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previous: Chapter 20 This webpage reproduces a chapter of Twentieth-Century Ukraine by Clarence Manning published by Bookman Associates New York, 1951 The text is in the public domain. This page has been carefully proofread and I believe it to be free of errors. If you find a mistake though, please let me know! next: Chapter 22

 p193  XXI

The Economic Development of Ukraine

It is a truism for all students of Ukraine that the country is potentially one of the richest sections of Europe. It is equally obvious that the wealth of the region has never been employed for the benefit of the population. This was true under imperial rule and is just as true under the Soviets.

What are some of the resources which are available for development? They fall into the two great divisions of agriculture and mineral deposits. In both the area is unusually well endowed.

A large part of Ukrainian territory falls within the famous "black earth" region⁠1 which is admirably suited for the raising of grain. Even in classical times the importation into Greece and Rome of wheat from the area to the north of the Black Sea was of the greatest economic importance. After a temporary reduction of grain production in the Middle Ages because of the Tatar invasions, interest in the wheat fields of Ukraine freshened and since the annexation of the country by the Moscow tsars, Ukraine has been one of the chief sources for feeding not only Great Russia but the whole of Europe. Absence of Ukrainian grain from the world market has led to many of the difficulties in Western Europe.

Ukraine is the greatest beet sugar area of Europe. Fruits and other products of the temperate zone are also produced in large  p194 quantities. In 1937 Ukraine produced 25 per cent of the total grain of the Soviet Union, 78 per cent of the sugar, 75 per cent of the canned goods, 15.2 per cent of the cattle and 30 per cent of the pigs.⁠2

The yield per acre is far lower than in less favored countries of Europe. The methods of agriculture employed are primitive. Efforts to improve them were thwarted by the imperial bureaucracy and the methods of administration of the large estates. With the establishment of the Ukrainian National Republic a drive was made toward efficiency and many agricultural stations were set up. These were for a while continued during the period of Ukrainization but their scope was gradually restricted.⁠3

There have been few attempts to diversify crops. The soybean has been planted more widely but that has been the chief development. The area devoted to tobacco has remained almost constant. Cotton has not been success­ful owing to failure to introduce a proper system of rotation and to fertilize properly. Other crops, like rice, which might profitably be grown in certain areas have not been developed, in view of the necessity of fitting Ukrainian economy into the general pattern adopted by the central organs of Moscow.⁠4 It is fair to say that less than one‑third of the agricultural resources of the country are being systematically developed, and that in strict accordance with Soviet plans.⁠5

The breeding of livestock has not progressed. The number of animals diminished sharply during World War I and the period of the revolution. Then it began to increase but it fell off sharply in 1929 when the peasants killed their animals rather than hand them over to the collective farms. The period from 1933 to 1937 witnessed an increase but World War II again ravaged the country, so that the industry is hardly yet on a par with what it was in 1912.⁠6

It is a striking fact that the percentage of many of the products of Ukraine is shrinking when compared with other sections of the Soviet Union which are regarded as less susceptible  p195 to national movements. This does not mean that conditions are improving for the population of the area. It only emphasizes the greater and greater exactions that are being demanded of the unfortunate people. Thus Ukraine produces 25 per cent of the total grain supply of the union but this is 2 per cent less than it was in 1913. On the other hand, despite the population increase, the Soviet Union expanded the export of Ukrainian grain from 41 per cent in 1913 to 71 per cent in 1937. The fixed policy of the Soviet Union has been to export the largest part of the Ukrainian grain crop without regard to the needs of the population. Total grain exports from the Soviet Union have paralleled the Ukrainian crop. As a result in 1937, despite the growth of the cities of Ukraine, nearly four million tons of grain less were available for the population than in 1913, after export. This contrasts with an increase of some twenty-one million tons for the population outside of Ukraine during the same period. Since the annexation of Western Ukraine after World War II, the disparity is even greater.⁠7

The mineral resources of Ukraine consist primarily of coal and iron. The coal deposits of the Donets basin are among the largest in Europe and were developed on a large scale long before World War I. It is estimated that some seventy billion tons of high quality are available — an almost inexhaustible supply.⁠8

Near by are the iron mines of Kriviy Rih, which contain ore that is often 55 per cent pure. These furnished the nucleus for the imperial metal industry.⁠9

The ease of bringing together the coal of the Donets basin and the iron of Kriviy Rih has long been recognized and has facilitated the development of the metallurgical industry in Russia. In imperial times the government encouraged the movement into the area of large numbers of non-Ukrainians and it was from these imported workers that the Soviets obtained many of the Communists who worked against the  p196 Ukrainian National Republic. De-Ukrainization of the mines has long been a definite policy of the Soviet Union and has perhaps succeeded better than in any other enterprise.

In the neighborhood enormous plants were established for the production of pig iron. About eight million tons are produced each year and Ukrainian production has formed about 61 per cent of the total.⁠10

The steel industry produces 47 per cent of all the country's steel. With this production we already find the first step in the diversion of industry. The production of steel is only a little over half of the total, while that of pig iron is three-quarters. When it comes to finished products, the proportion produced in the steel and iron area of Ukraine sinks still lower. Only 17 per cent of the machines produced in the Soviet Union come from Ukraine.⁠11

This is a continuation of the old imperial process which had concentrated around St. Petersburg and Moscow all the final manufacturing processes of the empire. Under that system Ukraine was to be only the source of raw material. The Soviets have sharpened and intensified this process with the idea of keeping the Ukrainian Soviet Republic completely dependent for all the necessities and conveniences of life.

The importance of Ukraine to the needs of the Soviet Union is being reduced by the development of Ural and Siberian centers of manufacture. Much money and energy are being expended to create these new plants and the German invasion gave the Kremlin a good pretext for moving a considerable number of the factories to the east. There are no plans for replacing these. The new Five-Year Plan adopted since the war provides for an increase of only 10 per cent in Ukrainian coal and iron production and of only 4 per cent in Ukrainian steel production. On the other hand, the energy with which this transfer of industry is being effected is shown by the fact that while in 1927 Ukraine produced 77 per cent of the coal, 75.9 per cent of the iron ore, and 72 per cent of  p197 the pig iron, in 1937 these figures had dropped to 53.8, 61.9 and 61.5 per cent. At the completion of the new plan, these figures are to drop to 34.4 per cent of the coal and 49.7 per cent of the pig iron.⁠12

This change is significant. Of course, part of it can be explained by the need of the Soviet Union for exploring the rich mineral deposits to be found in the Asiatic regions. It is hardly to be expected that Moscow would work hard at enlarging the already existing facilities of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic when other resources were available. In addition, however, the factories of Ukraine are far better known to foreigners than are the completely new developments in the east. The latter are regarded as in a safer position in time of war, since they are further removed from the frontiers. The creation of such facilities had been planned by the imperial regime but the revolution had prevented the carrying out of the process.⁠13 The aid given to the Soviet Union in World War II during the period of appeasement of Stalin made it possible to proceed with this work and it has been pushed even more vigorously since the German-Communist clash. Now it is to be extended still further, so that under the Moscow yoke Ukraine can look forward to a static period of its industry. No one in authority is interested any longer in treating Ukraine, with its mineral supplies, as the manufacturing base of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin hopes that it will still play an important role but its widespread discoveries of the living character of Ukrainian nationalism and its hostility to the West have persuaded it to leave Ukraine as it was and to perform on its territory only the rough fabrication of raw materials which could be dispensed with in case of an outbreak of hostilities. All this bears out Khvylovy's statement that the Soviet Union was experiencing an Asiatic renaissance in which the Russian Soviet Republic and the western Asian regions were to profit.

Agriculture, coal and iron do not exhaust the natural  p198 wealth of Ukraine. There are enormous deposits of peat in parts of the area. The Nikopol supply of manganese is perhaps the largest in the world and there is an unlimited quantity of potassium and other minerals. These of course must be worked until the authorities can find other sources of supply in the wide expanses of Siberia and elsewhere.⁠14

We can understand now the relative indifference with which Moscow regarded the reduction of the population of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic even before World War II. It has given up any possible intention of making Ukraine an important source of supply. This explains too the relative lack of attention shown in many other ways.

Here in an industrial area which can surpass any European part of the Russian Soviet Republic, there is no development of any form of light industry. Petitions to start textile plants or other necessary factories are uniformly turned down. The budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, which comprises 18 per cent of the population of the country, formed 4 per cent of the total budget of the Soviet Union in 1927 and this later dropped to 3 per cent.⁠15

Practically all of the projected plants are on the east bank of the Dnieper, rather than the west. While a few new plants are to be built in Lviv, we can be sure that West Ukraine will not benefit by its absorption and that her industries which were staggering along under Polish rule will not receive any substantial aid.

There may seem to be an exception in the production of hydroelectric power. Perhaps the best-known and best-advertised work in the U. S. S. R. is the Dnieprostroy. In the old days, when there was still the pretext of Ukrainization, American engineers were hired to construct this plant, largely destroyed during the Nazi-Soviet war. It is being rebuilt but its power will be conveyed mostly to Moscow and other points in the Russian Soviet Republic where the Kremlin wants to promote manufactures on a larger scale. As it is now,  p199 the Dnieprostroy stands as one of the first great enterprises undertaken by the Soviet Union, and its outcome is regarded by the world as a measure of Soviet achievement. It has become more of a propaganda symbol than anything else, since the military preparations of the Union demand the strengthening and multiplication of plants which are less well known and less accessible.

Another important asset of Ukraine is its ports on the Black Sea. It is often forgotten that it was the securing of control over the Zaporozhian Kozaks in the seventeenth century that first seriously turned the thoughts of the Moscow tsars toward an interest in the problems of Constantinople and the Straits. Before that time what seaborne commerce was carried on by Moscow came through the White Sea and the port of Archangel, which was closed by ice for much of the year. Then came the interest in the Baltic through St. Petersburg. The eighteenth century saw Russian control extended along the shores of the Black Sea. In New Russia, as it was called, the imperial government concentrated upon the ports of Odessa and Mykolayiv.

Before the Revolution, Odessa ranked as the second port of the Russian Empire, surpassed in total commerce only by St. Petersburg, although as a center for exporting grain it was second to Mykolayiv and equalled by Rostov on the Don.⁠16 Since the establishment of the Soviet regime, Odessa has been more or less superseded by Mykolayiv and Kherson, largely because it is located too near the border of Bessarabia, which was under Romanian control.

The Black Sea ports have always been closely connected with the export of Ukrainian grain and Caucasian oil. Neither during the imperial nor the Soviet regime have they been used extensively for the importation of manufactures and other articles from the West. This is only natural in view of the general purposes to which Ukraine has been put by her Russian neighbors. It was the two capitals and the Great Russian  p200 areas which were intended to receive the benefits of Western civilization which was being favored by the tsars. It was the Russian Soviet Republic which was to be the kernel and the heart of the Soviet Union; and for that Ukraine, even though it was declared a Soviet republic and admitted into the United Nations, was only an appendage to be explored in whatever way was convenient.

It is easier to understand the imperial policy toward Ukraine than the Soviet policy, although they are one and the same. The imperial regime recognized the wealth of the area but obstinately refused to admit that it existed as an entity. To the bureaucrats of the old order, the rich mineral and agricultural resources of "Little Russia" were a godsend but it was largely the force of inertia that impelled them to work for the well-being of the capitals and they were as reluctant to develop ports on the White Sea as on the Black.⁠17 The Baltic was their center of interest, for they viewed everything through the eyes of St. Petersburg, itself a Baltic port. The Soviets broadcast throughout the world their interest in all the peoples of the Soviet Union. They recognized, at least in the period of Ukrainization, the differences that existed between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians. But despite their international slogans they were as obstinate in insisting that progress should be Russian as had been the old regime. With their fear of the growth of Ukrainian nationalism, they naturally lost all desire to push the development of the area.

The wealth of Ukraine was for them a purely colonial possession. Throughout their entire history, they have expended less on the Ukrainian Soviet Republic than they have on the one region of Moscow, where they have concentrated their institutions and their progress. Now with the preparations for war and their appreciation of the potentialities of the Ural and Siberian areas, they are content to squeeze from the unfortunate republic whatever they can. They do not feel sure of their position there and they are trying to strengthen  p201 it by famine, by deportation, by liquidation.

As early as 1917 the first Five-Year Plan announced that each one of the Soviet republics was to fit into a definite place in the whole. This was to be determined by the interests not of the people but of the Kremlin. From this point of view the position of Ukraine was clear and its function definite. It was to be an advanced storehouse in the economic sense. It was to be an accessible source of raw materials and foodstuffs and nothing else. The main base of the Soviet Union was to be in Asia, in the great expanses of the Russian Soviet Republic.

History hardly knows an example where a naturally rich area has been treated with such unconcern. From 1918 on, the interest of Moscow in the region was merely for the purposes of acquisition and exploitation. So it will continue to be and Ukraine has no more to expect from the economic development of the Soviet Union than it has from the political or the cultural.

---

The Author's Notes:

1 According to Ukraine and Its People, edited by I. Mirchuk, Munich, 1949, p131, three-quarters of Ukrainian territory consists of black earth.

2 Prof. T. S., "Ukraine in the Economy of the U. S. S. R.," The Ukrainian Quarterly, III, 224 f.

3 Prof. Hryhory Makhiv, "Agricultural Science in Ukraine," The Ukrainian Quarterly, V, 53 ff.

4 Hryhory Makhiv, "New Cultivated Crops in Ukraine," The Ukrainian Quarterly, V, 319 ff.

5 Prof. Hryhory Makhiv, "Agricultural Science in Ukraine," The Ukrainian Quarterly, V, 58.

6 Wasyl Marchenko, "The Basic Features of the Development of Farming in Ukraine under the Soviets," The Ukrainian Quarterly, IV, 353 ff.

7 Prof. T. S., op. cit., p225.

8 Ukraine and Its People, p150.

9 Ukraine and Its People, p155.

10 Prof. T. S., op. cit., p225.

11 Prof. T. S., op. cit., p228.

12 V. Marchenko, "The Role of Ukraine in the Present Five-Year Plan," The Ukrainian Quarterly, V, 124 ff.

13 Russia-U.S.S.R., p395.

14 Ukraine and Its People, pp153, 158 ff.

15 T. S., "Ukraine and the Budget of the U. S. S. R.," The Ukrainian Quarterly, IV, 26 ff.

16 Russia-U.S.S.R., p454.

17 It was only during World War I that steps were taken to utilize the ice-free port of Murmansk in the north.

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