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This webpage reproduces an article in the English Historical Review Vol. 15, No. 57 (Jan. 1900), pp38‑57 The text is in the public domain: George Edmundson died in 1930. This page has been carefully proofread and I believe it to be free of errors. If you find a mistake though, please let me know!

 p38  The Dutch Power in Brazil

Part II. — The First Conquests (continued)

No sooner had Olinda been lost than urgent requests were made by Albuquerque that an armada should be sent out from Spain strong enough to keep the command of the sea, and compel by a close investment the surrender of the Reciff. Nor were they unheard. Already in July 1630 steps were slowly, and it must be added unwillingly, taken by the Spanish government to get ready a relief expedition. News of the preparations, however, speedily came to the knowledge of the Dutch through intercepted letters, and the directors of the West India Company lost no time in giving orders that a fleet should be fitted out to meet the Spaniards on their arrival at Pernambuco. The Netherlanders had indeed but little difficulty in being the first to appear upon the scene, and not until Olivares had heard that the succours from Holland had actually reached the Brazilian coast could the Conde-Duque be induced to believe that the situation was serious enough to demand a fresh outlay of treasure in defence of the Portuguese colony. He hoped that the West India Company would have grown weary of the task of maintaining a garrison at so great a cost on the far-off shores of South America, and that when they found they were unable to effect any further conquest on the mainland the Reciff would have been abandoned. But such was not the case, and, despite constant losses in skirmishes and some privations from lack of adequate food, the troops of Waerdenburgh had by additional forts practically made their position impregnable to attacks from without,​1 when on 18 Dec. Marten Thijssen with the first two ships belonging to the relief force sailed into the harbour. The whole fleet consisted of sixteen ships and yachts, manned by 1,270 sailors and 860 soldiers. The commander-in‑chief was Adriaan Janzoon  p39 Pater, who had but lately returned home from a successful expedition to the West Indies, in which, among other feats of arms, he had sailed up the Orinoco and taken and burnt San Thomé de Guayana, the chief Spanish settlement on that river, while Marten Thijssen, who had played so great a part under Hein at the capture of the silver fleet, occupied the post of second in command.​2 Thijssen, as already stated, reached the Reciff in December, and he was followed at intervals by other detachments, Pater himself, who left the Texel with five vessels on 9 Jan. 1631, arriving last on 14 April.

Acting upon a suggestion received from the Nineteen, it was resolved by the governor and council, as the Spanish armada had not yet started, to assume the offensive and attempt to capture the island of Itamaraca.​3 This island, lying in the mouth of the navigable river Goyana, about five leagues to the north of the Reciff, opposite to the first opening, after that at the Pao Amorello, in the belt of rock skirting the coast, was some seven leagues in circumference, and rich in sugar and other products. It contained a small town named Nostra Senhora de la Concepcion, situated on the summit of a wooded hill, which was well fortified and armed. The garrison, which at first consisted of only 60 soldiers and about 100 inhabitants, under the command of Salvador Piñiera, was afterwards reinforced​4 by Albuquerque. The expedition, which set sail on 22 April, consisted of fourteen ships, three large sloops, and some smaller craft under Admiral Thijssen, and carried 1,260 men. The command of the land forces was entrusted to Lieut.‑Colonel Stein-Callenfels. The second in rank was Major Schutte, and in the list of captains two names appear which will frequently recur in the later portion of this history, those of Sigismond van Schoppe and of Crestofle d'Artichau Artichofsky.5

Favoured by lovely weather, the troops reached their destination on the following day, and were safely landed without opposition on a small island lying at the south end of Itamaraca, and separated from the main island by a shallow channel. Next morning Stein-Callenfels had no difficulty in transporting his force across the narrow strait, but finding that his further march was much impeded by swampy ground and tropical vegetation, and that the town was well fortified and, situated as it was, on the top of a steep hill covered with tangled brushwood and surrounded by marsh,  p40 almost impregnable, he resolved to take no further steps without consulting the council. He accordingly despatched a vessel to the Reciff for further instructions, with the result that Joannes van Walbeeck, one of the councillors who had recently been appointed by his colleagues to the post of admiral of the coast of Brazil,​6 came in person to Itamaraca, as did afterwards others of the councillors. As the result of careful reconnoitring it was determined that it was not advisable to run the risk of an attack upon La Concepcion at the present juncture, but that a strong fort should be built upon the little island on which the first landing had taken place, which would command the principal approach​7 to the river, and render the Dutch to a large extent masters of the harbour. A strong quadrangular fort was accordingly built under the directions of the engineer Van Buren, which was finished in the middle of June and received the name of Fort Orange. Three companies were left as garrison, under the command of Artichofsky. Having thus firmly possessed themselves of a second foothold on the Pernambucan coast, Stein-Callenfels and Thijssen returned on 1 July to the Reciff.8

While these events were taking place the relief fleet had already set sail from Lisbon on 5 May under the experienced admiral Antonio de Oquendo.​9 It had, with that short-sighted selfishness on the part of the Spanish government which was in a few years to bring about the revolt of the Lusitanian kingdom, been equipped entirely at the cost of Portugal. The fleet consisted of twenty men-of‑war, fifteen Spanish and five Portuguese, and carried two thousand soldiers to be distributed between the three most important posts on the Brazilian coast. This effected, it had orders to proceed northwards to protect and convoy home the treasure fleet, which it was feared some of the Dutch squadrons might intercept and capture. Of the military succours eight hundred men were destined for Bahia, two hundred for Paraiba, and one thousand with twelve pieces of artillery for a reinforcement to Matthias de Albuquerque at the camp Bom Jesus. These last consisted of three hundred Spaniards, four hundred Portuguese, and three hundred Neapolitans under the command of the Neapolitan Count Giovanni Sanfelice Bagnuolo, a brother-in‑law of Duarte de Albuquerque, the proprietor of Pernambuco, who himself accompanied the expedition.

With the perversity which so often marred the efforts of the  p41 Spaniards at this time, Oquendo, in accordance with his instructions, instead of making a dash straight for Pernambuco first directed his course to Bahia. He entered All Saints' Bay on 13 July, and safely carried out the landing of the troops and munitions, which were assigned for the defence of San Salvador. But it was only through good luck that the Spanish admiral had escaped the notice of a squadron under Pater, and of other Dutch ships that were cruising along the coast in search of prizes, and it was impossible — such was the vigilance of his enemies — for his presence in Brazilian waters to remain long unconcealed. The yacht 'Katte,' which had been sent out to reconnoitre at the beginning of August, sighted the relief fleet lying at anchor in the bay, and at once returning reached the Reciff with the news on the 19th of that month. Thus Oquendo lost the opportunity of coming upon the Netherlanders by surprise, and so the possibility of blockading the Dutch fleet in the harbour and eventually forcing the garrison to surrender through lack of supplies. No sooner were the authorities at the Reciff apprised that the Spaniards were at Bahia than it was resolved that Pater should not await their coming, but should put out to sea with his fleet to engage the enemy, if possible, or at least to prevent the landing of reinforcements. On 31 Aug., accordingly, the Dutch admiral set sail with thirteen ships and three yachts, himself on board the 'Prins Willem,' his vice-admiral, Marten Thijssen, on the 'Vereenigte Provintien.'​10 As heavy fighting was expected, the ordinary crews were strengthened by nine companies of soldiers, under the command of Major Schutte, who were distributed through the fleet. A southerly wind prevented rapid progress. On 9 Sept. Bahia had not yet been reached, when the fleet fell in with a yacht, 'De Vriessche Jager,' which reported that the Spaniards had already left the bay five days before and were steering northwards. The position of affairs was critical, and Pater at once turned his helms to go in quest of the foe. For two days he cruised in vain; then, at last, just before sundown on the evening of the 11th, the Spanish fleet was descried on the horizon to the S. S. E. As the Dutch vessels were at this time scattered in pursuit, the admiral signalled immediately and despatched a swift sailing yacht to carry orders to all the ships to draw together and prepare for action. Thus in anxious but resolute preparation for what was to be one of the most fiercely contested naval fights in history the night wore away.

Steering under bright moonlight, so as to get to the windward of the Spaniards, the Dutch look-outs at sunrise were able to count  p42 fifty-three sail​11 lying to the W. S. W. As soon as he found himself •about two miles from the enemy Pater called all his ships' captains on board the flagship, and, after pointing out to them that the fortunes of the West India Company and the honour of Dutch seamen hung upon the issue, gave orders that they were to attack the Spanish galleons, two ships at a time, and so overpower them.​12 These orders were given under a mistake, Pater having received information that the galleons were only eight in number, exactly half of that of the ships and yachts under his command. 'Every one,' writes De Laet, 'gave fine promises, but few quitted themselves well.'​13 The 'Walcheren' was the ship appointed to act with the admiral's flagship, the 'Prins Willem,' the 'Provintie van Utrecht' with the vice-admiral on the 'Vereenigte Provintien;' but with the exception of these four the other vessels, when their captains saw the number, size, and formidable armament of their opponents, turned faint-hearted, and either hung back altogether or hovered on the outskirts of the fight.

Oquendo on his part was eager to join issue, confident in his superiority. When Bagnuolo and Duarte de Albuquerque urged him to take some of the soldiery from the caravels to the galleons, to strengthen the crews, he declined, saying contemptuously 'that the sixteen [Dutch] ships in sight were but poor stuff.'​14 He accordingly drew up his galleons in order of battle, so as to cover the transports and convoy, and hoisting the royal standard awaited the onset.​15 He was astonished to see only four vessels advancing towards him,​16 for Pater and Thijssen, undaunted by the doubtful attitude of so many of their captains, and accompanied only by their selected comrades, made straight for the two flagships of the enemy. The 'Prins Willem' bore down upon the Spanish admiral in the 'S. Jago,' while the 'Vereenigte Provintien' laid itself alongside of the galleon 'S. Antonio de Padua,' on which flew the pennant of Vice-Admiral Francisco de Vallecilla.º17

 p43  During the short interval of suspense, as the 'Prins Willem' approached, Oquendo by some skilful manoeuvring managed to get the weather gauge of his adversary, an advantage which afterwards proved his salvation.​18 The Dutch admiral, on his side, in full assurance of victory, was only anxious to come to close quarters, and after running the gauntlet of four galleons, which opened fire on him, about 10 A.M. he came alongside the 'S. Jago,' and throwing out grappling irons lashed the two ships firmly together. The 'Walcheren,' under its brave captain, Jan Mast, following close behind, now drew up on the other side of the 'S. Jago,' and a terrific combat began, which lasted until 4 P.M.​19 It was difficult for the other galleons to fire on the Dutch without injury to their own flagship, and though several gallant attempts were made to relieve Oquendo they were without success. A small Portuguese vessel under the command of Count Barbosa, at the risk of certain destruction, managed at a critical moment to draw away from the 'S. Jago' and upon itself the fire of the 'Walcheren,' but it was soon sunk and its captain taken prisoner. The crew of a galleon under Captain Juan de Prado also distinguished themselves by their brave efforts, and rendered valuable service. Hour after hour the first mêlée went on with the utmost determination and obstinacy on both sides, the guns, whose muzzles were almost touching, keeping up a ceaseless discharge, the roar of which from beneath the dense canopy of smoke in which the combatants were enveloped proclaimed aloud that the issue of the fight was still undecided. As the afternoon wore on, however, it became evident that the 'S. Jago' could not hold out much longer. Towards 4 P.M. she was nothing but a floating wreck, her rigging and sails torn to pieces, no longer manageable by the scanty remnant of her valiant crew,​20 of whom two hundred and fifty men and four officers lay killed and wounded​21 on the decks. But at the very moment of last despairing resistance salvation came. Suddenly flames were observed to be bursting forth from the stern of the Dutch flagship. All efforts to subdue the conflagration, which was apparently caused by a burning wad, and had got well hold before it was noticed, proved unavailing, and the efforts of the crew were much hindered, as Oquendo ordered his musketeers to open fire upon them.​22 Nearly did the  p44 Spanish admiral pay the penalty for this command by the destruction of his own ship, for, as the vessels were grappled together, it was only with difficulty, such was the rapidity with which the flames advanced, that by the prompt assistance of Juan de Prado the 'S. Jago' was hauled out of harm's way. Alone now in the midst of his foes in his burning ship, the fate of the lion-hearted Pater was sealed. Enraged at seeing the fruits of victory thus miserably snatched out of his grasp, stung with resentment at his desertion​23 by so many of his captains, none of whom came to his assistance, he and his men, disdaining to save their lives by surrendering, still fought on. At last, as the ship was now falling to pieces and on the point of sinking, the admiral, wrapping the standard around his body, clad in armour as he was, leaped into the sea. The proud spirit of the unvanquished seaman preferred the ocean for a tomb rather than captivity in the hands of his enemies.​24 Only a very small number of his men escaped, but a few were picked up and taken on board the Spanish vessels.

Better fortune meanwhile had smiled upon Marten Thijssen, whose conduct was in no way inferior to that of his chief. At the same time as Pater's great duel with Oquendo had begun the 'Vereenigte Provintien' had come to close quarters with the flagship of Vice-Admiral Valecilla. Promptly following in the wake of its leader, the 'Provintie van Utrecht,' in accordance with the orders of Pater, took up its position on the other side of the 'S. Antonio de Padua.' The galleon 'S. Bonaventura,' on seeing the danger of Valecilla, hastened up in its turn, and lay to on the other side of Thijssen's vessel. In this way the ships of both the vice-admirals found themselves placed between two fires. At the end of half an hour the mainmast of the 'Provintie van Utrecht' fell, and an hour and a half later the vessel was discovered to be on  p45 fire. After trying in vain to extinguish the flames the crew in their despair made a gallant attempt to board the 'S. Antonio,' but were driven back, and in their efforts to escape from the blazing wreck the greater part of them perished. During this time the other Dutch ships (with the exception of four)​25 seem to have come up, and forced the Spaniards who were not engaged to confine their attention to the protection of the transports and convoy, leaving the two vice-admirals to fight it out. The end was not long in coming. Valecilla was shot through the heart, and shortly afterwards his ship sank with all hands. Turning his attention to the 'S. Bonaventura,' Thijssen now compelled that vessel to surrender, and another Spanish galleon, the 'S. Juan Baptista,' pierced with many holes below the water line, went to the bottom. Night at last put an end to the furious contest. Both sides suffered severely. Richsoffer tells us how he himself saw the ships which had been New Mexico severely handled enter the harbor on the 24th, full of men grievously wounded. He places the total loss at more than five hundred killed and wounded, among the killed being the admiral himself, Thomas Sickes, captain of the 'Hollandia,' an Englishman, who had distinguished himself in the service of the Dutch West India Company, and Captain Cormillion.​26 Two Dutch ships were lost, the 'Prins Willem' and the 'Provintie van Utrecht,' both of them destroyed by fire. The Spaniards admitted the loss of fifteen hundred men on their side, among these the vice-admiral, Valecilla: three ships were sunk, one captured. Oquendo's own flagship was such a complete wreck that for three days it lay a helpless hulk upon the water, just able to float, but not to be navigated; and such was the destruction wrought among the crew by Pater's tremendous onset that it was found necessary to draft three hundred men from the six hundred intended as a reinforcement for Paraiba to replace the losses.27

During the night the fleets drifted away from each other, and neither of them were desirous of renewing the conflict in their crippled condition. Leaving the 'S. Bonaventura' in charge of the 'Wapen van Hoorn,' one of the fastest sailers of his fleet, Thijssen, though it was necessary for him to make his way as soon as possible to the Reciff to refit, thought it best not to lose touch  p46 of the Spaniards. They were sighted on the 15th, 17th, and again on the 20th, when it was perceived that they were setting their course northward past Itamaraca, and that the danger was over. On the 22nd the Dutch admiral arrived off the Reciff. Here he found that news had already been brought of the fight, and that for days the council had been sitting anxiously consulting with the captains of the vessels in harbour, nine in number, as to the best means of defence to be adopted in case of an attack, and it had been resolved that the ships should be held in readiness at any moment to put to sea, either to join Pater, or to oppose a landing of the enemy. The arrival of Thijssen relieved their anxiety, though it did not take away the necessity for vigilant activity. The admiral was able to assure the council that the enemy's fleet was on its way to Spain, but at the same time he had to inform them that when seen off Itamaraca only three caravels were with the fleet, and that without doubt the reinforcements and munitions for Pernambuco had been safely landed at Paraiba. He was right. When the Dutch fleet hove into sight on the 17th a council of war had been held by Oquendo, at which, through the advice of Bagnuolo, it was determined not to venture upon another fight, but to land the troops as quickly as possible, and then, when this one of the chief objectives of the expedition had been accomplished, to sail to the West Indies and convoy the silver fleet to Spain.

On the 20th, accordingly, the troops and artillery in eleven caravels, with Count de Bagnuolo and Duarte de Albuquerque, were put on shore at the Rio de San Antonio. The disembarkation was effected without interference, but two of the crippled ships, the flagship of the so‑called squadron of the four towns, and one of the five Portuguese galleons foundered off Paraiba, and Oquendo, no longer holding his opponents to be such poca ropa as before he had tested the quality of the stuff they were made of, as has already been said, turned his course northwards, and left them in undisturbed possession of the Brazilian waters. The Spaniards have been accustomed to claim this action as a victory,​28 because it issued in the death of Pater and the destruction of his ship, and because subsequently the Dutch made no attempt to hinder the landing of the relief force; but if a victory it was a barren one, in which the victors lost far more heavily than the vanquished, and through which they entirely failed to loosen the hold of the Netherlanders upon the Reciff or to prevent  p47 their keeping the command of the sea.​29 The truly splendid heroism of Pater and Thijssen more than upheld the honour of their flag, though it cannot atone for the cowardly conduct of some of their captains. The size of the Spanish galleons and the apparently overwhelming number of Oquendo's fleet were no excuse for hesitancy in following leaders who knew so well how to show the way to death or victory.

One of the first acts of the council, after the danger was past, was to appoint Marten Thijssen admiral in command of the fleet, in the place of Pater, and to give him a seat in the council; the next, to consider carefully the state of affairs. It was clearly a serious charge upon the company's resources to maintain so large a fleet and garrison at the Reciff, unless they were actively employed. In the judgment of the governor, Waerdenburgh, however, the troops were not sufficient in number to undertake offensive operations, and at the same time to defend the fortifications of the Reciff, Antonio Vaz, and Olinda. In consequence a portion of the council and the officers strongly urged that it would be well to abandon Olinda, and thus set free a number of soldiers for other enterprises. A memorial sent by Artichofsky from Itamaraca was entirely in favour of the adoption of this course, which Waerdenburgh, as his despatches show,​30 had long before recommended, and which at length, after long debate, met with the approval of the majority of the council. The whole of October was spent in these deliberations, but as soon as November came it was resolved that the evacuation of Olinda should be carried out at once, and all stores and valuables of every sort in the town taken to the Reciff. At the same time a muster roll was held of all the disposable forces available for the service of the company, and it was found that the numbers were, soldiers 4,199 (of whom 180 were on the sick list), negroes 921, and 2,340 sailors, altogether more than 7,000 men. By 24 Nov. everything, including the personal baggage of the garrison, had been brought from Olinda; so the troops having set fire to the town with barrels of tar and other combustibles, which completely destroyed it, marched out.

There being now a considerable force set free, the question remained to what purpose it should be employed? The Nineteen had pressed upon the council that they ought, if possible, to drive Matthias de Albuquerque from the Arreyal. As, however, the Portuguese general had but just received such large reinforcements, it was deemed useless by a direct assault to attempt to expel him  p48 from his well chosen and strongly fortified position. The officers were unanimous in recommending that the island of Itamaraca should be the objective; but the council, remembering how a number of these same officers in the previous June had held that the town of La Concepcion, whose garrison and fortifications had since been strengthened, was impregnable, preferred that an expedition should be fitted out for an attack on Paraiba. On 14 Nov. a negro who had made his escape from that place to the Reciff had given the council full particulars of the town, its garrison, and defences. Acting on this information,​31 it was thought that it would not be a difficult operation for a force to gain possession at any rate of the mouth of the river, and by establishing themselves there to cut off the town from the sea, and eventually to capture it. The bar of the river, which was approached through a break in the Brazilian reef, was passable at high water by vessels of 300 tons burden, which were then able to ascend the stream as far as the town, which lay on the southern bank •some nine miles up.​32 This town, or rather village, for it contained only some 500 inhabitants, was the capital of a district which included a large number of sugar mills and plantations. It was built upon a small hill and had as its active and capable governor Antonio de Albuquerque Marañon, a cousin of Duarte and Matthias de Albuquerque. On the sandy shore at the south side of the mouth of the river stood the strong fort of Cabedello, armed with twenty-five pieces of artillery and a garrison of 250 men under a tried old soldier, Joam de Matos Cardoso, now eighty years old, who had lived in Paraiba as a proprietor of the soil for many years with his wife and children, and had served in all the wars with the Indians.​33 The approach from the sea-shore to the town, through a dense wood intersected by many arms of the river, and barred at one point by a broad marsh impassable in winter or spring, was, in the opinion of a most competent authority,​34 impracticable for a land force. The only way to attack Paraiba successfully was to force the passage up the river, and this was defended by three forts.

The task, then, which the council had resolved to undertake was by no means a light one, and it was not undertaken in a light spirit, no less than thirteen companies of soldiers, 1,600 men in  p49 all, being selected and embarked on nineteen ships​35 for the expedition. The command was given to Lieut.‑Colonel Stein-Callenfels, and two councillors of policy, Carpentier and Van der Haghen, accompanied the troops.

The flotilla set sail on 1 Dec., and on the 5th arrived off the mouth of the river. Next morning the landing was safely effected under the personal supervision of Stein-Callenfels, whose own company, with which was Richsoffer, was the first to set foot on shore. They were not, however, to achieve this without opposition. Lying behind trenches, which had been thrown up on the beach, was a force of the enemy,​36 who opened fire upon the troops as they were disembarking, and by several charges endeavoured to drive them back to their boats. But the Dutch stood firm, and succeeded in beating off their assistants, who having to lament among others the death of Geronino de Albuquerque,​37 younger brother of the governor of Paraiba, and seeing the numbers of the invaders constantly increasing as fresh boatloads reached the shore, finally beat a retreat. The next step of Stein-Callenfels, who had lost about forty men killed and wounded,​38 was to reconnoitre the fort, Cabedello, which lay in his immediate front, with the result that, deeming it too strong to be carried by direct assault, the council of war resolved that siege should be laid in regular form. No time was lost in the preliminary operations. A breastwork was thrown up to defend the troops against a night surprise, and such was the expedition used that at midnight 700 men were told off and ordered to set to work upon the approaches. That same night a line of trenches was completed. The next morning a direct assault of the enemy was driven off, but a raking fire was brought to bear on the workers alike from the fort and the wood, and proved most troublesome. To counteract this a force of 300 sailors was landed from the fleet, who erected a battery, which was completed on the 8th but proved far too weak to cope with the  p50 superior armament of the fort, the more so as on this very day the strength of the defenders was largely increased by the arrival of four companies of Spanish troops sent by Matthias de Albuquerque from the Arreyal.​39 Encouraged by such an addition to their numbers, the garrison were no longer content to act on the defensive. Joam de Matos on his side began to advance by approaches towards the Dutch lines, each side working during the night at the trenches, and being engaged all day long in skirmishes and cannonading. Meanwhile sickness had broken out among the Company's troops. In five days, writes Richsoffer, more than 500 men were on the sick list. The besieged were now numerically as strong as the besiegers, and had at their disposal more guns and of heavier metal.​40 In these circumstances, judging that it was useless to persevere in the face of such obstacles, the council of war determined to avoid a further sacrifice of life by retiring, and steps were at once taken to accomplish so difficult an operation as far as might be in safety.

Orders were accordingly given by Stein-Callenfels that at eleven o'clock of the forenoon on the 10th an assault should be made by six companies on the enemy's outworks. It was carried out with great courage and vigour. Taken completely by surprise, the Spaniards and Portuguese were driven out of their entrenchments, and with such energy did the Netherlanders push on that they almost succeeded in entering the fort itself with the fugitives. The gates were closed just in time, but with the assailants a number of the garrison themselves were shut out. Not knowing which way to turn, some of these tried to make their way to the woods, others to scale the walls or to throw themselves into the water; most of them were shot down or drowned; few, if any, escaped. The Dutch lost twenty killed and about fifty wounded, their opponents a much larger number. In the evening the re-embarkation began, and was carried out quickly and in perfect silence, a constant fire being as long as possible maintained from the trenches upon the fort, in order to deceive the garrison. With such skill was everything managed that on the next morning the fleet was able to start on its return voyage to the Reciff, the entire army having been shipped without opposition or knowledge of the Portuguese commander. Besides bringing back a large number of sick this unfortunate expedition lost 180 men killed and wounded.41

On the arrival of Stein-Callenfels at the Reciff on the 14th a meeting of the governor and council with the military and naval  p51 officers was at once summoned, to consider what was now to be done. It was clear that so large a fleet of war ships ought not to lie idly in harbour at the cost of the Company; and therefore hoping by going northwards at once to find the enemy unprepared, and possibly to obtain help from the native tribe of the Tapuyas, with whom there had been negotiations for an alliance, it was resolved to send out practically the same force under the same officers to seize the fort at the mouth of the Rio Grande. On 21 Dec. Stein-Callenfels put to sea with ten companies and fourteen ships.​42 Again he was foiled by the activity of the wide-awake governor of Paraiba. Antonio de Albuquerque Marañon had obtained information of the expedition, and at once despatched 200 men, under his brother Matthias, to strengthen the garrison of Rio Grande. The Dutch, as usual ignorant of the locality, found that the reefs and cliffs made it almost impracticable to land close to the fort,​43 which was very strong and, being built upon the reef about a musket-shot from the mainland, impregnable to assault. •About six miles to the southward, at the Punto Negro, a convenient spot was at length found for the disembarkation, but nothing could be done except plundering a few farms and carrying off some cattle, pigs, and hens.​44 So on 4 Jan. the troops were once more taken on board the fleet, and on the 10th reached the Reciff. Still not discouraged, and thinking perhaps that his own presence might lead to better results, the governor Waerdenburgh himself organised yet another expedition, the objective this time being the Rio Formoso, lying almost as far south of Olinda as the Rio Grande to the north. He took with him the councillor Jan de Walbeeck, the admiral of the coast,​45 and thirteen companies of soldiers under Lieut.‑Colonel Schutte, and set sail with nineteen vessels on 22 Jan.​46 The Portuguese, aware of Waerdenburgh's intentions, did not attempt any resistance, but destroyed their small fort with its stores, and retreated into the dense woods which covered the slopes of the hills behind and stretched down to the shore. Finding nothing was to be gained by penetrating into the interior, the governor in his turn, after burning a few sugar mills, made his way back ingloriously to the Reciff.

In the month of February some ships arrived from Holland, bringing reinforcements and stores, and also letters from the Nineteen complaining that nothing was being done, and giving strict injunctions that some strenuous effort must be made to capture the Arreyal or strike some other important blow. This was precisely  p52 what the council had been striving to do with such miserable results. The position was indeed becoming intolerable. For two years a large fleet and army had held the Reciff, but not one square yard of territory did the Netherlanders possess on the mainland. They lived, as if perpetually on voyage, on nothing but salt meat and other provisions brought from Holland. They had no vegetables, never tasted milk, and could only obtain fuel at the risk of their lives in the pathless forests. Even the captured galleon 'S. Bonaventura' had been cut up for firewood. Having no guides and fearful of falling into ambushes, the Dutch leaders did not dare to venture away from the sea-shore, and so left the Portuguese masters of the interior. These, on their side, were no doubt suffering considerably from the constant presence of the Dutch cruisers along their coasts, but their state was in every way preferable to that of the invaders, whose base lay on the far side of the ocean, separated from them by a voyage of several months' duration. The urgent despatches from the Nineteen were therefore absolutely justified, as the drain upon the Company's resources was becoming serious, and only two courses seemed to be open to them, either to relieve the present dead-lock by some striking success or to give up any idea of attempting the conquest of Pernambuco. Yet it was difficult to see what was to be done. Three attempts at vigorous action had in the course of the past few weeks ended in failure, and the military authorities would not admit that a direct attack on the Arreyal could be safely attempted.

At last, after a long deliberation, and not until a careful reconnoissance had been made of the nature and position of the place, it was decided by the council to make an attempt on Cabo S. Augustin. For this a fleet of eighteen ships, under Admiral Thijssen, were got ready, and on these fourteen companies of soldiers were placed. Waerdenburgh himself took the command, with Stein-Callenfels under him, and on 13 March the expedition, accompanied also by Councillors Carpentier and Walbeeck, set sail from the Reciff for the appointed destination. At Cabo S. Augustin the squadron was joined by five other vessels that were cruising off the coast. Yet with this force nothing was effected. Waerdenburgh, with the two councillors and Stein-Callenfels, having set out with three boats to seek a fit spot for landing, found the approach, owing to reefs, impossible, except to one small bay, and on entering this they discovered that Conte Bagnuolo had thrown up entrenchments close to the shore, and that these were occupied by 300 men, ready to resist any disembarkation. Inland on a bare hill rose the town of Nossa Senhora de Nazareth, in defence of which the Neapolitan general had erected a fort with four bastions, known as Fort Nazareth. Wherever the Dutch turned they found their enemy  p53 prepared to meet them and strongly posted; and once more, with what seems a strange lack of resource and energy, they resolved to abandon any attempt to surmount the difficulties which opposed them. Without so much as firing a shot the fleet returned by the way it came, and after an absence of six days anchored once more in the harbour of the Reciff.

This collapse brought matters to a climax. As the great fleet could apparently achieve nothing in Brazilian waters, it was determined to send away Thijssen, with nineteen ships, first to seek out the enemy in the West Indies, and then to return straight to Holland. With Thijssen sailed one of the councillors, Seroosckerken, Colonel Stein-Callenfels, Major Cray, and others, who after two years' hard service were anxious to see their homes again. Among these was our old friend Richsoffer, from whose valuable journal we now with regret part company.​47 The thirteen ships that remained were placed under the command of Jan Mast, who, as captain of the 'Walcheren,' had so valiantly supported Pater in his fight with Oquendo; he was named admiral of the coast in the place of Jan van Walbeeck, who now became president of the council.

Immediately after this occurred an event of apparently slight importance, but one that was in reality the turning-point of the fortunes of the Dutch in Brazil. On 20 April a mulatto, by name Domingo Fernandez Calabar, a native of Pernambuco,​48 deserted from the Portuguese and arrived at the Reciff. What were the grounds of his desertion is not accurately known, but the Portuguese writers assert that he was flying from punishment for his crimes. Be this as it may, this man, who had served Albuquerque with valour and been wounded at the assault on the Arreyal on 14 March 1630, now deliberately broke his allegiance and passed over to the enemies of the king of Spain. In doing so he carried with him precisely what those enemies wanted, an accurate knowledge of the country, combined with great intelligence and courage and considerable military skill.49

The result of his presence in the Dutch lines was quickly seen in the planning and successful carrying out of an inland expedition, the first that the invaders had dared to attempt.​50 It was proposed  p54 to surprise the town of Igarazu, which lay •some sixteen or seventeen miles to the north of the Reciff, and •from four to five miles from Fort Orange, on Itamarica, from which post boats could ascend as far as the town by a navigable stream. Igarazu was an older settlement than Olinda, but had been declining in prosperity until the capture of its rival by the Dutch. This event had driven the rich merchants and citizens of Olinda to take refuge in the neighbouring town,​51 and in 1632 this had become the centre of trade and of the sugar industry in the district. The idea of Calabar was that a forced night march should be made through the woods by a path with which he was well acquainted, so that the troops should arrive before the town at early dawn, seize it by surprise, and carry off the spoil in boats, sent for the purpose by Artichofsky, down the stream to Fort Orange, before it was possible for the Portuguese general to send help from the camp of Bom Jesus for its defence. It was not without hesitation that Waerdenburgh gave his consent, as he knew by experience the vigilance of Albuquerque's scouts, and he did not as yet place implicit faith in the fidelity of the mulatto deserter.52

Five hundred men were selected to take part in this hazardous expedition, consisting of five companies of musketeers and one company of pikemen, the governor taking Major Rembach with him as second in command. Thirty or forty negroes carried the necessary stores. The start was made at 6 P.M. on 30 April, along the beach below Olinda, but not without being seen by two mounted outposts of the enemy, who at once hurried off to take the news to the Arreyal. It was now the rainy season, and three streams lay in their way. Fortunately the two previous days had been fair, or in all probability the flooded waters would have proved unfordable. As it was, on one occasion they had to wade for •more than a mile. Soon night fell upon them, but onward they pushed over stony hills, and through dense woods, along a track so narrow that the men could only walk in single file, and in such obscurity that when the moon set at 3 A.M. it was so dark that no one could see his neighbour, and many wandered from the path. At the break of day four wagons were met upon a hillside. This was awkward, as safety depended upon concealment. The drivers were therefore immediately cut down, as all other persons encountered on the road,​53 there being no time to parley, and villages and  p55 sugar mills were known to lie within a very short distance of the line of march. These were carefully avoided by the skill of the guide, and in the morning Waerdenburgh found himself before Igarazu without any one being aware of his approach. It was the feast of SS. Philip and James, and a large number of the inhabitants were at mass, while others were so free from suspicion that when they saw the Netherlanders from their doors they imagined they were some of their own troops en route for Itamaraca. The governor divided his force into two parts: half he left drawn up in battle order under Major Rembach; the other half he led himself to the town, where, despite the unexpectedness of the attack, a brief but fierce resistance was made. In the sharp fighting that ensued above one hundred of the inhabitants, including several persons of distinction, lost their lives; most of the others fled, carrying off their wounded, while a number of prisoners were made, among these five or six priests. The Dutch on their side did not escape unscathed. Such was the vigour of the improvised defence that the assailants did not gain possession of the town but at the cost of seven or eight killed and twenty to twenty-five wounded, in which number were Major Rembach and several officers. As soon as resistance was over Waerdenburgh took steps to prevent excesses. Having found 200 pipes of wine, he gave orders that the bottoms should be knocked out, lest the men should get drunk and disorderly, and be unfit for continuing their journey. Among the inhabitants who had not been able to fly were a number of women, many of them more than usually favoured; these he placed for security in the church of St. Cosmo, and appointed a guard of musketeers to see that they suffered no outrage. The town, which was rich in booty, was then given up to be sacked by the soldiery, after which it was set on fire in several places.54

Having thus thoroughly achieved the object of his march, and not wishing to risk anything by delay, Waerdenburgh embarked his men in the boats that were awaiting them, and brought them down safely, laden with spoil,​55 as the day was closing, within the shelter of Fort Orange. The troops sent to the rescue by Matthias de Albuquerque arrived too late. This blow was severely felt, and caused much despondency in the minds of the Pernambucans. Duarte de Albuquerque himself, who was now in his brother's camp,  p56 was obliged to acknowledge that it boded ill for the defence if the Dutch began to make expeditions by land and to pillage the country.​56 He was right. The success at Igarazu was but the prelude to others in different parts of the land. Calabar was most active, always proposing fresh enterprises, pointing out the places most suitable for attack, and frequently serving as guide. At the Rio Formoso, at Barra Grande, and at the Porto Francese, the troops, under his skilful conduct, were able to penetrate inland, to destroy and plunder sugar plantations, mills, and villages, and to return with loot and supplies to the Reciff. The Dutch even began to take a leaf out of their opponents' book by setting ambushes, and with success. It was at this time, when the tide of fortune was clearly setting against him, that Duarte de Albuquerque sent an envoy, named Pedro Alvarez,​57 to the council, offering to pay the West India Company an indemnity of several thousand chests of sugar if they would evacuate the land. The reply was a refusal under the form of a counter-proposal advising Albuquerque to surrender his territory on favourable terms. The council, in fact, knew from captured letters​58 that the Portuguese leaders did not expect any further help from Spain, and that the forces at their disposal were inadequate for the defence of so large a country.​59 They accordingly drew up a manifesto addressed to the sugar factors and inhabitants of Brazil,​60 putting before them the hopelessness of resistance and the advantages of submitting themselves to Dutch rule, a promise, in fact, being made that as Dutch subjects they should receive the remission of half their taxes, liberty of worship, and freedom of trade. But the settlers were not to be seduced by honeyed words, and the timely arrival of some Spanish caravels in the harbour of Cabo S. Augustin, which had successfully run the blockade of the Dutch cruisers, enabled the brothers Albuquerque to keep up their courage by pretending that these were an earnest of coming succour.

The period of Waerdenburgh's long and distinguished service was now at length drawing to an end. He had for some time been pressing upon the directors of the Company his desire to be relieved from his post, and also the necessity of sending out fresh troops to replace those whose three years' term of service had expired. His requests were duly considered by the Nineteen and approved, and it was resolved that in the autumn of the year 1632 two of their  p57 own body, Matthijs van Ceulen, of the chamber of Amsterdam, and Johann Gijsselingh, of the chamber of Zealand, should set out for Brazil, to assume the conduct of the government under the title of directors delegate, and should take with them ships and reinforcements. Accordingly on 8 Oct. Ceulen left the Texel with three ships, 'De Fama,' 'De Zutphen,' and 'De Otter,' followed by 'De Haringh' three days later, and on the 13th of the same month Gijsselingh set sail from Flushing with two vessels, 'De Middelburgh' and 'De Leeuw.' The Amsterdam director outstripped his colleague, as he arrived at the Reciff on 14 Dec., while the Zealand contingent did not reach their destination till 17 Jan. Waerdenburgh remained only a sufficient time to see the new-comers fairly installed in office before bidding farewell to the place, the capture of which had made his name famous. He started for Holland on 8 March with five ships, accompanied by his old companions in arms Lieut.‑Colonel Schutte, Major Berstedt, and a number of other officers, by the president of the council, Jan van Walbeeck, and 500 soldiers.

The labours of these men had not been in vain. By their tenacity and valour they had succeeded in giving to the Dutch West India Company a firm foothold in Brazil, and they left to their successors the task of using the impregnable base of operations which they had secured in the Reciff as a place d'armes from which to extend their dominion over the whole of Pernambuco. These years of hard and chequered experience had thoroughly acclimatised the Netherlanders in their new and strange surroundings. The period of struggle was over, that of expansion about to begin. The story of the Dutch power in Brazil during the next decade forms, perhaps, the most striking and brilliant chapter in the annals of seventeenth-century colonial enterprise.

George Edmundson.

---

The Author's Notes:

1 'Porem representarão todos que pezava tanto mais a restauração de Pernambuco e defensão do estado do Brazil, que todas as outras ocasiões presentes em razão da conservação da monarquia que tinhão por muito certo que sendo isto tão presente cumpre a V. Mag. antepor a tudo esta empreza e que vencendose todas as dificuldades inda quando chegarão a maior aperto, mandara V. Mag. tratar este negocio desde logo com o calor e forças supriores que elle riquere . . . por estas e outras razões conuinha que o poder que V. Mag. mandasse ao brazil fosse superior a todas as forças referidas e aos socorros que se diz que o inimiguo mandava e he de ver que ira mandar.' — Acta de Conselho d'Estado (29 April 1630), Arch. Simancas.

2 As usual in Dutch expeditions, Pater bore the title of general, Thijssen of admiral. For complete details as to this fleet see De Laet, pp203‑5, 235.

3 De Laet, p226; Albuquerque, Mem. Diar. fol. 46; Nieuhof's voyage in Brazil (Pinkerton's Voyages, XIV.708); Montanus, p421. De Laet compares Itamaraca to England: 'Dit is een goedt Eylandt, seer schoon landt aen te sien als Enghelandt.'

4 Albuquerque (fol. 49) says that he sent powder, munitions, and some men.

5 The latter was certainly a Pole; the nationality of Schoppe is uncertain.

6 De Laet, p203: 'Admirael op de custe van Brazil.'

7 Albuquerque calls it 'la barra principal.'

8 Consulta da Junta de Portugal (24 Sept. 1631): 'Considera la Junta que se alcanza bien el intento que tienen los rebeldes de sustentar lo ganado y pasar Adelante la conquista del Brasil con la faccion que emprendieron en Itamaraca aonde ya se han fortificado en la Ysleta del puerto, con la qual se han hecho Señores del.'

9 He lost his life in the battle of the Downs, 1639.

10 De Laet, p240; Richsoffer, p112; Montanus, p422; Thysius, Hist. Navalis, p260. The 'Prins Willem' was of 1,000 tons, carried 26 metal and 20 iron pieces of ordnance, and was manned by 150 sailors and 150 soldiers; the 'Vereenigte Provintien', 800 tons, 22 metal and 28 iron pieces, 195 sailors and 136 soldiers.

11 The actual numbers were 20 men-of‑war (galleons), 12 caravels carrying the relief force under the Conte di Bagnuolo, and 24 ships from Bahia, laden with sugar (Albuquerque, Mem. Diar., fol. 56; Brito Freyre, p214; Santa Teresa, p112). In Leeven en Daaden, p195, the writer describes the sight of the Spanish fleet as 'gelijck een heele Boschagie in de Zee gesien.'

12 So all the authorities. The words of Thysius, Hist. Navalis, p262, are, 'binae quaeque naves galeones singulas adorirentur.'

13 De Laet, p240: 'Een yeder beloofde wel wat schoons, maer weinighe queten haer wel.'

14 Albuquerque, Mem. Diar. fol. 56: 'que los navios que se veian del enemigo eran (palabras formales) poca ropa.'

15 Francisco de Lyra, Relacion de Jornada (Seville, 1631) a contemporary narrative of great value.

16 Albuquerque, Mem. Diar. fol. 56: 'No causa poca admiracion el ver el como se resolvieron a hazerlo, siendo tan inferiores en numero.'

17 The 'S. Jago' had 48 guns, 400 men; the 'S. Antonio de Padua' 26 guns, 260 men; the 'S. Bonaventura' 22 guns, 170 men; the 'S. Juan Baptista' 22 guns 100 men. De Laet, p245, gives a complete list of the Spanish fleet, as derived from Francisco de Fuentes, auditor of the fleet, taken prisoner in the 'S. Bonaventura.'

18 Albuquerque, Mem. Diar. fol. 57: 'la salvacion de la nuestra.'

19 Accounts of this celebrated fight are given in great detail in DeLyra's Jornada; Albuquerque, Mem. Diar. fol. 57‑9; Brito Freyre, pp215, 221; Santa Teresa, pp115‑7; Raphael de Jesus, pp54‑8; Montanus, pp422‑4; Richsoffer, pp112‑3; Thysius, Hist. Nav. pp261‑4; De Laet, pp240‑2; Leeven en Daaden, pp198‑9.

20 Brito Freyre, p216: 'A Espanhola atracada dos arpeos; a enxarcea em pedaços e as vellas rotas, ainda que lhe ficasse algua era impossivel marealla.'

21 Albuquerque, Mem. Diar. fol. 58.

22 Ibid.

23 Thysius, Hist. Nav. p263: 'perfide a suis desertus.'

24 Such is the unanimous testimony of those who draw their information from Spanish and Portuguese sources, and, as his enemies were almost the only eye-witnesses of the hero's death, there can be no reason to doubt its veracity. The narrative runs thus in Brito Freyre, p219: 'Cingio o Estandarte, e recebẽdo major dano da mesma indignação do que quanto podia esperar da violencia contraria, precipitandose ao mar, fez a soberba e a desesperação, tumulo do valor ao Oceane Onde volũtaria, mas inutil, e por ambas esta razões barbaramente se perdeo a sy, e nelle todos os seus hum grande Cabo.' Thus Santa Teresa, p115: 'Cingendosi a dosso lo stendardo, armato como egli era, si gettò barbaramente nell' onde, dicendo, che solo tutto l'Oceano era degno tumulo del suo invitto cuore.' Raphael de Jesus, p66. As we have Richsoffer's positive statement that no one at the Reciff knew the exact manner of the admiral's death, I have ventured to adopt the Spanish account, for the invention of which no motive could be assigned. Richsoffer writes in his journal, p113: 'Man nicht anders weiss als dass unsers Generals schiff im Brand gerathen und also zu grundt gangen, dass man noch zur Zeit von mehrern nicht vernommen, als dass vier soldaten und zween Bootsgesellen die von 250 mannen ohngefärhlichº mitt dem Leben davon kommen wie es aber dem heroische Helden General Pater engangen is't Gott bekandt.'

25 Richsoffer, p114, quoting the narrative of his friend and fellow countryman Philipp von Hannsen, who was present at the fight, gives the names of the four laggards as the 'Dordrecht,' 'Groningen,' 'Ammelsfort,' and 'Memmelick.'

26 Ibid. p113: 'Auch allereerst den 14 dieses allhie angelangt darunder dann die meisten gar schadhafft, mitbringende viel gequetst volck die arm und schenkel verlohren hatten . . . welcher dann auss folgenden leicht zu glauben weilen auff unserer Seiten über 500 man verlohren, zwei Schiff nemlichen dess H. Gen. Prince Wilhelm genannt unt die Provincie van Utrecht seind in feuer verdorben.'

27 Albuquerque, Mem. Diar. fol. 59. This is the evidence of Duarte de Albuquerque, himself an eye-witness of the fight. See also Brito Freyre, p221; Santa Teresa p115.

28 The news was received in Spain with great rejoicings. Philip IV caused a medal to be struck in its honour (Van Loons, Historie penningen, II.196), having his head on one side and on the other Samson laying low the lion of the Netherlands, and there exists in the naval museum at Madrid a picture with the inscription, 'Combate naval ocurrido el 12 de Sep. de 1631 sobre la costa del Brasil en que la armada de Española mandada da por Don Antonio de Oquendo venció y destrozó á la Holandeza bajo las ordenes del general Hanspater que morió en la accion.'

29 De Laet (p243) with great impartiality speaks of the Spaniards as the winners, while Santa Teresa (p115), the panegyrist of the Portuguese, says, 'Il Patres perdi la vita, ma non la vittoria.' The verdict of Thysius, p264, 'nostri victores vel victi viderentur,' is quite correct; technically the Dutch were 'victi,' practically they were 'victores.'

30 27 July 1630, 12 Feb. and 24 March 1631.

31 The account given by this deserter, as told by De Laet (p248), exactly tallies with the Descripção da Cidade e Barra da Paraiba de Antonio Gonçalves Paschoa, piloto natural de Peniche, que ha vinte annos, que reside na dita Cidade (Bibl. Nat. de Madrid).

32 There are good plans in the works of Santa Teresa, Montanus, and in Leti's Teatro Belgico.

33 Descripção de Paschoa, Santa Teresa, p117. Part of the artillery had been landed from Oquendo's fleet, and the garrison reinforced on news of the approach of the Dutch expedition.

34 Ibid.: 'Por terra nam podem os enemigos tomar a Paraiva.'

35 Richsoffer, p118. The list of ships in De Laet contains only 16 names, but no doubt he omitted some of the smaller vessels. Richsoffer himself took part in the expedition, and was in the forefront of danger throughout. His narrative is therefore again most valuable as that of an actor and eye-witness. On the Portuguese side there is also the testimony of an eye-witness, Fra Paulo do Rosario, in his Relaçam breve e verdadeira victoria, que ouve o Capitão mor da Capitania da Paraiua Antonio d'Albuquerque dos Rebeldes da Olanda, que com 20 naos de guerra e 27 lanchas, pretenderão ocupar esta praça de S. M. trazendo nellas para o effeito dois mil homems de guerra escolhidos a fora a gente do mar, Lisboa, 1632. Brito Freyre and other Portuguese writers, following Albuquerque, Mem. Diar. fol. 23, still further exaggerate the number of men, and are wrong in making Jan Corneliszoon Lichthardt the naval commander. Lichthardt was at this time in Holland.

36 These, according to the statement of a prisoner (De Laet, p251) consisted of a company of Spaniards and four companies of Portuguese, each numbering 60 or 70 men, with 600 to 700 Brazilians.

37 Albuquerque, Mem. Diar. fol. 66.

38 Richsoffer, p118. Among the wounded was the narrator.

39 Albuquerque, Mem. Diar. fol. 67.

40 Montanus, p425: 'De belegerde was sterker van volk en geschut dan de belegeraer.'

41 Fr. Paulo Rosario, who gives a detailed list of names, states the Hispano-Portuguese loss as 80 killed and 80 wounded.

42 Richsoffer, p123; De Laet, pp256‑8. Richsoffer's narrative is again that of an eye-witness. Albuquerque states wrongly that Waerdenburgh went in person to Rio Grande with 22 ships and 2,000 men, and is followed by Portuguese writers.

43 De Laet: 'De perijckelen op so een onbekende en vuyle kuste.'

44 Richsoffer, p124.

45 Corresponding almost to minister of marine.

46 Richsoffer, p126; De Laet, pp284‑6. This is the last expedition in which Richsoffer took part.

47 Richsoffer continued the journal throughout his voyage until his arrival home at the end of November.

48 Albuquerque, Mem. Diar. fol. 77. He was born in Porto Calvo.

49 Ibid. p78: 'Siendo de mucho valor, i astucia, i el mas platico en toda aquella costa i tierra que el enemigo podia desear.' Brito Freyre, p239, says of him: 'Para ser causa de grandes danos tão pequeno instrumento.' The later successes of the Dutch are ascribed to Calabar's local knowledge and skill by Santa Teresa, p120; Raphael de Jesus, p69.

50 A full account is given by Waerdenburgh, himself of this expedition, in his despatch dated 9 May 1632, which is followed by De Laet with his usual accuracy pp289‑90. Compare Albuquerque, Mem. Diar. fol. 78‑9.

51 Its full name was Villa do Santo Cosmo de Garazu, or Igarazu. It was generally called Garazu or Garasu by the Dutch, as we have the double forms Tamaraca or Itamaraca, Taparica or Itaparica.

52 Waerdenburgh's words are, 'Alle dese periculen rusten doen ter tydt op de trouwe ofte ontrouwe van eenen neger, de mij als guijde diende op welcken Volck sig nochtans weynich is te verlaten.'

53 Varnhagen (Os Holandezes no Brazil) condemns these proceedings as barbarous; but he seems to forget the circumstances and necessities of this particular case, and the fact that from the first it had been a war of reprisals. Humanity was a virtue held of small account by either combatant.

54 There are no grounds for believing the accounts of the barbarities committed by the Dutch troops in the pages of Brito Freyre, Santa Teresa, and others. The statements of Waerdenburgh are evidently trustworthy, and have been accepted as such by Varnhagen, p90. De Laet, who not only had access to all the official documents, but had read the letter of the priest Serraon describing the capture, gives the same testimony. Montanus, p430, writes, 'Alzoo hier veel schoon vrouw-volck was besloot hij alle binnen Cosmus kerck om tegen schennis te bevrijden.'

55 Valued by Serraon at 20,000 to 30,000 crusaden of three gulden each.

56 Albuquerque, Mem. Diar. fol. 80.

57 He was well known at the Reciff, having been a prisoner for some time in the hands of the Dutch.

58 De Laet, p289.

59 Albuquerque (Mem. Diar. fol. 89), in a letter to the king, states that he had only 1,200 men, scattered in many places, with 300 Indians, adding that the country was at the enemy's mercy.

60 'Aen de Srs van de Ingenios ende Inwooners van Brazil.'

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