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This webpage reproduces a portion of
The Library of History

Diodorus Siculus

published in Vol. VII
of the Loeb Classical Library edition, 1952

The text is in the public domain.

This page has been carefully proofread
and I believe it to be free of errors.
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please let me know!


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(Vol. VI) Diodorus Siculus
Library of History

(Book XV, continued)

 p3  20 1 When Evander was archon at Athens, the Romans elected six​1 military tribunes with consular power, Quintus Sulpicius, Gaius Fabius, Quintus Servilius, Publius Cornelius. During their term of office, the Lacedaemonians took possession of the Cadmeia in Thebes for the following reasons. Seeing that Boeotia had a large number of cities and that her inhabitants were men of outstanding valour, while Thebes,​2 still retaining her renown of ancient times, was, generally speaking, the citadel of Boeotia, they were mindful of the danger that Thebes, if a suitable occasion arose, might claim the leader­ship of Greece. 2 Accordingly the Spartans gave secret instructions3  p5 to their commanders, if ever they found an opportunity, to take possession of the Cadmeia. Acting under these instructions, Phoebidas the Spartan, who had been assigned to a command and was leading an expeditionary force against Olynthus, seized the Cadmeia.​4 When the Thebans, resenting this act, gathered under arms, he joined battle with them and after defeating them exiled three hundred of the most eminent Thebans. Then after he had terrorized the rest and had stationed a strong garrison in the Cadmeia, he went off on his own business. For this act the Lacedaemonians, being now discredited in the eyes of the Greeks,​5 punished Phoebidas with a fine but would not remove the garrison from Thebes. 3 So the Thebans in this way lost their independence and were compelled to take orders from the Lacedaemonians. As the Olynthians continued the war against Amyntas,​6 king of the Macedonians, the Lacedaemonians relieved Phoebidas of his command, and installed Phoebidas' brother Eudamidas as general. Giving him three thousand hoplites, they dispatched him to carry on the war against the Olynthians.

21 1 Eudamidas​7 struck into the territory of the Olynthians and, in conjunction with Amyntas, continued to wage war upon the Olynthians. Thereupon  p7 the Olynthians, who had collected a considerable force, had the better in the field because they had more soldiers than the enemy; but the Lacedaemonians, having made ready a considerable force, appointed Teleutias general in charge of it. Teleutias was brother of King Agesilaüs and was greatly admired for his valour by his fellow citizens. 2 He accordingly set out from the Peloponnese with an army and on arriving near the territory of the Olynthians took over the soldiers commanded by Eudamidas. Being now a match for the enemy, he began by plundering the Olynthian territory and dividing among his troops the booty that he had collected; but when the Olynthians and their allies in full force took the field, he gave battle. At first they drew apart after an even contest, but later a stubborn battle was fought in which Teleutias himself fell after a splendid fight and the Lacedaemonians lost more than twelve hundred men.​8 3 After the Olynthians had met with so remarkable a success, the Lacedaemonians, wishing to repair the loss they had sustained, prepared to send out more numerous forces, while the Olynthians, judging that the Spartans would come with larger forces and that the war would last for a long time, prepared large supplies of grain and procured additional soldiers from their allies.

22 1 When Demophilus was archon at Athens, the Romans elected as military tribunes military tribune with consular power Publius Cornelius, Lucius Verginius, Lucius Papirius, Marcus Furius, Valerius, Aulus Manlius,  p9 Lucius and Postumius. 2 During their term of office the Lacedaemonians appointed as general Agesipolis their king, gave him an adequate army, and voted to make war on the Olynthians.​9 On his arrival in Olynthian territory, he took under his command the soldiers previously encamped there and continued the war against the inhabitants. The Olynthians, however, engaged in no important battle this year, but to the end fought only by exchanges of missiles and short engagements, being in awe of the strength of the king's army.

23 1 At the close of the year Pythias was archon at Athens, and at Rome six military tribunes with consular power were elected, Titus Quinctius, Lucius Servilius, Lucius Julius, Aquilius, Lucius Lucretius, and Servius Sulpicius; and in this year the Eleians celebrated the hundredth Olympiad, at which Dionysodorus of Tarentum won the stadium race. 2 During their term of office Agesipolis, king of the Lacedaemonians, died of illness​10 after a reign of fourteen years; Cleombrotus his brother succeeded to the throne and reigned for nine years.​11 The Lacedaemonians appointed Polybiadas general and sent him to the war against the Olynthians. 3 He took over the forces, and, prosecuting the war vigorously and with able general­ship, was often superior. With ever-increasing success, after several victories, he reduced  p11 the Olynthians to a state of siege. In the end he thoroughly cowed his enemies and forced them to become subjects of the Lacedaemonians.​12 With the enrolment of the Olynthians in the Spartan alliance many other states likewise were eager to enlist under the Lacedaemonian standard. As a result the Lacedaemonians at this particular juncture reached their greatest power and won the overlord­ship of Greece on both land and sea.​13 4 For the Thebans were secured by a garrison; the Corinthians and the Argives were safely humbled as a result of the previous wars; the Athenians, because of their policy of occupying with colonists the lands of those whom they subdued,​14 had a bad reputation with the Greeks; the Lacedaemonians, however, had given their constant attention to securing a large population​15 and practice in the use of arms, and so were become an object of terror to all because of the strength of their following. 5 Consequently the greatest rulers of that time, the Persian King and Dionysius​16 the tyrant of Sicily, paid court to the Spartan overlord­ship and sought alliance with them.

24 1 When Nicon was archon at Athens, the Romans elected six military tribunes with consular power, Lucius Papirius, Gaius Servilius, Lucius Quinctius, Lucius Cornelius, Lucius Valerius, and Aulus Manlius.  p13 During their term of office the Carthaginians invaded Italy and restored their city to the Hipponiatae​17 who had been exiled from it, and, having gathered together all the refugees, they showed themselves very solicitous of their welfare. 2 After this a plague broke out among the inhabitants of Carthage which was so violent and took off so many of the Carthaginians that they risked losing their commanding position. For the Libyans, undervaluing them, seceded, and the Sardinians, thinking they now had an opportunity to oppose the Carthaginians, revolted, and, making common cause, attacked the Carthaginians. 3 And about the same time a supernatural disaster befell Carthage; for turmoils and fears and panicky disturbances constantly occurred throughout the city defying explanation; and many men rushed from their houses in arms, having the impression that enemies had burst into the city, and they fought constantly with one another as if with enemies, killing some and wounding others. Finally, after having propitiated the deity by sacrifices and with difficulty rid themselves of their misfortunes, they quickly subdued the Libyans and recovered the island of Sardinia.

25 1 When Nausinicus was archon at Athens, the Romans elected four military tribunes with consular power, Marcus Cornelius, Quintus Servilius, Marcus Furius, and Lucius Quinctius. During their term of  p15 office what is known as the Boeotian War broke out between the Lacedaemonians and the Boeotians for the following reasons. When the Lacedaemonians maintained a garrison unjustly in the Cadmeia and had exiled many important citizens, the exiles gathered together, secured the support of the Athenians, and returned by night to their native city. 2 Having first slain in their own houses those who favoured the Lacedaemonian cause, whom they surprised while still asleep,​18 they next rallied the citizens to the cause of freedom and obtained the co‑operation of all the Thebans. When the populace had quickly assembled under arms, at daybreak they attempted to assault the Cadmeia. 3 The Lacedaemonians who formed the garrison of the citadel, numbering with their allies not less than fifteen hundred, sent men to Sparta to announce the insurrection of the Thebans and to urge them to send help as soon as possible. Favoured by their position, they slew many of the attackers and wounded severely no small number. 4 The Thebans, anticipating the arrival of a large army from Greece to aid the Lacedaemonians, dispatched envoys to Athens to remind them that they too once aided in restoring the democracy of the Athenians at the time when the Athenians had been enslaved by the Thirty Tyrants,​19 and to request the Athenians to come with all their forces and assist them in reducing the Cadmeia before the arrival of the Lacedaemonians.

 p17  26 1 The Athenian people heard the ambassadors through to the end and voted​20 to dispatch immediately as large a force as possible for the liberation of Thebes, thus repaying their obligation for the former service and at the same time moved by a desire to win the Boeotians to their side and to have in them a powerful partner in the contest against the superiority of the Lacedaemonians. For the Boeotian was reputed to be inferior to none of the Greek nations in the number of its men and in military valour. 2 Finally Demophon, who had been made general, and had immediately raised a levy of five thousand hoplites and five hundred horse, on the following day at dawn led forth his troops from the city, and pressed on at full speed in an effort to outstrip the Lacedaemonians; but the Athenians none the less went on with their preparations for an expedition into Boeotia with all their forces in case of need. 3 Demophon by taking cross-country paths appeared unexpectedly before Thebes. And since many soldiers likewise came hurriedly together from the other cities of Boeotia, there was quickly assembled a great army for the support of the Thebans. 4 For not less than twelve thousand hoplites and more than  p19 two thousand horse were assembled. And since they were one and all eager for the siege, dividing their forces they kept making their assaults in relays, maintaining a persistent attack at all times both day and night.

27 1 The garrison in the Cadmeia under the exhortations of their commanders stoutly defended themselves against their adversaries, expecting that the Lacedaemonians would come shortly with a large army. Now as long as they had sufficient food, they held out stubbornly against the attacks and slew and wounded many of their besiegers, supported by the strength of the citadel; but when the scarcity of provisions increased and the Lacedaemonians, occupied in mustering forces, were long in coming, dissension spread amongst them. 2 For the Lacedaemonians among them thought they should hold out till death, while their partners in war from the allied cities, who were many times their number, declared themselves for surrendering the Cadmeia. Under such compulsion even the men from Sparta itself, who were but few, joined in the evacuation of the citadel. These therefore capitulated on terms and returned to the Peloponnese; 3 but the Lacedaemonians advanced with a considerable force on Thebes, and, coming just too late, were unsuccessful in their attack.​21 They put on trial the three officers of the garrison, sentenced two to death, and inflicted so heavy a fine upon the third that his estate could not pay it. 4 Subsequently the  p21 Athenians returned home, and the Thebans assailed Thespiae but were unsuccessful in their attack.

While these things were taking place in Greece, the Romans dispatched five hundred colonists, who were to be exempt from taxes, to Sardinia.22

28 1 When Calleas was archon at Athens, the Romans elected as military tribunes with consular power four men, Lucius Papirius, Marcus Publius, Titus Cornelius, and Quintus Lucius. During their term of office, following the failure of the Lacedaemonians at Thebes, the Boeotians, uniting boldly, formed an alliance and gathered a considerable army, expecting that the Lacedaemonians would arrive in Boeotia in great strength. 2 The Athenians sent their most respected citizens as ambassadors to the city which were subject to the Lacedaemonians, urging them to adhere to the common cause of liberty. For the Lacedaemonians, relying on the size of the force at their disposal, ruled their subject peoples inconsiderately and severely, and consequently many of those who belonged to the Spartan sphere of influence fell away to the Athenians. 3 The first to respond to the plea to secede were the peoples of Chios and Byzantium; they were followed by the peoples of Rhodes and Mytilenê and certain others of the islanders; and as the movement steadily gathered force throughout Greece, many cities  p23 attached themselves to the Athenians.​23 The democracy, elated by the loyalty of the cities, established a common council of all the allies and appointed representatives of each state. 4 It was agreed by common consent that, while the council should hold its sessions in Athens, every city great and small should be on an equal basis and enjoy but one vote, and that all should continue independent, accepting the Athenians as leaders. The Lacedaemonians, aware that the movement of their cities to secede could not be checked, nevertheless strove earnestly by means of diplomatic missions, friendly words and promises of benefits to win back the peoples who had become estranged. 5 Likewise they devoted themselves assiduously to their preparations for war, for they expected the Boeotian War to be a hard and tedious affair for them, since the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks who participated in the council were allied with the Thebans.

29 1 While these things were going on, Acoris, the king of the Egyptians, being on unfriendly terms with the Persian King, collected a large mercenary force; for by offering high pay to those who enrolled and doing favours to many of them, he quickly induced many of the Greeks to take service with him for the  p25 campaign.​24 2 But having no capable general, he sent for Chabrias the Athenian, a man distinguished both for his prudence as general and his shrewdness in the art of war, who had also won great repute for personal prowess. Now Chabrias, without first securing the permission of the Athenian people, accepted the appointment and took command of the forces in Egypt and with great dispatch made preparations to fight the Persians.​25 3 But Pharnabazus, who had been appointed by the King general of the Persian armies, prepared large supplies of war material, and also sent ambassadors to Athens, first to denounce Chabrias, who by becoming general of the Egyptians was alienating, so he said, the King's affection from the people of Athens, and, secondly, to urge them to give him Iphicrates as general. 4 The Athenians, being eager to gain the favour of the Persian King and to incline Pharnabazus to themselves, quickly recalled Chabrias from Egypt​26 and dispatched Iphicrates​27 as general to act in alliance with the Persians.

 p27  5 The truce which the Lacedaemonians and Athenians had concluded in the earlier period​28 remained unshaken up to this time. But now Sphodriades the Spartan, who had been placed in command and was by nature flighty and precipitate, was prevailed upon by Cleombrotus,​29 the king of the Lacedaemonians, without the consent of the ephors to occupy the Peiraeus. 6 Sphodriades with more than ten thousand soldiers attempted to occupy the Peiraeus at night,​30 but he was detected by the Athenians and, failing in the attempt, returned without accomplishing anything. He was then denounced before the council of the Spartans, but since he had the kings to support him, he got off by a miscarriage of justice.​31 7 As a result the Athenians, much vexed at the occurrence, voted that the truce had been broken by the Lacedaemonians.​32 They then decided to make war on them and chose three of their most distinguished citizens as generals, Timotheüs,​33 Chabrias, and Callistratus.34  p29 They voted to levy twenty thousand hoplites and five hundred cavalry, and to man two hundred ships. They likewise admitted the Thebans into the common council on terms equal in all respects.​35 8 They voted also to restore the land settled by cleruchs​36 to its former owners and passed a law that no Athenian should cultivate lands outside of Attica.​37 By this generous act they recovered the goodwill of the Greeks and made their own leader­ship more secure.

30 1 Now many of the other cities for the aforesaid reason were prompted to fall away to Athens; and the first to join in the alliance and the most eager were the cities of Euboea excepting Hestiaea;​38 for Hestiaea, having been treated most generously by the Lacedaemonians while she had suffered terribly in war with the Athenians, had very good reason for maintaining unabated her enmity to Athens and force continuing to observe inviolate her pledge of the Sparta. 2 Nevertheless seventy cities eventually entered into alliance with the Athenians and participated on equal footing in the common council. So with the constant increase in the strength of the Athenians and the diminution of that of the Lacedaemonians the two states were now well matched. The Athenians, seeing  p31 affairs proceeding to their liking, dispatched a force to Euboea to serve at once as a protection for their allies and to subdued the opposition. 3 In Euboea a short time before this a certain Neogenes with the assistance of Jason of Pherae had gathered soldiers and occupied the citadel of Hestiaea,​39 and so appointed himself tyrant of this country and of the city of Oreitans. Because of his violent and arrogant rule the Lacedaemonians had then dispatched Theripides against him. 4 Theripides at first endeavoured to prevail upon the tyrant by reasoning with him to leave the citadel; but when the tyrant paid no heed to him, he rallied the people of the district to the cause of freedom, took the place by storm, and restored their freedom to the people of Oreüs. For this reason the people who inhabit what is known as the country of the Hestiaeans continued to be loyal to the Spartans and preserved intact their friendship. 5 Chabrias, in command of the force dispatched by the Athenians,​40 laid waste Hestiaeotis, and, fortifying its Metropolis, as it is called, which is situated on a naturally steep hill, left a garrison in it, and then sailed to the Cyclades and won over Peparethos and Sciathos and some other islands which had been subject to the Lacedaemonians.

31 1 The Spartans, perceiving that the impulse of their allies to secede was not to be checked, put an end to their former severity and began to treat the  p33 cities humanely. By this sort of treatment and by benefactions they rendered all their allies more loyal. And now that they saw that the war was becoming more serious and required strict attention, they set ambitiously to work on their various preparations for it, and in particular brought to greater perfection the organization and distribution of their soldiers and the services. 2 In fact they divided the cities and the soldiers that were levied for the war into ten parts.​41 The first part included the Lacedaemonians, the second and third the Arcadians, the fourth the Eleians, the fifth the Achaeans. Corinthians and Megarians supplied the sixth, the seventh the Sicyonians and Phliasians and the inhabitants of the promontory called Actê,​42 the eighth the Acarnanians, the ninth the Phocians and Locrians, and the last of all the Olynthians and the allies who lived in Thrace. They reckoned one hoplite to two light-armed, and one horseman as equivalent to four hoplites.​43 3 Such was the organization, and King Agesilaüs was put in command of the campaign. He was renowned for courage and shrewdness in the art of war and had been all but invincible in the former periods. For in all his wars he won admiration and especially when the Lacedaemonians were fighting the Persians. For he gave battle and won the victory over a force of many times his own number; then he overran a large part  p35 of Asia,​44 mastering the open country, and finally would probably have succeeded, had not the Spartans recalled him because of political affairs, in reducing the whole Persian empire to the direst straits. 4 For he was a man of energy, daring but highly intelligent, engaging in hazardous actions. Accordingly the Spartans, seeing that the magnitude of the war called for a first-rate leader, again appointed him commander of the whole war.

32 1 Agesilaüs led forth his army and reached Boeotia accompanied by all the soldiers, amounting to more than eighteen thousand, in which were the five divisions of Lacedaemonians. Each division contained five hundred men. The company known as Sciritae​45 amongst the Spartans is not drawn up with the rest, but has its own station with the king and it goes to the support of the sections that from time to time are in distress; and since it is composed of picked men, it is an important factor in turning the scale in pitched battles, and generally determines the victory. Agesilaüs also had fifteen hundred cavalry. 2 Passing on then to the city of Thespiae, which was garrisoned by the Lacedaemonians, he encamped near it and for several days rested his men from the hardships of the march. The Athenians, having become aware of the arrival of the Lacedaemonians in Boeotia, immediately went to the assistance of  p37 Thebes with five thousand foot-soldiers and two hundred cavalry. 3 When these forces had assembled, the Thebans occupied an oblong crest about twenty stades from the city and, having transformed the obstacle into a bastion, awaited the attack of the enemy; for the reputation of Agesilaüs so overawed them that they were too timid to await his attack on equal terms in the level country. 4 As for Agesilaüs,​46 he led out his army in battle array against the Boeotians, and, when he had drawn near, in the first place launched his light-armed troops against his opponents, thus testing their disposition to fight him. But when the Thebans had easily from their higher position thrust his men back, he led the whole army against them closely arrayed to strike them with terror. 5 Chabrias​47 the Athenian, however, leading his mercenary troops, ordered his men to receive the enemy with a show of contempt, maintaining all the while their battle lines, and, leaning their shields against their knees, to wait with upraised spear. 6 Since they did what they were ordered as at a single word of command, Agesilaüs, marvelling at the fine discipline of the enemy and their posture of contempt, judged it inadvisable to force a way against the higher ground and compel his opponents to show their valour in a hand-to‑hand contest, and, having learned by trial that they would dare, if forced, to dispute the victory, he challenged them in the plain. But when the Thebans would not come down to meet him, he withdrew the phalanx of infantry, dispatched the cavalry and light-armed ranks  p39 to plunder the countryside unhampered, and so took a great quantity of spoil.

33 1 The Spartan advisers, who accompanied Agesilaüs, and his officers expressed to him their surprise that Agesilaüs, who reputedly was a man of energy and had the larger and more powerful force, should have avoided a decisive contest with the enemy. To them Agesilaüs made answer that, as it was, the Lacedaemonians had won the victory without the risk; for when the countryside was being sacked, the Boeotians had not dared to rally to its defence; but if, when the enemy themselves had conceded the victory, he had forced them to endure the risks of battle, perhaps through the uncertainty of fortune the Lacedaemonians might even have come to grief in the contest. 2 Now at the time he was thought in this reply of his to have estimated the possible outcome fairly well, but later in the light of events he was believed to have uttered no mere human saying but a divinely inspired oracle. For the Lacedaemonians, having taken the field against the Thebans with a mighty army and having compelled them to fight for their freedom, met with a great disaster. 3 They were defeated, namely, at Leuctra first, where they lost many of their citizen soldiers and their king Cleombrotus fell; and later, when they fought at Mantineia, they were utterly routed and hopelessly lost their supremacy.​48 For fortune has a knack, when men vaunt themselves too highly, of laying them unexpectedly low and so teaching them to hope for nothing in excess. At any rate  p41 Agesilaüs, prudently satisfied with his first success, brought his army through unharmed.

4 After this Agesilaüs returned with his army to the Peloponnese, while the Thebans, saved by the general­ship of Chabrias, though he had performed many gallant deeds in war, was particularly proud of this bit of strategy and he caused the statues which had been granted to him by his people to be erected to display that posture.​49 5 The Thebans after the departure of Agesilaüs, leading an expedition against Thespiae, destroyed the advance outpost​50 consisting of two hundred men, but after making repeated assaults on the city itself and accomplishing nothing worthy of mention, led their army back to Thebes. 6 Phoebidas,​51 the Lacedaemonian, who had a considerable garrison in Thespiae, sallied forth from the city, fell rashly upon the retreating Thebans, and lost more than five hundred soldiers, while he himself, fighting brilliantly, after receiving many wounds in front, met a hero's death.

34 1 Not long after this the Lacedaemonians again​52 took the field against Thebes in the same strength as before, but the Thebans, by occupying certain new obstacles, prevented the enemy from devastating the country, though they did not venture to offer battle in the plains face to face against the whole army of  p43 the enemy. 2 As Agesilaüs advanced to the attack, they came out to meet him gradually. A bitter battle raged for a long time, in which at first Agesilaüs' men prevailed, but later, as the Thebans poured forth in full force from the city, Agesilaüs, beholding the multitude of men streaming down upon him, summoned his soldiers by trumpet to withdraw from the battle. The Thebans, who found themselves now for the first time not inferior to the Lacedaemonians, erected a trophy of victory and thereafter faced the army of the Spartans with confidence.

3 With regard to the fighting of the land forces, such was the issue. At sea about the same time occurred a great naval battle between Naxos and Paros, of which the cause was as follows. Pollis, the admiral of the Lacedaemonians, learning that a large shipment of grain was on its way to Athens in freighters, lay in wait watching for the grain fleet as it put in to port, intending to attack the freighters. The Athenian people, being informed of this, sent out a convoy to guard the grain in transit, which in fact brought it safe to the Peiraeus. 4 Later Chabrias, the Athenian admiral, with the whole navy sailed to Naxos and laid it under siege. Bringing his siege-engines to bear against the walls, when he had shaken them, he then bent every effort to take the city by storm. While these things were going on, Pollis, the admiral of the Lacedaemonians, sailed into port to assist the Naxians. In eager rivalry both sides engaged in a sea-battle, and forming in line of battle charged  p45 each other.​53 5 Pollis had sixty-five triremes; Chabrias eighty-three. As the ships bore down on one another, Pollis, leading the right wing, was first to attack the opposing triremes on the left wing, which Cedon the Athenian commanded. In a brilliant contest he slew Cedon himself and sank his ship; and, in similar fashion engaging the other ships of Cedon and tearing them open with the beaks of his ships, he destroyed some and others he forced to flee. 6 When Chabrias beheld what was happening, he dispatched a squadron of the ships under his command and brought support to the men who were hard pressed and so retrieved the defeat of his own side. He himself with the strongest part of the fleet in a valiant struggle destroyed many triremes and took a large number captive.

35 1 Although he had thus won the upper hand and forced all the enemies' ships to flee, he abstained altogether from pursuit. For he recalled the battle of Arginusae​54 and that the assembly of the people, in return for the great service performed by victorious generals, condemned them to death on the charge that they had failed to bury the men who had perished in the fight; consequently he was afraid, since the circumstances were much the same, that he might run the risk of a similar fate. Accordingly, refraining from pursuit, he gathered up the bodies of his fellow citizens which were afloat, saved those who still lived, and buried the dead. Had he not engaged in this task he would easily have destroyed the whole  p47 enemy fleet. 2 In the battle eighteen triremes​55 on the Athenian side were destroyed; on the Lacedaemonian twenty-four were destroyed and eight captured with their crews. Chabrias then, having won a notable victory, sailed back laden with spoils to the Peiraeus and met with an enthusiastic reception from his fellow citizens. Since the Peloponnesian War this was the first naval battle the Athenians had won. For they had not fought the battle of Cnidus​56 with a fleet of their own, but had got the use of the King's fleet and won a victory.

3 While these things were going on, in Italy Marcus Manlius,​57 who aspired to a tyranny in Rome, was over­powered and slain.

36 1 When Charisander was archon at Athens, the Romans elected four military tribunes with consular power, Servius Sulpicius, Lucius Papirius, Titus Quinctius; and the Eleians celebrated the one hundred first Olympiad, in which Damon of Thurii won the stadium race. During their term of office, in Thrace the Triballians, suffering from a famine, moved in full force into territory beyond their borders and obtained food from the land not their own. 2 More than thirty thousand invaded the adjacent part of Thrace and ravaged with impunity the territory of Abdera; and after seizing a large quantity of booty they were  p49 making their way homeward in a contemptuous and disorderly fashion when the inhabitants of Abdera took the field in full force against them and slew more than two thousand of them as they straggled in disorder homewards.​58 3 The barbarians then, enraged at what had happened and wishing to avenge themselves upon the Abderites, again invaded their land. The victors in the earlier conflict, being elated by their success and aided by the presence of the Thracians of the neighbouring region, who had sent out a body of men to assist them, drew up their lines opposite to the barbarians. 4 A stubborn battle took place, and since the Thracians suddenly changed sides, the Abderites, now left to fight alone and surrounded by the superior number of the barbarians, were butchered almost to a man, as many as took part in the fight. But just after the Abderites had suffered so great a disaster and were on the point of being besieged, Chabrias the Athenian suddenly appeared with troops and snatched them out of their perils. He drove the barbarians from the country, and, after leaving a considerable garrison in the city, was himself assassinated by certain persons.​59 5 Timotheüs succeeded him as admiral, sailed to Cephallenia, won over the cities there, and likewise persuaded the cities of Acarnania to come over to Athens. After he had made a friend of Alcetas, king of the Molossians, and, speaking generally, had won over the areas belonging to the cities of those regions, he defeated the Lacedaemonians  p51 in a naval battle off Leucas.​60 6 All this he accomplished quickly and easily, not only persuading men by his eloquence, but also winning battles by courage and good general­ship. Consequently he won great acclaim, not only among his own fellow citizens but also among the Greeks at large. Thus stood the fortunes of Timotheüs.

37 1 While these things were going on, the Thebans made an expedition against Orchomenus with five hundred picked men and performed a memorable action. For as the Lacedaemonians maintained a garrison of many soldiers in Orchomenus and had drawn up their forces against the Thebans, a stiff battle took place in which the Thebans, attacking twice their number, defeated the Lacedaemonians.​61 Never indeed had such a thing occurred before; it had seemed enough if they won with many against few. 2 The result was that the Thebans swelled with pride, became more and more renowned for their valour, and had manifestly put themselves in a position to compete for the supremacy of Greece.

3 Of the historians, Hermeias of Methymnê​62 brought to a close with this year his narrative of Sicilian affairs, having composed ten books, or, as some divide the work, twelve.

38 1 When Hippodamas was archon at Athens, the Romans elected four military tribunes with consular power, Lucius Valerius, Lucius Manlius, Servius  p53 Sulpicius, and Lucretius. During their term of office Artaxerxes, King of the Persians, intending to make war on the Egyptians and being busily engaged in organizing a considerable mercenary army, decided to effect a settlement of the wars going on in Greece. For by this means he particularly hoped that the Greeks, once released from their domestic wars, would be more ready to accept mercenary service. Accordingly he sent ambassadors to Greece to urge the cities to enter into a general peace by agreement. 2 The Greeks welcomed his proposal because they wearied of the uninterrupted series of wars, and all agreed to make peace on the condition that all the cities should be independent and free from foreign garrisons. Accordingly the Greeks appointed agents who, going from city to city, proceeded to evacuate all the garrisons. But the Thebans alone would not agree that the ratification of the peace should be made city by city,​63 but insisted that all Boeotia should be listed as subject to the confederacy of the Thebans. 3 When the Athenians opposed this in the most contentious manner, Callistratus, their popular leader, reciting their reasons, while, on behalf of the Thebans, Epameinondas delivered the address before the general assembly with marvellous effect, the result was that though the terms of the peace were harmoniously concluded for all the other Greek states, the Thebans alone were refused participation in  p55 them;​64 and, through the influence of Epameinondas, who by his own personal merits inspired his fellow citizens with patriotic spirit, they were emboldened to make a stand against the decision of all the rest. 4 For the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, who had constantly been rivals for the hegemony, now yielded one to the other, the one being judged worthy on land, the other on the sea. They were consequently annoyed by the claims to leader­ship advanced by a third contender and sought to sever the Boeotian cities from the Theban confederation.65

39 1 The Thebans, who excelled in bodily strength and prowess and had already conquered the Lacedaemonians in numerous battles, were elated in spirit and eager to dispute the supremacy on land. Nor were they cheated of their hope, both for the aforesaid reasons and because they had more good commanders and generals during the period under consideration. 2 Most famous were Pelopidas, Gorgidas,​66 and Epameinondas. Epameinondas,​67 indeed, far excelled not merely those of his own race but even all Greeks in valour and shrewdness in the art of war. He had a broad general education, being particularly interested in the philosophy of Pythagoras.​68 Besides this, being well endowed with physical advantages, it is natural that he contributed very distinguished achievements. Hence even when compelled with a very few citizen soldiers to fight against all the armies of the Lacedaemonians and their allies, he was so far superior to these heretofore invincible warriors that he slew the Spartan king Cleombrotus, and almost completely annihilated the multitude of his opponents.​69 3 Such were the remarkable deeds which he unexpectedly performed because of his astuteness and the moral excellence he had derived from his education.

However, we shall somewhat later​70 explain these matters more fully in a special chapter; at present we shall turn to the thread of our narrative.

40 1 After autonomy had been conceded to the various peoples,​71 the cities fell into great disturbances and internal strife, particularly in the Peloponnese. Having been used to oligarchic institutions and now taking foolish advantage of the liberties which democracy allows itself, they exiled many of their good​72 citizens, and, trumping up charges against them,  p59 condemned them. Thus falling into internal strife they had recourse to exilings and confiscations of property, particularly against those who during the Spartan hegemony had been leaders of their native cities. 2 Indeed in those times the oligarchs had exercised authoritative control over their fellow citizens, and later as the democratic mob recovered is freedom it harboured a grudge. First, however, the exiles of Phialeia,​73 rallying their forces, recovered Heraea,​74 as it is called, a stronghold. And setting out from there, they swooped down upon Phialeia,​75 and at a time when, as it happened, the festival of Dionysus was being celebrated, they fell unexpectedly upon the spectators in the theatre, killed many, persuaded not a few to participate in their folly, and retreated to Sparta. 3 And the exiles from Corinth, who, many in number, were living among the Argives, attempted to return, but though admitted into the city by some of their relatives and friends, they were denounced and surrounded, and, as they were about to be apprehended, fearful of the maltreatment their capture would entail, they slew one another. The Corinthians, having charged many of their citizens with assisting the exiles in the attack, put some to death and exiled others. 4 Again, in the city of the Megarians, when some persons endeavoured to overturn the government and were over­powered by the democracy, many were slain and not a few driven into exile. Likewise among the Sicyonians as well  p61 a number who tried to effect a revolution but failed were killed. 5 Among the Phliasians, when many who were in exile had seized a stronghold in the country and gathered a considerable number of mercenaries, a battle was fought against the city party, and, when the exiles won the victory, over three hundred of the Phliasians were slain. Later, as the sentinels betrayed the exiles, the Phliasians got the upper hand and executed more than six hundred exiles, while they drove the rest out of the country and compelled them to take refuge in Argos. Such were the disasters that afflicted the Peloponnesian cities.

41 1 When Socratides was archon at Athens, the Romans elected four military tribunes with consular power, Quintus Servilius, Servius Cornelius, and Spurius Papirius. During their term of office King Artaxerxes sent an expedition against the Egyptians,​76 who had revolted from Persia. The leaders of the army were Pharnabazus, commanding the barbarian contingent, and Iphicrates​77 the Athenian, commanding the mercenaries, who numbered twenty thousand. Iphicrates, who had been summoned for the campaign by the King, was given the assignment because of his strategic skill. 2 After Pharnabazus had wasted several years making his preparations, Iphicrates perceiving that though in talk he was clever, he was sluggish in action, frankly told him that he marvelled that  p63 anyone so quick in speech could be so dilatory in action. Pharnabazus replied that it was because he was master of his words but the King was master of his actions. 3 When the Persian army had assembled at the city of Acê​78 it numbered two hundred thousand barbarians under the command of Pharnabazus and twenty thousand​79 Greek mercenaries led by Iphicrates. The triremes numbered three hundred and the thirty-oared vessels two hundred. The number of those conveying food and other supplies was great. 4 At the beginning of the summer​80 the King's generals broke camp with the entire army, and accompanied by the fleet sailing along the coast proceeded to Egypt. When they came near the Nile they found that the Egyptians had manifestly completed their preparations for the war. 5 For Pharnabazus marched slowly and had given plenty of time for the enemy to prepare. Indeed it is the usual custom for the Persian commanders, not being independent in the general conduct of war, to refer all matters to the King and await his replies concerning every detail.

42 1 The Egyptian king Nectanebôs learned the size of the Persian armies, but was emboldened, chiefly by the strength of the country, for Egypt is extremely difficult of approach, and secondly by the fact that all points of invasion from land or sea had been carefully blocked. 2 For the Nile empties into the Egyptian  p65 Sea by seven mouths,​81 and at each mouth a city had been established along with great towers on each bank of the stream and a wooden bridge commanding its entrance. He especially fortified the Pelusiac mouth because it is the first to be encountered by those approaching from Syria and seemed to be the most likely route of the enemy approach. 3 He dug channels connecting with this, fortified the entrances for ships at the most suitable points, and inundated the approaches by land while blocking the sea approaches by embankments. Accordingly it was not easy either for the ships to sail in, or for the cavalry to draw near, or for the infantry to approach. 4 Pharnabazus' staff, finding the Pelusiac mouth so remarkably fortified and guarded by a multitude of soldiers, rejected utterly the plan of forcing a way through it and decided to make the invasion by ship through another mouth. Accordingly they voyaged on the open sea so that the ships should not be sighted by the enemy, and sailed in by the mouth known as Mendesian, which had a beach stretching over a considerable space. Landing here with three thousand men, Pharnabazus and Iphicrates pushed forward to the walled stronghold at the mouth. 5 The Egyptians rushed out with three thousand horse and infantry, and a sharp battle ensued, but many men from their ships came to increase the number of the Persians, until finally the Egyptians were surrounded, many slain, and not a few captured alive; and the rest  p67 were driven in confusion into the city. Iphicrates' men dashed in with the defenders inside the walls, took possession of the fortress, razed it, and enslaved the inhabitants.

43 1 After this, discord set in amongst the commanders, causing the failure of the enterprise. For Iphicrates, learning from the captives that Memphis,​82 the most strategically situated of the Egyptian cities, was undefended, advised sailing immediately up to Memphis before the Egyptian forces arrived there, but Pharnabazus thought they should await the entire Persian force; for in this way the campaign against Memphis would be less dangerous. 2 When Iphicrates demanded that he be given the mercenaries that were on hand and promised if he had them to capture the city, Pharnabazus became suspicious of his boldness and his courage for fear lest he take possession of Egypt for himself. Accordingly when Pharnabazus would not yield, Iphicrates protested that if they let slip the exact moment of opportunity, they would make the whole campaign a failure. Some generals indeed bore a grudge against him and were attempting to fasten unfair charges upon him. 3 Meanwhile the Egyptians, having had plenty of time to recuperate, first sent an adequate garrison into Memphis, and then, proceeding with all their forces against the ravaged stronghold at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile and being now at a great advantage owing to the strength their position, fought constant engagements with the  p69 enemy. With ever-increasing strength they slew many Persians and gained confidence against them. 4 As the campaign about this stronghold dragged on, and the Etesian winds had already set in, the Nile, which was filling up and flooding​83 the whole region with the abundance of its waters, made Egypt daily more secure. The Persian commanders, as this state of affairs constantly operated against them, decided to withdraw from Egypt. 5 Consequently, on their way back to Asia, when a disagreement arose between him and Pharnabazus, Iphicrates, suspecting that he might be arrested and punished as Conon​84 the Athenian had been, decided to flee secretly from the camp. Accordingly, having secured a ship he covertly got away at night and reached port at Athens. 6 Pharnabazus dispatched ambassadors to Athens and accused Iphicrates of being responsible for the failure to capture Egypt. The Athenians, however, replied to the Persians that if they detected him in wrongdoing they would punish him as he deserved, and shortly afterward appointed Iphicrates general in command of their fleet.

44 1 It will not be out of place to set forth what I have learned about the remarkable character of Iphicrates. For he is reported to have possessed shrewdness in command and to have enjoyed an exceptional natural genius for every kind of useful invention. Hence we are told, after he had acquired his long  p71 experience of military operations in the Persian War, he devised many improvements in the tools of war, devoting himself especially to the matter of arms. 2 For instance, the Greeks were using shields which were large and consequently difficult to handle; these he discarded and made small oval ones of moderate size, thus successfully achieving both objects, to furnish the body with adequate cover and to enable the user of the small shield, on account of its lightness, to be completely free in his movements. 3 After a trial of the new shield its easy manipulation secured its adoption, and the infantry who had formerly been called "hoplites" because of their heavy shield, then had their name changed to "peltasts" from the light pelta they carried.​85 As regards spear and sword, he made changes in the contrary direction: namely, he increased the length of the spears by half, and made the swords almost twice as long. The actual use of these arms confirmed the initial test and from the success of the experiment won great fame for the inventive genius of the general. 4 He made soldiers' boots that were easy to untie and light and they continue to this day to be called "iphicratids" after him. He also introduced many other useful improvements into warfare, but it would be tedious to write about them. So the Persian expedition against Egypt, for all its huge preparations, disappointed expectations and proved a failure in the end.

The Loeb Editor's Notes:

1 Only four mentioned by name — a frequent inconsistency.

2 Sparta had been successful in stripping Thebes of much of her strength in Boeotia by dissolving the Boeotian League at the time of the King's Peace. Thebes was beginning to assert her strength again by withholding the help due Sparta in her action against Olynthus (see Xenophon, Hell. 5.2.27).

3 Diodorus alone speaks of these secret instructions which have no existence in Xenophon's fuller account. In fact Xenophon expressly says (5.2.32) ὅτι οὐ προσταχθέντα ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ταῦτα ἐπεπράξει. But then we must remember Xenophon's pro-Spartan bias. Plutarch, Agesilaüs, 23, 24, virtually admits the complicity of Agesilaüs, and Ed. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, 5.298, accepts the notion of a secret commission, as does Laistner, The Greek World from 479 to 323 B.C., p190.

4 See Xenophon, Hell. 5.2.25‑31.

5 The reaction of the Greek world and the punishment of Phoebidas are recounted in Isocrates, Panegyricus, 126; Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.1; Plutarch, Pelopidas, 6 and De Genio Socratis, 576A; Nepos, Pelopidas, 1; and Polybius, 4.27.4.

6 This was Amyntas III, king of Macedonia 393‑369. Through the opposition of a pretender Argaeüs and the Illyrians, Amyntas had been confined to a small portion of his realm. By the aid of the Thessalians he had succeeded in ousting Argaeüs. Amyntas now looked for help from Sparta to recover the lost portion of his kingdom. (See Xenophon, Hell. 5.2.11‑19 and chap. 19.).

7 According to Xenophon (Hell. 5.2.24), Eudamidas was sent against the Olynthians before the occupation of the Cadmeia.

8 See Xenophon, Hell. 5.2.37‑3.6.

9 See Xenophon, Hell. 5.38, 9.

10 See Xenophon, Hell. 5.3.18‑20.

11 Cp. infra, chap. 55.5.

12 See Xenophon, Hell. 5.3.26.

13 See Xenophon, Hell. 5.3.27.

14 The sending of κληροῦχοι or settlers from Athens to the territory of her subjects to serve as garrison and owners of the soil was one of the grievances against Athens in the eyes of her subjects during her fifth-century empire.

15 This must refer to the "perioeci," free inhabitants of Laconia, not Spartans, and to the Helots, Spartan serfs, who tilled the land for their masters. The population of true Spartiatae was constantly on the wane owing to the accumulation of land in a few hands and the resulting inability of ever greater numbers of citizens to contribute their share of products from the soil to the general mess or syssitia. Those who failed to make their contributions were degraded, i.e. became "hypomeiones," though they still served as soldiers.

16 See Isocrates, Panegyricus, 126, Peace, 99, Archidamus, 63.

17 The city of Hipponium on the west coast of Bruttium in Italy had been captured by Dionysius, its citizens transferred to Syracuse, and its land to the Locrians (see Book 14.107.2). Apparently the Carthaginians were trying to cultivate the exiles as allies in Italy against Dionysius.

18 Fuller accounts are found in Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.2‑12; Nepos, Pelopidas, 3; Plutarch, Pelopidas, 7‑12 and De Genio Socratis, 596. Criticism of these accounts in von Stern, Gesch. d. spartan. u. theban. Hegemonie, 44 ff. Beloch, Griechische geschichte2, 3.2.234, gives the date as December 379.

19 The thirty Tyrants, established for the fall of Athens, 404, by Lysander of Sparta, were headed by Critias and Theramenes, the latter judicially murdered by Critias. Exiles of the democratic régime received help from Thebes to overthrow this tyranny.

20 Only Deinarchus, Against Demosthenes, 39, mentions a vote of the Athenians. Most modern historians (Beloch, Griechische Geschichte 2, 3.1.146, Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, 5.94, notes, and Cary, Cambridge Ancient History, 6.67) accept the account in Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.19, which insists on the private nature of the assistance afforded Thebes by Athens and the punishment by the people of the two generals who were rash enough to give that assistance, one of whom was executed and the other exiled. Glotz in his Hist. gr., though generally inclined to give more weight to Diodorus, here speaks of "volontaires athéniens." In the same vein von Stern, Gesch. d. spartan. u. theban. Hegemonie, 44 ff., Xenophons Hellenika und die boiotische Geschichtsüberlieferung. For the contrary view see E. Fabricius, "Die Befreiung Thebens" in Rheinisches Museum 48 (1893), 448 ff., and W. Judeich, "Athen und Theben vom Königsfrieden bis zur Schlacht bei Leuktra" in Rheinisches Museum 76 (1927), 171 ff. Cp. also A. O. Prickard, The Return of the Theban Exiles (379/8 B.C.).

21 Cp. Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.13‑18. Plutarch, Pelopidas, 13.

22 The Romans were scarcely interested in Sardinia before the first Punic War. Hence Satricum, a city of Latium, may be the correct reading. See critical note and cp. Livy, 6.16.6.

The critical note to the Greek text (εἰς Σαρδονίαν ἀπέστειλαν) reads:

Σαρδονίαν] Wesseling suggests Satricum.

23 This is the formation of the second Athenian maritime confederacy which aimed at the overthrow of Spartan supremacy in Greece. The account here and in Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.34‑6.3, are the essential literary texts. Important inscriptional evidence exists, IG 22.43, also 40‑42, 44, 45, 82, 95‑101. The formation of the confederacy should probably be placed after Sphodrias' attempt to surprise the Peiraeus (see chap. 29.6 and Ed. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, 5.384).

24 This war between the Persians and the Egyptians (cp. Isocrates, Panegyricus, 140 f.; Demosthenes, 20.76; Nepos, Chabrias, 2.1) belongs to an earlier period (according to Hall, Cambridge Ancient History, 6.145 f. to the years 385‑383). Nectanebôs became king of Egypt in succession to Acoris by 378 (ibid. 148). Olmstead, A. T. History of the Persian Empire, p399, gives 385‑383 as dates of the war.

25 This must have been c. 386‑384 when Chabrias was in charge of the Athenian army which was recalled from Cyprus (Hall, l.c. 146). Chabrias went shortly afterward to Egypt. Hall (l.c. 148), on the other hand, says that he went to Egypt in 377 and was soon recalled. See my note 26 below.º Hall on the dates for Chabrias is at variance with other historians and Greek evidence. A good discussion of dates is found in Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, 59‑62. See recent treatment in Olmstead, op. cit. pp397 ff. Complete data in Kirchner, Pros. Att. no. 15086.

26 The recall of Chabrias probably occurred in the winter 380/79, since in the next winter he held the Athenian frontier against Cleombrotus (Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.14) and in the early summer 378 helped defend Thebes against Agesilaüs. He was probably elected general in the spring of 379 (see Beloch, Griechische Geschichte2, 3.2.229‑230). Chabrias was of good family, lived on a generous scale, kept a racing stable, and was an able condottiere.

27 Iphicrates was probably sent out to Persia (see Nepos,Iphicrates, 2.4) about the time Chabrias was elected general. Since the Corinthian War Iphicrates had been in Thrace, restored to King Cotys his rule over the Odrysians, and married Cotys' daughter. He returned from Persian service to Athens in 373. He was a self-made man, great organizer, and master of light-armed tactics, one of the most able of the condottieri (see chap. 44 and Nepos, Iphicrates).

28 Cp. Book 14.110.4.

29 Other accounts are Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.20‑21 and Plutarch, Pelopidas, 14 and Agesilaüs, 24. Diodorus here as in the case of Phoebidas is suspicious of Spartan policy, while Xenophon and Plutarch both speak of Thebes as the instigator of the raid in order to embroil Athens and Sparta. Again Diodorus seems right in suspecting Sparta (cp. "leitende Kreise in Sparta" in Beloch, Griechische Geschichte2, 3.1.147 and Judeich, op. cit. 178). The inroad of Sphodrias (in Diodorus Sphodriades) was made (cp. Pearl Harbor) at the very time when three Spartan ambassadors were in Athens to negotiate. Their promises that Sparta would punish Sphodrias did much to assuage the anger of the Athenians at the moment.

30 Diodorus recounts the whole war from the raid of Sphodrias to the battle of Naxos under the year 377/6. The raid of Sphodrias probably took place in the spring of 378 when Cleombrotus was operating in Boeotia after the liberation of Thebes (December 379).

31 See for the influence of Cleombrotus and Archidamus, son of Agesilaüs, in rescuing Sphodrias, Xenophon, l.c. 22‑33; Plutarch, Agesilaüs, 25.

32 Cp. Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.34; Plutarch, Pelopidas, 15.

33 Conon's son Timotheüs was successful as general and as statesman from this time on till his death in 354.

34 Callistratus of Aphidna, though one of the opponents of the King's Peace (see Book 14.110.2‑3), had come to see that Athens had no other choice. One of the most brilliant orators of this period, he was a keen politician and a skilful finance administrator.

35 Cp. Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.34; Plutarch, Pelopidas, 15. For the League see chap. 28.4.

36 See chap. 23.4.

37 Thousands of Athenian citizens lost their last hope of recovering the land outside Attica which they or their fathers had lost in the catastrophe of 404. These hopes were still alive in the Corinthian War.

38 In the list of cities, IG 23.1.43, Hestiaea appears as having joined later than the other cities of Euboea. For the treatment of Hestiaea under Pericles see Book 12.7.

39 Hestiaea, more often written Histiaea, a city on the north coast of Euboea, had a deme named Oreüs (Theopom. in Strabo, 445), situated to the west a few miles, which in Pericles' time received two thousand cleruchs and was officially known as Histiaea. The names became confused in antiquity. (See Richard Kiepert, p6 of text to Map XIV, Formae O.A.).

40 According to Plutarch, De Gloria Atheniensium, 8, Timotheüs, not Chabrias, freed Euboea.

41 For other members of the league see Beloch, Griechische Geschichte2, 3.1.108 and note 1.

42 On the Argolid peninsula, inhabited by people of Epidaurus, Methonê, and Troezên.

43 This reckoning (see Xenophon, Hell. 5.2.21 and 6.2.16) gives a commutation rate payable by a state that does not send its normal contingent to the league force. Three Aeginetan obols (or 4½ Athenian) per day was the rate for one hoplite.

44 See Book 14.79‑80, 83.

45 A people who lived on the mountainous northern frontier of Laconia. This special corps, considered apparently the cream of the army, formed the vanguard of an advance and the rearguard of a retreat. Thought by some to be light-armed, though this is doubted by Kromayer-Veith on the strength of this and other passages (p39, Heerwesen und Kriegsführung der Griechen und Römer, Munich, 1928). (See Thucydides, 5.67.1.)

46 For the campaign of this year (actually 378) see Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.35‑41, Agesilaüs, 26.

47 For the rôle of Chabrias see Polyaenus, 2.1.2; Nepos, Chabrias, 1; Demosthenes, 20.76.

48 362 B.C., though the battle of Leuctra, 371, established the supremacy of Thebes.

49 As described in chap. 32.5. For the statues see Nepos, Chabrias, 1.

50 The camp site of Agesilaüs, chap. 32.2.

51 See Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.42‑46; Plutarch, Pelopidas, 15; Polyaenus, 2.5.2.

52 This is the campaign of a new year (this time 377), the account of which is found in Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.47‑55 Plutarch, Agesilaüs, 26.3 f.

53 The battle of Naxos took place in Sept. 376. For other accounts see Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.60‑61; Plutarch, Phocion, 6 (for date); Polyaenus, 3.11.2 (also gives date).

54 406 B.C. One of the Athenian causes célèbres (see Book 13.99, 101).

55 At variance with Demosthenes, 20.78: μόνος τῶν πάντων στρατηγῶν οὐ φρούριον, οὐ ναῦν, οὐ στρατιώτην ἀπώλεσεν (sc. Χαβρίας) οὐδέν’ ἡγούμενος ὑμῶν.

56 394 B.C. Conon, the Athenian admiral, had a Persian fleet in this naval victory which threatened Sparta's supremacy (see Book 14.83).

57 See Livy, 6.20.

58 See Aeneas Tacticus, 15.8‑10.

59 Demosthenes, Nepos, and Diodorus himself (Book 16.7.3) state that Chabrias died eighteen years later at Chios.

60 Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.62‑66 gives a fuller account of Timotheüs' activities. See also Isocrates, Antidosis, 109; Nepos, Timotheüs, 2.1; Polyaenus, 3.10.4‑17 (passim); Frontinus, Strat. 2.5.47. The year is 375.

61 Properly in the year 375/4 (Beloch, Griechische Geschichte2, 3.1.55). See Plutarch, Pelopidas, 16 f.

62 One fragment of the Sicilian history of Hermeias remains (Athenaeus, 10.438C; also F. H. G., 2.80.1). The history seems to have dealt mainly with the Elder Dionysius with perhaps a brief introduction on early Sicilian affairs. (See Beloch, Griechische Geschichte2, 3.2.42‑43).

63 This peace seems to have been concluded though it did not last long. Ascribed by Beloch, Griechische geschichte2, 3.1.156 to the year 375/4 (see also Judeich, "Athen und Theben," Rheinisches Museum 76 (1927), 181 and his ascription in note 2 of Cephisodotus' statue of Eirenê to this occasion). Cp. Xenophon, Hell. 6.2.1; Isocrates, Antidosis, 109 f., Plataïcus, 10; Nepos, Timotheüs, 2; Philochorus in Didymus, de Demosthene, 7.64 ff.

64 Beloch (l.c. note 1) thinks that Diodorus has confused this peace with the peace concluded three years later before Leuctra from which Epameinondas withdrew. Judeich (op. cit. pp182‑183) accepts Diodorus' account of this peace of 374 and believes that Epameinondas may well have addressed the league synhedrion at Athens, to which he thinks Diodorus refers. In any case Thebes remained in the Athenian confederacy, as is shown in Isocrates, Plataïcus, 21; Demosthenes, In Timotheüm, 14, 21, 40 ff. If Diodorus means by synhedrion an assembly of the members of the second Athenian confederacy, as Judeich seems to think, and not a general peace conference, the question arises how it happens that Callistratus addresses the assembly in which Athens by the terms of the league has no voice. Possibly we are to interpret the κοινόν as a joint meeting of the league assembly and the Athenians. But Diodorus, chap. 28.3, uses the term κοινὸν συνέδριον of the common council of the league which seems to mean the council of the allies. Callistratus may have spoken in the Athenian assembly only, while Epameinondas addressed the allies in their council.

65 The ethnic league of the Boeotians was reorganized under Thebes in 394 B.C. but was under an eclipse from 387 to this time. In 371, the Theban envoys claim the right of Thebes (cp. chap. 50.4; Xenophon, Hell. 6.3.19) to sign for the rest of Boeotia as Sparta did for Laconia. Thebes, like Prussia in the German Bund, held the predominance by being able to command the majority of the votes.

66 Though Diodorus has Gorgias in two places, all other writers mentioning the Theban general of this period give only Gorgidas (see P.‑W. Realencyclopädie, s.v. "Gorgidas").

67 See his life by Nepos, and Plutarch, Pelopidas, 3, 4.

68 His Pythagorean instructor was Lysis of Tarentum (Nepos, Epameinondas, 2.2).

69 At Leuctra, see chaps. 53 ff.

70 See chap. 88.

71 See chap. 38.2.

72 "Good" is used in the political sense: "conservative," though doubtless Diodorus thought they were really good.

73 Phialeia, in the south-western corner of Arcadia. The more ancient name was Phigaleia, which later came back into use.

74 Herae, an Arcadian town, near the frontier of Elis, on the road from Arcadia to Olympia.

75 Beloch, Griechische geschichte2 3.1.174, notes 2, 4) would assign these instances of party strife to the period after Leuctra. Glotz (3.151, note 22) likewise. See Isocrates, Archidamus, 64‑69.

76 Other accounts: Nepos, Iphicrates, 2.4; Trogus, Prologue to 10; Plutarch, Artaxerxes, 24; Polyaenus, 3.9.38, 56, 59.

77 See chap. 29.3‑4 for Artaxerxes' request for the services of Iphicrates.

78 Later St. Jean d'Acre, or simply Acre.

79 12,000 in Nepos, l.c.

80 Spring 373 just before Nile flood (chap. 43.4). In the autumn Iphicrates was again in Athens where he was elected general (chap. 43.5‑6).

81 See Book 1.33.5 f.

82 See Book 1.50.3 ff.

83 See Book 1.39.

84 When Antalcidas, the Spartan, went to Tiribazus, satrap of Ionia, in 392, to enlist the aid of Persia against the growing power of Athens, Tiribazus arrested Conon (Xenophon, Hell. 4.8.16; Book 14.85), who was acting with the confidence of Pharnabazus. According to one authority Conon was put to death by the Persians in prison, according to another he took refuge with Evagoras in Cyprus, where he died of sickness.

85 Consult H. W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers, 79 ff., who quotes this passage and upholds Diodorus in that "he regards the peltast's equipment as a moderation introduced into hoplite troops." See also Nepos, Iphicrates, 1. 3‑4.

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