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This webpage reproduces a portion of
The Library of History

Diodorus Siculus

published in Vol. V
of the Loeb Classical Library edition, 1950

The text is in the public domain.

This page has been carefully proofread
and I believe it to be free of errors.
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(Vol. V) Diodorus Siculus
Library of History

(Book XIII, continued)

 p213  34 1 When Callias was archon in Athens, the Romans elected in place of consuls four military tribunes, Publius Cornelius . . . Gaius Fabius, and among the Eleians the Ninety-second Olympiad was celebrated, that in which Exaenetus of Acragas won the "stadion." In this year it came to pass that, after the Athenians had collapsed in Sicily, their supremacy was held in contempt; 2 for immediately the peoples of Chios, Samos, Byzantium, and many  p215 of the allies revolted to the Lacedaemonians. Consequently the Athenian people, being disheartened, of their own accord renounced the democracy, and choosing four hundred men they turned over to them the administration of the state. And the leaders of the oligarchy, after building a number of triremes, sent out forty of them together with generals.​1 3 Although these were at odds with one another, they sailed off to Oropus, for the enemy's triremes lay at anchor there. In the battle which followed the Lacedaemonians were victorious and captured twenty-two vessels.

4 After the Syracusans had brought to an end the war with the Athenians, they honoured with the booty taken in the war the Lacedaemonians who had fought with them under the command of Gylippus, and they sent back with them to Lacedaemon, to aid them in the war against the Athenians, an allied force of thirty-five triremes under the command of Hermocrates, their foremost citizen. 5 And as for themselves, after gathering the spoil that accrued from the war, they embellished their temples with dedications and with arms taken from the enemy and honoured with the appropriate gifts those soldiers who had fought with distinction. 6 After this Diocles, who was the most influential among them of the leaders of the populace, persuaded the citizens to change their form of government so that the administration would be conducted by magistrates chosen by lot and that lawgivers also should be elected for organizing the polity and drafting new laws privately.

 p217  35 1 Consequently the Syracusans elected lawgivers from such of their citizens as excelled in judgement, the most distinguished of them being Diocles. For he so far excelled the rest in understanding and renown that, although the writing of the code was a task of all in common, they were called "The Laws of Diocles." 2 And not only did the Syracusans admire this man during his lifetime, but also, when he died, they rendered him the honours accorded to heroes and built a temple in his honour at public expense — the one which was torn down by Dionysius at a later time when the walls of the city were being constructed.​2 3 And this man was held in high esteem among the other Sicilian Greeks as well; indeed many cities of the island continued to use his laws down to the time when the Sicilian Greeks as a body were granted Roman citizen­ship.​3 Accordingly, when in later times laws were framed for the Syracusans by Cephalus​4 in the time of Timoleon and by Polydorus in the time of King Hiero,​5 they called neither one of these men a "lawgiver," but rather an "interpreter of the lawgiver," since men found the laws of Diocles, written as they were in an ancient style, difficult to understand. 4 Profound reflection is displayed in his legislation, the lawmaker showing himself to be a hater of evil, since he sets heavier penalties against all wrongdoers than any other legislator, just, in that more precisely than by any  p219 predecessor the punishment of each man is fixed according to his deserts, and both practical and widely experienced, in that he judges every complaint and every dispute, whether it concerns the state or the individual, to be deserving of a fixed penalty. He is also concise in his style and leaves much for the readers to reflect upon. 5 And the dramatic manner of his death​6 bore witness to the uprightness and austerity of his soul.

Now these qualities of Diocles I have been moved to set forth in considerable detail by reason of the fact that most historians have rather slighted him in their treatises.

36 1 When the Athenians learned of the total destruction of their forces in Sicily, they were deeply distressed at the magnitude of the disaster. Yet they would not at all on that account abate their ardent aspiration for the supremacy, but set about both constructing more ships and providing themselves with funds wherewith they might contend to the last hope for the primacy. 2 Choosing four hundred men they put in their hands the supreme authority to direct the conduct of the war; for they assumed that an oligarchy was more suitable than a democracy in critical circumstances like these. 3 The events, however, did not turn out according to the judgement of those who held that opinion, but the Four Hundred conducted the war far less competently. For, although they dispatched forty ships, they sent along to command them two generals who were at odds with each other. Although, with the affairs of the Athenians at such low ebb, the emergency called for  p221 complete concord, the generals kept quarrelling with each other. 4 And finally they sailed to Oropus without preparation and met the Peloponnesians in a sea-battle; but since they made a wretched beginning of the battle and stood up to the fighting like churls, they lost twenty-two ships and barely got the rest safe over to eretria.

5 After these events had taken place, the allies of the Athenians, because of the defeats they had suffered in Sicily as well as the estranged relations of the commanders, revolted to the Lacedaemonians. And since Darius, the king of the Persians, was an ally of the Lacedaemonians, Pharnabazus, who had the military command of the regions bordering on the sea, supplied money to the Lacedaemonians; and he also summoned the three hundred triremes supplied by Phoenicia, having in mind to dispatch them to the aid of the Lacedaemonians.

37 1 Inasmuch as the Athenians had experienced setbacks so serious at one and the same time, everyone had assumed that the war was at an end; for no one expected that the Athenians could possibly endure such reverses any longer, even for a moment. However, events did not come to an end that tallied with the assumption of the majority, but on the contrary it came to pass, such was the superiority of the combatants, that the whole situation changed for the following reasons.

2 Alcibiades, who was in exile from Athens, had for a time fought on the side of the Lacedaemonians and had rendered them great assistance in the war; for he was a most able orator and far the outstanding  p223 citizen in daring, and, besides, he was in high birth and wealth first among the Athenians. 3 Now since Alcibiades was eager to be allowed to return to his native city, he contrived every device whereby he could do the Athenians some good turn, and in particular at the crucial moments when the Athenians seemed doomed to utter defeat. 4 Accordingly, since he was on friendly terms with Pharnabazus, the satrap of Darius, and saw that he was on the point of sending three hundred ships to the support of the Lacedaemonians,​7 he persuaded him to give up the undertaking; for he showed him that it would not be to the advantage of the King to make the Lacedaemonians too powerful. That would not, he said, help the Persians, and so a better policy would be to maintain a neutral attitude toward the combatants so long as they were equally matched, in order that they might continue their quarrel as long as possible. 5 Thereupon Pharnabazus, believing that Alcibiades was giving him good advice, sent the fleet back to Phoenicia. Now on that occasion Alcibiades deprived the Lacedaemonians of so great an allied force; and some time later, when he had been allowed to return to Athens and been given command of a military force, he defeated the Lacedaemonians in many battles and completely restored again the sunken fortunes of the Athenians. 6 But we shall discuss these matters in more detail in connection with the appropriate period of time, in order that our account may not by anticipation violate the natural order of events.

38 1 After the close of the year Theopompus was archon in Athens and the Romans elected in place of consuls four military tribunes, Tiberius Postumius,  p225 Gaius Cornelius, Gaius Valerius, and Caeso Fabius. At this time the Athenians dissolved the oligarchy of the Four hundred and formed the constitution of the government from the citizens at large.​8 2 The author of all these changes was Theramenes, a man who was orderly in his manner of life and was reputed to surpass all others in judgement; for he was the only person to advise the recall from exile of Alcibiades, through whom the Athenians recovered themselves, and since he was the author of many other measures for the benefit of his country, he was the recipient of no small approbation.

3 But these events took place at a little later time, and for the war the Athenians appointed Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus generals, who collected the fleet at Samos and trained the soldiers for battle at sea, giving them daily exercises. 4 But Mindarus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, was inactive for some time at Miletus, expecting the aid promised by Pharnabazus; and when he heard that three hundred triremes had arrived from Phoenicia, he was buoyed up in his hopes, believing that with so great a fleet he could destroy the empire of the Athenians. 5 But when a little later he learned from sundry persons that Pharnabazus had been won over by Alcibiades and had sent the fleet back to Phoenicia, he gave up the hopes he had placed in Pharnabazus and by himself, after equipping both the ships bought from the Peloponnesus and those supplied by his allies from abroad, he dispatched Dorieus with thirteen ships to Rhodes, since he had learned that certain Rhodians were banding together for a revolution. — 6 The ships we have mentioned had  p227 recently been sent to the Lacedaemonians as an allied force by certain Greeks of Italy. — And Mindarus himself took all the other ships, numbering eighty-three, and set out for the Hellespont, since he had learned that the Athenian fleet was tarrying at Samos. 7 The moment the generals of the Athenians saw them sailing by, they put out to sea against them with sixty ships. But when the Lacedaemonians put in at Chios, the Athenian generals decided to sail on to Lesbos and there to gather triremes from their allies, in order that it should not turn out that the enemy surpassed them in number of ships.

39 1 Now the Athenians were engaged in gathering ships. But Mindarus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, setting out by night with his entire fleet, made in haste for the Hellespont and arrived on the second day at Sigeium.​9 When the Athenians learned that the fleet had sailed by them, they did not wait for all the triremes of their allies, but after only three had been added to their number they set out in pursuit of the Lacedaemonians. 2 When they arrived at Sigeium, they found the fleet already departed, but three ships left behind they at once captured; after this they put in at Eleüs​10 and made preparations for the sea-battle. 3 The Lacedaemonians, seeing the enemy rehearsing for the battle, did likewise, spending five days in proving their ships and exercising their rowers; then they drew up the fleet for the battle, its strength being eighty-eight ships. Now the Lacedaemonians stationed their ships on the Asian side of the channel, while the Athenians lined  p229 up against them on the European side, being fewer in number but of superior training. 4 The Lacedaemonians put on their right wing the Syracusans, whose leader was Hermocrates, and the Peloponnesians themselves formed the whole left wing with Mindarus in command. For the Athenians Thrasyllus was stationed on the right wing and Thrasybulus on the left. At the outset both sides strove stubbornly for position in order that they might not have the current against them. 5 Consequently they kept sailing around each other for a long time, endeavouring to block off the straits and struggling for an advantageous position; for the battle took place between Abydus and Sestus​11 and it so happened that the current was of no little hindrance where the strait was narrow. However, the pilots of the Athenian fleet, being far superior in experience, contributed greatly to the victory.

40 1 For although the Peloponnesians had the advantage in the number of their ships and the valour of their marines, the skill of the Athenian pilots rendered the superiority of their opponents of no effect. For whenever the Peloponnesians, with their ships in a body, would charge swiftly forward to ram, the pilots would manoeuvre their own ships so skilfully that their opponents were unable to strike them at any other spot but could only meet them bows on, ram against ram. 2 Consequently Mindarus, seeing that the force of the rams was proving ineffective, gave orders for his ships to come to grips in small groups, or one at a time. But not by this manoeuvre either, as it turned out, was the skill of  p231 the Athenian pilots rendered ineffective; on the contrary, cleverly avoiding the on-coming rams of the ships, they struck them on the side and damaged many. 3 And such a spirit of rivalry pervaded both forces that they would not confine the struggle to ramming tactics, but tangling ship with ship fought it out with the marines. Although they were hindered by the strength of the current from achieving great success, they continued the struggle for a considerable time, neither side being able to gain the victory. 4 While the fighting was thus equally balanced, there appeared beyond a cape twenty-five ships which had been dispatched to the Athenians from their allies. The Peloponnesians thereupon in alarm turned in flight toward Abydus, the Athenians clinging to them and pursuing them the more vigorously.

5 Such was the end of the battle; and the Athenians captured eight ships of the Chians, five of the Corinthians, two of the Ambraciotes, and one each of the Syracusans, Pellenians, and Leucadians, while they themselves lost five ships, all of them, as it happened, having been sunk. 6 After this Thrasybulus set up a trophy on the cape where stands the memorial of Hecabê​12 and sent messengers to Athens to carry word of the victory, and himself made his way to Cyzicus with the entire fleet. For before the sea-battle this city had revolted to Pharnabazus, the general of Darius, and to Clearchus, the Lacedaemonian commander. Finding the city unfortified the  p233 Athenians easily achieved their end, and after exacting money of the Cyziceni they sailed off to Sestus.

41 1 Mindarus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, after his flight to Abydus from the scene of his defeat repaired his ships that had been damaged and also sent the Spartan Epicles to the triremes at Euboea with orders to bring them with all speed. 2 When Epicles arrived at Euboea, he gathered all the ships, which amounted to fifty, and hurriedly put out to sea; but when the triremes were off Mt. Athos there arose a storm of such fury that all the ships were lost and of their crews twelve men alone survived. 3 These facts are set forth by a dedication, as Ephorus states, which stands in the temple at Coroneia and bears the following inscription:

These from the crews of fifty ships, escaping destruction,

Brought their bodies to land hard by Athos' sharp crags;

Only twelve, all the rest the yawning depth of the waters

Took to their death with their ships, meeting with terrible winds.

4 At about the same time Alcibiades with thirteen triremes came by sea to the Athenians who were lying at Samos and had already heard that he had persuaded Pharnabazus not to come, as he had intended, with his three hundred ships to reinforce the Lacedaemonians. 5 And since the troops at Samos gave him a friendly welcome, he discussed with them the matter of his return from exile, offering promises to render many services to the fatherland; and in like manner he defended his own conduct and  p235 shed many tears over his own fortune, because he had been compelled by his enemies to give proof of his own valour at the expense of his native land.13

42 1 And since the soldiers heartily welcomed the offers of Alcibiades and sent messages to Athens regarding them, the people​14 voted to dismiss the charges against Alcibiades and to give him a share in the command; for as they observed the efficiency of his daring and the fame he enjoyed among the Greeks, they assumed, and with good reason, that his adherence to them would add no little weight to their cause. 2 Moreover, Theramenes, who at the time enjoyed the leader­ship in the government and who, if anyone, had a reputation of sagacity, advised the people to recall Alcibiades. When word of this action was reported to Samos, Alcibiades added nine ships to the thirteen he already had, and sailing with them to Halicarnassus he exacted money from that city. 3 After this he sacked Meropis​15 and returned to Samos with much plunder. And since a great amount of booty had been amassed, he divided the spoils among the soldiers at Samos and his own troops, thereby soon causing the recipients of his benefactions to be well disposed toward himself.

4 About the same time the Antandrians,​16 who were held by a garrison,​17 sent to the Lacedaemonians for soldiers, with whose aid they expelled the garrison and thus made their country a free place to live in; for the Lacedaemonians, finding fault with Pharnabazus for the sending of the three hundred ships back  p237 to Phoenicia, gave their aid to the inhabitants of Antandrus.

5 Of the historians, Thucydides ended his history,​18 having included a period of twenty-two years in eight Books, although some divide it into nine;​19 and Xenophon and Theopompus have begun at the point where Thucydides left off. Xenophon embraced a period of forty-eight years, and Theopompus set forth the facts of Greek history for seventeen years and bring his account to an end with the sea-battle of Cnidus in twelve Books.20

6 Such was the state of affairs in Greece and Asia. The Romans were waging war with the Aequi and invaded their territory with a strong army; and investing the city named Bolae they took it by siege.

43 1 When the events of this year had come to an end, in Athens Glaucippus was archon and in Rome the consuls elected were Marcus Cornelius and Lucius Furius. At this time in Sicily the Aegestaeans, who had allied themselves with the Athenians against the Syracusans, had fallen into great fear at the conclusion of the war; for they expected, and with good reason, to pay the penalty to the Sicilian Greeks for the wrongs they had inflicted upon them. 2 And when the Selinuntians went to war with them over the land in dispute,​21 they withdrew from it of their free will, being concerned lest the Syracusans should use this excuse to join the Selinuntians in the war and they should thereby run the risk of utterly  p239 destroying their country. 3 But when the Selinuntians proposed, quite apart from the territory in dispute, to carve off for themselves a large portion of the neighbouring territory, the inhabitants of Aegesta thereupon dispatched ambassadors to Carthage, asking for aid and putting their city in the hands of the Carthaginians. 4 When the envoys arrived and laid before the Senate the instructions the people had given them, the Carthaginians found themselves in no little quandary; for while they were eager to acquire a city so strategically situated, at the same time they stood in fear of the Syracusans, having just witnessed their defeat of the armaments of the Athenians. 5 But when Hannibal, their foremost citizen, also advised them to acquire the city, they replied to the ambassadors that they would come to their aid, and to supervise the undertaking, in case it should lead to war, they selected as general Hannibal, who at the time lawfully exercised sovereign powers.​22 He was the grandson of Hamilcar, who fought in the war against Gelon and died at Himera,​23 and the son of Gescon, who had been exiled because of his father's defeat and had ended his life in Selinus.

6 Now Hannibal, who by nature was a hater of the Greeks and at the same time desired to wipe out the disgraces which had befallen his ancestors, was eager by his own efforts to achieve some advantage for his country. Hence, seeing that the Selinuntians were not satisfied with the cession of the territory in dispute, he dispatched ambassadors together with the Aegestaeans to the Syracusans, referring to them  p241 the decision of the dispute; and though ostensibly he pretended to be seeking that justice be done, in fact he believed that, after the Selinuntians refused to agree to arbitration, the Syracusans would not join them as allies. 7 Since the Selinuntians also dispatched ambassadors, refusing the arbitration and answering at length the ambassadors of the Carthaginians and Aegestaeans, in the end the Syracusans decided to vote to maintain their alliance with the Selinuntians and their state of peace with the Carthaginians.

44 1 After the return of their ambassadors the Carthaginians dispatched to the Aegestaeans five thousand Libyans and eight hundred Campanians. 2 These troops had been hired by the Chalcidians​24 to aid the Athenians in the war against the Syracusans, and on their return after its disastrous conclusion they found no one to hire their services; but the Carthaginians purchased horses for them all, gave them high pay, and sent them to Aegesta.

3 The Selinuntians, who were prosperous in those days and whose city was heavily populated, held the Aegestaeans in contempt. And at first, deploying in battle order, they laid waste the land which touched their border, since their armies were far superior, but after this, despising their foes, they scattered everywhere over the countryside. 4 The generals of the Aegestaeans, watching their opportunity, attacked them with the aid of the Carthaginians​25 and Campanians. Since the attack was not expected, they easily put the Selinuntians to flight, killing about a thousand of the soldiers and capturing all their loot.  p243 And after the battle both sides straightway dispatched ambassadors, the Selinuntians to the Syracusans and the Aegestaeans to the Carthaginians, asking for help. 5 Both parties promised their assistance and the Carthaginian War thus had its beginning. The Carthaginians, foreseeing the magnitude of the war, entrusted the responsibility for the size of their armament to Hannibal as their general and enthusiastically rendered him every assistance. 6 And Hannibal during the summer and the following winter enlisted many mercenaries from Iberia and also enrolled not a few from among the citizens; he also visited Libya, choosing the stoutest men from every city, and he made ready ships, planning to convey the armies across with the opening of spring.

Such, then, was the state of affairs in Sicily.

45 1 In Greece Dorieus the Rhodian, the admiral of the triremes from Italy, after he had quelled the tumult in Rhodes,​26 set sail for the Hellespont, being eager to join Mindarus; for the latter was lying at Abydus, and collecting from every quarter the ships of the Peloponnesian alliance. 2 And when Dorieus was already in the neighbourhood of Sigeium in the Troad, the Athenians who were at Sestus, learning that he was sailing along the coast, put out against him with their ships, seventy-four in all. 3 Dorieus held to his course for a time in ignorance of what was happening; but when he observed the great strength of the fleet he was alarmed, and seeing no other way to save his force he put in at Dardanus. 4 Here he disembarked his soldiers and took over the  p245 troops who were guarding the city, and then he speedily got in a vast supply of missiles and stationed his soldiers both on the fore-parts of the ships and in advantageous positions on the land. 5 The Athenians, sailing in at full speed, set to work hauling the ships away from the shore, and they were wearing down the enemy, having crowded them on every side by their superior numbers. 6 When Mindarus, the Peloponnesian admiral, learned of the situation, he speedily put out from Abydus with his entire fleet and sailed to the Dardanian Promontory​27 with eighty-four ships to the aid of the fleet of Dorieus; and the land army of Pharnabazus was also there, supporting the Lacedaemonians.

7 When the fleets came near one another, both sides drew up the triremes for battle; Mindarus, who had ninety-seven ships, stationed the Syracusans on his left wing, while he himself took command of the right; as for the Athenians, Thrasybulus led the right wing and Thrasyllus the other. 8 After the forces had made ready in this fashion, their commanders raised the signal for battle and the trumpeters at a single word of command began to sound the attack; and since the rowers showed no lack of eagerness and the pilots managed their helms with skill, the contest which ensued was an amazing spectacle. 9 For whenever the triremes would drive forward to ram, at that moment the pilots, at just the critical instant, would turn their ships so effectively that the blows were made ram on. 10 As for the marines, whenever they would see their own ships borne along with their sides to the triremes of the enemy, they would be  p247 terror-stricken, despairing of their lives; but whenever the pilots, employing the skill of practice, would frustrate the attack, they would in turn be overjoyed and elated in their hopes.

46 1 Nor did the men whose position was on the decks fail to maintain the zeal which brooked no failure; but some, while still at a considerable distance from the enemy, kept up a stream of arrows and soon the space was full of missiles, while others, each time that they drew near, would hurl their javelins, some doing their best to strike the defending marines and others the enemy pilots themselves; and whenever the ships would come close together, they would not only fight with their spears but at the moment of contact would also leap over on the enemy's triremes and carry on the contest with their swords. 2 And since at each reverse the victors would raise the war-cry and the others would rush to aid with shouting, a mingled din prevailed over the entire area of the battle.

For a long time the battle was equally balanced because of the very high rivalry with which both sides were inspired; but later on Alcibiades unexpectedly appeared from Samos with twenty ships, sailing by mere chance to the Hellespont. 3 While these ships were still at a distance, each side, hoping that reinforcement had come for themselves, was elated in its hopes and fought on with far greater courage; but when the fleet was now near and for the Lacedaemonians no signal was to be seen, but for the Athenians Alcibiades ran up a purple flag from his own ship, which was the signal they had agreed upon, the Lacedaemonians in dismay turned  p249 in flight and the Athenians, elated by the advantage they now possessed, pressed eagerly upon the ships trying to escape. 4 And they speedily captured ten ships, but then a storm and violent winds arose, as a result of which they were greatly hindered in the pursuit; for because of the high waves the boats would not respond to the tillers, and the attempts at ramming proved fruitless, since the ships were receding when struck. 5 In the end the Lacedaemonians, gaining the shore, fled to the land army of Pharnabazus, and the Athenians at first essayed to drag the ships from the shore and put up a desperate battle, but when they were checked in their attempts by the Persian forces they sailed off to Sestus. 6 For Pharnabazus, wishing to build a defence for himself before the Lacedaemonians against the charges they were bringing against him, put up all the more vigorous fight against the Athenians; while at the same time, with respect to his sending the three hundred triremes to Phoenicia,​28 he explained to them that he had done so on receiving information that the king of the Arabians and the king of the Egyptians had designs upon Phoenicia.

47 1 When the sea-battle had ended as we have related, the Athenians sailed off at the time to Sestus, whence it was already night, but when day came they collected their ships which had been damaged and set up another trophy near the former one.​29 2 And Mindarus about the first watch of the night set out to Abydus, where he repaired his ships that had been damaged and sent word to the Lacedaemonians for reinforcements of both soldiers and ships; for he  p251 had in mind, while the fleet was being made ready, to lay siege with the army together with Pharnabazus to the cities in Asia which were allied with the Athenians.

3 The people of Chalcis and almost all the rest of the inhabitants of Euboea had revolted from the Athenians​30 and were therefore highly apprehensive lest, living as they did on an island, they should be forced to surrender to the Athenians, who were masters of the sea; and they therefore asked the Boeotians to join with them in building a causeway across the Euripus and thereby joining Euboea to Boeotia.​31 4 The Boeotians agreed to this, since it was to their special advantage that Euboea should be an island to everybody else but a part of the mainland to themselves. Consequently all the cities threw themselves vigorously into the building of the causeway and vied with one another; for orders were issued not only to the citizens to report en masse but to the foreigners dwelling among them as well, so that by reason of the great number that came forward to the work the proposed task was speedily completed. 5 On Euboea the causeway was built at Chalcis, and in Boeotia in the neighbourhood of Aulis, since at that place the channel was narrowest. Now it so happened that in former times also there had always been a current in that place and that the sea frequently reversed its course, and at the time in question the force of the current was far greater because the sea had been confined into a very narrow channel; for passage was left for only a single ship. High towers were also  p253 built on both ends and wooden bridges were thrown over the channel.​a

6 Theramenes, who had been dispatched by the Athenians with thirty ships, at first attempted to stop the workers, but since a strong body of soldiers was at the side of the builders of the causeway, he abandoned this design and directed his voyage toward the islands.​32 7 And since he wished to relieve both the citizens and the allies from their contributions,​33 he laid waste the territory of the enemy and collected great quantities of booty. He visited also the allied cities and exacted money of such inhabitants as were advocating a change in government. 8 And when he put in at Paros and found an oligarchy in the city, he restored their freedom to the people and exacted a great sum of money of the men who had participated in the oligarchy.

48 1 It happened at this time that a serious civil strife occurred in Corcyra accompanied by massacre, which is said to have been due to various causes but most of all to the mutual hatred that existed between its own inhabitants. 2 For never in any state have there taken place such murderings of citizens nor have there been greater quarrelling and contentiousness which culminated in bloodshed.​34 For it would seem that the number of those who were slain by their fellow citizens before the present civil strife was some fifteen hundred, and all of these were leading citizens. 3 And although these misfortunes had already befallen them, Fortune brought upon them a second disaster, in that she increased once more the disaffection which prevailed  p255 among them. For the foremost Corcyraeans, who desired the oligarchy, favoured the cause of the Lacedaemonians, whereas the masses which favoured the democracy were eager to ally themselves with the Athenians. 4 For the peoples who were struggling for leader­ship in Greece were devoted to opposing principles; the Lacedaemonians, for example, made it their policy to put the control of the government in the hands of the leading citizens of their allied states, whereas the Athenians regularly established democracies in their cities. 5 Accordingly the Corcyraeans, seeing that their most influential citizens were planning to hand the city over to the Lacedaemonians, sent to the Athenians for an army to protect their city. 6 And Conon, the general of the Athenians, sailed to Corcyra and left in the city six hundred men from the Messenians in Naupactus,​35 while he himself sailed on with his ships and cast anchor off the sacred precinct of Hera. 7 And the six hundred, setting out unexpectedly with the partisans of the people's party at the time of full market​36 against the supporters of the Lacedaemonians, arrested some of them, slew others, and drove more than a thousand from the state; they also set the slaves free and gave citizen­ship to the foreigners living among them as a precaution against the great number and influence of the exiles. 8 Now the men who had been exiled from their country fled to the opposite mainland; but a few days later some people still in the city who favoured the cause of the exiles seized the market-place, called back the exiles, and essayed  p257 a final decision of the struggle. When night brought an end to the fighting they came to an agreement with each other, stopped their quarrelling, and resumed living together as one people on their fatherland.

Such, then, was the end of the massacre in Corcyra.

49 1 Archelaus, the king of the Macedonians,​37 since the people of Pydna would not obey his orders, laid siege to the city with a great army. He received reinforcement also from Theramenes, who brought a fleet; but he, as the siege dragged of, sailed to Thrace, where he joined Thrasybulus who was commander of the entire fleet. 2 Archelaüs now pressed the siege of Pydna more vigorously, and after reducing it he removed the city some twenty stades distant from the sea.

Mindarus, when winter had come to an end, collected his triremes from all quarters, for many had come to him from the Peloponnesus as well as from the other allies. But the Athenian generals in Sestus, when they learned of the great size of the fleet that was being assembled by the enemy, were greatly alarmed lest they, attacking with all their triremes, should capture their ships. 3 Consequently the generals on their side hauled down the ships they had at Sestus, sailed around the Chersonesus, and moored them at Cardia;​38 and they sent triremes to Thrasybulus and Theramenes in Thrace, urging them to come with their fleet as soon as possible, and they summoned Alcibiades also from Lesbos with what ships he had. And the whole fleet was gathered into  p259 one place, the generals being eager for a decisive battle. 4 Mindarus, the Lacedaemonian general, sailing to Cyzicus, disembarked his whole force and invested the city. Pharnabazus was also there with a large army and with his aid Mindarus laid siege to Cyzicus and took it by storm.

5 The Athenian generals, having decided to sail to Cyzicus, put out to sea with all their ships and sailed around the Chersonesus. They arrived first at Eleüs; and after that they made a special point of sailing past the city of Abydus at night, in order that the great number of their vessels might not be known to the enemy. 6 And when they had arrived at Proconnesus,​39 they spent the night there and the next day they disembarked the soldiers who had shipped with them on the territory of the Cyzicenes and gave orders to Chaereas, their commander, to lead the army against the city.

50 1 As for the generals themselves, they divided the naval force into three squadrons, Alcibiades commanding one, Theramenes another, and Thrasybulus the third. Now Alcibiades with his own squadron advanced far ahead of the others, wishing to draw the Lacedaemonians out to a battle, whereas Theramenes and Thrasybulus planned the manoeuvre of encircling the enemy and, if they sailed out, of blocking their retreat to the city. 2 Mindarus, seeing only the ships of Alcibiades approaching, twenty in number, and having no knowledge of the others, held them in contempt and boldly set sail from the city with eighty  p261 ships to attack him. Then, when he had come near the ships of Alcibiades, the Athenians, as they had been commanded, pretended to flee, and the Peloponnesians, in high spirits, pursued after them vigorously in the belief they were winning the victory. 3 But after Alcibiades had drawn them a considerable distance from the city, he raised the signal; and when this was given, the ships of Alcibiades suddenly at the same time turned about to face the enemy, and Theramenes and Thrasybulus sailed toward the city and cut off the retreat of the Lacedaemonians. 4 The troops of Mindarus, when they now observed multitude of the enemy ships and realized that they had been outgeneralled, were filled with great fear. And finally, since the Athenians were appearing from every direction and had shut off the Peloponnesians from their line of approach to the city, Mindarus was forced to seek safety on land near Cleri, as it is called, where also Pharnabazus had his army. 5 Alcibiades, pursuing him vigorously, sank some ships, damaged and captured others, and the largest number, which were moored on the land itself, he seized and threw grappling-irons on, endeavouring by this means to drag them from the land. 6 And when the infantry of Pharnabazus rushed to the aid of the Lacedaemonians, there was great bloodshed, inasmuch as the Athenians because of the advantage they had won were fighting with greater boldness than expediency, while the Peloponnesians were in number far superior; for the army of Pharnabazus was supporting the Lacedaemonians and fighting as it was from the land the  p263 position it had was more secure. 7 But when Thrasybulus saw the infantry aiding the enemy, he put the rest of his marines on the land with intent to assist Alcibiades and his men, and he also urged Theramenes to join up with the land troops of Chaereas and come with all sped, in order to wage a battle on land.

51 1 While the Athenians were busying themselves with these matters, Mindarus, the Lacedaemonian commander, was himself fighting with Alcibiades for the ships that were being dragged off, and he dispatched Clearchus the Spartan with a part of the Peloponnesians against the troops with Thrasybulus; and with him he also sent the mercenaries in the army of Pharnabazus. 2 Thrasybulus with the marines and archers at first stoutly withstood the enemy, and though he slew many of them, he also saw not a few his own men falling; but when the mercenaries of Pharnabazus were surrounding the Athenians and were crowding about them in great numbers from every direction, Theramenes appeared, leading both his own troops and the infantry with Chaereas. 3 Although the troops of Thrasybulus were exhausted and had given up hope of rescue, their spirits were suddenly revived again when reinforcements so strong were at hand. 4 An obstinate battle which lasted a long time ensued; but at first the mercenaries of Pharnabazus began to withdraw and the continuity of their battle line was broken; and finally the Peloponnesians who had been left behind with Clearchus, after having both inflicted and suffered much punishment, were expelled.

5 Now that the Peloponnesians had been defeated,  p265 the troops of Theramenes rushed to give aid to the soldiers who had been fighting under Alcibiades. Although the forces had rapidly assembled at one point, Mindarus was not dismayed at the attack of Theramenes, but, after dividing the Peloponnesians, with half of them he met the advancing enemy, while with the other half which he himself commanded, first calling upon each soldier not to disgrace the fair name of Sparta, and that too in a fight on land, he formed a line against the troops of Alcibiades. 6 He put up a heroic battle about the ships, fighting in person before all his troops, but though he slew many of the opponents, in the end he was killed by the troops of Alcibiades as he battled nobly for his fatherland. When he had fallen, both the Peloponnesians and all allies banded together and broke into terror-stricken flight. 7 The Athenians pursued the enemy for a distance, but when they learned that Pharnabazus was hurrying up at full speed with a strong force of cavalry, they returned to the ships, and after they had taken the city​40 they set up two trophies for the two victories, one for the sea-battle at the island of Polydorus, as it is called, and one for the land-battle where they forced the first flight of the enemy. 8 Now the Peloponnesians in the city and all the fugitives from the battle fled to the camp of Pharnabazus; and the Athenian generals not only captured all the ships but they also took many prisoners and an immeasurable  p267 quantity of booty, since they had won the victory at the same time over two armaments of such size.41

52 1 When the news of the victory came to Athens, the people, contemplating the unexpected good fortune which had come to the city after their former disasters, were elated over their successes and the populace in a body offered sacrifices to the gods and gathered in festive assemblies; and for the war they selected from their most stalwart men one thousand hoplites and one hundred horsemen, and in addition to these they dispatched thirty triremes to Alcibiades, in order that, now that they dominated the sea, they might lay waste with impunity the cities which favoured the Lacedaemonians. 2 The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, when they heard of the disaster they had suffered at Cyzicus, sent ambassadors to Athens to treat for peace, the chief of whom was Endius.​42 When permission was given him, he took the floor and spoke succinctly and in the terse fashion of Laconians, and for this reason I have decided not to omit the speech as he delivered it.

3 "We want to be at peace with you, men of Athens, and that each party should keep the cities which it now possesses and cease to maintain its garrisons in the other's territory, and that our captives be ransomed, one Laconian for one Athenian. We are not unmindful that the war is hurtful to both of us, but far more to you. 4 Never mind the words I use but learn from the facts. As for us, we till the entire  p269 Peloponnesus, but you only a small part​43 of Attica. While to the Laconians the war has brought many allies, from the Athenians it has taken away as many as it has given to their enemies. For us the richest king to be found in the inhabited world​44 defrays the cost of the war, for you the most poverty-stricken folk of the inhabited world. 5 Consequently our troops, in view of their generous pay, make war with spirit, while your soldiers, because they pay the war-taxes out of their own pockets, shrink from both the hardships and the costs of war. 6 In the second place, when we make war at sea, we risk losing only hulls among resources of the state, while you have on board crews most of whom are citizens. And, what is the most important, even if we meet defeat in our actions at sea, we still maintain without dispute the mastery on land — for a Spartan foot-soldier does not even know what flight means — but you, if you are driven from the sea, contend, not for the supremacy on land, but for survival.

7 "It remains for me to show you why, despite so many and great advantages we possess in the fighting, we urge you to make peace. I do not affirm that Sparta is profiting from the war, but only that she is suffering less than the Athenians. Only fools find satisfaction in sharing the misfortunes of their enemies, when it is in their power to make no trial whatsoever of misfortune. For the destruction of the enemy brings no joy that can balance the gift caused by  p271 the distress of one's own people. 8 And not for these reasons alone are we eager to come to terms, but because we hold fast to the custom of our fathers; for when we consider the many terrible sufferings which are caused by the rivalries which accompany war, we believe we should make it clear in the sight of all gods and men that we are least responsible of all men for such things."

53 1 After the Laconian had made these and similar representations, the sentiments of the most reasonable men among the Athenians inclined toward the peace, but those who made it their practice to foment war and to turn disturbances in the state to their personal profit chose the war. 2 A supporter of this sentiment was, among others, Cleophon, who was the most influential leader of the populace at this time. He, taking the floor and arguing at length on the question in his own fashion, buoyed up the people, citing the magnitude of their military successes, as if indeed it is not the practice of Fortune to adjudge the advantages in war now to one side and now to the other. 3 Consequently the Athenians, after taking unwise counsel, repented of it when it could do them no good, and, deceived as they were by words spoken in flattery, they made a blunder so vital that never again at any time were they able truly to recover. 4 But these events, which took place at a later date, will be described in connection with the period of time to which they belong; at the time we are discussing the Athenians, being elated by their successes and entertaining many great hopes because they had Alcibiades as the leader of their armed forces, thought that they had quickly won back their supremacy.

54 1 When the events of this year had come to an  p273 end, in Athens Diocles took over the chief office,​45 and in Rome Quintus Fabius and Gaius Furius held the consul­ship. At this time Hannibal, the general of the Carthaginians, gathered together both the mercenaries he had collected from Iberia and the soldiers he had enrolled from Libya, manned sixty ships of war, and made ready some fifteen hundred transports. 2 On these he loaded the troops, the siege-engines, missiles, and all the other accessories. After crossing with the fleet the Libyan Sea he came to land in Sicily on the promontory which lies opposite Libya and is called Lilybaeum; 3 and at that very time some Selinuntian cavalry were tarrying in those regions, and having seen the great size of the fleet as it came to land, they speedily informed their fellow citizens of the presence of the enemy. The Selinuntians at once dispatched their letter-carriers to the Syracusans, asking their aid; 4 and Hannibal disembarked his troops and pitched a camp, beginning at the well which in those times had the name Lilybaeum, and many years after these events, when a city was founded near it,​46 the presence of the well occasioned the giving of the name to the city.​47 5 Hannibal had all told, as Ephorus has recorded, two hundred thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, but as Timaeus says, not many more than one hundred thousand men. His ships he hauled up on land in the bay about Motyê,​48 every one of them, wishing to give the Syracusans the impression that he had not come to make war upon them or to sail along  p275 the coast with his naval force against Syracuse. 6 And after adding to his army the soldiers supplied by the Aegestaeans and by the other allies he broke camp and made his way from Lilybaeum toward Selinus. And when he came to the Mazarus River, he took at the first assault the trading-station situated by it, and when he arrived before the city, he divided his army into two parts; then, after he had invested the city and put his siege-engines in position, he began the assaults with all speed. 7 He set up six towers of exceptional size and advanced an equal number of battering-rams plated with iron against the walls; furthermore, by employing his archers and slingers in great numbers he beat back the fighters on the battlements.

55 1 The Selinuntians, who had for a long time been without experience in sieges and had been the only Sicilian Greeks to fight on the side of the Carthaginians in the war against Gelon,​49 had never conceived that they would be brought to such a state of fear by the people whom they had befriended. 2 But when they saw the great size of the engines of war and the hosts of the enemy, they were filled with dread and dismayed at the magnitude of the danger threatening them. 3 However, they did not totally despair of their deliverance, but in the expectation that the Syracusans and their other allies would soon arrive, the whole populace fought off the enemy from the walls. 4 Indeed all the men in the prime of life were armed and battled desperately, while the older men busied themselves with the supplies and, as they made the rounds of the wall, begged the young men not to allow them to fall under subjection to the  p277 enemy; and women and girls supplied the food and mills to the defenders of the fatherland, counting as naught the modesty and the sense of shame which they cherished in time of peace. 5 Such consternation prevailed that the magnitude of the emergency called for even the aid of their women.

Hannibal, who had promised the soldiers that he would give them the city to pillage, pushed the siege-engines forward and assaulted the walls in waves with his best soldiers. 6 And all together the trumpets sounded the signal for attack and at one command the army of the Carthaginians as a body raised the war-cry, and by the power of the rams the walls were shaken, while by reason of the height of the towers the fighters on them slew many of the Selinuntians. 7 For in the long period of peace they had enjoyed they had given no attention whatever even to their walls and of so they were easily subdued, since the wooden towers far excelled the walls in height. When the wall fell the Campanians, being eager to accomplish some outstanding feat, broke swiftly into the city. 8 Now at the outset they struck terror into their opponents, who were few in number; but after that, when many gathered to the aid of the defenders, they were thrust out with heavy losses among their own soldiers; for since they had forced a passage when the wall had not yet been completely cleared and in their attack had fallen foul of difficult terrain, they were easily overcome. At nightfall the Carthaginians broke off the assault.

56 1 The Selinuntians, picking out their best horsemen, dispatched them at once by night, some to  p279 Acragas, and others to Gela and Syracuse, asking them to come to their aid with all speed, since their city could not withstand the strength of the enemy for any great time. 2 Now the Acragantini and Geloans waited for the Syracusans, since they wished to lead their troops as one body against the Carthaginians; and the Syracusans, on learning the facts about the siege, first stopped the war they were engaged in with the Chalcidians and then spent some time in gathering the troops from the countryside and making great preparations, thinking that the city might be forced by siege to surrender but would not be taken by storm.

3 Hannibal, when the night had passed, at daybreak launched assaults from every side, and the part of the city's wall which had already fallen and the portion of the wall next the breach he broke down with the siege-engines. 4 He then cleared the area of the fallen part of the wall and, attacking in relays of his best troops, gradually forced out the Selinuntians; it was not possible, however, to overpower by force men who were fighting for their very existence. 5 Both sides suffered heavy losses, but for the Carthaginians fresh troops kept taking over the fighting, while for the Selinuntians there was no reserve to come to their support. The siege continued for nine days with unsurpassed stubbornness, and in the event the Carthaginians suffered and inflicted many terrible injuries. 6 When the Iberians mounted where the wall had fallen, the women who were on the house-tops raised a great cry, whereupon the Selinuntians, thinking that the city was being taken, were struck with terror, and  p281 leaving the walls they gathered in bands at the entrances of the narrow alleys, endeavoured to barricade the streets, and held off the enemy for a long time. 7 And as the Carthaginians pressed the attack, the multitudes of women and children took refuge on the housetops whence they threw both stones and tiles on the enemy. For a long time the Carthaginians came off badly, being unable either, because of the walls of the houses, to surround the men in the alleys or, because of those hurling at them from the roofs, to fight it out on equal terms. 8 However, as the struggle went on until the afternoon, the missiles of the fighters from the houses were exhausted, whereas the troops of the Carthaginians, which constantly relieved those which were suffering heavily, continued the fighting in fresh condition. Finally, since the troops within the walls were being steadily reduced in number and the enemy entered the city in ever-increasing strength, the Selinuntians were forced out of the alleys.

57 1 And so, while the city was being taken, there was to be observed among the Greeks lamentation and weeping, and among the barbarians there was cheering and commingled outcries; for the former, as their eyes looked upon the great disaster which surrounded them, were filled with terror, while the latter, elated by their successes, urged on their comrades to slaughter. 2 The Selinuntians gathered into the market-place and all who reached it died fighting there; and the barbarians, scattering throughout the entire city, plundered whatever of value was to be found in the dwellings, while of the inhabitants they  p283 found in them some they burned together with their homes and when others struggled into the streets, without distinction of sex or age but whether infant children or women or old men, they put them to the sword, showing no sign of compassion. 3 They mutilated even the dead according to the practice of their people, some carrying bunches of hands which they had spitted upon their javelins and spears.​50 Such women as they found to have taken refuge together with their children in the temples they called upon their comrades not to kill, and to these alone did they give assurance of their lives. 4 This they did, however, not out of pity for the unfortunate people, but because they feared lest the women, despairing of their lives, would burn down the temples, and thus they would not be able to make booty of the great wealth which was stored up in them as dedications. 5 To such a degree did the barbarians surpass all other men in cruelty, that whereas the rest of mankind spare those who seek refuge in the sanctuaries from the desire not to commit sacrilege against the deity, the Carthaginians, on the contrary, would refrain from laying hands on the enemy in order that they might plunder the temples of their gods. 6 By nightfall the city had been sacked, and of the dwellings some had been burned and others razed to the ground, while the whole area was filled with blood and corpses. Sixteen thousand was the sum of the inhabitants who were found to have fallen, not counting the more than five thousand who had been taken captive.

58 1 The Greeks serving as allies of the Carthaginians, as they contemplated the reversal in the lives of the hapless Selinuntians, felt pity at their lot. The  p285 women, deprived now of the pampered life they had enjoyed, spent the nights in the very midst of enemies' lasciviousness, enduring terrible indignities, and some were obliged to see their daughters of marriageable age suffering treatment improper for their years. 2 For the savagery of the barbarians spared neither free-born youths nor maidens, but exposed these unfortunates to dreadful disasters. Consequently, as the women reflected upon the slavery that would be their lot in Libya, as they saw themselves together with their children in a condition in which they possessed no legal rights and were subject to insolent treatment and thus compelled to obey masters, and as they noted that these masters used an unintelligible speech and had a bestial character, they mourned for their living children as dead, and receiving into their souls as a piercing wound each and every outrage committed against them, they became frantic with suffering and vehemently deplored their own fate; while as for their fathers and brothers who had died fighting for their country, them they counted blessed, since they had not witnessed any sight unworthy of their own valour. 3 The Selinuntians who had escaped capture, twenty-six hundred in number, made their way in safety to Acragas and there received all possible kindness; for Acragantini, after portioning out food to them at public expense, divided them for billeting among their homes, urging the private citizens, who were indeed eager enough, to supply them with every necessity of life.

59 1 While these events were taking place there arrived at Acragas three thousand picked soldiers from Syracusans, who had been dispatched in advance with all speed to bring aid. On learning of  p287 the fall of Selinus, they sent ambassadors to Hannibal urging him both to release the captives on the payment of ransom and to spare the temples of the gods. 2 Hannibal replied that the Selinuntians, having proved incapable of defending their freedom, would now undergo the experience of slavery, and that the gods had departed from Selinus, having become offended with its inhabitants. 3 However, since the fugitives had sent Empedion as an ambassador, to him Hannibal restored his possessions; for Empedion had always favoured the cause of the Carthaginians and before the siege had counselled the citizens not to go to war against the Carthaginians. Hannibal also graciously delivered up to him his kinsmen who were among the captives and to the Selinuntians who had escaped he gave permission to dwell in the city and to cultivate its fields upon payment of tribute to the Carthaginians.

4 Now this city was taken after it had been inhabited from its founding for a period of two hundred and forty-two years. And Hannibal, after destroying the walls of Selinus, departed with his whole army to Himera, being especially bent on razing this city to the ground. 5 For it was this city which had caused his father to be exiled and before its walls his grandfather Hamilcar had been out-generalled by Gelon and then met his end,​51 and with him one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers had perished and no fewer than these had been taken captive. 6 These were the reasons why Hannibal was eager to exact punishment, and with forty thousand men he pitched camp upon some hills not far from the city, while with the rest of his entire army he invested the city, twenty thousand additional soldiers from both Siceli and  p289 Sicani having joined him. 7 Setting up his siege-engines he shook the walls at a number of points, and since he pressed the battle with waves of troops in great strength, he wore down the defenders, especially since his soldiers were elated by their successes. 8 He also set about undermining the walls, which he then shored up with wooden supports, and when these were set on fire, a large section of the wall soon fell. Thereupon there ensued a most bitter battle, one side struggling to force its way inside the wall and the other fearing lest they should suffer the same fate as the Selinuntians. 9 Consequently, since the defenders put up a struggle to the death on behalf of children and parents and the fatherland which all men fight to defend, the barbarians were thrust out and the section of the wall quickly restored. To their aid came also the Syracusans from Acragas and troops from their other allies, some four thousand in all, who were under the command of Diocles the Syracusan.

60 1 At that juncture, when night brought an end to all further striving for victory, the Carthaginians abandoned the attack. And when day came, the Himeraeans decided not to allow themselves to be shut in and surrounded in this ignominious manner, as were the Selinuntians, and so they stationed guards on the walls and led out of the city the rest of their soldiers together with the allies who had arrived, some ten thousand men. 2 And by engaging the enemy thus unexpectedly, they threw the barbarians into consternation, thinking as they did that allied forces had arrived to aid those who were penned in by the siege. And because the Himeraeans were far superior in deeds of daring and of skill, and especially because their single hope of safety lay in their prevailing  p291 in the battle, at the outset they slew the first opponents. 3 And since the multitude of the barbarians thronged together in great disorder because they never would have expected that the besieged would dare such a move, they were under no little disadvantage; for when eighty thousand men streamed together without order into one place, the result was that the barbarians clashed with each other and suffered more heavily from themselves than from the enemy. 4 The Himeraeans, having as spectators on the walls parents and children as well as all their relatives, spent their own lives unsparingly for the salvation of them all. 5 And since they fought brilliantly, the barbarians, dismayed by their deeds of daring and unexpected resistance, turned in flight. They fled in disorder to the troops encamped on the hills, and the Himeraeans pressed hard upon them, crying out to each other to take no man captive, and they slew more than six thousand of them, according to Timaeus, or, as Ephorus states, more than twenty thousand. 6 But Hannibal, seeing that his men were becoming exhausted, brought down his troops who were encamped on the hills, and reinforcing his beaten soldiers caught the Himeraeans in disorder as they were pushing the pursuit. 7 In the fierce battle which ensued the main body of the Himeraeans turned in flight, but three thousand of them who tried to oppose the Carthaginian army, though they accomplished great deeds, were slain to a man.

61 1 This battle had already come to an end when there arrived at Himera from the Sicilian Greeks the twenty-five triremes which had previously been sent  p293 to aid the Lacedaemonians​52 but at this time had returned from the campaign. 2 And a report also spread through the city that the Syracusans en masse together with their allies were on the march to the aid of the Himeraeans and that Hannibal was planning to man his triremes in Motyê with his choicest troops and, sailing to Syracuse, seize that city while it was stripped of its defenders. 3 Consequently Diocles, who commanded the forces in Himera, advised the admirals of the fleet to set sail with all speed for Syracuse, in order that it might not happen that the city should be taken by storm while its best troops were fighting a war abroad. 4 They decided, therefore, that their best course was to abandon the city, and that they should embark half the populace on the triremes (for these would convey them until they had got beyond Himeraean territory) and with the other half keep guard until the triremes should return. 5 Although the Himeraeans complained indignantly at this conclusion, since there was no other course they could take, the triremes were hastily loaded by night with a mixed throng of women and children and of other inhabitants also, who sailed on them as far as Messenê; 6 and Diocles, taking his own soldiers and leaving behind the bodies of those who had fallen in the fighting, set forth upon the journey home.​53 And many Himeraeans with children and wives set out with Diocles, since the triremes could not carry the whole populace.

62 1 Those who had been left behind in Himera spent the night under arms on the walls; and when  p295 with the coming of day the Carthaginians surrounded the city and launched repeated attacks, the remaining Himeraeans fought with no thought for their lives, expecting the arrival of the ships. 2 For that day, therefore, they continued to hold out, but on the next, even when the triremes were already in sight, it so happened that the wall began to fall before the blows of the siege-engines and the Iberians to pour in a body into the city. Some of the barbarians thereupon would hold off the Himeraeans who rushed up to bring aid, while others, gaining command of the walls, would help their comrades get in. 3 Now that the city had been taken by storm, for a long time the barbarians continued, with no sign of compassion, to slaughter everyone they seized. 4 But when Hannibal issued orders to take prisoners, although the slaughter stopped, the wealth of the dwellings now became the objects of plunder. Hannibal, after sacking the temples and dragging out the suppliants who had fled to them for safety, set them afire, and the city he razed to the ground, two hundred and forty years after its founding. Of the captives the women and children he distributed among the army and kept them under guard, but the men whom he took captive, some three thousand, he led to the spot where once his grandfather Hamilcar had been slain by Gelon​54 and after torturing them put them all to death. 5 After this, breaking up his army, he sent the Sicilian allies back to their countries, and accepting them also were the Campanians, who bitterly complained to the Carthaginians that, though they had been the ones chiefly responsible for the Carthaginian successes, the rewards they had received were not a fair return  p297 for their accomplishments. 6 Then Hannibal embarked his army on the warships and merchant vessels, and leaving behind sufficient troops for the needs of his allies he set sail from Sicily. And when he arrived at Carthage with much booty, the whole city came out to meet him, paying him homage and honour as one who in a brief time had performed greater deeds than any general before him.

63 1 Hermocrates the Syracusan arrived in Sicily. This man, who had served as general in the war against the Athenians and had been of great service to his country, had acquired the greatest influence among the Syracusans, but afterwards, when he had been sent as admiral in command of thirty-five triremes to support the Lacedaemonians,​55 he was overpowered by his political opponents and, upon being condemned to exile, he handed over the fleet in the Peloponnesus​56 to the men who had been dispatched to succeed him. 2 And since he had struck up a friendship with Pharnabazus, the satrap of the Persians, as a result of the campaign, he accepted from him a great sum of money with which, after he had arrived at Messenê, he had five triremes built and hired a thousand soldiers. 3 Then, after adding to this force also above a thousand of the Himeraeans who had been driven from their home, he endeavoured with the aid of his friends to make good his return to Syracuse; but when he failed in this design, he set out through the middle of the island and seizing Selinus he built a wall about a part of the city and called to him from all quarters the Selinuntians who  p299 were still alive.​57 4 He also received many others into the place and thus gathered a force of six thousand picked warriors. Making Selinus his base he first laid waste the territory of the inhabitants of Motyê​58 and defeating in battle those who came out from the city against him he slew many and pursued the rest within the wall of the city. After this he ravaged the territory of the people of Panormus​59 and acquired countless booty, and when the inhabitants offered battle en masse before the city he slew about five hundred of them and shut up the rest within their walls. 5 And since he also laid waste in like fashion all the rest of the territory in the hands of the Carthaginians, he won the commendation of the Sicilian Greeks. And among other things the majority of the Syracusans also repented of their treatment of him, realizing that Hermocrates had been banished contrary to the merits of his valour. 6 Consequently, after much discussion of him in meetings of the assembly, it was evident that the people desired to receive the man back from exile, and Hermocrates, on hearing of the talk about himself that was current in Syracuse, laid careful plans regarding his return from exile, knowing that his political opponents would work against it.

Such was the course of events in Sicily.

The Loeb Editor's Notes:

1 Diodorus is most sketchy at this point and in the repetitive passage in chap. 36. A Peloponnesian fleet had been lying off Salamis, possibly hoping to be able to attack the Peiraeus in the midst of the political confusion in Athens; it had then sailed on to Euboea, which was of the utmost importance to Athens now that all Attica was exposed to the Spartan troops stationed in Deceleia. See Thucydides, 8.94‑95.

2 In 402 B.C.; cp. Book 14.18.

3 Cicero (ad Att. 14.12), writing in April, 43 B.C., states that this was an act of Antony, based upon a law of Caesar's presumably passed by the Roman people. Nothing can have come of it, since Sextus Pompeius held the island by late 43 B.C. and lost it to Augustus, who showed no interest in extending Roman citizen­ship to the provinces on such a wholesale scale. Pliny in his sketch of Sicily (3.88‑91) lists, shortly before A.D. 79, several different degrees of civic status for the cities of the island.

4 In 339 B.C.: cp. Book 16.82.

5 Hiero was given the title of "King" in 270 B.C. and probably bore it until his death in 216.

6 Cp. chap. 33.

7 Cp. chap. 36.5.

8 This step was the government of the Five Thousand in place of the oligarchy of the Four Hundred. The old democracy was restored the following year.

9 On the Asian side at the very entrance of the Hellespont.

10 Directly opposite Sigeium.

11 Some eight miles up the Hellespont from the entrance.

12 Also called "Hecabê's Monument" and "Bitch's Monument" (Strabo, 7.55; the Cynossema of the Romans, modern Cape Volpo), because one account states that Hecabê (Hecuba) was metamorphosed into a bitch (cp. Euripides, Hec. 1273).

13 According to Thucydides (8.81) this meeting between Alcibiades and the Athenian fleet took place before the naval battle.

14 The Assembly in Athens.

15 The island of Cos.

16 Just outside the Troad to the south-east.

17 Of Persians (Thucydides, 8.108).

18 i.e. with this year.

19 Modern editions recognize eight Books.

20 The Hellenica of Xenophon covers the years 411‑362 B.C., ending with the battle of Mantineia, and the Hellenica of Theopompus, which is not extant, included the years 410‑394 B.C.

21 Cp. Book 12.82.

22 As one of the two annually elected suffetes, somewhat similar to the Roman consuls. Evidently Diodorus preferred not to use the unfamiliar title.

23 Cp. Book 11.21‑22.

24 Of Sicily.

25 More accurately, the Libyan mercenaries mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

26 Cp. chap. 38.5; Thucydides, 8.44.

27 Some ten miles inside the Hellespont on the Asian side.

28 Cp. chap. 37.4 f.

29 Cp. chap. 40.6.

30 Soon after the Athenian disaster at Syracuse (Thucydides, 8.95).

31 Strabo (9.2.2) quotes Ephorus to the effect that a bridge only two plethra (202 ft.) long spanned the Euripus at Chalcis.

32 i.e. of the Athenian Confederacy.

33 Toward the cost of the war with the Lacedaemonians.

34 Thucydides (3.70 ff.) describes the earlier civil strife on the island.

35 These Messenians had been allowed by the Spartans to leave their country and had been settled in Naupactus by the Athenian general Tolmides in 456 B.C. (cp. Book 11.84).

36 In the middle of the morning.

37 413‑399 B.C. He was a great admirer of Greek culture and Euripides was but one of many distinguished Greeks whom he invited to his kingdom.

38 On the north side of the Chersonesus on the Gulf of Melas.

39 The island of Marmora.

40 Cyzicus.

41 The despair of the Lacedaemonians a such a disaster is portrayed in the letter from the vice-admiral to Sparta which is given by Xenophon (Hell. 1.1.23) and ran as follows: "The ships are gone. Mindarus is dead. The men are starving. We know not what to do."

42 Endius, an ex‑ephor, was an hereditary friend of Alcibiades and had served before on such a mission (Thuc. 5.44.3; 8.6.3).

43 From Deceleia, some 13 miles north and a little east of Athens, which the Lacedaemonians had seized and fortified, they could raid the larger part of Attica.

44 The king of Persia, who was contributing to the maintenance of the Peloponnesian fleet, but not as yet so generously as toward the end of the war.

45 Of archon.

46 In 396 B.C.

47 The city of Lilybaeum.

48 The bay and island of the same name lie a little north of Lilybaeum.

See the photogazetteer pages at Livus.

49 Cp. Book 11.21.

50 Cp. Book 5.29 for the custom of the Gauls of preserving heads of warriors they had conquered.

51 Cp. Book 11.21 f.

52 Cp. chaps. 34.4; 40.5; 63.1.

53 To Syracuse.

54 Cp. Book 11.22.

55 Cp. chap. 34.4.

56 Xenophon (Hell. 1.1.31) states that the new commanders took over the Syracusan ships and troops at Miletus.

57 Hermocrates is carrying on his own war against that part of Sicily held by the Carthaginians.

58 Cp. chap. 54.5.

59 Modern Palermo.

Thayer's Note:

a The Greek text actually has καὶ ξυλίνας τοῖς διάρροις ἐπέστησαν γεφύραςchannels in the plural; see Strabo, IX.2.8 and note 72.

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