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The problem of the legalization of the Pereyaslav agreement has not been settled by scholars in a uniform way. First of all, the original treaty documents are missing: only the Muscovite drafts and copies or translations of some of the corresponding Ukrainian documents have been preserved. p48 Another question that remains obscure is of which documents the official text of the treaty consisted. Prof. A. Yakovliv analyzes this question most thoroughly, particularly in his recent book on the Pereyaslav Treaty. In his opinion, "the Treaty of 1654 was made up of . . . three documents different in form",1 and "the complete and final text of the Treaty of 1654" consisted of the following documents:
1) draft treaty of February 17, 1654,
2) the Tsar's charter of March 27, 1654,
3) the 11 Articles composed at the Posolsky Prikaz in Moscow and dated March 27, 1654.2
This opinion arouses some doubts. Is it possible to consider "the draft treaty of February 17, 1654", i.e. the famous "23 Articles" of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, a part of the "final text of the treaty of 1654"? Prof. A. Yakovliv himself observes that the "proposals" of B. Khmelnytsky of February 17 (the 23 Articles) "were treated in a most exhaustive way . . . in the general terms of the Tsar's charter and in the 11 Articles with the Tsar's resolutions of March 27, 1654."3 In this case (and Prof. Yakovliv has proved this by his analysis of the respective documents),4 the "draft treaty of February 17, 1654" cannot be a part of the "final text of the treaty of 1654", accepted and confirmed by the Tsar (Prof. Yakovliv speaks fittingly of a "ratification instrument of the Tsar's authority").5
In this connection one is inclined to wonder what happened to the document containing the 23 Articles which bore the signature of the Hetman and the seal of the Cossack Army (i.e. the original copy) and which was delivered to the Muscovite government by the Ukrainian envoys. The original of this document is not extant. In 1709, when the Tsar Peter I ordered a search in the archives of Posolsky Prikaz, he was informed that it was not there.6 Only a translation ("copy from Byelorussian writing") 7 of these articles has been preserved in Moscow and it was published several times during the 19th and 20th centuries.
Prof. Yakovliv thinks that the "23 " (translated into Ukrainian) with the resolutions of the Tsar and the boyars were handed to the envoys together with other documents on March 27, 1654.8 The same opinion was expressed at one time by G. Karpov.9 However M. Hrushevsky p49 does not mention the "23 Articles" among the documents which were handed to the envoys on March 27.10 Prof. Yakovliv himself also says nothing about the handing of the "23 Articles" to the envoys in his earlier book on the Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties.11
In our opinion Karpov's assertion, repeated by Professor Yakovliv, is not correct. The "23 Articles" with the resolutions of the Tsar and the boyars could not have been handed to the envoys either as a part of the basic text of the treaty or even as an ordinary document. It has already been stated above that the "23 Articles" in their present form are partly the instructions ("order") of the Hetman to the envoys and partly the petition (or proposals) made by the Hetman or his envoys to the Tsar. This document is extant only in a Muscovite translation which was undoubtedly made for the Boyarskaya Duma. The resolutions of that body with the usual formula "the Tsar has directed and the boyars have decided" have been preserved in a copy of the "23 Articles" in the of the Posolsky Prikaz. It is highly improbable that a copy of these articles and the resolutions of the Boyarskaya Duma should have been handed to the envoys (for the use of the Hetman). The contents and the form of the resolutions both militate against this assumption. Let us quote some examples:
"The Tsar granted their petition; and concerning the judges: ask how many judges" (art. 10).
"The Tsar has directed and the boyars have decided: to tell the envoys about the expedition of the soldiers, on what day the Tsar himself, the boyars and the soldiers will leave Moscow and not to write to the Hetman" (art. 19)
"To ask in what places at the border (the army) should be stationed" (art. 20).
"The Hetman mentioned this in their presence, in the presence of the judge and the colonels, and it is not necessary to speak to them about it" (art. 21).
Also, in some other articles we find similar expressions: "to tell" (art. 22), "to ask" (art. 23). Finally, the concluding passage of the document: "the boyars were told to report to the Tsar: the Tsar's subjects of any rank who should flee to the Tsar's Cherkass (Ukrainian) towns and cities should be detected and given up."12
p50 Thus it may be said that we have before us something like the minutes of the Boyarskaya Duma which discussed the Ukrainian proposals. It is obvious that such a document could not be sent to the Hetman. It was prepared for the use of the Muscovite government and had to be deposited in the of Moscow. It was on the basis of the Ukrainian draft treaty (the "23 Articles") and the resolutions of the Boyarskaya Duma as well as the conferences with the Ukrainian envoys that the charter of March 27, 1654 and the "11 Articles" with the decrees of the Tsar were drawn up. They were delivered to the Hetman by the Ukrainian envoys. These two documents comprise the final text of the Treaty of 1654 and are, in their original form, its official copy prepared for use of the Ukrainian government. On the other hand, the "23 Articles", prepared by the Ukrainian government and bearing the signature of the Hetman, were confirmed by the resolutions of Boyarskaya Duma and other acts of the Tsarist government. They were the official Muscovite copy of the treaty and thus had to be left in Moscow.13
Another rather interesting question concerns the language of the acts of the Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaty of 1654, particularly that of the charter of March 27 and the "11 Articles". According to Prof. Yakovliv, "both documents were written in Moscow in "Byelorussian writing" and handed to the Cossack envoys on March 27, 1654.14 It is difficult to accept this point of view. The "11 Articles" were undoubtedly translated into Ukrainian and in this form handed to the envoys. The Muscovite copy of the "11 Articles" contains the following note: "This letter was given to the envoys. Written in columns in Byelorussian writing, without the registration of the dyak. Written by Stepan, Timophey and Mikhailo."15 On the other hand, there is no documentary evidence that the Tsar's charter to the Cossack Army was written in Ukrainian. The extant draft of the charter in the Moscow bears the following inscription: "The signature of Almaz Ivanov, the dyak of the Duma . . . Alexei Mikhailovich, by the grace of God the Great Tsar and Grand Prince, autocrat of the whole of Great and Little Russia. Sealed with the new seal . . . Written by Andrei Ivanov."16 Had this charter been composed in Ukrainian (obviously we cannot speak of a translation), other charters and title-deeds, particularly those for the gentry and the town p51 of Pereyaslav, would also have been written in that language. It would have been important precedent in Muscovite diplomatic practice which was never to recur.
Thus the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement of 1654 consisted of two separate and seemingly unlike documents. Scholars have repeatedly discussed the question which was the basic act of the treaty, the charter or the "Articles". One may agree with M. Hrushevsky that "the Muscovite government considered the charter the basic act"; on the other hand, the "Articles" were a "supplementary, subsidiary" act.17 Both documents represented the Muscovite answer to the Ukrainian draft treaty (the "23 Articles") and undoubtedly constituted a single whole. This is clearly proved by their contents. The "Articles" are a continuation of and supplement to the Charter. As the charter puts it, "what concerns other articles (beside those mentioned in the charter — A. O.), which were humbly presented to us by the envoys and delivered by the boyars, we, the Great Tsar, have graciously taken them into consideration and ordered to write under each of those articles what we have decreed with regard to each and that those articles with our Tsarist decree should be given to the envoys Samoylo and Pavlo."18 The charter for the Cossack Army was also composed in the same manner (the proposals or petition of the Hetman and the answer or resolutions of the Tsar).
The Tsar's charter for the Hetman and the Cossack Army dated March 27, 1654,19 answered the request made by the Hetman in his letter to the Tsar of February 17: "May it please Your Majesty to confirm and secure for ever with your Tsarist charters".20 Later in a letter to the envoys of March 21, the Hetman reminded them "that everything should be done according to order and the privileges of His Majesty should be sent by Your Worships without any delay."21 This was also stressed by Secretary-General Vyhovsky in his letter to Teterya of March 21: "if they grant anything, they should grant it at once and confirm the privileges without any delay."22 This is quite understandable. The Tsar's charter was a documentary act; it (not only) solemnly corroborated the constitutional rights of the Cossack Army (and, taken together with charters granted to other classes, those of the whole Ukraine), but also contained the pledge of the Tsar of Muscovy to recognize and respect those rights. This was p52 the guarantee demanded by the Ukrainian government from the Muscovite envoys at Pereyaslav and at the same time the ratification instrument of the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement, approved and by the Tsar.
In addition to the general confirmation of all the rights and privileges and of the Cossack Army, "granted by the Polish Kings and the Grand Dukes of Lithuania",23 the charter recognized and confirmed the class jurisdiction of the Cossacks in its entirety: "we have decreed that they should be tried by their elders, according to their former laws."24 The charter also recognizes the Cossack register (standing army) of 60,000 ("and we have decreed, according to their petition, that the number of the registered Cossack Army should be 60,000, always kept up"),25 the election of the hetman should be free ("and if the Hetman should die, according to Divine judgment, we, the Great Tsar, have allowed the Cossack Army to elect a new hetman in accordance with their old customs, from their own ranks; and they should write us whom they have elected and the new hetman should swear the oath of allegiance and loyalty to the Great Tsar in the presence of a person designated by us"),26 and all property rights of the Cossacks should be guaranteed ("we have decreed that the properties and lands of the Cossacks which they use for their living should not be taken away from the widows left by the Cossacks and their children, but should be left to them as before").27
If we consider in this connection also the charters and title-deeds granted to the Ukrainian Orthodox gentry,28 townsfolk (the charter for the town of Pereyaslav was obviously to become a model for other towns)29 and the clergy (this question was settled in principle during the March negotiations in Moscow but the deed was issued somewhat later in the year,30 the specification of which entirely corresponded to the political concepts of that time and the social order of the Ukrainian State, it will become obvious that the charters (particularly that for the Cossack Army) recognized and confirmed the sovereign rights of the Ukraine notwithstanding their form and the ceremonial phraseology. After all, the charters fully upheld the right of the Cossack Army to represent the whole Ukrainian State and its classes and confirmed the life-long character of the authority of the Hetman.
p53 The second part of the treaty, the "11 Articles" (also dated March 27, 1654), had a somewhat different character.31 Although the Muscovite copy of these Articles (preserved in the archives of the Posolsky Prikaz) attributes its origin to the Ukrainian embassy ("in the letter which was sent . . . to the privy boyars . . . by the envoys of the Cossack Army),32 there can be no doubt that we have before us a Muscovite composition. "The clauses of the 11 Articles," M. Hrushevsky writes, "are a Muscovite rehash made in connection with the preparation of the charters. The notes clearly show that these Articles were worked out by the Muscovite clerks, simultaneously with the charters, as a supplement".33 Prof. Yakovliv also thinks that the 11 Articles "were not worked out by the envoys of the Cossack Army but are, together with the charters, the answer of the Tsar to the draft treaty of February 17, delivered by the envoys in Moscow on March 14."34 One could even say that the "11 Articles", in their present form, were drawn up after the final text of the charter for the Cossack Army had already been settled. After all, Article 5 dealing with the right of diplomatic relations was contained in the original text of the charter and was only later transferred to the "11 Articles". Moreover, this Muscovite composition had become necessary only because a number of articles of the Ukrainian draft treaty (the "23 Articles") was inserted in the charters. Thus the "11 Articles", with the Tsar's resolutions, were a supplement to and direct continuation of the charter issued to the Cossack Army.
It is easily noticed that the "11 Articles" included those clauses of treaty which were, for the most part, of comparatively secondary or temporary importance and could be later changed or rescinded. It was for this reason that they were not inserted in the charter which was to remain the unchangeable basic law of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance. These were the clauses dealing with the costs of maintenance of the general and regimental officers (art. 2 and 3), artillery (art. 4), the date of the Muscovite expedition against Poland (Smolensk) (art. 7), the troops to be used for the protection of the Ukrainian-Polish border after the conclusion of the war against Poland (art. 8), the payments for the Cossack troops sent beyond the borders of the Ukraine (art. 9), provisions for the defence of the Ukraine against the Crimea (art. 10) and the p54 securing of the defence of the Sich (art. 11). All these questions positively settled; only articles 9 and 11 caused some misunderstanding and the former was discussed in a long explanatory letter written in the name of the Tsar.35 The Muscovite government particularly stressed that "much money from the Tsar's technology had been spent" on Muscovite troops which were to "defend" the Ukraine and wage war against Poland ("many Russian, German and Tartar troops"). For this reason it was "to no purpose to speak about the payment . . . for the Cossack Army", all the more since the Hetman himself had stipulated during the negotiations at Pereyaslav that "they would not ask payment from the Tsar".36 Thus the Muscovite government refused as a matter of principle to give the Ukraine financial assistance in the common struggle against Poland. As far as Ukrainian financial sources were concerned, the Tsar indicated that they were unknown to him ("and what revenue there is in Little Russia in towns and city, His Majesty does not know"). When "the noblemen of His Majesty will compute and mark all the revenue", then "His Majesty will issue a decree about the payment for the Cossack Army."37 It is well known that Ukrainian envoys were determined in insisting upon their demands during the Moscow negotiations and the Tsar finally agreed "to send his gratuity in golden coins to . . . the Hetman and the whole Cossack Army."38Notwithstanding the fact that this clause was formally not settled according to the Ukrainian demands, the Tsar's decision was, in fact, in line with the Ukrainian proposals and created a precedent for the future.
Similar, too, was the Tsar's resolution in response to the demands of the Ukrainian government to make provision for the defence of the Sich "with foodstuffs and gunpowder" (art. 11). "His Majesty will issue a decree . . . concerning that article when it shall be made known what supplies and in what quantity used to be sent to those places and how much revenue will be collected for His Majesty."39 Thus, in the opinion of the Muscovite government, the supply of foodstuffs and war material for the southern border of the Ukraine was to come from Ukrainian sources.
However, in addition to these technical questions subject, for the most part, to the terms of the military alliance and war conditions, the "11 Articles" also included two clauses p55 which were fundamental in their nature and had great political significance. The Ukrainian draft treaty demanded full financial and diplomatic independence of the Ukraine. The first question was discussed at length in Moscow, but was finally settled in a satisfactory way: "the officials in towns, mayors, burgomasters, councillors and assessors should collect all the revenue in money and grain for His Majesty the Tsar and deliver it to the Tsar's treasury to those persons who will be sent by His Majesty the Tsar"; they should "look after those collectors so that they act honestly" (art. 1).40 Thus in collecting taxes the Tsar reserved for himself only the right of control.
Even more important was article 5 dealing with the diplomatic relations of the Ukraine. The Ukrainian government demanded the right to maintain diplomatic relations with all countries, under a pledge to "inform His Majesty the Tsar" about that which "would be adverse to His Majesty."41 The resolution of the Tsar generally recognized this right: "to receive and dismiss the envoys (who come) on right business." However, "on what business they came and with what (answer) they were dismissed should be communicated truthfully and immediately to His Tsarist Majesty."42 Here, too, the Muscovite government reserved to itself the right of control. To be sure, "the envoys who should be sent from some (other country) on business adverse to His Tsarist Majesty, those ambassadors and envoys should be detained by the (Cossack) Army and it should be written immediately to His Tsarist Majesty for his decree; and they should not be dismissed without the decree of His Tsarist Majesty."43 It was, however, forbidden to "have relations without the decree of His Tsarist Majesty with the Turkish Sultan and the King of Poland" (art. 5).44 This limitation was quite understandable and it was probably made because the Ukraine was earlier a part of the Polish Commonwealth and it was also well known that Bohdan Khmelnytsky acknowledged at one time the protectorate of the Turkish Sultan.
Finally, article 6 of the "11 Articles" deals with the question of church property. It is known that "an oral instruction was given to the envoys concerning the Metropolitan of Kiev" and the envoys demanded "in their speeches" that "His Majesty the Tsar . . . should order that a patent be issued for his (the p56 Metropolitan's) possessions." The Tsar's resolution was that "a Tsarist patent should be given to the Metropolitan and all clergy for the possessions which they own at present."45
While article 6 of the "11 Articles" was actually a kind of certificate and was inserted in the "11 Articles" mainly because the patent issued to the Metropolitan was not yet dispatched, the very fact that the articles 1 and 5 were included in the "11 Articles" seems to support the view that the Muscovite government was anxious to reserve for itself a free hand in the future as far as these important questions were concerned, and for this reason did not include them (especially art. 5) in the charter. On the other hand, however, this enabled the Ukrainian government to disregard all those limitations which were contained in the Tsar's resolutions dealing with these articles.
The form of the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement of 1654 has caused many misconceptions and is responsible for many disagreements in historiography. Some scholars (mostly Russians) denied on the strength of the formal data the contractual nature of the agreement and eo ipso rejected the idea of the equality of rights of the contracting parties. However, Ukrainian historiography always regarded the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement of 1654 as a treaty. Thus, e.g., Kostomarov spoke of the "Pereyaslav treaty".46 Hrushevsky stresses that "recent historians and jurists agree that, notwithstanding the formal side . . ., what originated at Pereyaslav and was completed in Moscow had the nature of a treaty and was recognized as such by the Muscovite side."47 Muscovite official documents of the 17 and 18th centuries call the agreement of 1654 the "Pereyaslav treaty" (1659), "treaty articles" (1663‑1669), "resolutions" (1711), "treaty" (1722), "articles proposed and made binding as a treaty" (1722), "treaties of Khmelnytsky" (1722), "treaty of B. Khmelnytsky" (1722) 48 The contractual nature of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance of 1654 is stressed in numerous Ukrainian official documents of the 17th and 18th cents. in the works of Ukrainian political thinkers and, finally, in Ukrainian political tradition. A similar point of view was prevalent abroad. Thus, e.g., Charles Gustavus, the King of Sweden, wrote in his letter to Bohdan Khmelnytsky dated July 15, 1656: "We have been informed that a certain treaty was concluded between the Grand Duke p57 of Muscovy and Cossack nation."49 A thorough analysis of the form and contents of the Pereyaslav treaty made by Prof. Yakovliv leaves no doubt that "the act of 1654 was really a treaty between the Cossack Army and Moscow."50 To be sure, the form of the Pereyaslav agreement complied with the conditions and usages of that time and, above all, took into account the different political systems of Muscovy and the Ukraine and the different nature of authority exercised by their rulers — the Tsar, an absolute monarch, and the Hetman, the leader ("dux") of the Cossack Army, which represented the Ukrainian State.
The form of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654 was influenced to a great extent by the Zboriv Treaty of 1649.
M. Hrushevsky mentioned in 1922 "interesting resemblances" between "the articles of 1654 submitted to Muscovite government" and "the articles of Zboriv of 1649".51 This does not only concern the contents of some of the basic "articles" (the first two of the "23 Articles" of 1654 correspond with the first articles of the Zboriv agreement, esp. art. 1 and 2, the so‑called "Puncta o potrzebach Woyska Zaporoskiego"52 but also the form of these two treaties. One can agree with M. S. Hrushevsky and A. I. Yakovliv that "the Muscovite government followed the acts of the Zboriv agreement between the Cossack Army and the Polish King as a model."53 Hrushevsky observes that the Zboriv treaty "became a pattern for the settlement of Cossack-Ukrainian requirements during the Ukrainian-Muscovite-Polish negotiations of 1653" and at the same time "a series of details concerning military organization", which were "an archaic survival of the former 'ordinations of the Cossack Army' passed through sheer inertia to the Zboriv treaty" "became mixed up with the negotiations between the officers and Moscow."54 It was the Ukrainian government itself that suggested the form to Moscow. It was not without reason that the envoys brought with them to Moscow the acts of the Zboriv agreement.55 "It was quite natural", Prof. writes, "that, while such strict attention to outward forms prevailed in Moscow, the Muscovite dyaks did not dare to suggest to the Tsar a formula different from that used by the Polish King . . . The Muscovite chancellery used in drawing up the treaty with the Cossack Army the form used for the Zboriv agreement, copying it even in detail. Thus, p58 as it was at Zboriv, decrees were issued which confirmed the articles and, in addition, a charter was granted, similar in form to the Zboriv 'privilege' ".56
We may also add that the "23 Articles" of the Ukrainian government (1654) corresponded to the "Puncta o potrzebach Woyska Zaporoskiego" of Zboriv,57 the Tsar's charter of March 27, 1654, to the royal privilege for the Cossack Army of August 8, 1649, and the "11 Articles" of 1654 to the "Declaration of the King's grace given in response to the articles of petition of the Cossack Army" of 1649 which, by the way, consisted also of 11 articles.58
The Treaty of 1654 (in its Muscovite version) was not ratified by the Ukrainian government. Hrushevsky stresses that "the Hetman . . . and the officers did not accept either the articles or the charter."59 These documents were not published in the Ukraine. After the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, during the Chyhyryn Assembly of August 25, 1657, (according to a Muscovite account) "the officers . . . and army . . . spoke among themselves . . . that the Hetman's son (Yuri Khmelnytsky) and the Secretary (Vyhovsky) should show to the whole army all those articles which Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Army requested from the Tsar through their envoys — for we . . . do not know what the Great Tsar granted us in response to the army petition". The following day "the articles sent from His Majesty the Tsar in response to the petition of the Hetman and the whole Army through Judge Samiylo and Colonel Pavlo Teterya were read out at the assembly."60 Bohdan Khmelnytsky recognized this treaty only in so far as it tallied with the Pereyaslav agreement and the demands made at Chyhyryn by the Ukrainian government.61 All limitations of the sovereign rights of the Ukraine as specified by the Muscovite documents of March 27, 1654, (particularly those concerning the right of foreign relations and the payment of the tribute to the Tsar) "were not put in force and remained a dead letter."62
It has been observed more than once that the term "Pereyaslav treaty" used in connection with the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement of 1654 is rather inappropriate since the treaty was formally concluded in Moscow. It was suggested that the terms "Moscow treaty"63 or the "treaty of Pereyaslav and Moscow" should be used, or that any attempt at local definition should be abandoned.64
p59 We use, however, the traditional term — the Pereyaslav agreement". True, the term "Pereyaslav treaty" appeared for the first time in Moscow in 165965 and no written treaty was drawn up at Pereyaslav in 1654. There is, however, no doubt that an agreement concerning the basic provisions of the treaty was reached already at Pereyaslav66 and that only specific and technical questions were decided upon during the Moscow negotiations. Even more important is the fact that Bohdan Khmelnytsky regarded as binding only the clauses agreed upon at Pereyaslav. This is the reason which prompts us to adhere to the old term which is intelligible to everybody.
(p95) 1 A. Yakovliv, Treaty . . ., p7.
2 Ibid., p40.
3 Ibid., p39.
4 Ibid., pp39‑40.
5 Ibid., p39.
(p96) 6 M. Hrushevsky, op. cit., p784, footnote 2.
7 Hrushevsky (op. cit., 835) calls it a "semitranslation".
8 A. Yakovliv, Treaty . . ., pp8, 37, 78.
9 G. Karpov, Peregovory ob usloviekh soyedinyeniya Malorossii s Vyelikoy Rossiey. See also Yakovliv, Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties, p29.
10 See M. Hrushevsky, pp813, 819‑820, 828‑829.
11 See A. Yakovliv, Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties, p32.
12 ASWR, X, 446‑452.
13 The Ukrainian original of the "23 Articles" was evidently left at Moscow. Its further fate was, in our opinion, connected with the notorious Muscovite falsification of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654 (see below). Prof. Yakovliv, comparing "the 1659 version with the draft treaty worked out at Chyhyryn and handed to the boyars by the envoys of B. Khmelnytsky on March 14, 1654 (the "23 Articles" with Khmelnytsky's signature), came to the conclusion that the 1659 version resembled rather closely the text of the treaty but differed from it by its exposition. Obviously the author of the 1659 version used the draft treaty and the Articles in the 1654 version and made rather accurate rendering of the contents of the treaty. However, he also "made very important changes in the clauses of the treaty of 1654 and in the decrees of the Tsar; he added, moreover, new clauses and new decrees of the Tsar which, together with the alterations made, considerably limited the rights of the Cossack Army as specified by the Treaty of 1654." (A. Yakovliv, Treaty, pp82‑83). The authentic document containing the 23 Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky probably disappeared (was lost or destroyed) at the same time.
14 A. Yakovliv, Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties, p33. Sea also his Treaty . . ., p38.
15 ASWR, X, p484.
16 Ibid., p494. M. Hrushevsky does not speak anything about the alleged "Ukrainian" language of the Charter.
17 M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, p812, footnote 1.
18 ASWR, X, pp493‑494.
20 Ibid., 435.
21 Ibid., 553.
22 Ibid., 558.
23 Ibid., 492.
24 Ibid., 492. Further it was written in the first version of the Charter "and our boyars and voyevodas will not interfere with those military courts." (Ibid.).
27 Ibid., 493. The rough copy of the Charter preserved in Moscow has two additional articles dealing with the placing of the Chyhyryn district under the Hetman's jurisdiction and the right of diplomatic relations enjoyed by the Cossack Army. These articles in the rough copy were "underlined with ink" according to G. Karpov who published them in ASWR, vol. X (p492, footnote). They are not included in the official edition of the Charter in the Complete Code of Laws of the Russian Empire (vol. 1, pp325‑327); they are not taken into consideration by the students of the Pereyaslav agreement (particularly Prof. Yakovliv — see his Treaty, appendix 2, pp101‑103). On the contrary, M. Hrushevsky thinks that they were left in the final text of the Charter (see his History of the Ukraine‑Rus′, IX, 2, 822). It is difficult to decide without the authentic text of the Tsar's charter which articles were included in the final version. However, the two articles in question were finally for some reason included in the separate charter granted to the Hetman and in the "11 Articles", respectively.
28 ASWR, X, 495‑496.
29 Ibid., 533‑534.
31 ASWR, X, 477‑484. See Appendix 2. In the Muscovite copy, these articles are dated March 12; however, Karpov proved that this date was impossible (Ibid., p477, footnote). He proposes another date — March 21 (Ibid.). It would be possible to accept it if these Articles had been actually delivered by the Ukrainian envoys. Since this did not occur, we have to accept the common date of all acts of the treaty — March 27. See A. Yakovliv, Treaty, pp35‑37.
32 ASWR, X, 477.
33 M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, 813. See ibid., pp812‑813.
34 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p37.
35 ASWR, X, 481‑483.
36 Ibid., 483.
37 Ibid., 483.
39 Ibid., 484.
40 Ibid., 479.
41 Ibid., 446‑452.
42 Ibid., 480.
45 Ibid., 480‑481.
46 See M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, p754.
(p98) 47 Ibid., p755.
48 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, pp43‑44.
49 Quoted according to Yakovliv, Treaty, p63.
50 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p41.
51 M. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine‑Rus, v. VIII, part 3, 210‑211.
52 Ibid., 210, footnote 1.
53 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p41.
54 M. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine‑Rus, IX, 2, p789.
55 The envoys brought to Moscow the following documents: the royal privilege granted to the Cossack Army at Zboriv, the royal assent to the Zboriv pact, confirmation of the rights to the Terekhtemyriv foundation and placing of the Chyhyryn district under the jurisdiction of the Hetman. They were "in the official copies made at Kiev where they had been registered in March, 1650." (M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, p792). These documents were handed by the envoys to the boyars on March 17, 1654 (Ibid., p808).
56 A. , Treaty, p41. It is interesting that Moscow recognized and even stressed the contractual nature of the Zboriv agreement.
57 From the 23 Articles of 1654, 18 articles dealt with constitutional matters (like the "Puncta o potrzebach"), which had also 18 articles). The remaining five had a purely military significance.
58 M. Hrushevsky, History, VIII, 3, pp215‑217.
59 M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, p812, footnote 1.
60 M. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine‑Rus, X, Kiev, 1937, pp32‑33.
61 M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 3, p756.
62 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p54.
63 See E. Borshchak, La légende historique de l'Ukraine — Istorija Rusov. Paris, 1949, p138, footnote 5.
64 See M. Andrusiak, "Pereyaslav or Moscow Treaty", Svoboda, 1954 No. 15. A. Yakovliv, "Moscow or Pereyaslav Treaty?" — Svoboda, 1954, No. 21.
65 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, 87, 91.
66 See M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, 758.
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