empire. This can be seen in the article of Stanislas Srokowski, "The Ukrainian Problem in Poland," Slavonic and East European Review, IX, 588 ff., especially 593 f. This distinction is not made in the Treaty of Riga (see summary in Skrzypek, The Problem of Eastern Galicia [London, 1948], pp72 ff.) It is not made either in the Polish Encyclopedia, Vol. II, Nos. 3 and 5, Geneva, 1921, which uses the old terminology, regards Ukraine as the gubernia of Kiev and uses the term Ruthenia for the entire area, exactly the reverse of modern usage.

7 The Council of Ambassadors recognized the Polish boundaries as set by the Treaty of Riga. See Skrzypek, op. cit., pp74 f. This decision, recognizing the legality of Polish control over regions to the east, made the question of Eastern Galicia as mentioned in the text academic and meaningless.

8 See Hrushevsky, op. cit., p563.

9 Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy, p853.

10 Poland, pp118 ff.

11 Chamberlin, op. cit., p67.

12 See Paneyko, op. cit., p585.

13 See Czubatyj, "Silver Jubilee," p242.

14 See Hrushevsky, op. cit., pp504, 509, 562; C. A. Manning, "The Jubileum of the Shevchenko Scientific Society (1873‑1948)," in The Ukrainian Quarterly, V, 29‑36.

15 See Hrushevsky, op. cit., p568; Buell op. cit., pp276 ff.

16 See Buell, op. cit., pp277 ff.

17 Velyka Istoriya Ukrainy, pp856 ff.

18 Roman Olesnicki, "The Ukrainian Cooperative Movement," The Ukrainian Quarterly, II, 36‑42.

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