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The appraisal of the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 in both historical and historical-legal literature has been by no means uniform. Most discrepancies and even contradictions have been caused by the legal definition of the Pereyaslav agreement. As far as this point is concerned, the opinion of the scholars vacillates between the conception of a complete incorporation of the Ukraine with Muscovy according to the Pereyaslav agreement and that of a simple military alliance between two independent and sovereign countries. All varieties of opinion can be reduced to two principal groups:
The first group, represented for the most part by Russian scholars, supports the theory of a union or, at least, more or less close ties between two unequal countries, while the second one, composed chiefly of Ukrainian scholars, defends the conception of contractual relations between two more or less independent and sovereign countries.
To the first group belong the conceptions of the incorporation of the Ukraine with Russia, either complete (D. Odynets, V. Myakotin in his later works) or incomplete (I. Rosenfeld), and of autonomy of the Ukraine within the Muscovite Tsardom and, later, within the Russian Empire (Baron B. Nolde and others).
The second group includes the conceptions of real p60 union between two states — the Ukraine and Muscovy (M. Diakonov, O. Popov), their personal union in the person of the Tsar of Muscovy (V. Serheyevych, R. Lashchenko and others), vassalage (Korkunov, V. Myakotin in his earlier works, Sokolsky, M. Pokrovsky, partly M. Hrushevsky, partly Prof. Krypyakevych, M. Slabchenko, Professor L. Okinshevych, Professor Yakovliv in his earlier works, and others), protectorate (partly M. Hrushevsky, partly Prof. Krypyakevych, partly D. Doroshenko, Prof. B. Krupnytsky, Prof. Yakovliv, to a certain extent V. Lypynsky in his later works), pseudo-protectorate (Dr. B. Halaychuk), and, finally, that of a military alliance between two nations, Ukraine and Muscovy, consolidated by the protection of the Tsar (V. Lypynsky, Prof. I. Borshchak, Prof. Yakovliv, Dr. S. Ivanytsky and others in part).1
Most prevalent in modern Ukrainian historiography are the conceptions of vassalage-protectorate and military alliance. Prof. L. Okinshevych is entirely correct when he observes that "vassalage and protectorate in the relationship between two states are formally close to each other."2 Prof. Yakovliv is also of the same opinion when he stresses that "vassalage and protectorate occurred quite often in international relations, also in the form of a purely nominal dependence, where the dependence of the vassal state was limited to the use of certain titles by the monarch, to an alliance and to the obligation (or simply a promise) to pay tribute."3 In his opinion, "the relations between Ukraine and Muscovy are, according to the literal contents of the treaty, very close to those of nominal vassalage or protectorate."4
V. Lypynsky, in his analysis of the whole complex of the Ukrainian-Polish and Ukrainian-Muscovite relations in the time of Khmelnytsky, reached the conclusion that "his (Khmelnytsky's) agreement with Moscow in 1654 was a chance alliance, directed against Poland and concluded in order to liberate Ukraine from Polish domination, like all his former alliances with the Crimea and chiefly with Turkey."5 For this reason Lypynsky considers the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 a "military alliance against Poland and the Tartars, guaranteed by a formal protectorate."6 Prof. Yakovliv also admits that "all historical facts show quite clearly that Khmelnytsky regarded this agreement as a simple treaty of protection which p61 was quite familiar to him since he had more than once concluded similar treaties in the past, as a temporary military alliance of two states"; however, "since Ukraine was at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of 1654 much weaker than Moscow, this military alliance acquired some attributes of vassalage and protection," though "actually this dependence . . . manifested itself very seldom and was more apparent in the demands of Moscow than in Khmelnytsky's voluntary acts." Later, "during the years following the conclusion of the treaty and especially in the last year of Khmelnytsky's life (1657), that dependence had become purely nominal, in proportion to the increase of the power of the Ukrainian State," and "Ukraine was, in fact, independent from Moscow."7
If we consider the specific tasks and peculiarities of history and jurisprudence and review the most recent publications of the younger representatives of the latter (Dr. B. Halaychuk,8 Dr. S. Ivanytsky),9 it is possible to state that modern Ukrainian scholars have appraised the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 in a more or less uniform way.10
The two basic opinions about the Pereyaslav agreement as represented by the Ukrainian and the Russian scholars have remained unchanged. They proceed from a marked discrepancy in the national and political interests of the Ukraine and Muscovy at the time of the conclusion of the treaty and from their different political objectives after that event. It is "in this discrepancy in the relations between both contracting parties and their way of looking at the Pereyaslav treaty as a temporary agreement which could later be modified and changed according to their wishes, that the difficulties of a legal political definition of a new mutual relationship lie."11 However, a legal definition of the Ukrainian-Muscovite agreement of 1654, even if scholars had a uniform inspiration about it, is still inadequate for a historical appraisal of the Pereyaslav treaty. In order to "explain the real legal nature of the Treaty of 1654 as well as the actual mutual relationship which resulted from that treaty, we have to consider not only the literal contents of the agreement but also that actual relationship inasmuch as it replaced the unfulfilled provisions of the treaty. The appraisal of the treaty by the contracting parties and their neighbours is also of a certain importance," Professor Yakovliv writes.12 Thus in order properly to define and appraise the p62 Pereyaslav agreement it is necessary to examine not only the documents of the treaty but also its historical circumstances.
How did the Pereyaslav agreement change the political situation of the Ukraine? First of all, we must state that after 1654 the Ukraine remained separate, independent state, with its own head — the Hetman, who was elected for life, with a distinct tendency toward making his office hereditary in one dynasty, with its own government, army (one of the best in Europe), foreign policy (the restrictions of the Pereyaslav agreement concerning the relations with Poland and Turkey were not put into effect), social and economic order, legislative power and jurisdiction, finances (the obligation to pass the revenue from towns "to the Tsar's treasury" was not enforced) and, finally, with its own religious and cultural life. It is very important that all restrictions of Ukrainian sovereignty specified in the agreement (or, strictly speaking, in the Tsar's charter for the Cossack Army and in the "11 ") were not recognized by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and that the Muscovite government evidently did not consider this a violation of the agreement on the part of the Hetman. The only indication or symbol of the supremacy of the Muscovite Tsar in the Ukraine was his new Ukrainian title — "Tsar of Little Russia, Grand Duke of Kiev and Chernihiv" — and the presence of Muscovite troops in Kiev.13
The chief symbol of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State was the person of the Hetman in his capacity as the head of the state and its government. He was invested with full state authority in both internal matters of the state and its foreign policy, which he conducted independently. The Hetman's authority increased even more after 1654. He retained his legal power as "Sovereign and Hetman" of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) State. In Ukrainian official documents he is referred to as the "sovereign", the "supreme ruler and sovereign of our fatherland", "supreme lord", "commander-in‑chief".14 His supremacy and authority were recognized by the higher Ukrainian clergy and the Ukrainian nobles. He was, in the words of Metropolitan Sylvester Kosiv, the "chief and commander of our country".15 After his death, Prince Stepan Sviatopolk-Chetvertynsky, the chamberlain of Bratslav and a leader of the Ukrainian nobility, referred to him as "His Excellency, Worthy of Remembrance, His Grace, Lord Khmelnytsky, p63 the Great Hetman, Defender of our Orthodox faith."16 Foreign rulers styled the Hetman "Illustrissimus Dux" (Most Serene Prince).17
In his letter to the Hospodar (Potentate) of Wallachia dated June 18, 1657, Bohdan Khmelnytsky calls himself "Clementia divina (by the grace of God) Generalis Dux Exercituum Zaporoviensium."18 His letter to (the Elector of Brandenburg), Frederick William, (June 21, 1657), in which the Hetman calls himself "a friend of the Elector", is signed "Dux Cohortium Zaporoviensium."19
(p4) The letter of the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky to Frederick William, the Elector of Brandenburg. Chyhyryn, June 21, 1657.
"The Hetman is like a prince or a king in his country, as the Tsar is a sovereign in his. He has conquered his country with his sword liberated it from the (Polish) yoke", Vyhovsky told the Muscovite envoy (as quoted by Szebeszy, envoy of the Prince of Transylvania, on June 28, 1657).20 Hetman Pylyp Orlyk writes in his "Exposition of the rights of the Ukraine" (1712) that Bohdan Khmelnytsky "made the Ukraine an independent principality and contented himself with the title of the Hetman of the Cossack Army which his son inherited from him, and the estates of the said principality continued to elect their princes after his death and no nation claimed the right to object to it."21
How was the Pereyaslav agreement appraised in the Ukraine and abroad?
A contemporary and fully authoritative Ukrainian appraisal of the Pereyaslav agreement appears in the well-known manifesto of the Ukrainian government to the nations of Europe (1658):
"We had not accepted the protection (protectionem) of the Grand Duke of Muscovy for any other reason but in order to preserve, with God's help, for ourselves and our descendants the freedom, won by arms and sanctified with our own blood which we have shed so many times . . . Because of religious ties and our free and voluntary submission we hoped that our subjection would be a just one, based on a genuine and sincere friendship, without encroachments on our freedom; we hoped, moreover, that it would continue to increase, according to their promises."22
In spite of the unfortunate experience of the Ukrainian-Muscovite relations after the conclusion of the Pereyaslav agreement and a gross violation of that treaty by Moscow, the Ukrainian government was anxious both in the time of p64 Khmelnytsky and after his death to maintain the alliance with Moscow. Khmelnytsky, while conducting a military convention with Sweden, an enemy of Moscow, in 1655, declared that the alliance with Moscow remained in force since it was advantageous to the Ukraine.23 An obvious example of this attitude was the Korsun agreement between Ukraine and Sweden (October 6, 1657). Concluding a treaty of "alliance and military association" with Sweden, the Ukrainian government made a reservation to the effect that the commitments which it had assumed under that treaty had no bearing upon its relations with "His Serene Highness the Duke of Muscovy to whom the Cossack Army is bound by a close (formal) alliance and will remain unalterably faithful to him."24 Even in the Hadiach agreement with Poland (September 6, 1658) the Ukraine, while returning to membership in the Commonwealth as the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, made a reservation that "if the estates of the (Polish) Crown and the Grand Duchy had to go to war against the Tsar of Muscovy, the Cossack Army would not be forced to participate in such a war;" only "if the Tsar should refuse to return the provinces of the Commonwealth and attack it, then all the forces of the Crown, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Ruthenian Cossack Army under the command of the Hetman should combine and go to war."25
It was Moscow's open military aggression against Ukraine in the autumn of 1658 that forced the Ukrainian government to break the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance. In a manifesto issued in October, 1658, to all nations, the Cossack Army cited numerous instances of Muscovite perfidy and made the following declaration:
"Thus have been exposed the perfidy and fraud of those who, without any fault on our part, prepared for us the yoke of servitude, at first by fomenting civil war in our midst and then by open armed aggression. So that this may be properly understood, we profess our innocence and praying for divine help declare that we have been forced to defend steadfastly our rightful cause and ask our neighbors to help us to defend our freedom . . . We are not responsible for this war nor is it our fault that, having been and wishing to remain faithful to the Grand Duke (the Tsar of Muscovy), we have been forced to take up arms."26
Very interesting was the appraisal of the Pereyaslav agreement p65 of 1654 by the Ukrainian statesmen of the time of Mazepa. They had generally a high opinion of the lifework of Bohdan Khmelnytsky27 and connected directly their own struggle for national liberation with the great Ukrainian revolution of 1648. This attitude is reflected in numerous state documents of Hetman Ivan Mazepa, in the writings of his antagonist Petryk, in literary works and various other historical materials of that time. A striking instance of this attitude toward the epoch of Khmelnytsky is the well-known preamble to the "Bendery Constitution" of April 5, 1710.28
Hetman Pylyp Orlyk also paid a great deal of attention to the Pereyaslav agreement and to the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance of 1654 in general. In his manifesto to the governments of Europe, dated April 4, 1712, the Hetman wrote: "It is known to everybody that His Excellency Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of immortal memory voluntarily, and not compelled by anyone, placed the Ruthenian people and the Cossack nation under the Tsar of Muscovy (. . . a soumis le peuple ruthène et la Nation Cosaque au Czar Moscovite). And Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich affirmed in a solemn pact under oath to guard forever under his protection the Cossack nation and the Ruthenian people." However P. Orlyk continues, "it is common knowledge that after the death of His Excellency Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of blessed memory the Muscovite State violated in various ways the rights and liberties of the Cossack nation which it had itself formerly confirmed; the Tsar of Muscovy wanted to enslave the free Ruthenian people."29
In his famous treatise "Exposition of the Rights of Ukraine" (1712), Orlyk gave a brilliant analysis of the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654: "The strongest and most invincible argument and proof of the sovereignty of Ukraine", he writes, "is the solemn treaty of alliance concluded by Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich on the one side and the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky on the other. This treaty was concluded in 1654 and was signed by authorized representatives. It seemed that this solemn and detailed treaty which was named a permanent agreement ought to have established for ever peace, freedom and order in the Ukraine. This would have happened if the Tsar had executed it as scrupulously as the Cossacks believed he would. They p66 handed over their fortresses to the Muscovite troops and combined their troops with those of the Tsar for the sake of the common cause; however, the Tsarist generals took advantage of their confidence, seized by cunning devices a great number of other fortifications and then began to command like masters in the whole country. Nevertheless the Cossacks retained a shadow of sovereignty and even after the death of Hetman Khmelnytsky the Tsar granted a charter to the Estates of the Ukraine."30
Hryhor Orlyk, an assistant to his father and continuator of his lifework and tradition, wrote in his "Memoirs" for Louis XV of France (February 12, 1741): "It is certainly known to Your Majesty that the Cossack nation under Hetman Khmelnytsky after a prolonged war with Poland seceded from that Commonwealth . . . Hetman Khmelnytsky foresaw that the power of his nation, which he had founded, could not prevail against that of its neighbors and deemed it more advantageous to safeguard its security by the protection of Russia which he accepted on terms most favorable to his nation."31
In his "Remarks on the Ukraine and the Cossacks," which Prof. considered to be fragments of a history of Ukraine, Hryhor Orlyk wrote: "In the name of the rights of his nation Khmelnytsky rebelled against the (Polish) Crown which was chastised by God with defeats, for Khmelnytsky was a leader of genius and had the backing of the whole Cossack nation who believed in the justice of their cause . . . After ten (sic) years of war which made the name of the Cossacks known throughout the world, Khmelnytsky accepted the protection of the Tsar of Muscovy for the country and the nation with all the rights of a free nation. However, the perfidy of the Tsar of Muscovy was the cause that immediately after Khmelnytsky's death the rights of the Cossack Nation began to be violated by the Muscovites and then these people who value freedom more than else in the world revolted, and war continued a long time in the Ukraine . . ."32
To the statesmen of the age of Mazepa, the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 was something in the nature of a prototype of the Ukrainian-Swedish agreement of 1708. The King of Sweden substituted for the Tsar of Muscovy and "took forever this people (Ruthenian nation) and the Cossack Army under p67 his protection, guardianship, patronage and custodianship in order to throw off the Muscovite yoke."33 The Bendery Constitution, too, confirmed the permanent protectorate of the Swedish kings over Ukraine.34
Generally speaking, the nature of the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 was correctly understood in the 18th century Ukraine. Both the government of the Ukrainian State and the broad masses of the population knew that the alliance between Ukraine and Muscovy, which resulted from the Pereyaslav treaty, was an association of free and equal partners. Hetman Demian Mnohohrishny told Taneev, a Muscovite envoy, on the occasion of the Andrusiv agreement of 1667 (which, among other things, provided for the return of Kiev to Poland): "The Sovereign did not conquer us with his sword: we submitted to him voluntarily, because of our common faith. If he has no use for Kiev and other Ukrainian towns and gives them back to the (Polish) King, we shall look for another ruler."35 This declaration was repeated almost word for word by Petro Ivanenko (Petryk), later the Hetman of the so‑called "Khan's Ukraine",36 in his letter to the chief ataman of the Sich (1692): "The Muscovite Tsars . . . have not conquered us by sword, but our ancestors submitted to them voluntarily, for the sake of the Christian faith".37 Hryhory Pokas, an army clerk, stresses in his "Description of Little Russia" (1751) that Ukraine "joined the Russian state of its own will."38 Hryhory Poletyka speaks of "voluntary submission, based on treaties concluded by Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Little Russian people."39
Semen Divovych, a translator with the General Chancery of the Army and the author of the famous "Discourse Between Great Russia and Little Russia" (1762), makes his Ukraine say the following words: "I have submitted to your Sovereign, not to yourself . . . Do not think that you are my mistress, but the Tsar is our common ruler, both yours and mine."40
The Ukrainian tradition of the Pereyaslav agreement has been vividly recorded in the "Istoriya Rusov". It is emphasized throughout this memorable production of Ukrainian national and political thought. "The whole world knows that the Ruthenian people and its Cossacks, having been at the beginning a sovereign nation, dependent only on itself, . . . joined Muscovy voluntarily, merely because of the common faith; p68 now, after we have made it what it is today, it unscrupulously and shamelessly scorns and offends us."41
The idea of the independence of Ukraine and of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State continued to live among the widest circles of the Ukrainian people in the 17th and 18th centuries, beginning with the head of the state, the Hetman, and ending with rank-and‑file Cossacks. Thus, e.g., Hetman Ivan Samoylovych uses the expression "our state" and strives for the "extension of its bounds."42 Petro Ivanenko concludes in 1692 a treaty of alliance with the "Crimean State" on behalf of the "Little Russian State."43 The elders and townsfolk of Poltava who complained to Hetman Mazepa (in 1690) about harsh treatment by the settlers from the Right Bank Ukraine, were indignant because such things happened in a country which was not "stateless" or "lawless".44 A common Cossack of the village of Yukhniv in the district of Novhorod Siversky relates in 1721 "how the Poles were brought to ruin in our Little Russian towns" and how "the (Roman Catholic) priests fled from this state to Poland."45 And when a Ukrainian monk died in distant China (Peking), it was recorded on his tombstone that he "was born in the Kingdom of Little Russia, regiment (district) of Nizhyn."46
It was on this foundation of Ukrainian statehood (although it was oppressed by the imperialist centralism of Moscow which had violated the Pereyaslav agreement) that the idea of sovereign "Little Russian nation" developed — a notion which was characteristic of the Left Bank Ukraine in the 18th century.
The independence of the Ukrainian State was also recognized by Moscow both during and after the Pereyaslav negotiations. The Muscovite formula "King Jan Kazimierz . . . violated his oath and thereby freed his subjects — you, Orthodox — from subjection",47 was a peculiar, but indisputable recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence. We have already mentioned the formula "the Muscovite State of the and the Ukraine of the Cossack Army", used in Buturlin's report (Stateyny spisok).49 During the Moscow negotiations the Muscovite government undoubtedly recognized that the Hetman of the Cossack Army had the right to represent all the estates of the Ukraine and it was as a result of his petition that those estates received Tsarist charters. The "subjection" of the Hetman and the Cossack p69 Army together with the whole Ukrainian population did not change this situation. Professor Yakovliv correctly observes that the formula "subject to our Tsarist Majesty", as the Tsar styled the Hetman after 1654, was used in Moscow "with reference to kings or rulers of those countries which entered into contractual relationship with the Tsar of Muscovy, seeking his protection against their enemies."50 According to the concepts of international law of that time, a "sovereign who was under someone's protection" did not cease to be a sovereign.51 It is, therefore, no wonder that the Muscovite government, even at a later time, recognized the existence of a separate Ukrainian State. Thus, e.g., in 1666 Steward Kyril Khlopov, Muscovite voyevoda in Starodub, wrote: "in the Little Russian State, in the town of Starodub . . ."52
To be sure, the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 brought something new as far as the legal aspect of the relationship between Ukraine Muscovy was concerned. The Ukraine recognized the protection of the Tsar of Muscovy. In one of the Muscovite patents of 1654 (granted to the guilds of Kiev) we find the following formula: "how by the grace of God the Grand Duchies of Kiev and Chernihiv, Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the whole Cossack Army and the whole Little Rus have come under Our Sovereign exalted arm (protection)."53 In this connection important changes were made in the title of the Tsar of Muscovy who thenceforth began to style himself the Tsar of "Great and Little Russia" — a formula aptly described by M. Hrushevsky as "the Ukrainian title" of the Tsar.54 V. Prokopovych observes that this title was "as though presented to the Tsar by the Ukrainians."55
In the opinion of Professor Yakovliv, at that time "a new idea began to manifest itself in connection with the treaty of 1654 . . . the conception of the return under the rule of the Muscovite Tsar of his 'ancestral patrimony which had been torn away — Kiev'.56 In this connection the additional formula 'Grand Duke of Kiev and Chernihiv' appeared in the title of the Tsar.57 This notion, in the minds of the autocrats of Muscovy, later replaced the idea of the treaty of 1654, the only historically correct basis of Muscovite-Ukrainian relationship."58
Such are, indeed, the facts of the case; however, the idea of the "patrimony of Kiev" was by no means new in the dynastic policy of Moscow. The Muscovite branch of the Rurik p70 dynasty first laid their claim to the Ruthenian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish Commonwealth (i.e. all the territories of the former Kievan State) in the time of Ivan III. In the 16th c. this idea became the practical program of the Muscovite theory of the "Third Rome",59 although the "Smuta" (time of disturbances) at the beginning of the 17th c. dealt a severe blow to this theory and the revival of the Ukrainian State in 1648 was even more dangerous to its realization.60 The Pereyaslav agreement opened new far‑reaching prospects to the Muscovite policy and, what was of the utmost importance, offered real possibilities for attaining them. The Ukrainian and, before long, the Byelorussian territories of the old Kievan Empire passed under the rule of the Tsar of Muscovy. It was only little by little that Moscow put this project in a prominent position. The help of certain Ukrainian circles, particularly of some members of the Ukrainian Cossack gentry and of the secular clergy, considerably contributed to the success of this policy.61
Bohdan Khmelnytsky at first did not oppose this development since it furthered to a certain extent his main objective: to embroil Moscow with Poland, impair the power of the Polish Commonwealth and unite all Ukrainian (and, perhaps, even Byelorussian) territories under the rule of the Cossack Army.62 However, after some time he began to realize the danger of these Muscovite encroachments.
It was probably because of the unfortunate experience of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance of 1654 that the Ukrainian government later paid more attention and attached more importance to the problem of titles. It was not without reason that in the Ukrainian-Swedish agreement of 1708 there was, according to Orlyk's "Exposition of the Rights of Ukraine", a reservation to the effect that the King of Sweden, the protector of the Ukrainian State, could not use either the title of the Duke of Ukraine or the coat of arms of the Ukrainian State (art. 5).63
V. Prokopovych observed in his very valuable work "The Little Russian Seal" (unfortunately unfinished and till now unpublished)64 that Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich used his new (Ukrainian) title only in documents dealing with Ukrainian matters (beginning with February 9, 1654). In the official documents of the Muscovite State as well as in his decrees "to p71 the people of all ranks in the Muscovite State" the Tsar "obstinately and consistently adheres to the old famous 'Autocrat of all Rus' which was worked out as a result of centuries of usage". Thus, e.g., "the order to the appropriate office in Moscow about the 'dismissal' of the Ukrainian envoys (19.3.1654) was issued in the name of the Tsar and Grand Duke of 'all Russia', but at the same time it was stated in the instruction to the Dyak of the Duma (State Secretary) Almaz Ivanov concerning the audience with the Ukrainian embassy that he "should introduce that embassy and greet on its behalf the Tsar as 'the Autocrat of all Great and Little Russia'." "A special seal of the Tsars of Muscovy which was used only in the intercourse between Moscow and Ukraine," Prokopovych writes, " that Moscow treated the Cossack Army as a state organism separate from the Tsardom of Muscovy and that certain ties existed between Ukraine and Muscovy, just as separate seals used by Holy Roman Emperors in their intercourse with the kings of Hungary and Bohemia bear witness to the fact that these kingdoms enjoyed an independent existence within the Empire."65
It is a well known fact that Moscow's relations with the Hetman of the Cossack Army, like those with foreign monarchs, were conducted by the Prikaz, the Muscovite Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, as Professor Okinshevych writes, "this intercourse was so frequent and its subject so special that Moscow soon decided to separate it from the apparatus of the Posolsky Prikaz and concentrate it in an office specially established for this purpose." This was the Prikaz of "Little Russia" (later known as "Malorossiysky Prikaz"), established in 1663. Professor Okinshevych stresses that the Malorossiysky Prikaz "was not one of those Muscovite departments which controlled and managed certain territories (as, e.g., the Prikaz for Siberia, Smolensk etc.)," since "Russia could not directly govern the Ukraine which had its own state apparatus." In his opinion, "the Prikaz of Little Russia was actually another department in charge of foreign affairs which operated side by side with the Posolsky Prikaz", but "was not subordinated to the latter."66 While this statement is essentially correct, we must add that the Malorossiysky Prikaz was not a substitute for the Posolsky Prikaz, but had its own special functions.67 Diplomatic relations between the Ukraine and Muscovy p72 continued to be handled by the Posolsky Prikaz.68 In our opinion, the Malorossiysky Prikaz could be described as the Muscovite ministry for Ukrainian affairs or as the chancery of the Tsar of Muscovy in his capacity as the Tsar of "Little Russia". This distribution of functions between two offices, separate and independent from each other, was caused by the political and legal duality of Ukrainian-Muscovite relations in the second half of the 17th century.
V. Prokopovych stresses that the Great State Seal and red sealing wax were always used in Moscow's official correspondence with Ukrainian Hetmans, while the privy seal in black wax was usually affixed to the official letters to the Crimean Khan and the princes of South-East Europe. According to Prokopovych, "the pompous title" of the "Lord Keeper of the Tsar's Seal and Privy Councilor" which replaced that of the former "keeper of the seal", "was created especially for intercourse with foreign monarchs and the Hetman of the Cossack Army."69
It is also very important that the Ukraine continued to be separated from Muscovy by international boundary and customs barriers. Muscovy merchants who arrived in the Ukraine had to pay import duties like other foreigners, while Ukrainian merchants were not allowed to trade freely in Muscovy and the Russians were forbidden till 1709 to acquire landed property in the Ukraine.
In foreign countries the nature and importance of the Pereyaslav agreement were interpreted correctly. Professor Yakovliv states that "foreign nations and monarchs treated Ukraine as a free and independent state, separate from Moscow, and its Hetman as an independent ruler; they regarded the Treaty of 1654 as a contract of alliance or protection which was, according to the conception of that time, purely nominal and did not prevent them from maintaining diplomatic relations with the Ukraine as a competent subject of international law."70 The vast documentary evidence collected by the Ukrainian and non‑Ukrainian students of the epoch of Khmelnytsky, in particular by M. Hrushevsky in the 9th volume of his "History of Ukraine‑Rus", leaves no doubts as to the full independence of foreign policy of the Ukrainian State after 1654 and of the independent and decisive part played by the Ukraine in contemporary political p73 events in Eastern Europe. The growth of the Ukrainian State, the consolidation of the authority of the Hetman and the increase in the stature of Bohdan Khmelnytsky both as a statesman and an individual furnished sufficient evidence to enable official foreign circles and public opinion to appraise correctly the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654.
This situation was probably best understood in Sweden. Charles Gustavus, the King of Sweden, wrote to Khmelnytsky on July 15, 1656: "We have been informed that a certain treaty has been concluded between the Grand Duke of Muscovy and the Cossack nation but that it was of such a nature that the freedom of the people has remained complete and inviolable . . . Relying upon this free condition of your (people), we wished to correspond with Your Serene Highness quite openly, even with the knowledge of the Grand Duke of Muscovy . . ."71 Very in this respect are so‑called "Swedish projects" (dating approximately from the end of 1655 and 1656) which deal with the future political status of the Ukraine, its place in the system of East European states and the future Ukrainian-Swedish relations. They give several possible variants of the future constitution of the Ukrainian State and all describe the Ukraine as a "free and separate state" or "Cossack Republic", without even mentioning its alliance with Muscovy.72 The treaty of alliance with Sweden concluded at Korsun on October 6, 1657 (signed when Vyhovsky was Hetman but based on spade-work done by Khmelnytsky) recognized the Ukraine as a "free nation, subject to nobody" ("pro libera gente et nulli subjecta").73
This was the general opinion prevailing in Europe at that time. It was accepted in Austria, whose envoy, Archbishop Baron Parchevich, sent on a mission to Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1657 called the Ukraine a "renowned and martial Republic",74 in Transylvania, Prussia (Brandenburg), Moldavia, Wallachia, Turkey, the Crimea and other countries.
We know, thanks to the research of Professor Borshchak, that French official circles and public opinion appraised the Pereyaslav treaty as a military alliance between Ukraine and Muscovy and were well aware of the fact that Khmelnytsky needed it only to get a temporary respite in his struggle against Poland.75 The well-informed "Theatrum Europaeum" reported that Khmelnytsky's chief objective was to become the p74 master of the Ukraine and rule over that country ("Indem er anderst nicht gemeynet als ueber die Ukraine selbsten ein Herr zu seyn und darinnen zu dominiren"), that the Tsar wanted to seize the Ukraine in defiance of the treaty of alliance and that this brought about a conflict between them and prompted Khmelnytsky to ask Turkey for its assistance.76 In Poland, Khmelnytsky's desire to create a "separate state" in the Ukraine was realized even more clearly and the Polish government warned the Hetman that "this way of changing 'protection' would not secure his independence."77
The historical destiny of the Pereyaslav agreement and the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance is a well known subject and we do not propose to deal with it in detail in this essay. While the immediate objectives of the agreement — both military and political — were realized somehow or other and the restrictions imposed upon Ukrainian sovereignty by the Muscovite version of the treaty were not put into effect, "further political objectives of both sides . . . were absolutely different" and therefore "both sides began to interpret the Pereyaslav agreement differently, each in its own way".78 The Ukrainian government firmly and consistently supported the principle of "actual statehood of the Ukraine".79 It was during the years following the Pereyaslav agreement that the greatest successes in the building of the Ukrainian state and most remarkable achievements of its foreign policy took place which made the Ukraine of Bohdan Khmelnytsky the decisive factor in contemporary events in Eastern Europe.
However, the Muscovite government pursued a policy of "incorporation of the Cossack Ukraine and its transformation into an ordinary province of the Muscovite Tsardom."80 This course was not perceptible at once, but it was bound, sooner or later, to bring the Pereyaslav agreement to nothing. The most serious blow to the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance and an indisputable violation of the Pereyaslav agreement was the treaty of alliance between Moscow and Poland, concluded in 1656 at Vilno and directed against Sweden, an ally of the Ukraine. The Ukrainian envoys were denied admission to the Vilno negotiations; this affront aroused a storm of indignation in the Ukraine and prompted the Ukrainian government to lodge a formal protest. The Vilno agreement was "formidable for the Ukraine;"81 it not only obstructed the realization of p75 Khmelnytsky's desire to unite all Ukrainian territories under the rule of the Cossack Army but also frustrated the chief objective of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance: to make impossible a common policy of Poland and Muscovy directed against Ukraine. In this respect the Vilno agreement was the direct forerunner of the Andrusiv agreement between Poland and Muscovy (1667), which proved fatal to the Ukraine, and of the so‑called "permanent peace" between these nations (1686).
An even more serious violation of the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 (at least as far as the formal or legal side of the matter is concerned) was the falsification of the Pereyaslav treaty by Moscow which took place in 1659, while a new agreement with Hetman Yuri Khmelnytsky was being negotiated. This problem was at one time extensively discussed by scholars,82 the majority of whom (both Ukrainians and Russians) is of the opinion that the so‑called "Previous Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky," fourteen in number, which were promulgated at the Rada in Pereyaslav on October 17, 1659, by Prince Alexei (the former head of the Muscovite delegation during the March negotiations of 1654), were "a forgery, falsification of the authentic articles of the Treaty of 1654," designed to "bring about very important changes in the terms of that treaty, tending to restrict the rights and liberties of the Cossack Army."83 A detailed analysis of this question in the works of Professor Yakovliv has proved this beyond any doubt.84 This falsified text was misrepresented by Moscow as the authentic treaty of 1654 and thrust upon Hetman Yuri Khmelnytsky together with the "new articles" which restricted even more the rights of the Ukrainian State. For the sake of being on the safe side Prince Trubetzkoy was ordered to print in the Pechersk printing shop in Kiev the "old" (1654) and the "new" (1659) articles together and "send those printed books to all the Cherkass (Ukrainian) regiments so that those articles might become known in all regiments to the whole Cossack Army."85 A protest by the Ukrainian government against the falsification of the Pereyaslav treaty of 1654 was of no avail, but the recollection of this forgery was preserved for a long time in Ukrainian tradition.86
Finally, after many violations of the Pereyaslav treaty p76 by Moscow in the 17th and 18th c., Empress Catherine II "abolished (in 1764) the treaty of 1654, forced Hetman Kyril Rozumovsky by a threat of punishment for 'high treason' to renounce his office and, notwithstanding the protests of the representatives of the Ukrainian people elected to the 'New Codification Commission,' carried out a complete incorporation of Ukraine."87 The Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance, concluded in 1654 by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, ceased to exist.
Let us sum up the historical evidence.
The Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 was a treaty of military alliance between two independent nations, the Ukraine and Muscovy, guaranteed by the protection of the Muscovite Tsar over Ukraine and legalized by the new (Ukrainian) title of the Tsar.
However, the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations did not live up to the spirit of the Pereyaslav agreement. The national and political interests of the two allies as well as their objectives and aspirations were too much at variance. The military and political alliance between the Ukraine and Muscovy was gradually transformed into Moscow's domination over Ukraine. The Pereyaslav agreement, concluded in order to secure the independence of Ukraine, actually proved to be its undoing. It marked the beginning of that tragic complex of Ukrainian-Russian relations which transformed the ties of a free alliance into the shackles of three centuries of servitude and enmity.
And yet the Pereyaslav agreement was neither a tragedy nor a disgrace to the Ukraine. A historian has to judge events by their causes and not by their consequences. The more Moscow departed from the spirit and letter of the Pereyaslav treaty while persistently clinging to that handy springboard for the domination of Eastern Europe, the greater importance was attached to it by the Ukrainian side. For the "Pereyaslav Constitution" (as it was dubbed by M. Mikhnovsky),88 though falsified, disfigured, mutilated and violated by Moscow, has remained forever, according to the words of a great Ukrainian patriot and statesman of the 18th c., "the strongest and most invincible argument and proof of the sovereignty of the Ukraine."89
(p98) 1 Mykola Mikhnovsky came after a detailed analysis of the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 ( uses the term "Pereyaslav Constitution") to the interesting conclusion that it had all the distinctive marks of a "union of states". (M. Mikhnovsky, Independent Ukraine, 1948 ed., p20; see also ibid., pp19‑23).
(p99) 2 L. Okinshevych, Lectures on the History of Ukrainian Law, Munich, 1947, pp33‑34.
3 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p67.
4 Ibid., p68.
5 V. Lypynsky, Ukraine at the Crossroads, p67; see also ibid., p121.
6 Ibid., p30. D. Doroshenko (in his Survey of Ukrainian Historiography, Prague, 1923, p211) speaks of Lypynsky's "brilliant" analysis of the Pereyaslav agreement.
7 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, pp68‑69.
8 B. Halaychuk, The Treaty of Pereyaslav in the Light of International Law, Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific society, Historical-Philosophical section, vol. 1, New York-Paris, 1951, pp102‑105 (an abstract of the author's more detailed work on this subject).
9 S. Ivanytsky, The Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654, 1954. See also "The Juridical Aspect of the Treaty of Pereyaslav (concluded in 1654 between Russia and Ukraine)". — Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific society, vol. 1, pp106‑108 (an abstract).
10 Prof. Yakovliv writes in one of his most recent publications on the Pereyaslav agreement: "Only V. Lypynsky's appraisal of the Treaty of 1654 as a military alliance between Ukraine and Moscow tallied with developments both before and during the time when the treaty was being negotiated and its authentic text. I have also subscribed to Lypynsky's opinion and have merely added that the treaty showed some influence of the idea of the protectorate of the Tsar with certain signs of nominal vassalage (oath of allegiance, tribute)." (A. Yakovliv, "On the 300th anniversary of Khmelnytsky's treaty with Moscow," Svoboda, 1954, No. 75).
11 M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2.
12 A. Yakovliv, Treaty p55. See also ibid., p61.
13 It is necessary to observe that the presence of Muscovite troops (garrison) in Kiev did not violate the sovereign rights of Ukraine. It was stated in the Tsar's order to the Muscovite voyevodas assigned for duty in Kiev (January 30, 1654) that the Tsar "according to the petition of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky . . . sent them (the voyevodas) to Kiev and ordered that soldiers should be with them in Kiev in order to protect (it) from the arrival of the Poles and various military men." (ASWR, X, 355).
14 A. Yakovliv, Treaty.
15 ASWR, X, 709.
16 V. Lypynsky, Ukraine at the Crossroads, p203. See ibid., 201‑3.
17 See Archives of South-Western Russia, part 3, vol. 6.
(p100) 18 M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, p1549.
19 D. Olyanchyn, "Two Letters of Hetmans Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Ivan Vyhovsky to Frederick William, the Elector of Brandenburg". Khliborobska Ukraina, vol. 5, p378. Vienna, 1924‑1925.
20 M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, p1439.
21 I. Borshchak, "Exposition of the Rights of the by P. Orlyk". — Stara Ukraina, Lviv, 1925, I‑II, pp5‑9.
22 Archives of S.‑W. Russia, part 3, vol. 6, p363. In 1763, during a broadened assembly of the Council of Officers at Hlukhiv, one of the participants said: "Who could have expected that at the very time when we hoped to find our well-being, our peace and security through this subjection (to the Tsar of Muscovy — A. O.), there began our misfortune and the violation of our peace and prosperity." (Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific society, vol. 159, p34. Munich, 1949.
23 M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, 1109.
24 Archives of S‑W Russia, part 3, vol. 6, 333. See M. Hrushevsky, History, X, 63‑66.
25 M. Hrushevsky, History, X, 354‑367.
26 Archives of S.‑W. Russia, part 3, vol. 6, pp368‑369. See Appendix IV.
27 "We" — Ukrainian patriots of the time of Mazepa used to say — "always pray to God for Khmelnytsky's soul and bless his name."
28 Readings of the Moscow Society of Russian History and Antiquities, 1859, 1.
29 I. Borshchak, "Orlikiana", Khliborobska Ukraina, vol. 4, 1922‑1923. Vienna. (p366).
30 I. Borshchak, "Exposition of the Rights of the Ukraine by P. Orlyk." — Stara Ukraina, Lviv, 1925, I‑II, pp5‑9. P. Orlyk later obtained the restitution of the Pereyaslav agreement (I. Borshchak, "Orlikiana", 353‑354).
31 I. Borshchak, "Orlikiana", p368.
32 I. Borshchak, Hryhor Orlyk, Lviv, 1932, p146.
33 M. Vozniak, "The Commission of Bendery After Mazepa's Death", Mazepa, Warsaw, 1938, vol. 1, p. III.
34 Readings of the Moscow Society of Russian History and Antiquities, 1859, 1.246 (article 2).
35 M. Kostomarov, Ruthenian History in the Biographies of Its Principal Personages, vol. 3, Lviv, 1877, p22, footnotes on pp22‑23.
36 "Khan's Ukraine" — the territory in the south of Ukraine between the rivers Boh and Dniester. It was a part of the Crimean State and had its own Hetmans appointed by the Khan of Crimea.
(p101) 37 Moscow Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Little Russian Original Documents", 1692, No. 35/3.
38 See our article "Hryhory Pokas and his 'Description of Little Russia' ". Symposium of Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S., I, New York, 1952, pp67‑69.
39 M. Hrushevsky, The Pereyaslav Agreement Between Ukraine and Moscow in 1654, Kiev, 1917, p22.
40 Kievskaya Starina, 1882, II, 342. An interesting formula was used in official documents of the second half of the 18th century: "Little Russian Service of Her Imperial Majesty" (1766).
41 Istoriya Rusov, Moscow, 1846, pp209, 210 passim.
42 N. Kostomarov, Collected Works, Historical Monographs and Studies, vol. 15, St. Petersburg, 1905, p537.
43 See O. Ohloblyn, Sketches on the History of the Rebellion of Petro Ivanenko (Petryk), Kiev, 1929, p24.
44 Moscow Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Little Russian Original Documents", No. 729/712.
45 Records of the Statistic Committee of the Chernihiv Province, vol. 1. Chernihiv, 1866, pp254‑255.
46 I. Svit. An interesting Ukrainian monument in Peking, Symposium of Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S., I, New York, 1952, pp116, 117.
47 ASWR, X, 223.
48 Ibid., 224.
49 Ibid., 235.
50 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p58.
51 See E. Borshchak, "A little known French biography of Juras Khmelnytsky, "Symposium of Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S., vol. III, No. 1 (7), 1953, p517. Prof. Borshchak quotes the opinion of , a well-known authority on international law in the 17th cent.: L'Ambassadeur et ses fonctions, La Haye, 1680, livre II, part IV, §3.
52 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p61.
53 M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, p850.
54 M. Hrushevsky, "Great, Little and White Rus", Ukraina, 1917, I, p11.
55 V. Prokopovych, "The Little Russian Seal", part 1, On the question of the authenticity of the "Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" in the version of 1659 (manuscript).
56 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p62.
57 On the strength of the decree of Sept. 3, 1655, the Tsar of (p102) Muscovy began to style himself also "the Grand Duke of Lithuania, White Russia, Volhynia and Podolia" (V. Prokopovych, "The Little Russian Seal" — manuscript).
58 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p62.
59 See O. Ohloblyn, The Moscow Theory of the Third Rome in the 16th and 17th century., Munich, 1951.
60 Ibid., pp38‑41.
61 See, e.g., the speech by Hryhory Butovych, protopresbyter of Pereyaslav (Dec. 31, 1653) in M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, 732, or speech of Pavlo Teterya in Moscow on August 4, 1657 (M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 12‑13).
62 See ASWR, X.216‑217.
63 "L'on n'innovera rien à ce qui a été observé jusqu'à présent au sujet des Armes et du Titre de Prince de l'Ukraine. S. M. R. ne pourra jamais s'arroger ce Titre ni les Armes" (I. Borshchak, "The Exposition of the Rights of the Ukraine" by P. Orlyk, Stara Ukraina, Lviv, 1925, I‑II, pp5‑9).
64 V. Prokopovych, The Little Russian Seal, part 1, On the question of the authenticity of the "Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" in the 1659 version (in manuscript). An abstract of this work (Procopovich, "Pechat Malorossiyskaya — The Little Russian Seal") appeared in the Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, I, 72‑75. See also V. Prokopovych, Sphragistical Anecdotes, Prague, 1938, pp17‑18.
65 V. Prokopovych, "The Little Russian Seal" (manuscript).
66 L. Okinshevych, Lectures, 40.
67 See ibid., pp46‑47.
68 See O. Ohloblyn, New Materials on the History of the Rebellion of Petro Ivanenko (Petryk), Augsburg, 1949, pp8‑11.
69 V. Prokopovych, "The Little Russian Seal" (manuscript).
70 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p63.
71 M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, p1280.
72 Collected Materials on the History of South-West Russia, vol. 1, Kiev, 1911, pp107‑116. ("Documents of the Epoch of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, 1656‑1657," published by I. Kamanin). See M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, 1290‑1294; V. Lypynsky, Ukraine at the Crossroads, 118‑248, 270‑272, 294.
73 Archives of S‑W Russia, part 3, vol. 6, 332‑337. See M. Hrushevsky, History, X, 63‑66.
74 M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, 1344.
75 "The Pereyaslav Council of 1654 and France", a paper read by Prof. I. Borshchak at the 1953 Session of the Shevchenko Scientific (p103) Society. (See V. Y., Scientific Session at . — "America", 1953, No. 22).
Thayer's Note: The last part as printed in the English translation was seriously garbled; I've corrected it from the Ukrainian text, note 75, p88. The Shevchenko Scientific Society has maintained its Western European headquarters in Sarcelles (a town in France, not America) since 1951; "V. Y." is very likely the poet and literary critic Volodymyr Yaniv: active in the Society's leadership in 1953, he would eventually serve briefly as its interim Secretary General in the 1980s.
76 M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, 775‑776.
77 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p62.
78 V. Lypynsky, Ukraine at the Crossroads, 30.
79 M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2.
81 V. Lypynsky, op. cit.
82 See M. Hrushevsky, History, IX, 2, p813.
83 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p90.
84 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, pp71‑92. See also "The Articles of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the 1659 version" by the same author (UVAN Book of Homage to Academician M. Hrushevsky, vol. I, Kiev, 1928) and his"Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaties in the 17th and 18th cents." Warsaw, 1934.
85 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p77. See V. Danylevych, "Little known Ukrainian incunabula", (Memoires of the Historical-Philological Section of UVAN, Kiev, 1929).
86 S. Velychko mentions interpolations in the "Articles of B. Khmelnytsky" in the 1659 version (see A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p91). Hryhory Pokas in his "Description of Little Russia" (1751) writes: "If you should find in the negotiated and accepted articles of Hetman Zinovi Bohdan Khmelnytsky his envoys . . . anything different from what they had actually been, . . . (it is because) these articles passed through many hands and perhaps did not escape those which were unfriendly to his (Ukrainian) people." (Symposium of Science of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S., I, p68). Evidently, Pokas was with the Lavra edition of the "Articles" (1659).
87 A. Yakovliv, Treaty, p8.
88 M. Mikhnovsky, Independent Ukraine, pp18, 20, 21, 22, 23.
89 "L'argument et la preuve la plus forte et la plus invincible de la souveraineté de l'Ukraine" (P. Orlyk, Exposition of the Rights of Ukraine).
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