Treaty of Pereyaslav 1654 • Negotiations at Pereyaslav and Moscow (January and March, 1654)

Fulfilling the decision of the Zemsky Sobor, the Muscovite government sent to the Ukraine an extraordinary diplomatic mission — the "great embassy" — composed of the privy boyar and governor of Tver Vasili Vasilyevich Buturlin, okolnichy (nobleman of the second rank) and governor of Murom Ivan Vasilyevich Olferyev and the dyak of the duma Larion Dmitrovich Lopukhin, with a large retinue. The mission was also accompanied by Muscovite clergy: "archimandrite Prokhor from the Preobrazhensky monastery at Kazan, protopresbyter Andrean from the Rozhdestvensky cathedral, priest Jonah from the monastery of Sava Storozhevsky, and deacons". They traveled with their icons, crosses and banners and carried with them "the icon of our Saviour given by the Tsar".1

The embassy went to accomplish an important mission: it had to deliver to the Hetman an official letter from the Tsar, to conduct preliminary negotiations, to accept the oath of allegiance from the Hetman and the Council of Officers, to present to the Hetman the insignia of his authority and the gifts from the Tsar for himself and his senior officers, to administer the oath to be taken by the local population etc. Accordingly the embassy received detailed instructions (later partly modified). After the fulfillment of their mission, the envoys were to report to the Tsar. This report, the so‑called "stateyny spisok," has been preserved and is the primary source p20 of our information about the Ukrainian-Muscovite negotiations at Pereyaslav (January 7‑13, O. S., 1654).2

The "records" of the Muscovite diplomats of the 17th c. have been duly appraised a long time ago. A well-informed junior clerk of the Posolski Prikaz of that time, Grigory Kotoshikhin, gives the following account of the reliability and objectivity of this source: "They (the agents of the Muscovite government) write in their records about things not as they happened, but wisely, beautifully, glorifying their own cleverness. They cheat in order to obtain from the Tsar honors and great rewards and are not ashamed of doing such things since nobody can inform against them."3 The report of Buturlin should also be approached very carefully and the information it contains must be subject to thorough critical analysis. However, notwithstanding this reservation there is no denying that the general picture of the negotiations at Pereyaslav given in the report of the Muscovite embassy is pretty clear and very colorful.

The envoys reached the Ukrainian border on November 1 (O. S.), 1653, and spent almost two months at Putyvl, keeping in touch with the Ukrainian government. The envoys awaited the return of the Hetman from the Polish campaign and the arrival of many additional items from Moscow (instructions, insignia etc.). They had trouble with the banner which was to be presented to the Hetman: it got wet during the journey, the paint stuck together, and a new banner had to be made in Moscow.4 It was not yet agreed upon where the negotiations were to take place. The Muscovite government wanted the negotiations and the oath of the Hetman to take place in Kiev, in solemn circumstances. Buturlin was instructed to "go to Kiev and ask Khmelnytsky to come to Kiev."5 However, the Hetman chose for that purpose the town of Pereyaslav. Obviously, he took into account the opposition of the higher Ukrainian clergy and nobility as well as a possible surprise attack from Lithuania. Moreover, the Hetman wanted to avoid the inevitable solemn celebrations in Kiev which would magnify the whole affair to untrue proportions. The business negotiations in which the Ukrainian government was primarily interested could be more easily conducted at Pereyaslav, a quiet Cossack town situated beyond the Dnieper, a fortress and main stronghold of Ukrainian artillery, with large gunpowder magazines.6 p21 This was a town with which Khmelnytsky himself was closely connected7 and where the office of colonel was held by Pavlo Teterya, a confidant of Bohdan (his future son-in‑law) and a relation of the Secretary-General Ivan Vyhovsky.8

In the last days of December (O. S.) the embassy left Putyvl for Pereyaslav. When it reached a distance of some four miles from Putyvl, it learned "in the steppe", already on the Ukrainian side of the border, that the Hetman had concluded a peace treaty with Poland according to the terms of the Zboriv agreement.9 This news was very unwelcome for the envoys. It brought to naught the whole idea of the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement; it made the whole mission purposeless and put its members in an illegal and dangerous situation. However, on that very day it was established that the news was not true and the embassy continued their journey. On December 31 they reached Pereyaslav where they were solemnly welcomed by Teterya. On that very day in Moscow the Tsar declared war on Poland.

The Hetman was not yet in Pereyaslav. He had to make the arrangements for the funeral of his son Tymish at Chyhyryn (Jan. 1, 1654), and then drifting ice on the Dnieper detained him at Domontiv. It is possible that the Hetman did not wish to meet the envoys during the Christmas holidays and wanted to avoid their presence during religious services and festivities connected with Yuletide. He arrived in Pereyaslav only on the eve of Epiphany, and Vyhovsky with the senior officers came on the following day (January 7). The Hetman's wife Anna, and the wife of Vyhovsky, who had also planned to be at Pereyaslav did not arrive. This enabled Khmelnytsky to avoid any intimate meetings with and receptions for the envoys with the exception of business negotiations and official ceremonies. Even Buturlin's report shows that all negotiations at Pereyaslav were strictly official, dull, without any trace of the traditional hospitality of which Bohdan was so fond. There were no receptions, either official or private; neither the Hetman nor the host, the local colonel Teterya, invited the envoys to any party, formal dinner or banquet. It seemed that the negotiations were being conducted by former enemies rather than by future allies.

The first informal meeting between the Hetman and the envoys took place in the afternoon of January 7 at the quarters p22 of Buturlin. It was arranged by Khmelnytsky himself. There both sides reached an agreement about the official meetings and ceremonies scheduled for the following day. On the morning of January 8 a meeting of the Council of Officers was to take place. Later the Hetman had to go to the assembly hall10 to accept the official letter of the Tsar. Later another meeting of the Council of Officers (colonels and other officers) had to take place, after which the Hetman was to arrive at the cathedral and take an oath of allegiance to the Tsar.

However, the order of the day was suddenly changed. In the morning of January 8 a secret meeting of the Hetman with the colonels and senior officers took place. It was resolved to make an agreement with the Tsar of Muscovy — "to accept the protection of the Tsar", according to the report of Buturlin ("bowed under the high hand of the Sovereign").11 However, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon an unexpected event took the envoys completely by surprise: the beat of the drums summoned the population of Pereyaslav — Cossacks and townsfolk — to a general assembly ("meeting of all the people"). This was the famous Pereyaslav Rada (Council). The account of this assembly in the report of the envoys is very colorful; it contains, however, some very suspicious details and rhetorical embellishments.12 The envoys were not present at the meeting and learned about it probably from Vyhovsky. The popular assembly could, of course, only approve the decision of the Hetman and the Council of Officers.

It was only after this peculiar plebiscite (limited to Pereyaslav) that the Hetman and the officers appeared in the assembly hall where the official audience took place. The Tsar's letter was accepted by the Hetman and read aloud by Vyhovsky. There was an exchange of speeches by Buturlin and the Hetman. The former in a long speech gave an account of the Muscovite-Polish negotiations of 1653 and enumerated the motives which prompted the Tsar to take the Ukraine under his protection. He assured the Hetman that the Tsar would "ever keep him and the whole Cossack army in his favor and defend them against their enemies."13 The Hetman stated briefly that "he, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the whole Cossack army were willing to serve the Tsar and lay down their lives for his prosperity and to take oath and obey the Tsar's will in everything."14 After that the Hetman p23 and the envoys proceeded in a carriage to the Uspensky Cathedral where the Muscovite clergy and the protopresbyter of Pereyaslav Hryhory Butovych, with the local clergy, were already awaiting their arrival.

It was there, at solemn moment, that an incident took place which took the Muscovite envoys by surprise and cast an ominous shadow on the Pereyaslav negotiations and on the whole Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement. When "the clergy, having put on their vestments, wanted to begin the administering of the oath according to the official book sent them by the Tsar," the Hetman demanded from the envoys that they should first take an oath in the name of the Tsar that "he, the Sovereign, would not abandon them — the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Cossack army — to the Polish King, but would defend them and never violate their liberties, and whether nobleman, Cossack or townsman, whatever rank or property he had, all should remain as before, and the Greata Sovereign would deign to grant them his official certificates of ownership of their property.15

In other words, the Hetman demanded from the Tsar a solemn formal confirmation of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance, a pledge to defend the Ukraine (particularly against Poland) as well as a recognition and promise to safeguard all the rights and internal constitution of the Ukrainian Cossack State. This demand showed not only the full equality of both sides but also a certain lack of confidence, and some apprehension among the leading circles of the Ukrainian State as to the true intentions of Moscow. There can be no doubt that this demand, as well as the time and place when it was put forward, had been approved by the Council of Officers.

The Hetman's declaration created great confusion among the Muscovite embassy. Buturlin firmly declined to take an oath in the name of the Tsar and stressed that "never before did it happen and it never would happen that anybody should presume to take an oath in the name of the Great Tsar, and that he, the Hetman, should not even speak about it, since every subject should take an oath (of allegiance) to his sovereign", and that "the Great Tsar . . . would show his gracious favor toward them and protect and defend them against their enemies, and would not take away their liberties, and would allow them to keep their properties as before".16 If we put aside the official Muscovite phraseology, we see plainly that Buturlin, while refusing to take an oath in the Tsar's name, p24 did solemnly promise in his sovereign's name to fulfill all the demands of the Ukrainians.

However, Buturlin's answer did not satisfy the Hetman. He said that he "would discuss this with the colonels and with all those who were together with him (i.e. with the Council of Officers), and having left the church went to the house of the colonel of Pereyaslav, Pavlo Teterya, and talked this over with the colonels and all the people a long time, while they (envoys and clergy) stood in the church".17

This was something more than a public affront for the embassy: it was probably the most critical moment of the Pereyaslav negotiations. The initiative was now in the hands of the Ukrainians. It is enough to recollect the great importance attached by Moscow to questions of procedure to be able to understand the mood of Buturlin and his colleagues who waited "a long time" for the decision of the Hetman and the Council of Officers.

In the meantime the Hetman sent to the cathedral the representatives of the Council, the colonels Teterya and Hryhory Lisnytsky (of Myrhorod), who "having come to the envoys . . . said the same thing . . . that they should take an oath in the Tsar's name.")18 This means that the first answer of the envoys did not satisfy the Hetman and the Council. An interesting discussion started between the envoys and the colonels. To the remark of the Ukrainians that "the Polish kings always take an oath to their subjects," the envoys replied that "it was not fitting to refer to such an example since these kings were infidels (i.e. not Orthodox) and not autocrats and did not keep even that to which they bound themselves in an oath". The envoys again refused to take an oath in the Tsar's name, and added that earlier "nobody even mentioned such improper things and even now it was not fitting for the Hetman and the colonels to discuss them since the Tsar never changed his word."19 This was a new, solemn declaration on the part of the envoys: it had to replace the formula of the Tsar's oath which was unacceptable to the Muscovite side.

Teterya and Lisnytsky now made their last attempt to persuade the envoys. They told them that "the Hetman and they themselves believed it, but the Cossacks did not and wanted them to take the oath."20 It is difficult to say whether this was only a pretext; after all, one should not discount the p25 possibility that the Pereyaslav Rada did not go as smoothly as the Muscovite report seems to suggest. It is clear, however, that some caution and reserve were shown by the Ukrainian side at the very beginning of the alliance with Moscow.

Buturlin answered the colonels that "even if the ignorant people said improper things inappropriate for such a great occasion, they (the colonels) should show their devotion to the Great Tsar and persuade the ignorant people not to engage in such talk."21 With this reply the colonels returned to the Hetman.

The short winter day was coming to an end and night was approaching. It was high time to come to a decision. "And after that," the report of the envoys continues, "Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Secretary Ivan Vyhovsky came to the church together with the colonels, the captains, the essauls, the atamans and the Cossacks." The Hetman and the officers told the envoys that they believed "the Tsar's word" and were willing to take the oath. They also stressed their determination to appeal directly to the Tsar and state their case before him. Then the Hetman and the Council of Officers took the oath "to be under the Tsar's high hand with their properties and cities for ever."22 The ceremony ended with a prayer for the prolongation of the Tsar's life, recited by a Muscovite deacon.

The question of the alleged oath-taking by the Muscovite envoys at Pereyaslav has two different and contradictory traditions, as manifested by the dispute of historians in the 19th and 20th c. Did the Muscovite envoys take the oath at Pereyaslav as the Hetman and the Council of Officers demanded, or did they not? The Muscovite reports are positive that no such oath was administered. On the other hand the Ukrainian tradition, both official and private, considered this oath-taking an accomplished fact. A contemporary account by Makary Krynytsky, a monk at the Kievo-Pechersk monastery and messenger of Metropolitan Sulvester Kosiv, who left Kiev for Lutsk on January 15, 1654, reads as follows: "On the 8th of January Khmelnytsky, together with Vyhovsky, took the oath of allegiance to the Tsar and the envoys took a reciprocal oath."23 The so‑called articles of Zherdev (1659), a Ukrainian draft of a new treaty with Moscow under Hetman Yuri Khmelnytsky (an official document), contain a reference p26 to the agreement "reached at Pereyaslav under the late Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of glorious memory and confirmed by oath from both sides" (art. 1).24 Samiylo Velychko also writes in his "Narrative of the Cossack war against the Poles" (1720) that "after that oath Khmelnytsky was given by the plenipotentiary envoy boyar Buturlin a banner and a mace from the Tsar and other important gifts were bestowed on behalf of the Sovereign on Khmelnytsky himself, all the officers and the common people present (at the meeting) together with the Sovereign's word and assurance under oath that he would keep Little Russia and the whole Cossack army under his protection and respect without violation all its ancient rights and liberties and assist and defend it against all foes with his armies and treasures."25 The well-known manifesto of Hetman Pylyp Orlyk to the governments of Europe dated April 4, 1712, shows that this was the official version of the Mazepa period. It reads in part as follows: "It is common knowledge that His Excellency Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of immortal memory voluntarily, and not compelled by anyone, placed the RuHan people and the Cossack nation under the Tsar of Muscovy. In a solemn pact Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich affirmed under oath that he would shield forever under his protection the Cossack nation and the Ruthenian people."26 This tradition was maintained in the Ukraine throughout the 18th c., and the author of the "Istoria Rusov" wrote: "They (the articles of the treaty with the Tsar) were written down and after approval by the Hetman and the Council were submitted to the Muscovite envoys who, having accepted their contents, affirmed with their oath, given in the name of the Tsar and the Muscovite Tsardom, that these agreements would be kept permanently and inviolably."27

Taking into account this old tradition, some Ukrainian historians (especially Kostomarov) maintained that the Muscovite envoys at Pereyaslav did take some form of oath. True, the statement contained in the official report of Buturlin account which the envoys refused to take oath is too positive to be disregarded. Had the envoys taken the oath on January 8 in the Pereyaslav cathedral in the presence of numerous witnesses (especially those from Moscow), this fact would have become well-known and it would have been impossible for Buturlin to conceal it. Moreover, such an oath p27 did not conform with the idea of an autocratic ruler which was generally accepted at that time.28

There are, however, many facts confirming the opinion of M. Hrushevsky that "Buturlin made greater promises in a more definite form than that mentioned in his report, and only refused to take a formal oath 'according to the official book' ". In the words of the Hetman that Buturlin "assured us and through that oath (assurance) strengthened our determination" one could see a cautious implication that something like an oath-taking really took place."29 In our opinion Prof. A. I. Yakovliv is entirely correct when, having analyzed this problem, he reaches the following conclusion: "The repeated reference of the envoys to the word of the Tsar which was then considered equivalent to a sovereign's oath, confirming the inviolability of the rights and freedoms of the Cossack army and stating that the Tsar would not abandon the Cossack army to the Poles and that the political and social order in the Ukraine would not be changed, were interpreted and appraised by Khmelnytsky and the officers as an act equivalent to an oath on the part of the Tsar."30 This was probably sufficient at that early stage of the Ukrainian-Muscovite negotiations at Pereyaslav, all the more since it enabled the Hetman to conduct further negotiations with the Tsar in Moscow.

After the oath the Hetman went with the envoys in the same carriage to the "assembly hall", where the colonels and other officers also assembled. It was there that the banner, the mace, the coat and the cap sent by the Tsar were handed to the Hetman. Other personal gifts ("sables") were also bestowed upon the Hetman and his officers. This was actually a kind of investiture of the Hetman (according to the Polish and Turkish tradition) as the ruler of the Ukraine. "You are the commander of the pious army and of all the people", as Buturlin said in his official speech when handing the mace to the Hetman.31

Thus the ceremonies of the day ended and the Hetman, accompanied by the officers and "many other people" retired to his quarters.32

Next day (January 9) "captains, essauls, clerks, Cossacks and townsfolk" took the oath in the same cathedral. Those absent (officers, Cossacks, as well as "townsfolk and people p28 of various ranks") were made to take the oath a few days later.33

This is the picture of the Pereyaslav Council of 1654 as given in the official account of the Muscovite embassy. Even that subjective report was unable to conceal the clashes which transformed the first steps of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance into a dramatic spectacle. Fortunately, however, we possess other documents (also of Muscovite origin) which enable us to imagine the real character and dimensions of the ceremonies at Pereyaslav. The Muscovite version of the Pereyaslav legend speaks of the assembly attended by "all the people": at the meeting (Rada) there "assembled a great multitude of people of all ranks", in the church (during the oath of the Hetman) there was a "multitude of people of male and female sexes")34 etc. However, the same Muscovite source notes that the oath was taken at Pereyaslav by "Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Secretary Ivan Vyhovsky, military judges, quartermasters, colonels, nobles, Cossacks and townsfolk — in all, 284 people."35 These were "all the people" of the Pereyaslav Rada of 1654.

M. Hrushevsky found in the archives of Moscow an extremely interesting document, namely the lists of names of those who took the oath at Pereyaslav.36 They were, beside the Hetman himself, all the officers of highest rank: Secretary Ivan Vyhovsky, judges Samiylo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Fedir Loboda (?), quartermaster (obozny) Korobka, essauls Missko and Pavlo (Yanenko?), colonels Trushenko of Chyhyryn, Parkhomenko of Cherkassy, Starodub of Kaniv, Hulanytsky of Korsun, Polovets of Bila Tserkva, Pishko of Kiev, Podobaylo of Chernihiv, Ivan Zolotarenko of Nizhyn, Voronchenko of Pryluky, Lisnytsky of Myrhorod, Pushkar of Poltawa and Teterya of Pereyaslav.37 They were joined in the next few days by colonel Dzalaliy, retired colonel Ivan Fedorenko, 37 regimental officers, 97 captains, nobles, ordinary Cossacks, clergy and townsfolk, in all 284 persons.38 This was the "great multitude" referred to by Buturlin.39

The following days were devoted to negotiations between the Hetman and the Council of Officers on one side and the Muscovite envoys on the other. Although in the report of the envoys these negotiations look like rather unsystematic talks between two allies on various topics concerning their alliance, one cannot help noticing that both sides were really discussing p29 a series of questions which were to be the subject of further parleys in Moscow.

Both sides conducted the negotiations (even according to the Muscovite report) as independent and equal partners. In this connection we must stress the unusual significance of a formula used by the envoys and put in black and white in their account: "the Muscovite State of the Tsar and the Cossack Army of the Ukraine."40 On one side there was the Tsar (in the person of his envoys) as the representative of the Muscovite State; on the other side we see the Cossack Army (in the person of its Hetman) as the representative of the Ukrainian State.

The main topics of the Pereyaslav negotiations were international affairs (particularly Poland and Crimea) and military matters. The envoys were interested in Ukrainian-Polish and Ukrainian-Crimean relations. The Hetman affirmed that no peace with Poland had been negotiated at Zhvanets.

He thought it possible to preserve his alliance with the Khan of Crimea — a hope which, as is well known, failed to materialize. In Khmelnytsky's opinion Lithuania was likely to follow the Ukraine in accepting the Tsar's protection (this did not occur). It is also interesting that the Hetman hoped to persuade the Kalmucks (obviously, he had connections with them) to join the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance and had the same plans with regard to the Nogay Tartars. It was also planned to enlist the support of Moldavia and Byelorussia (Vyhovsky was particularly interested in the latter possibility because of his family ties and personal connections with Byelorussia; he probably discussed this matter with the envoys with the Hetman's knowledge and permission). This was an extensive program aiming at the creation of an anti-Polish coalition. It is not known whether it was sincerely, or with a touch of humor, that the Hetman told the envoys: "I would be glad to see the whole earth under the high hand of the Tsar".41 This idea is repeated in the Hetman's letter to the Tsar (February 17, 1654) expressing his wish that the Tsar "might have all earthly kings for his servants."42 Everything possible was done in order to bring about the fall of Poland and prevent the renewal of the Muscovite-Polish alliance.

Military matters were even more important. A new Polish attack seemed to be in the making even before the Pereyaslav p30 agreement. Now it was practically inevitable and the Hetman wanted to press Moscow to speed the beginning of the military operations against Poland. During the negotiations at Pereyaslav preventive measures against a Polish attack were discussed. In his earlier correspondence with Moscow the Hetman had expressed a desire that the Tsar should send his troops to Kiev. Obviously he was interested not so much in the military as in the political side of the question: the appearance of the Tsarist military commanders in Kiev would have brought about not only the actual beginning of a Muscovite-Polish war, but would have also shown everybody in the Ukraine and abroad that the Tsar was determined to defend the Ukraine with all the resources of the Muscovite State. Buturlin reminded the Hetman of his demand but distorted it by ascribing to the Hetman the wish to have the Tsarist military commander not only in Kiev but also in other Ukrainian cities (this did not correspond with the facts). The Tsar agreed to fulfill the Hetman's wish and Buturlin informed the Ukrainians that 3,000 Muscovite troops headed by Prince Kurakin and Prince Volkonsky were to arrive in the near future. The Hetman confirmed his invitation and added: "the more troops, the better."43

However, the Hetman made the envoys understand quite clearly that the technical details of the defensive measures against the Polish attack were none of their business. When the envoys asked questions about the quantity of military supplies in each city, number of guns and magazines for storing gunpowder, the Hetman replied that they (the Ukrainians) "had military supplies in their cities", but did not give any specific numbers as to guns or munitions. "This he did not reveal", the report observes. "They had, however, but little gunpowder and lead in their cities" and for this reason the Hetman asked to "supply the cities with gunpowder and lead."44

However, the Pereyaslav negotiations were not limited to international and military questions. The Ukrainian side put forward a series of internal political problems. Obviously these questions caused much concern to the Ukrainians who were now facing the new, incomprehensible political world of Muscovy. The refusal of the envoys to take the oath and the emphasis with which Buturlin stressed in his specific p31 Muscovite terminology the autocratic character and nature of the Tsar's authority were alien the Ukrainian political consciousness, which had developed from the democratic conceptions of the Polish nobility. These incidents were bound to cause certain apprehensions among the Ukrainian leading circles. Some signs of this discontentment can be found even in the Muscovite account of the negotiations and discussions at Pereyaslav. After the envoys had given a solemn assurance in the name of the Tsar that he would not violate the political and social order of the Ukraine, those "rights and liberties" which were so highly valued by the Cossacks and other classes of the Ukrainian population, the Hetman and the Council of Officers raised other specific questions concerned with sounding the ground and looking like an attempt to put to a full and particular test the sincerity and reliability of the general declarations made by Moscow. The question about a Cossack register (standing army) of 60,000 men put forward by the Ukrainian government (the most ambitious of all contemporary plans and demands) had also some importance for the military alliance between the two countries. On the other hand, the questions concerning the assignment of the Chyhyryn regiment (or rather corresponding administrative subdivision) to the Hetman's mace and other similar matters45 which normally should have been within the exclusive sphere of action of the Ukrainian government were discussed now not so much because of the precedent established by the Ukrainian-Polish negotiations (a view accepted by some scholars, notably M. Hrushevsky and A. Yakovliv),46 but rather because of the apprehensions of the leading Ukrainian circles at the uncertain prospects of the negotiations with Moscow and the unknown future of Muscovite-Ukrainian relations in general. It was necessary to clarify what exactly were Moscow's views concerning those Ukrainian rights and liberties and to what extent it was ready to respect and protect them. In our opinion, these questions were intended to serve as a touchstone of the Ukrainian-Muscovite relations, although there is no doubt that their discussion and clarification at Pereyaslav could have formed a precedent and basis for further decisions to be taken in Moscow. Such was indeed the later course of events.

This was plainly shown on January 12. On that day "Secretary Ivan Vyhovsky, military judge Samoylo, colonels p32 Pavlo Teterya of Pereyaslav, Hryhory Sokhnovich (Lisnytsky) of Myrhorod and other colonels," i.e. almost the whole Council of Officers in a body, called on the envoys and made the following statement: "Since you have refused to take the oath in the name of our great Sovereign . . . give us now the letters written with your own hand that our liberties, rights and properties should remain as before . . . In the past they had agreements with the (Polish) king and the nobles and received charters from the senators; now you have been sent from our great Sovereign . . . with plenary powers and have full authority to do this." The Council of Officers stressed that it was necessary "for each colonel to show something after his return to his regiment." Should the envoys refuse to give them such a charter, "the stewards and (Muscovite) nobles need not bother to go to the towns (to accept the oath of the Ukrainian population) since all the people in the towns would be confused". In order to intensify their pressure upon the envoys the officers connected their demand with the alleged danger of a Tartar invasion. Vyhovsky informed Buturlin that "the Hetman today received letters from Bila Tserkva and other towns that the Tartars were advancing and the stewards and nobles would be afraid to go to those towns."47

This was something in the nature of an ultimatum — another typical incident which helps us to understand the real atmosphere of the negotiations at Pereyaslav. However, the Muscovite envoys could not taken backº so easily. Buturlin gave the officers the following reply: "It would be improper for us to give you a letter written by ourselves and it is unbecoming for you to talk about it. We have told you before and the Tsar has ordered that in your towns . . . there will be your officials as before and the trials will be conducted according to your laws, and your properties will not be taken away from you."48 It is interesting that Buturlin's answer to the general demands of the Council and the repetition of his declaration of January 8 about the Tsar's recognition and preservation of the political and social order in the Ukraine were made this time in more specific and detailed terms. As to the threat of the Tartar invasion, Buturlin's answer was as follows: "Should the Tartars appear in any town, they (the Muscovite officials) would not go to that town.".49 The ultimatum was rejected.

p33 It must be observed that sending of the Muscovite officials to the Ukrainian towns on an extremely delicate mission (to accept the oath of allegiance from the local population) was generally disagreeable to the Ukrainian government. In order to find out the real intentions of Moscow the officers asked the envoys how long the stewards and nobles intend to "stay in their towns" (it is interesting that special emphasis was put on the fact that the Ukrainian towns were theirs, the Cossacks'). Buturlin declared that the Muscovite officials "had no need to live in the Cherkass (Ukrainian) towns: having administered the oath to all the people, they would leave those towns."50

The official character of these negotiations was manifested not only by the composition of the Ukrainian delegation (the Council of Officers) but also by the fact that it was acting according to the instructions of the Hetman. After the conclusion of the talks Vyhovsky and his colleagues declared that they would go to the Hetman and "report what they had been told to the Hetman and the colonels (i.e. to a plenary meeting of the Council of Officers) and would inform them (the envoys) about the decision of the Hetman and the colonels."51

After that a meeting of the Council took place which arrived at the final decision in this matter. Colonel Hryhory Lisnytsky informed the envoys on behalf of the Council that "the Hetman and the colonels relied in everything upon the Tsar's will" and also agreed to the sending of the Muscovite officials who were to administer the oath.52

Was this really a surrender on the part of the Ukrainian government as it might seem to a reader of the Muscovite report? In our opinion, it was not. In order to be able to understand correctly the real meaning and significance of the Pereyaslav negotiations which took place between January 9 and 12, one has to remember the fact that the principle of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance had already been accepted by both sides. The solemn declaration made in the name of the Tsar by Buturlin (January 8) and dealing with the defence of the Ukraine by the Tsar and his recognition of Ukraine's state right and her social, political and economic order as well as the Hetman's declaration of the same day about the transfer of the final negotiations to Moscow are also of great significance. p34 These facts show plainly that the demand of additional guarantees (in writing) from the envoys was made in order to compel the Muscovite government not only to specify its commitments and promises but also to make greater concessions during the negotiations in Moscow. In this the Ukrainians were probably successful for, although Buturlin's report does not mention it directly, the Hetman wrote in a letter to the Ukrainian envoys in Moscow (March 21) as follows: "You remember, however, Your Worships, how Vasili Vasilyevich Buturlin assured us with the word of His Majesty the Tsar that His Majesty was going not only to confirm our age‑old rights and privileges and preserve our ancient liberties, but would also graciously bestow his special favors on the people of all ranks."53

This shows that the Ukrainian government held the initiative in its hands throughout the Pereyaslav negotiations.

However, at Pereyaslav there appeared also the first breach in the common Ukrainian front. We refer here to an action of the Ukrainian gentry which is described in the report of the envoys and we quote this account in its entirety:

"The gentry came to boyar Vasili Vasilyevich at Pereyaslav and told him that the gentry should occupy a privileged position among the Cossacks and be tried according to their own laws and own their properties as before. And they brought a written list of their names and distributed among themselves governments of provinces and offices. And boyar Vasili Vasilyevich told the gentry that they were acting in an improper manner before anything was settled, they had allotted to themselves provinces and offices, a thing which they should not even have dreamed of doing; and boyar Vasili Vasilyevich and his colleagues would tell the Hetman about this for heretofore the Hetman did not petition the Tsar about this matter. And the gentry begged him not to tell this to the Hetman since they were acting on their own and not by the Hetman's order, and it depended upon the Tsar's will; they went to take the oath and would sign their names."54

Now, after the research of M. Hrushevsky, we know the names of the gentry who took the oath of allegiance to the Tsar at Pereyaslav (January 11).55 They were: the old Ostap Vyhovsky, Ivan's father, with his son Danylo, Syluyan Muzhylovsky, p35 a known Ukrainian diplomat, envoy to Moscow in 1649 and 1653, to Lithuania in 1649, to the Ottoman Porte in 1651, to Sweden in 1653 and to Crimea in 1653,56 with three of his relatives, Stepan Mykhaylovych Mazepa, a landowner of Bila Tserkwa and the father of the future hetman, Hunashevsky, a junior clerk in the Hetman's Chancellery, and other "unimportant people."57 Hrushevsky does not mention the importance of this action and considers it a "family scheme of the Vyhovskys."58

Of course, the importance of this diversion of the Ukrainian Cossack gentry should not be overestimated. The Pereyaslav gentry certainly did not represent the influential circles of the Ukrainian nobles who, together with the higher clergy, kept apart from the Pereyaslav negotiations and generally took a negative attitude toward the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance. However, the significant fact is that it was the gentry who had joined the Cossack movement, i.e. that part of Ukrainian gentry which, though not influential in itself, had at the very beginning tied its fortunes to the national revolution and thus was able to exert an important influence upon the policy of the Ukrainian government. It is enough to mention the names of the Vyhovskys and Muzhylovsky to understand that the action of the gentry at Pereyaslav was connected in some way with the higher circles of the Cossack officers. It was precisely because of these circumstances that this diversion of the gentry was dangerous to the Ukrainian cause. While Buturlin rejected their demands, he did so only because Moscow knew who wielded the real power in the Ukraine and understood the nature of that power. It was primarily interested in a speedy conclusion to negotiations with the Ukrainian Hetman government. However, Moscow took note of this fact and, in due course, took advantage of the differences among the leading circles in the Ukraine in order to promote its own interests.

Thus ended the Pereyaslav part of the Ukrainian-Muscovite negotiations. On January 13 the Hetman, accompanied by the officers, called on the envoys and after a brief, formal speech handed Buturlin a letter to the Tsar. He thanked the Tsar for taking him and "the whole Cossack Army" under his protection ("mighty hand") and asked him "to defend them against all the foes." "And whatever we have discussed with p36 the privy boyar of Your Majesty and his colleagues, they will report at full length to Your Majesty."59

There was nothing more left to be done at Pereyaslav. "And on that day (January 13) Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Secretary Ivan Vyhovsky left Pereyaslav for Chyhyryn." Next day (January 14) Buturlin and his colleagues "went to Kiev", accompanied by the colonel of Kiev and the Cossacks.60

Buturlin received, for his part in the Pereyaslav negotiations, the high office of the "dvoretski s putem" (Lord High Steward) and many other rewards.61 The Muscovite envoys undoubtedly accomplished successfully their mission; Moscow indeed won a great victory at Pereyaslav. However, neither this success nor the general significance of the Pereyaslav negotiations should be overestimated. They merely marked a stage (not of primary importance at that) in the history of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance of 1654. Moreover, this alliance did not originate at Pereyaslav and the negotiations were not completed there. On the way to its realization there still lay Chyhyryn and Moscow.

The Pereyaslav negotiations solved two essential questions: 1) the military alliance between the Ukraine and Muscovy (guaranteed by the protection of the Tsar over the Ukraine), and 2) the pledge on the part of the Tsar to preserve all the rights and liberties of the Ukrainian State.

However, many questions remained unsolved and indeterminate, particularly those concerning the practical realization of the military alliance, a more specific definition of Ukrainian rights and liberties and, finally, future relations between the Ukraine and the Tsar of Muscovy. What was of the utmost importance, the Pereyaslav negotiations did not give the Ukrainian government any official document, any written guarantee of the oral commitments and promises made by the Muscovite envoys in the name of the Tsar. This was especially important to the Ukrainian government since it had to show some concrete achievement to the Cossacks, the gentry, the townsfolk and other classes of society. The situation was even more urgent because of the enemy propaganda from Poland and Lithuania and because of the danger of a Polish or Polish-Tartar invasion. The Hetman realized that it was necessary to obtain formal guarantees of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance as well as the official pledge of the Tsar to protect the Ukraine.

p37 According to the decision taken by the Council of Officers at Pereyaslav, the Hetman in February, 1654, sent an embassy to Moscow and entrusted it with this urgent task. The sending of the embassy was preceded by the deliberations of the Hetman and the Council of Officers in January and February at Korsun and Chyhyryn; unfortunately, no full and detailed account of these meetings has been preserved. At first it was planned that the embassy would be headed by Ivan Vyhovsky.62 However, the chief envoys sent to Moscow were Samiylo Bohdanovych-Zarudny, a military judge, and Pavlo Teterya, the colonel of Pereyaslav, who both played an active part in the Pereyaslav negotiations.

The Muscovite government evidently hoped that the embassy would be made up of more prominent persons. It was somewhat irritated by Vyhovsky's absence and wanted the Hetman himself to come to Moscow. However, Bohdan Khmelnytsky found an excuse for not coming — the Polish invasion — and never visited Moscow during his lifetime.63 Obviously he was unwilling to go there and did not wish to commit himself. It was probably for that reason that he did not send Vyhovsky.

Beside Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Teterya, the embassy had the following members: Hryhory Kyrylovych, essaul of Bratslav, Kindrat Yakymovych, the Hetman's stepson, Herasym Haponovych, ataman of Chyhyryn, Illya Kharkiv (Kharitonovych), and Ivan Ivanovych. The embassy was accompanied by Yakiv Ivanovych, an army interpreter, Sulvestr, the abbot of the Spassky monastery at Novhorod Siversky (probably acting as a chaplain for the embassy), 12 "companions" (including a son of judge Bohdanovych-Zarudny), a secretary, 24 ordinary Cossacks, 2 trumpeters and 11 "boys". A deputation of the town of Pereyaslav headed by its mayor traveled together with the embassy.64

The embassy arrived in Moscow on March 11. On March 12 an official entry into the city took place and on March 13 the envoys had an official audience with the Tsar. Beside the gifts from the Hetman (5 valuable Turkish horses — "argamaks"),65 they brought also his letter of February 17, written in Ukrainian ("in Byelorussian writing"), which served also as their official credentials, a Ukrainian draft of the treaty (the so‑called "23 Articles") and many other letters and p38 documents, including the acts of the Zboriv agreement. Unfortunately, the original copies of these documents have not been preserved in the archives of Moscow and we have to rely on Muscovite translations.

In his letter to the Tsar the Hetman addressed him on behalf of himself, the Cossack Army and the whole "Orthodox Russian" people (according to Hrushevsky, the original expression was "Ruthenian").66 He mentioned "lengthy negotiations dealing with various matters"67 with Muscovite envoys at Pereyaslav and stressed that "this boyar (Buturlin) and his colleagues assured us and strengthened our unshaken faith." Reminding the Tsar of Buturlin's promise that "His Majesty would bestow upon us more liberties and properties than the Polish kings and the ancient dukes of Russia," the Hetman asked him to "confirm and secure for ever with his charters the rights, statutes, privileges, liberties and titles to property enjoyed by clergymen and laymen, in whatever rank and position they might be, which they have held for centuries . . . bestowed by princes, pious lords and the Polish kings, for which we have shed our blood, having inherited them from our grandfathers and great-grandfathers and determined not to lose them." First of all, however, the Hetman asked the Tsar to "protect, maintain and defend us with his mighty hand and his Tsarist army from all our foes who hate and insult us and wage war against us." The remaining requests and proposals were to be submitted to the Tsar orally by the envoys.68

One can agree with Prof. Yakovliv who observes that the official letter of the Hetman of February 17 "makes an impression of coherence and is written in terms which embrace the whole Ukrainian State including all classes of society."69 It is very important to note that the Hetman is acting as the spokesman for his "Ruthenian" state. He emphasized this fact before the Tsar, and that circumstance proves that both Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Muscovite government understood and expressly recognized that the Ukrainian State had not ceased to exist, even after the Pereyaslav agreement.

The "Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" of February 17 consist of an introduction and 23 articles.70 Since this document has been preserved only in a Muscovite translation, it is not impossible that the order of the articles could have been changed. The Muscovite version is an unsystematic hodgepodge p39 which prompted M. Hrushevsky to make some very critical remarks.71 More correct is Prof. Yakovliv who observes that "the underlying idea of the whole draft of the treaty (i.e. 23 articles) was to establish such a mutual relationship between the Ukraine and Muscovy as would guarantee full external, and especially internal, independence of Ukraine on condition that the Tsar would exert a certain amount of control over international relations, and receive tribute for military protection against external enemies."72

Here it must only be added that this document had, in its original form, a different title. It was not mentioned in Hetman's letter to the Tsar and it was delivered by the envoys to the Muscovite government ("sent by Cossack envoys") on March 15,73 the third day of the negotiations (earlier, on March 13, the envoys made only an oral statement). It is enough to examine closely the text of the 23 articles to come to the conclusion that this was not so much the draft of a future treaty (and certainly not a petition to the Tsar) as an "order", an instruction to be used by the envoys during the drafting of the treaty. The original copy was "under the Hetman's hand and seal";74 this document was later translated in Moscow — probably in a very careless manner. Thus, e.g., one cannot fail to notice the lack of uniformity in the form of address. In art. 1 the Hetman addresses the Tsar directly, as he does in articles 3, 4, 9, 12 and 15. On the other hand other articles mention the Tsar only in the third person or do not mention him at all, while articles 16‑21 are undoubtedly part of the original instruction. Thus, in our opinion, the present (Muscovite) version of the document containing the 23 articles cannot be considered the original (Ukrainian) draft of the treaty. Hrushevsky observes that it "shows traces of various changes and additions which resulted from long discussions, conducted by many different persons, who represented various views, moods and trends of thought within the army."75 We should like to add that the negotiations between the envoys and the boyars in Moscow (March 13‑14) also influenced the contents or, at least, the form of the "23 articles".

However, notwithstanding all these reservations, the document covers all the questions which the Ukrainian government considered necessary to submit to the Tsar in order to obtain his written pledge and approval. In this respect it can p40 be considered a specification of the Pereyaslav agreement made by the Ukrainian side.

A masterful analysis of the "23 articles" made by Prof. Yakovliv76 enables us to detect two essential ideas underlying this document. The idea of the external independence of the Ukrainian State is embodied in articles 6 (free election of the hetman as the head of the state and the government), 14 (the right to maintain international relations with foreign countries), 15 and 16 (the payment of tribute to the Tsar who was to receive a certain amount of money in one payment or had to rely on the local officials to collect the "revenue" for him "in the same way as Turkish Sultan used to collect from the Hungarian, Moldavian and Wallachian lands"), 13 and 17 (the inviolability of the rights and privileges of the whole Ukrainian population and their confirmation by the Tsar's charters). Professor Yakovliv also mentions art. 21 (money payments to the officers and the Cossacks).77

The second part of the articles concerns the internal independence of the Ukrainian State and "the idea of political autonomy is embodied in the privileges of various classes of the population."78 These are the following articles: 1. (inviolability of the rights and liberties of the Cossacks in administration, law courts and civil law proceedings), 7º (property of Cossack widows and orphans), 3 (rights and liberties of the gentry), 4 (rights of self-government for towns and cities), 18 and part of 13 (the rights of the clergy and their head — the Metropolitan of Kiev), 17 (the legal position of the peasants and the "subject" population). "All these articles taken together were, according to the draft of the treaty, to secure the inviolability of the political and social order and the privileges of the entire population of the country."79 Prof. Yakovliv is entirely correct in his assertion that they "guaranteed the fullness of the internal autonomy of the (Ukrainian) state and eliminated any interference by a foreign authority — the authority of the Muscovite Tsar — with the internal affairs of the state."80

The third group of articles, dealing with the defence of the Ukraine, were directly connected with the chief purpose of the treaty as a military alliance. These are the following articles: 19 (military plans for a war against Poland), 20 (the maintenance of a hired defense force of 3,000 or more on the p41 Polish frontier after the end of the war), 22 (a military plan to deal with a Tartar attack), 23 (garrison of the fortress of Kodak and the Cossack's headquarters for the protection of the southern frontier of the Ukraine).

Finally, the document contains some articles which remind one of the old Cossack "ordinations" (art. 1 about a Cossack standing army of 60,000, art. 5 about the placing of the Chyhyryn district under the Hetman's jurisdiction, art. 8‑12 concerning titles to mills and estates and payment of a specific amount of money for the maintenance of the offices of military secretary, colonels, judges, essauls, quartermaster and artillery staff).81 In our opinion it is necessary to stress that the problem of a standing army was not a purely internal matter but was also directly connected with the main objective of the treaty as a military alliance. The approval of a standing army of 60,000 actually amounted to the legalization of a new ruling class in the Ukraine. If we remember that these class privileges were also to be enjoyed by the families of the Cossacks and were to influence their numerous body of dependents, it will become clear that this was actually the creation of a new privileged class embracing some 300,000, i.e. approximately 15‑20% of the population of the Dnieper Ukraine at that time.

The placing of the Chyhyryn district under the Hetman's jurisdiction was connected not only with the role of Chyhyryn as the residence of the Hetman and the government or with the material security of the Hetman's office in the future, but also with the personal property interests of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, whose estates (both inherited and acquired by purchase) lay in that district.

Articles 8‑12 were important not only as far as the material security of certain offices was concerned, but also because they dealt with the remuneration of the holders of these offices. This was in conformance with the spirit and practice of that time.

For the conduct of the negotiations with the Ukrainian envoys the Muscovite government appointed a delegation consisting of Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetzkoy, privy boyar and governor of Kazan, one of the most prominent Muscovite boyars, boyar V. V. Buturlin (former head of the "great embassy" at Pereyaslav), Peter Petrovich Golovin, okolnichy and governor of Kashira, and Almaz Ivanov, a dyak of the p42 Duma and "the most distinguished among the Muscovite diplomats of that time."82 Evidently these negotiations were regarded in Moscow as a matter of primary importance.

The first conference took place on March 13, after a solemn audience with the Tsar. The minutes of this meeting (in a rather inaccurate Muscovite transcription) have been preserved in two versions: the original short one (the 16 points mentioned by M. Hrushevsky),83 and the longer version (20 points) made for the use of the Boyarskaya Duma (edited by G. Karpov).84 The proposals made by the envoys generally reflected the instructions of the Hetman (23 articles), but in the course of the discussion some of them were clarified and defended with very interesting arguments.

The most controversial question was that concerning the Muscovite military commanders (voyevodas) in the Ukraine and the limits of their authority. The envoys revealed that the Ukrainian government was obviously unwilling to have the foreign voyevodas inside the country. They agreed that "the voyevodas of the Tsar should be in Kiev and Chenihiv"º (probably because these were the old capitals of the Grand Dukes and later the residential cities of the Polish governors), but demanded that "they . . . should not be stationed in other cities." And if the Tsar agreed to have no voyevodas in Little Russia (here we see undoubtedly the influence of Muscovite official terminology), the Hetman would rule as before and send the money collected yearly to the Tsar"º (short version). In the course of the discussion various possible solutions to this question were examined. The Ukrainian government wanted that "the voyevodas in the Cossack towns will be of their own stock, prominent people, loyal and well-versed in Cossack affairs,"85 who would "collect the revenue for the Tsar". "If however, the Tsar should not agree to this and insist on having his voyevodas in the Cherkass towns," then "the court proceedings should be conducted by Cossack officials", and "the gentry, Cossacks and townsfolk should be tried according to their law and not by the Tsar's voyevodas," unless they preferred a trial by the Tsarist officials. Revenue, too, "should be collected by their own people (Cossacks)" and then given to the Muscovite representatives. The best solution, however, would be (according to the view of the Ukrainian government) for the Tsar to "let Hetman rule as before". Then "the Hetman and the p43 army would pay (tribute) . . . as the Turkish Sultan uses to collect from the Hungarian, Moldavian and Wallachian lands, having computed in advance how much should be taken from each place." The Tsar would only "appoint his man to compute all that revenue" (longer version).86

The envoys also put forward Ukrainian demands concerning the international diplomatic relations of the Ukrainian State. This was a matter of primary importance. It is formulated in the "23 articles" as follows: "The Hetman and the Cossack Army should have the right to receive envoys who from time immemorial have come to the Cossack Army from foreign countries with good intentions and His Majesty the Tsar should not be offended by this; if there should be anything against His Majesty, we should let H. M. know" (art. 14).87 The Muscovite version of the minutes of the conference formulated the Ukrainian demands in its own way: "when the envoys from any country come on important business, the Hetman will send them to the Tsar; and let the Tsar allow the Hetman to receive and send away the envoys who come on business of smaller importance and take no offence against him" (short version; the wording of the long version is almost identical).88 This attitude of the Muscovite government probably met with strong objections on the part of the envoys, for the resolution of the Boyarskaya Duma was essentially in line with the demands of the Ukrainians: "To receive and send away envoys who come on right business and write to the Tsar what their business was and what was the result of their mission; and if envoys should be sent from anybody on business adverse to the interests of the Tsar, they should be detained and the Tsar should be informed about this; and they should not be released without the Tsar's permission." To this was added another reservation: "have no relations with the Turkish Sultan and the Polish King without the Tsar's permission."89 This limitation is quite understandable, especially as a part of a military alliance. Both countries — the Ukraine and Muscovy — were at war with Poland and the possibility of separate negotiations with the enemy had to be excluded. As far as Turkey was concerned, the Ukraine earlier had been under the protection of the Turkish Sultan and the conclusion of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance quite naturally made Turkey the enemy of both Moscow and the Ukraine.

p44 The clause dealing with lease and mortgage contracts has aroused many doubts on the part of Ukrainian scholars and prompted them to some critical remarks. As early as the Pereyaslav negotiations the Hetman mentioned this to the envoys: "wherever a business has been leased in two or three towns for a set term and the term is not yet up, but two or three years are still to run, the Tsar should allow the tenants to keep the rented business and not take it away before the set term expires."90 Hrushevsky considers this a proof that at Pereyaslav "the officers helplessly and impotently drifted between a consciousness of their actual position of leadership which had developed as a result of the revolutionary practice of the recent years . . . and the juridical state of affairs: the former pre‑revolutionary constitution of the Polish Republic. It seems there was nobody to cry out: "Stop — that's the limit. Here are the bounds of the Ukrainian statehood."91

This question also emerged in the course of the negotiations in Moscow. "If anybody has leased or mortgaged his property and the creditor is in possession thereof, he should be allowed to collect the revenue for the years in which it was not collected" (short version). The longer version explains some details: "If anybody had leased or mortgaged his property and the tenant did not derive benefit from the lease due to war circumstances, or the mortgagee did not take possession of the mortgaged property, all these people should be allowed to hold these leases and mortgaged properties and the revenue for the Tsar should not be collected thereof before the set term expires."92 Hrushevsky correctly observes that this article "explains in more detail the question concerning the unexpired leases which were discussed at Pereyaslav and in the written petition (the "23 articles") and enables us to understand the whole matter better."93

However, this question probably had a greater importance. The fact is that many estates belonging to the gentry and those which were formerly owned by magnates as well as many trade establishments (mostly potash boileries) were rented by foreign merchants. Even before the epoch of Khmelnytsky the Danzig merchants, Daniel Ryka and Heinrich Marquardt, took on lease the production of potash boileries in the Ukraine east of the Dnieper which belonged to Polish and Ukrainian magnates.94 An identical situation prevailed in the part of p45 Ukraine west of the Dnieper. Thus, e.g., the Danzig merchants Bernhard and Jacob Schultins rented before 1649 the towns Stary and Novy Korostyshiv which belonged to Ludwik Olizar-Volchkovich. As a result of the events of 1648‑49 the conditions of the lease were not fulfilled (or, at any rate, the tenants collected no revenue). However, in 1650 the heirs of the Schultins, Daniel Ryka and Georg Bronswick, merchants and citizens of Danzig, arrived at Korostyshiv. In 1651, Bronswick assumed possession of the rented property in spite of the fact that the original term of the lease had already expired and continued to use it up to the middle of the 1660‑ies (it is not known whether there were any interruptions). Of course all this happened with the knowledge and permission of the Ukrainian Cossack government.95 There were probably more similar cases and the Ukrainian government, anxious to fulfill its economic engagements and to maintain its international economic and political interests and connections, had to make stipulations to this effect during the negotiations with Moscow.

This shows that some apparently purely internal questions put forward by the Ukrainian side in the course of the negotiations with Moscow actually went beyond the limits of Ukrainian internal affairs and interests. Without a detailed knowledge of the conditions prevailing at that time (particularly in the field of economy which remains almost unexplored), we have to be extremely cautious in making general inferences and conclusions.

Also the delicate question of the Tsar's pay for the Cossack army can be explained quite simply if we read attentively the minutes of the Moscow negotiations. They were particularly concerned with the payments to the Cossacks "when they are in the Tsar's service, by the Tsar's order" (i.e., under Muscovite command, "not for their own defence, but when serving in foreign countries").96 It is evident that this was the question of Moscow's financial support in case of Ukrainian (or common Ukrainian-Muscovite) military operations beyond the borders of the Ukraine. It must be also added that the financial matters were one of the most controversial topics discussed during the Moscow negotiations.

Much attention was also paid to military matters (in connection with the war against Poland).

Further conferences took place on March 14 and 17. In p46 the meantime the envoys were treated to a military parade (March 15), a banquet with the Tsar at the "Golden Palace" (March 18), a dinner with the Patriarch (March 19) etc.97 On March 17 the envoys handed over to the boyars the acts of the Zboriv agreement and some other documents.98 On March 18 the Boyarskaya Duma discussed the proposal put forward by the Ukrainian envoys (the "23 articles," i.e. the instructions for the embassy which were hastily rehashed by the envoys into a petition to the Tsar).99 The demands of the Hetman were, on the way, satisfied and Moscow asked for additional explanations only with regard to a few articles. The Muscovite government for its part put forward two proposals: 1) the return of Muscovite refugees ("those of the Tsar's men of any rank who should flee to the Tsar's Cherkass (Ukrainian) towns and places should be sought after and returned"),100 mostly serfs who fled from their landlords, and 2) the despatch by the Hetman of an auxiliary Cossack force headed by colonels Zolotarenko of Nizhyn and Teterya of Pereyaslav to participate in the Tsar's expedition against Smolensk. These proposals were accepted by the envoys.101

On March 19 the Tsar received the envoys in a farewell audience.102 Later there was another conference with the boyars who "announced the Tsar's orders in response to their (the envoys') articles."103 The basic demands of the Hetman were accepted by the Tsar, though with some modifications in Moscow's favor (mostly in financial matters, e.g. concerning the computation and collection of the revenue from Ukraine).

The Ukrainian embassy remained in Moscow until March 27, although the Hetman urged the envoys to complete the negotiations and return as soon as possible.104 They waited for the preparation of the Tsar's title-deeds, charters and other documents. They were probably also delayed by Holy Week and it was not until March 27, the second day of Easter, that the embassy left Moscow for the Ukraine.105

1) the Tsar's charter for the Hetman and the Cossack army, the so‑called "zhaluvana gramota";

6) the Tsar's title-deed granting to Bohdan Khmelnytsky the Hadiach district106 and confirming his ownership of Subotiv, Novoselytsia, Medvedivka, Borky and Kamenka;

7) 3 letters from the Tsar to the Hetman about the activity of the Ukrainian embassy in Moscow (this was in a sense a dismissal letter for the embassy) and the sending of a new state seal for the Ukraine, about the declaration of war on Poland and the sending of an auxiliary Cossack army of 18,000 headed by Teterya, about the sending of the Metropolitan of Kiev to Moscow for explanations concerning his conflict with the Muscovite voyevodas at Kiev.107

Professor Yakovliv adds to this list a "copy of the treaty draft of February 17 with the signatures of the Tsar and the boyars under its 23 articles."108 In our opinion this document could not have been handed over to the envoys, at least not in the form known to us. These were the resolutions of the Boyarskaya Duma and they were, of course, kept in the archives of Moscow. Only the orders ("ukazy") of the Tsar had the character of an official document for the embassy and for the Ukrainian government and they were recorded in the charter issued to the Cossack Army and in the "11 articles". We shall return to this question in the next chapter.

The Moscow negotiations in March, 1654, put into official form the Pereyaslav agreement and its ratification by the Tsar. The Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance was now completed.

The Author's Notes:

(p91) 1 "Acts Pertaining to the History of Southern and Western Russia", (ASWR), vol. X, p215.

3 A. Yakovliv, Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties in 17‑18 cents., Warsaw, 1934, p9.

7 There is some reason to believe that Pereyaslav was Khmelnytsky's native town (Compare Szajnocha, Dwa lata dziejow naszych, vol. II, Lwow, 1869, App. 40). Here he married his first wife — Hanna Somko.

26 I. Borshchak: "Orlikiana" — Khliborobska Ukraina, IV. 1922‑23, Vienna, p366.

28 M. Hrushevsky and A. Yakovliv mention in this connection that George II Rakocsy, Prince of Transylvania, notified in 1656 his envoy to Khmelnytsky that he would not confirm his friendship for the Ukrainian with an oath since he was an "absolute ruler (autocrat)" and "with God's help nothing but death could change his position." (see Yakovliv, Ukrainian-Muscovite Agreements, p14, footnote 10).

37 Among those who did not take the oath at Pereyaslav there were the colonels of Bratslav and Uman who guarded the borderland against the Tartar raiders, colonel Sulychych of Pavoloch who was then with an embassy in Transylvania and colonel Ivan Bohun of Kalnyk who, according to Hrushevsky, took the oath somewhat later. (M. Hrushevsky, op. cit., p735).

38 Here some interesting data about the representation of the individual regiments: from the Pereyaslav regiment, the oath was taken by the colonel, the regimental officers (quartermaster, essaul, master of standards, (p93) secretary), the town commander, 14 captains and 37 Cossacks; from the Chyhyryn, Korsun and Kaniv regiments (beside the officers), altogether 8 Cossacks; from the Kropyvna regiment, besides the colonel and 3 officers, 5 Cossacks; from the Nizhyn, Kaniv and Korsun regiments, in addition to the officers and captains (11), 18 Cossacks (January 10); from the so‑called "Hetman regiment" — one captain and two Cossacks. From other regiments there were only the colonels and other officers (with no Cossacks present), and the Uman, Pavoloch and Kalnyk regiments were without any representation. Thus the army was represented at Pereyaslav by some 200 men (100 captains and 100 other officers and ordinary Cossacks). The remainder of those who took the oath was made up of noblemen (24), clergy and townsfolk — in all, 84 persons. (M. Hrushevsky, op. cit., pp734‑736).

39 It is interesting to compare these numbers with contemporary data given by Paul of Aleppo. He writes as follows: "The colonel of Pereyaslav (Teterya) told our Bishop (Patriarch Makarios of Antioch, then on a visit to the Ukraine) that he ruled over nine towns and more than 500 villages and had under his command 40,000 soldiers. If necessary, he added, he could raise as many as 100,000." (M. Hrushevsky, op. cit., p1009).

45 We do not discuss in detail the Pereyaslav negotiations since they had a preliminary character and all specific questions were to be decided during the negotiations in Moscow which will be discussed later.

56 For more information about him see M. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine‑Rus, vol. IX, pp14, 473, 493, 499‑502, 534, 545‑548, 552‑555, 561, 565‑569, 610, 614, 741, 743, 929, 963.

(p94) V. Lypynsky, Ukraina na perelomi, pp127‑128; "Ukraina", 1914, II; Z dziejow Ukrainy, Cracow, 1912, pp316‑317.

67 Hrushevsky observes correctly that " 'razgavor' is a diplomatic term . . . used to denote diplomatic negotiations." (Ibid., p793, footnote 1).

73 M. Hrushevsky (op. cit., 784‑785) and Prof. Yakovliv (p25) think that the "23 articles" were delivered by the envoys on March 14. However, the ASWR, X, 445, show that this happened on March 15.

74 This was probably the "real order" given to the envoys, mentioned in the Hetman's letter of Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Teterya of March 21, 1654. (ASWR, X, 553, 558).

(p95) 90 ASWR, X, 244‑245. Buturlin agreed to this in the name of the Tsar. (Ibid., 245).

94 ASWR, v. III. See our article on potash industry in the Ukraine at the time of Khmelnytsky (Proceedings of the Historic-Philological Section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, vol. X, Kiev, 1927, pp303‑310).

95 Kiev Central Archives of Ancient Deeds, liber 19, folio 227, 229, liber 20, 240‑242, liber 21, folio 52, 53, 130, 174‑179.

106 Thus Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky became the owner of the property of Alexander Koniecpolski, his personal enemy. It is possible that this was the reason why the Hetman asked the Tsar for a title-deed to this property.

107 ASWR, X, 477‑506. See M. Hrushevsky, 819‑829. In addition to this the envoys had with them the letters to the Hetman from some of the eminent Muscovite boyars (Boris Morozov, Illya Myloslavsky, the Tsar's father-in‑law). According to Hrushevsky there was also "undoubtedly" a letter from Patriarch Nikon which has not been preserved (p829).

108 A. Yakovliv, The Treaty Between Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Muscovite Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, New York, 1954, p37. Earlier Prof. Yakovliv was of a different opinion (see his Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties, p32).

Thayer's Note:

a What follows "Great", thru to the end of the paragraph and including the note marker, is missing in my printed copy, which, having reached the end of the line, proceeds immediately to the (indented) next paragraph: one or maybe two lines were omitted by the printer. I've restored the meaning, adequately I hope, by translating the text I find on p24 of Ohloblyn's original Ukrainian (at Ukrainica): after и тому бъ всему быть по прежнему, и пожаловалъ бы великій, the part missing in the English translation: государь, велѣлъ имъ дать на ихъ маетности свои государевы грамоты.

No more, however, than those few words are missing in the English text: the paragraph that follows does correspond to the paragraph following in the Ukrainian text.

p19 II. Negotiations at Pereyaslav and Moscow (January and March, 1654)

The Author's Notes:

Thayer's Note:

p19 II.

Negotiations at Pereyaslav and Moscow
(January and March, 1654)