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This webpage reproduces a section of
Institutio Oratoria


published in Vol. II
of the Loeb Classical Library edition, 1920

The text is in the public domain.

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(Vol. II) Quintilian
Institutio Oratoria

Book V

Chapters 11‑12

11 The third kind of proof, which is drawn into the service of the case from without, is styled a παράδειγμα by the Greeks, who apply the term to all comparisons of like with like, but more especially to historical parallels. Roman writers have for the most part preferred to give the name of comparison to that which the Greeks style παραβολή, while they translate παράδειγμα by example, although this latter involves comparison, while the former is of  p273 the nature of an example. 2 For my own part, I prefer with a view to making my purpose easier of apprehension to regard both as παραδείγματα and to call them examples. Nor am I afraid of being thought to disagree with Cicero, although he does separate comparison from example.​96 For he divides all arguments into two classes, induction and ratiocination, just as most Greeks​97 divide it into παραδείγματα and ἐπιχείρηματα, explaining παράδειγμα as a rhetorical induction. 3 The method of argument chiefly used by Socrates was of this nature: when he had asked a number of questions to which his adversary could only agree, he finally inferred the conclusion of the problem under discussion from its resemblance to the points already conceded. This method is known as induction, and though it cannot be used in a set speech, it is usual in a speech to assume that which takes the form of a question in dialogue. 4 For instance take the following question: "What is the finest form of fruit? Is it not that which is best?" This will be admitted. "What of the horse? What is the finest? Is it not that which is the best?" Several more questions of the same kind follow. Last comes the question "What of man? Is not he the finest type who is best?" The answer can only be in the affirmative. 5 Such a procedure is most valuable in the examination of witnesses, but is differently employed in a set speech. For there the orator either answers his own questions or makes an assumption of that which in dialogue takes the form of a question. "What is  p275 the finest fruit? The best, I should imagine. What is the finest horse? The swiftest. So too the finest type of man is not he that is noblest of birth, but he that is most excellent in virtue."

All arguments of this kind, therefore, must be from things like or unlike or contrary. Similes are, it is true, sometimes employed for the embellishment of the speech as well, but I will deal with them in their proper place;​98 at present I am concerned with the use of similitude in proof. 6 The most important of proofs of this class is that which is most properly styled example, that is to say the adducing of some past action real or assumed which may serve to persuade the audience of the truth of the point which we are trying to make. We must therefore consider whether the parallel is complete or only partial, that we may know whether to use it in its entirety or merely to select those portions which are serviceable. We argue from the like when we say, "Saturninus was justly killed, as were the Gracchi"; 7 from the unlike when we say, "Brutus killed his sons for plotting against the state, while Manlius condemned his son to death for his valour";​99 from the contrary when we say, "Marcellus restored the works of art which had been taken from the Syracusans who were our enemies, while Verres​100 took the same works of art from our allies." The same divisions apply also to such forms of proof in panegyric or denunciation. 8 It will also be found useful when we are speaking of what is likely to happen to refer to historical parallels: for instance if the orator asserts that Dionysius is asking for a bodyguard that with their armed assistance he may establish himself as tyrant, he may  p277 adduce the parallel case of Pisistratus who secured the supreme power by similar means.

9 But while examples may at times, as in the last instance, apply in their entirety, at times we shall argue from the greater to the less or from the less to the greater. "Cities have been overthrown by the violation of the marriage bond. What punishment then will meet the case of adultery?" "Flute-players have been recalled by the state to the city which they had left. How much more then is it just that leading citizens who have rendered good service to their country should be recalled from that exile to which they have been driven by envy."​101 10 Arguments from unlikes are most useful in exhortation. Courage is more remarkable in a woman than in a man. Therefore, if we wish to kindle someone's ambition to the performance of heroic deeds, we shall find that parallels drawn from the cases of Horatius and Torquatus will carry less weight than that of the woman by whose hand Pyrrhus was slain, and if we wish to urge a man to meet death, the cases of Cato and Scipio will carry less weight than that of Lucretia. These are however arguments from the greater to the less. 11 Let me then give you separate examples of these classes of argument from the pages of Cicero; for where should I find better? The following passage from the pro Murena102 is an instance of argument from the like: "For it happened that I myself when a candidate had two patricians as competitors, the one a man of the most unscrupulous and reckless character, the other a most excellent and respectable citizen. Ye I defeated Catiline by force of merit and Galba by my  p279 popularity." 12 The pro Milone103 will give us an example of argument from the greater to the less: "They say that he who confesses to having killed a man is not fit to look upon the light of day. Where is the city in which men are such fools as to argue this?º It is Rome itself, the city whose first trial on a capital charge was that of Marcus Horatius, the bravest of men, who, though the city had not yet attained its freedom, was none the less acquitted by the assembly of the Roman people, in spite of the fact that he confessed that he had slain his sister with his own hand." The following​104 is an example of argument from the less to the greater: "I killed, not Spurius Maelius, who by lowering the price of cornº and sacrificing his private fortune fell under the suspicion of desiring to make himself king, because it seemed that he was courting popularity with the common people overmuch," and so on till we come to, "No, the man I killed (for my client would not shrink from the avowal, since his deed had saved his country) was he who committed abominable adultery even in the shrines of the gods"; then follows the whole invective against Clodius.

13 Arguments from unlikes present great variety, for they may turn on kind, manner, time, place, etcetera, almost every one of which Cicero employs to overthrow the previous decisions that seemed to apply to the case of Cluentius,​105 while he makes use of argument from contraries when he minimises​106 the importance of the censorial stigma by praising Scipio Africanus, who in his capacity of censor allowed one whom he openly asserted to have committed deliberate perjury to retain his horse, because no one had appeared as evidence against him, though he  p281 promised to come forward himself to bear witness to his guilt, if any should be found to accuse him. I have paraphrased this passage because it is too long to quote. 14 A brief example of a similar argument is to be found in Virgil,107

"But he, whom falsely thou dost call thy father,

Even Achilles, in far other wise

Dealt with old Priam, and Priam was his foe."

15 Historical parallels may however sometimes be related in full, as in the pro Milone:​108 "When a military tribune serving in the army of Gaius Marius, to whom he was related, made an assault upon the honour of a common soldier, the latter killed him; for the virtuous youth preferred to risk his life by slaying him to suffering such dishonour. And yet the great Marius acquitted him of all crime and let him go scot free." 16 On the other hand in certain cases it will be sufficient merely to allude to the parallel, as Cicero does in the same speech:​109 "For neither the famous Servilius Ahala nor Publius Nasica nor Lucius Opimius nor the Senate during my consul­ship could be cleared of serious guilt, if it were a crime to put wicked men to death." Such parallels will be adduced at greater or less length according as they are familiar or as the interests or adornment of our case may demand.

17 A similar method is to be pursued in quoting from the fictions of the poets, though we must remember that they will be of less force as proofs. The same supreme authority, the great master of eloquence, shows us how we should employ such quotations. 18 For an example of this type will be found in the same speech:​110 "And it is therefore, gentlemen of the jury, that men of the greatest learning have recorded  p283 in their fictitious narratives that one who had killed his mother to avenge his father was acquitted, when the opinion of men was divided as to his guilt, not merely by the decision of a deity, but by the vote of the wisest of goddesses." 19 Again those fables which, at length they did not originate with Aesop (for Hesiod seems to have been the first to write them), are best known by Aesop's name, are specially attractive to rude and uneducated minds, which are less suspicious than others in their reception of fictions and, when pleased, readily agree with the arguments from which their pleasure is derived. Thus Menenius Agrippa​111 is said to have reconciled the plebs to the patricians by his fable of the limbs' quarrel with the belly. 20 Horace​112 also did not regard the employment of fables as beneath the dignity even of poetry; witness his lines that narrate

"What the shrewd fox to the sick lion told."

The Greeks call such fables αἶνοι (tales) and, as I have already​113 remarked, Aesopean or Libyan stories, while some Roman writers term them "apologues," though the name has not found general acceptance. 21 Similar to these is that class of proverb which may be regarded as an abridged fable and is understood allegorically: "The burden is not mine to carry," he said, "the ox is carrying panniers."

22 Simile has a force not unlike that of example, more especially when drawn from things nearly equal without any admixture of metaphor, as in the following case: "Just as those who have been accustomed to receive bribes in the Campus Martius are specially hostile to those whom they suspect of having withheld the money, so in the present case the judges came into court with a strong prejudice against the  p285 accused."​114 23 For παραβολή, which Cicero​115 translates by "comparison," is often apt to compare things whose resemblance is far less obvious. Nor does it merely compare the actions of men as Cicero does in the pro Murena:​116 "But if those who have just come into harbour from the high seas are in the habit of showing the greatest solicitude in warning those who are on the point of leaving port of the state of the weather, the likelihood of falling in with pirates, and the nature of the coasts which they are like to visit (for it is a natural instinct that we should take a kindly interest in those who are about to face the dangers from which we have just escaped), what think you should be my attitude who am now in sight of land after a mighty tossing on the sea, towards this man who, as I clearly see, has to face the wildest weather?" On the contrary, similes of this kind are sometimes drawn from dumb animals and inanimate objects. 24 Further, since similar objects often take on a different appearance when viewed from a different angle, I feel that I ought to point out that the kind of comparison which the Greeks call εἰκών, and which expresses the appearance of things and persons (as for instance in the line of Cassius​117 —

"Who is he yonder that doth writhe his face

Like some old man whose feet are wrapped in wool?")

should be more sparingly used in oratory than those comparisons which help prove our point. For instance, if you wish to argue that the mind requires cultivation, you would use a comparison drawn from the soil, which if neglected produces thorns and thickets, but if cultivated will bear fruit; or if you  p287 are exhorting someone to enter the service of the state, you will point out that bees and ants, though not merely dumb animals, but tiny insects, still toil for the common weal. 25 Of this kind is the saying of Cicero:​118 "As our bodies can make no use of their members without a mind to direct them, so the state can make no use of its component parts, which may be compared to the sinews, blood and limbs, unless it is directed by law." And just as he draws this simile in the pro Cluentio from the analogy of the human body, so in the pro Cornelio119 he draws a simile from horses, and in the pro Archia120 from stones. 26 As I have already said, the following type of simile comes more readily to hand: "As oarsmen are useless without a steersman, so soldiers are useless without a general." Still it is always possible to be misled by appearances in the use of simile, and we must therefore use our judgment in their employment. For though a new ship is more useful than one which is old, this simile will not apply to friendship: and again, though we praise one who is liberal with her money, we do not praise one who is liberal with her embraces. In these cases there is similitude in the epithets old and liberal, but their force is different, when applied to ships and friendship, money and embraces. 27 Consequently, it is all-important in this connexion to consider whether the simile is really applicable. So in answering those Socratic questions which I mentioned above,​121 the greatest care must be taken to avoid giving an incautious answer, such as those given by the wife of Xenophon to Aspasia in the dialogue of Aeschines the Socratic: the passage is translated by Cicero​122 as follows: 28 "Tell me, pray, wife of Xenophon, if your  p289 neighbour has finer gold ornaments than you, would you prefer hers or yours?" "Hers," she replied. "Well, then, if her dress and the rest of her ornaments are more valuable than yours, which would you prefer, hers or yours?" "Hers," she replied. "Come, then," said she, "if her husband is better than yours, would you prefer yours or hers?" 29 At this the wife of Xenophon not unnaturally blushed; for she had answered ill in replying that she would prefer her neighbor's gold ornaments to her own, since it would be wrong to do so. If on the other hand she had replied that she would prefer her ornaments to be of the same quality as those of her neighbor, she might have answered without putting herself to the blush that she would prefer her husband to be like him who was superior in virtue.

30 I am aware that some writers have shown pedantic zeal in making a minute classification of similes, and have pointed out that there is lesser similitude (such as that of a monkey to a man or a statue when first blocked out to its original), a greater similitude (for which compare the proverb "As like as egg to agg"), a similitude in things dissimilar (an elephant, for instance, and an ant both belong to the genus animal), and dissimilitude in things similar (puppies and kids, for example, are unlike the parents,​123 for they differ from them in point of age). 31 So too they distinguish between contraries: some are opposites, as night to day, some hurtful, as cold water to a fever, some contradictory, as truth to falsehood, and some negative, as things which are not hard when contrasted with things which are hard. But I cannot see that such distinctions have any real bearing on the subject under discussion.

 p291  32 It is more important for our purpose to note that arguments may be drawn from similar, opposite, and dissimilar points of law. As an example of the first, take the following passage from the Topica of Cicero,​124 where he argues that a man to whom the usufruct of a house has been left will not restore it in the interests of the heir if it collapses; just as he would not replace a slave if he should die. The following will provide an example of an argument drawn from opposite points of law: "The absence of a formal contract is no bar to the legality of a marriage, provided the parties cohabit by mutual consent." An instance of an argument drawn from dissimilar points of law occurs in the pro Caecina of Cicero:​125 33 "If anyone had driven me from my house by armed violence, I should have ground for action against him. Have I then no ground, if he has prevented me from entering my house?" Dissimilar points may be illustrated by the following example:​126 "Because a man has bequeathed all his silver to a given person and this bequest is regarded as including silver coin as well as plate, it does not follow that he intended all outstanding debts to be paid to the legatee."

34 Some draw a distinction between analogy and similarity, but personally I regard the former as included under the latter. For the statement that the relation of 1 to 10 is the same as that of 10 to 100 certainly involves similarity, just as does the statement that a bad citizen may be compared to an actual enemy. But arguments of this kind are carried still further: "If connexion with a male  p293 slave is disgraceful to the mistress of the house, so is the connexion of the master with a female slave. If pleasure is an end sought by dumb animals, so also must it be with men." 35 But these arguments may readily be met by arguments from dissimilars: "It is not the same thing for the master of the house to have intercourse with a female slave as for the mistress to have intercourse with a male slave; nor does it follow that because dumb animals pursue pleasure, reasoning beings should do likewise." Or they may even be met by arguments from opposites; as for instance, "Because pleasure is an end sought by dumb animals, it should not be sought by reasoning beings."

36 Authority also may be drawn from external sources to support a case. Those who follow the Greeks, who call such arguments κρίσεις, style them judgments or adjudications, thereby referring not to matters on which judicial sentence has been pronounced (for such decisions form examples or precedents), but to whatever may be regarded as expressing the opinion of nations, peoples, philosophers, distinguished citizens, or illustrious poets. 37 Nay, even common sayings and popular beliefs may be found to be useful. For they form a sort of testimony, which is rendered all the more impressive by the fact that it was not given to suit special cases, but was the utterance or action of minds swayed neither by prejudice or influence, simply because it seemed the most honourable or honest thing to say or do. 38 For instance, if I am speaking of the misfortunes of this mortal life, surely it will help me to adduce the opinion of those nations who hold that we should weep over the new-born child and rejoice  p295 over the dead. Or if I am urging the judge to shew pity, surely my argument may be assisted by the fact that Athens, the wisest of all states, regarded pity not merely as an emotion, but even as a god. 39 Again, do we not regard the precepts of the Seven Wise Men as so many rules of life? If an adulteress is on her trial for poisoning, is she not already to be regarded as condemned by the judgment of Marcus Cato, who asserted that every adulteress was as good as a poisoner? As for reflexions drawn from the poets, not only speeches, but even et works of the philosophers, are full of them; for although the philosophers think everything inferior to their own precepts and writings, they have not thought it beneath their dignity to quote numbers of lines from the poets to lend authority to their statements. 40 Again, a remarkable example of the weight carried by authority is provided by the fact that when the Megarians disputed the possession of Salamis with the Athenians, the latter prevailed by citing a line from Homer,​127 which is not however found in all editions, to the effect that Ajax united his ships with those of the Athenians. 41 Generally received sayings also become common property owing to the very fact that they are anonymous, as, for instance, "Friends are a treasure," or "Conscience is as good as a thousand witnesses," or, to quote Cicero,​128 "In the words of the old proverb, birds of a feather flock together." Sayings such as these would not have acquired immortality had they not carried conviction of their truth to all mankind. 42 Some include under this head the supernatural authority that is derived from oracles, as for instance the response asserting that Socrates was the wisest of mankind: indeed, they  p297 rank it above all other authorities. Such authority is rare, but may prove useful. It is employed by Cicero in his speech on the Replies of the Soothsayers​129 and in the oration in which he denounced Catiline to the people,​130 when he points to the statue of Jupiter crowning a column, and again in the pro Ligario,​131 where he admits the cause of Caesar to be the better because the gods have decided in his favour. When such arguments are inherent in the case itself they are called supernatural evidence; when they are adduced from without they are styled supernatural arguments. 43 Sometimes, again, it may be possible to produce some saying or action of the judge, of our adversary of his advocate in order to prove our point. There have therefore been some writers who have regarded examples and the use of authorities of which I am speaking as belonging to inartificial proofs, on the ground that the orator does not discover them, but receives them ready-made. 44 But the point is of great importance. For witnesses and investigation and the like all make some pronouncement on the actual matter under trial, whereas arguments drawn from without are in themselves useless, unless the pleader has the wit to apply them in such a manner as to support the points which he is trying to make.

12 1 Such in the main are the views about proof which I have either heard from others or learned by experience. I would not venture to assert that this is all there is to be said; indeed I would exhort students to make further researches on the subject, for I admit the possibilities of making further discoveries. Still anything that may be discovered will not different greatly from what I have said here.  p299 I will now proceed to make a few remarks as to how proofs should be employed.

2 It has generally been laid down that an argument to be effective must be based on certainty; for it is obviously impossible to prove what is doubtful by what is no less doubtful. Still some things which are adduced as proof require proof themselves. "You killed your husband, for you were an adulteress."​132 Adultery must first be proved: once that is certain it can be used as an argument to prove what is uncertain. "Your javelin was found in the body of the murdered man." He denies that it was his. If the point is to serve as a proof, it must itself be proved. 3 It is, however, necessary in this connection to point out that there are no stronger proofs than those in which uncertainty has been converted into certainty. "You committed the murder, for your clothes were stained with blood." This argument is not so strong if the accused admits that his clothes were bloodstained as if the fact is proved against his denial. For if he admits it, there are still a number of ways in which the blood could have got on to his clothes: if on the other hand he denies it, he makes his whole case turn on this point, and if his contention is disproved, he will be unable to make a stand on any subsequent ground. For it will be thought that he would never have told a lie in denying the allegation, unless he had felt it a hopeless task to justify himself if he admitted it.

4 In insisting on our strongest arguments we must take them singly, whereas our weaker arguments should be massed together: for it is undesirable that those arguments which are strong in themselves should have their force obscured by the  p301 surrounding matter, since it is important to show their true nature: on the other hand arguments which are naturally weak will receive mutual support if grouped together. 5 Consequently arguments which have no individual force on the ground of strength will acquire force in virtue of their number, since all tend to prove the same thing. For instance, if one man is accused of having murdered another for the sake of his property, it may be argues as follows: "You had expectations of succeeding to the inheritance, which was moreover very large: you were a poor man, and at the time in question were specially hard pressed by your creditors: you had also offended him whose heir you were, and knew that he intended to alter his will." These arguments are trivial and commonplace in detail, but their cumulative force is damaging. They may not have the overwhelming force of a thunderbolt, but they will have all the destructive force of hail.

6 There are certain arguments, which must not merely be stated, but supported as well. If we say, "The motive for the crime was greed," we must show the force of greed as a motive: if we say that anger was the motive, we must show the sway that this passion has over the minds of men. Thus our arguments will not only be strengthened, but will be more ornamental as well, since we shall have produced something more than a mere fleshless skeleton. 7 It also makes an enormous difference, supposing that we allege hatred as the motive for a crime, whether such hatred was due to envy, injury or unlawful influence, whether it was recent or of long standing, whether it was directed against an  p303 inferior, an equal or a superior, against a stranger or a relative. There are special methods for the treatment of all these arguments, and the treatment to be selected will depend on the interests of the case which we are defending. 8 On the other hand we must not always burden the judge with all the arguments we have discovered, since by so doing we shall at once bore him and render him less inclined to believe us. For he will hardly suppose those proofs to be valid which we ourselves who produce them regard as insufficient. On the other hand, where the facts are fairly obvious, it would be as foolish to argue about them as to bring some artificial light into broad sunlight.

9 To these proofs some authorities would add those which they call pathetic or emotional. Aristotle​133 indeed holds that the strongest argument in support of a speaker is that he is a good man. This no doubt is the best support, but to seem good is also of value, though the semblance is but a bad second to the reality. 10 Of this nature is the noble defence of Scaurus. "Quintus Varius of Sucro asserts that Aemilius Scaurus has betrayed the interests of the Roman people: Aemilius Scaurus denies it." A similar defence is said to have been employed by Iphicrates:​134 he asked Aristophon who was accusing him on a similar charge of treason whether he would consent to betray his country for a bribe: when Aristophon replied in the negative, he continued, "Have I then done what you would have refused to do?" 11 We must however take the character of the judge into consideration and seek out such arguments as will appeal to him. I have already spoken of this in the rules which I laid  p305 down for the exordium and for deliberative oratory.​135 12 Another form of proof is provided by asseveration as in "I did this," "You told me this," or "O outrageous crime!" and the like. Every pleading should contain some such asseverations; if it does not, the loss will be considerable. Still asseverations must not be regarded as supports of the first importance, since they can be produced by either party in the same case with the same emphasis. 13 A most forcible kind of proof is that drawn from character and supported by some plausible reason, as for instance, "It is not likely that a wounded man or one who has lost his son would accuse anyone who is not guilty, since if he accused an innocent man, he would free the real offender from all risk of punishment." It is from such arguments that fathers seek support when pleading against their sons or one relative against another.

14 The further question has been raised as to whether the strongest arguments should be placed first, to take possession of the judge's mind, or last, to leave an impression upon it; or whether they should be divided between the commencement and close of the proof, adopting the Homeric disposition of placing the weakest in the centre of the column,​136 so that they may derive strength from their neighbours. But in the disposition of our arguments we must be guided by the interests of the individual case: there is only one exception to this general rule in my opinion, namely, that we should avoid descending from the strongest proofs to the weakest.

15 I have been content to give a brief outline of my views concerning these points, and have put them forward in such a way as to show as clearly as was in  p307 my power the various topics and kinds of arguments. Others have dealt with the subject at greater length, preferring to deal with the whole subject of commonplaces and to show how each topic may be treated. 16 This seems to me unnecessary, since it is as a rule obvious what should be said against the injurious conduct or avarice of our opponents, or against a hostile witness or powerful friends; to say everything on all these subjects is an endless task, as endless in fact as if I were to attempt la down rules for dealing with every dispute that can ever occur and all the questions, arguments and opinions thereby involved. 17 I do not venture to suppose that I have pointed out all the circumstances that may give rise to arguments, but I think that I have done so in the majority of cases.

This was a task which required all the more careful handling because the declamations, which we used to employ as foils wherewith to practise for the duels of the forum, have long since departed from the true form of pleading and, owing to the fact that they are composed solely with the design of giving pleasure, have become flaccid and nerveless: indeed, declaimers are guilty of exactly the same offence as slave-dealers who castrate boys in order to increase the attractions of their beauty. 18 For just as the slave-dealer regards strength and muscle, and above all, the beard and other natural characteristics of manhood as blemishes, and softens down all that would be sturdy if allowed to grow, on the ground that it is harsh and hard, even so we conceal the manly form of eloquence and power of speaking closely and forcibly by giving it a delicate complexion of style and, so long as what we say is smooth and  p309 polished, are absolutely indifferent as to whether our words have any power or no. 19 But I take Nature for my guide and regard any man whatsoever as fairer to view than a eunuch, nor can I believe that Providence is ever so indifferent to what itself has created as to allow weakness to be an excellence, nor again can I think that the knife can render beautiful that which, if produced in the natural course of birth, would be regarded as a monster. A false resemblance to the female sex may in itself delight lust, if it will, but depravity of morals will never acquire such ascendancy as to succeed in giving real value to that to which it has succeeded in giving a high price. 20 Consequently, although this debauched eloquence (for I intend to speak with the utmost frankness) may please modern audiences by its effeminate and voluptuous charms, I absolutely refuse to regard it as eloquence at all: for it retains not the slightest trace of purity and virility in itself, not to say of these qualities in the speaker. 21 When the masters of sculpture and hand desired to carve or paint forms of ideal beauty, they never fell into the error of taking some Bagoas or Megabyzus​137 as models, but rightly selected the well-known Doryphorus,​138 equally adapted either for the fields of war or for the wrestling school, and other warlike and athletic youths as types of physical beauty. Shall we then, who are endeavouring to mould the ideal orator, equip eloquence not with weapons but with timbrels? 22 Consequently, let the youth whom we are training devote himself, as far as in him lies, to the imitation of truth and, in view of the fact that the battles of the forum that await him are not few, let him strive for victory in the schools and learn  p311 how to strike the vitals of his foe and protect his own; and let his instructor insist on his doing this above all else and reserve his special approval for the master of this art. For though young men may be lured to evil practices by praise, they still prefer to be praised for what is right. 23 At the present time the misfortune is that teachers more often than not pass over what is necessary in silence, and utility is not accounted one of the good qualities of eloquence. But I have dealt with these points in another work,​139 and shall often have to recur to them in this. I will now return to my prescribed course.

The Translator's Notes:

96 de Inv. I.XXX.49.

97 cp. Ar. Rh. I.II.18.

98 VIII.III.72 sqq.

99 Manlius had forbidden all encounters with the enemy. His son engaged in single combat and slew his man. See Liv. VIII.VII.1.

100 cp. Verr. IV.LV.123.

101 cp. Liv. IX.30. The flute-players employed in public worship migrated to Tibur because deprived of an old-established privilege, but were brought back by stratagem, after their hosts had made them drunk.

102 viii.17. Sulpicius, one of Murena's accusers and an unsuccessful candidate for the consul­ship, had sought to deprecateº Murena's birth. Cicero urges that even if Sulpicius' statements were true they would be irrelevant and cites his own case to support his argument.

103 iii.7.

104 pro Mil. xxvii.72.

105 pro Cluent. xxxii sqq.

106 ib. xlviii.134. The accused was a knight; the retention of his horse implied that he retained his status.

107 Aen. II.540.

108 pro Mil. iv.9.

109 ib. iii.8.

110 ib. iii.8. The allusion is to Orestes, acquitted when tried before the Areopagus at Athens by the casting vote of Pallas Athene.

111 See Liv. II.32.

112 Epist. I.I.73.

113 In the preceding section. cp. Arist. Rhet. II.XX.3 for "Libyan stories."

114 pro Cluent. xxvii.75.

115 de Inv. i.30.

116 ii.4.

117 Probably the epigrammatist Cassius of Parma. lanipedis = bandaged for the gout. Regius emended to planipedis, a dancer who performed barefoot.

118 pro Cluent. liii.146.

119 See IV.IV.8.

120 pro Arch. viii.19.

121 § 3.

122 de Inv. I.XXXI.51.

123 Verg. Ecl. I.23.

124 iii.15.

125 xii.34.

126 cp. Cic. Top. iii.13 and 16.

127 Il. II.558. "Twelve ships great Ajax brought from Salamis, And ranged them where the Athenian army stood."

128 Cato maj. iii.7.

Thayer's Note: Don't expect feathers from Cicero; his version of the "old proverb" is not our picturesque English statement of it, but merely that "like easily congregate with like."

129 de har. resp. passim. The soothsayers consulted as to the significance of certain prodigies had replied that they were due to the profanation of sacred rites. Clodius interpreted this as referring to the rebuilding of Cicero's house. Cicero argued against this in a speech to the senate (56 B.C.).

130 in Cat. III.IX.21.

131 vi.19.

132 cp. V.XI.39.

133 Rhet. I.II.4.

134 Ar. Rhet. II.XXIII.7.

135 IV.I.17 sq., III.VIII.36 sq.

136 Il. IV.299.

137 Eunuchs.

138 The famous statue of Polycletus, regarded as the standard of manly beauty and proportion. Many copies have survived. Doryphorus = the Spearbearer.

139 Perhaps the lost de causis corruptae eloquentiae.

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