mail: Bill Thayer	Italiano	Help	Up	Home
previous: Chapter 14 This webpage reproduces a chapter of A History of Philosophy by Frederick Copleston, S. J. as reprinted by Image Books — Doubleday New York • London • Toronto • Sydney • Auckland 1993 The text, and illustrations except as noted, are in the public domain. next: Chapter 16

Part II: The Socratic Period

 p116  Chapter XV
Minor Socratic Schools

The term "Minor Socratic Schools" should not be taken to indicate that Socrates founded any definite School. He hoped, no doubt, that others would be found to carry on his work of stimulating men's minds, but he did not gather round him a band of disciples to whom he left a patrimony of definite doctrine. But various thinkers, who had been disciples of Socrates to a greater or less extent, emphasised one or other point in his teaching, combining it also with elements culled from other sources. Hence Dr. Praechter calls them Die einseitigen Sokratiker, not in the sense that these thinkers only reproduced certain sides of Socrates' teaching, but in the sense that each of them was a continuation of Socratic thought in a particular direction, while at the same time they modified what they took from earlier philosophising, in order to harmonise it with the Socratic legacy.​1 In some ways, then, the use of a common name, Minor Socratic Schools, is unfortunate, but it may be used, if it is understood that the connection of some of these thinkers with Socrates is but slender.

I. The School of Megara

Euclid of Megara (not to be confused with the mathematician) seems to have been one of the earliest disciples of Socrates, as — if the story be genuine — he continued his association with Socrates in spite of the prohibition (of 432/1) of Megarian citizens entering Athens, coming into the city at dusk dressed as a woman.​2 He was present at the death of Socrates in 400/399, and after that event Plato and other Socratics took refuge with Euclid at Megara.

Euclid seems to have been early acquainted with the doctrine of the Eleatics, which he so modified under the influence of the Socratic ethic as to conceive of the One as the Good. He also regarded virtue as a unity. According to Diogenes Laërtius, Euclid asserted that the One is known by many names, identifying the One with God and with Reason.​3 The existence of a  p117 principle contrary to the Good he naturally denied, as that principle would be multiplicity, which is illusory on the Eleatic view. We may say that he remained an adherent of the Eleatic tradition, in spite of the Socratic influence that he underwent.

The Megaric philosophy, particularly under the influence of Eubulides, developed into an Eristic which concocted various ingenious arguments, designed to disprove a position through a reductio ad absurdum. For example, the famous difficulty: "One grain of cornº is not a heap: add a grain and there is yet no heap: when does the heap begin?" was designed to show that plurality is impossible, as Zeno wanted to show that motion was impossible. Another conundrum is that ascribed by some to Diodorus Cronus, another Megaric: "That which you have not lost, you still have; but you have not lost horns; therefore you still have horns." Or again: "Electra knows her brother, Orestes. But Electra does not know Orestes (who stands before her, disguised). Therefore Electra does not know what she knows."4

Another philosopher of the Megaric School, Diodorus Cronus (mentioned above), identified the actual and the possible: only the actual is possible. His argument was as follows: The possible cannot become the impossible. Now, if of two contradictories one has actually come to pass, the other is impossible. Therefore, if it had been possible before, the impossible would have come out of the possible. Therefore it was not possible before, and only the actual is possible; (e.g. "The world exists," and "The world does not exist," are contradictory propositions. But the world actually exists. Therefore it is impossible that the world does not exist. But if it were ever possible that the world should not exist a possibility has turned into an impossibility. This cannot be so. Therefore it was never possible that the world should not exist.) This proposition has been taken up in recent times by Professor Nicolai Hartmann of Berlin, who has identified the actual with the possible on the ground that what actually happens depends on the totality of given conditions, and — given those conditions — nothing else could have happened.5

A noted adherent of the School was Stilpo of Megara, who taught at Athens about 320, but was afterwards banished. He applied himself chiefly to ethics, developing the point of self-sufficiency in a theory of "apathy." When asked what he had lost in the plundering of Megara, he replied that he had not seen  p118 anyone carrying off wisdom or knowledge.​6 Zeno (the Stoic) was a pupil of Stilpo.

II. The Elean-Eretrian School

This School was named after Phaedo of Elis (the Phaedo of Plato's Dialogue) and Menedemus of Eretria. Phaedo of Elis seems to have resembled the Megarians in his use of dialectic, while Menedemus was chiefly interested in ethics, holding the unity of virtue and knowledge.

III. The Early Cynic School

The Cynics, or disciples of the dog, may have got their name from their unconventional mode of life or from the fact that Antisthenes, the founder of the School, taught in the gymnasium known as the Kynosarges. Perhaps both factors had something to do with the nickname.

Antisthenes (c. 445‑c. 365) was born of an Athenian father and of a Thracian slave mother.​7 This might explain why he taught in the Kynosarges, which was reserved for those who were not of pure Athenian blood. The Gymnasium was dedicated to Heracles, and the Cynics took the hero as a sort of tutelary god or patron. One of Antisthenes' works was named after Heracles.8

At first a pupil of Gorgias, Antisthenes afterwards became an adherent of Socrates, to whom he was devoted. But what he chiefly admired in Socrates was the latter's independence of character, which led him to act in accordance with his convictions, no matter what the cost. Neglecting the fact that Socrates had been independent of earthly riches and the applause of men only in order to obtain the greater good of true wisdom, Antisthenes set up this independence and self-sufficiency as an ideal or end in itself. Virtue in his eyes was simply independence of all earthly possessions and pleasures: in fact, it was a negative concept — renunciation, self-sufficiency. Thus the negative side of Socrates' life was changed by Antisthenes into a positive goal or end. Similarly, Socrates' insistence on ethical knowledge was exaggerated  p119 by Antisthenes into a positive contempt for scientific learning and art. Virtue, he said, is sufficient by itself for happiness: nothing else is required — and virtue is the absence of desire, freedom from wants, and complete independence. Socrates, of course, had been independent of the opinion of others simply because he possessed deep convictions and principles, the surrender of which, to satisfy popular opinion, he regarded as treason to the Truth. He did not, however, set out to flout popular opinion or public convictions simply for the sake of doing so, as the Cynics, particularly Diogenes, seem to have done. The philosophy of the Cynics was thus an exaggeration of one side of Socrates' life and attitude, and that a negative one or at least one consequent on a much more positive side. Socrates was ready to disobey the Oligarchy at the risk of his life, rather than commit an act of injustice; but he would not have lived in a tub like Diogenes merely to flaunt his disregard for the ways of men.

Antisthenes was strongly opposed to the theory of Ideas, and maintained that there are only individuals. He is said to have remarked: "O Plato, I see a horse, but I do not see horseness."​9 To each thing only its own name should be applied: e.g. we can say "Man is man" or "The good is good," but not "The man is good." No predicate should be attributed to a subject other than the subject itself.​10 With this goes the doctrine that we can only predicate of it member­ship of a class. Hence the denial of the theory of Ideas. Another logical theory of Antisthenes was that of the impossibility of self-contradiction. For if a man says different things, he is speaking of different objects.11

Virtue is wisdom, but this wisdom consists principally in "seeing through" the values of the majority of mankind. Riches, passions, etc., are not really good, nor are suffering, poverty, contempt, really evil: independence is the true good. Virtue, then, is wisdom and it is teachable, though there is no need of long reasoning and reflection in order to learn it. Armed with this virtue, the wise man cannot be touched by any so‑called evil of life, even by slavery. He stands beyond laws and conventions, at least those of the State that does not recognise true virtue. The ideal state or condition of life in which all would live in  p120 independence and freedom from desire, is of course incompatible with wars.12

Socrates had, indeed, placed himself in opposition on occasion to the authority of the Government, but he was so convinced of the rightness of the State's authority as such and of the Law, that he would not take advantage of the opportunity presented to him of escape from prison, but preferred to suffer death in accordance with the Law. Antisthenes, however, with his usual one‑sided exaggeration denounced the historic and traditional State and its Law. In addition he renounced the traditional religion. There is only one God; the Greek pantheon is only a convention. Virtue is the only service of God: temples, prayers, sacrifices, etc, are condemned. "By convention there are many gods, but by nature only one."​13 On the other hand, Antisthenes interpreted the Homeric myths allegorically, trying to get moral applications and lessons out of them.

Diogenes of Sinope (d. c. 324 B.C.) thought that Antisthenes had not lived up to his own theories and called him a "trumpet which hears nothing but itself."​14 Banished from his country, Diogenes spent most of his life in Athens, though he died in Corinth. He called himself the "Dog," and held up the life of animals as a model for mankind. His task was the "recoining of values,"​15 and to the civilisation of the Hellenic world he opposed the life of animals and of the barbaric peoples.

We are told that he advocated community of wives and children and free love, while in the political sphere he declared himself a citizen of the world.​16 Not content with Antisthenes' "indifference" to the external goods of civilisation, Diogenes advocated a positive asceticism in order to attain freedom. Connected therewith is his deliberate flouting of convention, doing in public what it is generally considered should be done in private — and even what should not be done in private.

Disciples of Diogenes were Monimus, Onesicritus, Philiscus, Crates of Thebes. The latter presented his considerable fortune to the city, and took up the Cynic life of mendicancy, followed by his wife Hipparchia.17

 p121  IV. The Cyrenaic School

Aristippus of Cyrene, founder of the Cyrenaic School, was born about 435 B.C. From 416 he was in Athens, from 399 in Aegina, from 389/388 with Plato at the court of the elder Dionysus, and then after 356 in Athens. But these dates and order of events cannot be regarded as beyond dispute, to say the least of it.​18 It has even been suggested that Aristippus never founded the Cyrenaic "School" at all, but was confused with his grandson, a later Aristippus. But in view of the statements of Diog. Laërt., Sotion and Panaetius (cf.  D. L. 2.84 ff.), it does not seem possible to accept the statement of Sosicrates and others (D. L.) that Aristippus wrote nothing at all, while the passage in Eusebius' Praeparatio Evangelica (14.18.31) can be explained without having to suppose that Aristippus never laid a foundation for the Cyrenaic philosophy.

In Cyrene Aristippus seems to have become acquainted with the teaching of Protagoras, while afterwards at Athens he was in relation with Socrates. The Sophist may have been largely responsible for Aristippus' doctrine, that it is our sensations alone that give us certain knowledge:​19 of things in themselves they can give us no certain information, nor about the sensations of others. Subjective sensations, then, must be the basis for practical conduct. But if my individual sensations form the norm for my practical conduct, then, thought Aristippus, it follows as a matter of course that the end of conduct is to obtain pleasurable sensations.

Aristippus declared that sensation consists in movement. When the movement is gentle, the sensation is pleasurable; when it is rough, there is pain; when movement is imperceptible or when there is no movement at all, there is neither pleasure nor pain. The rough movement cannot be the ethical end. Yet it cannot consist in the mere absence of pleasure or pain, i.e. be a purely negative end. The ethical end must, therefore, be pleasure, a positive end.​20 Socrates had indeed declared that virtue is the one path to happiness, and he held out happiness as a motive for the practice of virtue, but he did not maintain that pleasure is the end of life. Aristippus, however, seized on the one side of the Socratic teaching and disregarded all the rest.

 p122  Pleasure, then, according to Aristippus, is the end of life. But what kind of pleasure? Later on for Epicurus it would be rather painlessness, negative pleasure, that is the end of life; but for Aristippus it was positive and present pleasure. Thus it came about that the Cyrenaics valued bodily pleasure, as being more intense and powerful. And it would follow from their theory of knowledge that the quality of the pleasure does not come into account. The consequential following‑out of this principle would obviously lead to sensual excesses, but, as a matter of fact, the Cyrenaics, no doubt adopting the hedonistic elements in Socrates' doctrine, declared that the wise man will, in his choice of pleasure, take cognisance of the future. He will, therefore, avoid unrestrained excess, which would lead to pain, and he will avoid indulgence that would occasion punishment from the State or public condemnation. The wise man, therefore, needs judgment in order to enable him to evaluate the different pleasures in life. Moreover, the wise man in his enjoyments will preserve a certain measure of independence. If he allows himself to be enslaved, then to that extent he cannot be enjoying pleasure, but rather is he in pain. Again, the wise man, in order to preserve cheerfulness and contentment, will limit his desires. Hence the saying attributed to Aristippus, ἔχω (Λαΐδα), καὶ οὐκ ἔχομαι ἐπεὶ τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι ἡδονῶν ἄριστον, οὐ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι.21

This contradiction in the teaching of Aristippus between the principle of the pleasure of the moment and the principle of judgment, led to a divergence of views — or an emphasis on different sides of his doctrine — among his disciples. Thus Theodorus the Atheist declared indeed that judgment and justness are goods (the latter only because of the external advantages of a just life), and that individual acts of gratification are indifferent, the contentment of the mind being true happiness or pleasure, but he asserted too that the wise man will not give his life for his country and that he would steal, commit adultery, etc, if circumstances allowed it. He also denied the existence of any god at all.​22 Hegesias also demanded indifference towards individual acts of gratification, but he was so convinced of the miseries of life and of the impossibility of attaining happiness, that he emphasised a negative concept of the end of life, namely, absence of pain and sorrow.​23 Cicero and other sources tell us that Hegesias'  p123 lectures at Alexandria led to so many suicides on the part of his hearers, that Ptolemy Lagi forbade their continuance!​24 Anniceris, on the other hand, stressed the positive side of Cyrenaicism, making positive pleasure and, indeed, individual acts of gratification the end of life. But he limited the logical conclusions of such a view by giving great weight to love of family and country, friendship and gratitude, which afford pleasure even when they demand sacrifice.​25 In the value he placed on friendship he differed from Theodorus, who declared (D. L.) that the wise are sufficient for themselves and have no need of friends.

Diogenes Laërtius clearly implies that these philosophers had their own peculiar disciples: for example, he speaks of "Hegesiakoi," though he also classes them together as "Cyrenaics." Thus, while Aristippus the Cyrenaic laid the foundation of the "Cyrenaic" or pleasure-philosophy (v. sup.), he can hardly be said to have founded a closely-knit philosophical School, comprising Theodorus, Hegesias, Anniceris, etc., as members. These philosophers were part-heirs of Aristippus the elder, and represent a philosophical tendency rather than a School in the strict sense.

The Author's Notes:

1 Ueberweg-Praechter, p155.

❦

2 Gell., Noct. Att., 7.10.º

❦

3 Diog. Laërt, 2.106.

❦

4 Cf. Diog. Laërt, 2.108.

❦

5 Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, Berlin, 1938.

❦

6 Diog. Laërt, 2.115. Senec., Ep. 9.3.

❦

7 Diog. Laërt, 6.1.

❦

8 It has been suggested that it was Diogenes who founded the Cynic School or "Movement," and not Antisthenes: Arist. refers to the followers of Antisthenes as Ἀντισθενέιοι (Metaph., 1043b24). But the nickname of "Cynics" seems to have been accepted, only in the time of Diogenes and Arist.'s use of the term Ἀντισθενέιοι would not appear to prove anything against Antisthenes having been the real fountain-head of the Cynic School.

❦

9 Simplic. in Arist., Categ., 208.29 f.; 211.17 f.

❦

10 Plat., Soph., 251B; Arist., Metaph., Δ 29, 1029f32‑25A 1.

❦

11 Arist, Top. Α xi, 104b20; Metaph., Δ 29, 1024b33‑4.

❦

12 Cf. Vita Antisth., apud Diog. Laërt.

❦

13 Cf.  Cic., De Nat. I.13.32; Clem. Alex., Protrep., 6.71.2; Strom., 5.14, 108.4.

❦

14 Dion. Chrys., 8.2.

❦

15 Diog. Laërt., 6.20.

❦

16 Diog. Laërt., 6.72.

❦

17 Diog. Laërt., Lives of Crates and Hipparchia.

❦

18 Dates from Heinrich von Stein's De philos. Cyrenaica, part I, De Vita Aristippi, Gött., 1858.

❦

19 Cf. Sext. Emp. adv. mathemat., 7.191 ff.

❦

20 Diog. Laërt., 2.86 ff.

❦

21 Diog. Laërt., 2.75.

❦

22 Diog. Laërt., 2.97; Cic., De Nat. D., I.1.2.º

❦

23 Diog. Laërt., 2.94‑96.

❦

24 Cic., Tusc., I.34.83.

❦

25 Diog. Laërt., 2.96 f.; Clem. Alex., Strom., 2.21, 130.7 f.

◂ previous						next ▸
Images with borders lead to more information. The thicker the border, the more information. (Details here.)
UP TO:		A History of Philosophy	LacusCurtius	Home
A page or image on this site is in the public domain ONLY if its URL has a total of one *asterisk. If the URL has two **asterisks, the item is copyright someone else, and used by permission or fair use. If the URL has none the item is © Bill Thayer. See my copyright page for details and contact information.